arm-trusted-firmware/bl1/bl1_fwu.c

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2015-10-10 19:06:53 +01:00
/*
* Copyright (c) 2015-2019, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
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*
* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
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*/
#include <assert.h>
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#include <errno.h>
#include <string.h>
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#include <platform_def.h>
#include <arch_helpers.h>
#include <bl1/bl1.h>
#include <common/bl_common.h>
#include <common/debug.h>
#include <context.h>
#include <drivers/auth/auth_mod.h>
#include <lib/el3_runtime/context_mgmt.h>
#include <lib/utils.h>
#include <plat/common/platform.h>
#include <smccc_helpers.h>
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#include "bl1_private.h"
/*
* Function declarations.
*/
static int bl1_fwu_image_copy(unsigned int image_id,
uintptr_t image_src,
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unsigned int block_size,
unsigned int image_size,
unsigned int flags);
static int bl1_fwu_image_auth(unsigned int image_id,
uintptr_t image_src,
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unsigned int image_size,
unsigned int flags);
static int bl1_fwu_image_execute(unsigned int image_id,
void **handle,
unsigned int flags);
static register_t bl1_fwu_image_resume(register_t image_param,
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void **handle,
unsigned int flags);
static int bl1_fwu_sec_image_done(void **handle,
unsigned int flags);
static int bl1_fwu_image_reset(unsigned int image_id,
unsigned int flags);
__dead2 static void bl1_fwu_done(void *client_cookie, void *reserved);
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/*
* This keeps track of last executed secure image id.
*/
static unsigned int sec_exec_image_id = INVALID_IMAGE_ID;
/*******************************************************************************
* Top level handler for servicing FWU SMCs.
******************************************************************************/
register_t bl1_fwu_smc_handler(unsigned int smc_fid,
register_t x1,
register_t x2,
register_t x3,
register_t x4,
void *cookie,
void *handle,
unsigned int flags)
{
switch (smc_fid) {
case FWU_SMC_IMAGE_COPY:
SMC_RET1(handle, bl1_fwu_image_copy(x1, x2, x3, x4, flags));
case FWU_SMC_IMAGE_AUTH:
SMC_RET1(handle, bl1_fwu_image_auth(x1, x2, x3, flags));
case FWU_SMC_IMAGE_EXECUTE:
SMC_RET1(handle, bl1_fwu_image_execute(x1, &handle, flags));
case FWU_SMC_IMAGE_RESUME:
SMC_RET1(handle, bl1_fwu_image_resume(x1, &handle, flags));
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case FWU_SMC_SEC_IMAGE_DONE:
SMC_RET1(handle, bl1_fwu_sec_image_done(&handle, flags));
case FWU_SMC_IMAGE_RESET:
SMC_RET1(handle, bl1_fwu_image_reset(x1, flags));
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case FWU_SMC_UPDATE_DONE:
bl1_fwu_done((void *)x1, NULL);
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default:
assert(0); /* Unreachable */
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break;
}
SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK);
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}
/*******************************************************************************
* Utility functions to keep track of the images that are loaded at any time.
******************************************************************************/
#ifdef PLAT_FWU_MAX_SIMULTANEOUS_IMAGES
#define FWU_MAX_SIMULTANEOUS_IMAGES PLAT_FWU_MAX_SIMULTANEOUS_IMAGES
#else
#define FWU_MAX_SIMULTANEOUS_IMAGES 10
#endif
static unsigned int bl1_fwu_loaded_ids[FWU_MAX_SIMULTANEOUS_IMAGES] = {
[0 ... FWU_MAX_SIMULTANEOUS_IMAGES-1] = INVALID_IMAGE_ID
};
/*
* Adds an image_id to the bl1_fwu_loaded_ids array.
* Returns 0 on success, 1 on error.
*/
static int bl1_fwu_add_loaded_id(unsigned int image_id)
{
int i;
/* Check if the ID is already in the list */
for (i = 0; i < FWU_MAX_SIMULTANEOUS_IMAGES; i++) {
if (bl1_fwu_loaded_ids[i] == image_id)
return 0;
}
/* Find an empty slot */
for (i = 0; i < FWU_MAX_SIMULTANEOUS_IMAGES; i++) {
if (bl1_fwu_loaded_ids[i] == INVALID_IMAGE_ID) {
bl1_fwu_loaded_ids[i] = image_id;
return 0;
}
}
return 1;
}
/*
* Removes an image_id from the bl1_fwu_loaded_ids array.
* Returns 0 on success, 1 on error.
*/
static int bl1_fwu_remove_loaded_id(unsigned int image_id)
{
int i;
/* Find the ID */
for (i = 0; i < FWU_MAX_SIMULTANEOUS_IMAGES; i++) {
if (bl1_fwu_loaded_ids[i] == image_id) {
bl1_fwu_loaded_ids[i] = INVALID_IMAGE_ID;
return 0;
}
}
return 1;
}
/*******************************************************************************
* This function checks if the specified image overlaps another image already
* loaded. It returns 0 if there is no overlap, a negative error code otherwise.
******************************************************************************/
static int bl1_fwu_image_check_overlaps(unsigned int image_id)
{
const image_desc_t *image_desc, *checked_image_desc;
const image_info_t *info, *checked_info;
uintptr_t image_base, image_end;
uintptr_t checked_image_base, checked_image_end;
checked_image_desc = bl1_plat_get_image_desc(image_id);
checked_info = &checked_image_desc->image_info;
/* Image being checked mustn't be empty. */
assert(checked_info->image_size != 0);
checked_image_base = checked_info->image_base;
checked_image_end = checked_image_base + checked_info->image_size - 1;
/* No need to check for overflows, it's done in bl1_fwu_image_copy(). */
for (int i = 0; i < FWU_MAX_SIMULTANEOUS_IMAGES; i++) {
/* Skip INVALID_IMAGE_IDs and don't check image against itself */
if ((bl1_fwu_loaded_ids[i] == INVALID_IMAGE_ID) ||
(bl1_fwu_loaded_ids[i] == image_id))
continue;
image_desc = bl1_plat_get_image_desc(bl1_fwu_loaded_ids[i]);
/* Only check images that are loaded or being loaded. */
assert (image_desc && image_desc->state != IMAGE_STATE_RESET);
info = &image_desc->image_info;
/* There cannot be overlaps with an empty image. */
if (info->image_size == 0)
continue;
image_base = info->image_base;
image_end = image_base + info->image_size - 1;
/*
* Overflows cannot happen. It is checked in
* bl1_fwu_image_copy() when the image goes from RESET to
* COPYING or COPIED.
*/
assert (image_end > image_base);
/* Check if there are overlaps. */
if (!(image_end < checked_image_base ||
checked_image_end < image_base)) {
VERBOSE("Image with ID %d overlaps existing image with ID %d",
checked_image_desc->image_id, image_desc->image_id);
return -EPERM;
}
}
return 0;
}
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/*******************************************************************************
* This function is responsible for copying secure images in AP Secure RAM.
******************************************************************************/
static int bl1_fwu_image_copy(unsigned int image_id,
uintptr_t image_src,
unsigned int block_size,
unsigned int image_size,
unsigned int flags)
{
uintptr_t dest_addr;
unsigned int remaining;
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/* Get the image descriptor. */
image_desc_t *image_desc = bl1_plat_get_image_desc(image_id);
if (!image_desc) {
WARN("BL1-FWU: Invalid image ID %u\n", image_id);
return -EPERM;
}
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/*
* The request must originate from a non-secure caller and target a
* secure image. Any other scenario is invalid.
*/
if (GET_SECURITY_STATE(flags) == SECURE) {
WARN("BL1-FWU: Copy not allowed from secure world.\n");
return -EPERM;
}
if (GET_SECURITY_STATE(image_desc->ep_info.h.attr) == NON_SECURE) {
WARN("BL1-FWU: Copy not allowed for non-secure images.\n");
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return -EPERM;
}
/* Check whether the FWU state machine is in the correct state. */
if ((image_desc->state != IMAGE_STATE_RESET) &&
(image_desc->state != IMAGE_STATE_COPYING)) {
WARN("BL1-FWU: Copy not allowed at this point of the FWU"
" process.\n");
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return -EPERM;
}
if ((!image_src) || (!block_size) ||
check_uptr_overflow(image_src, block_size - 1)) {
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WARN("BL1-FWU: Copy not allowed due to invalid image source"
" or block size\n");
return -ENOMEM;
}
if (image_desc->state == IMAGE_STATE_COPYING) {
/*
* There must have been at least 1 copy operation for this image
* previously.
*/
assert(image_desc->copied_size != 0);
/*
* The image size must have been recorded in the 1st copy
* operation.
*/
image_size = image_desc->image_info.image_size;
assert(image_size != 0);
assert(image_desc->copied_size < image_size);
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INFO("BL1-FWU: Continuing image copy in blocks\n");
} else { /* image_desc->state == IMAGE_STATE_RESET */
INFO("BL1-FWU: Initial call to copy an image\n");
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/*
* image_size is relevant only for the 1st copy request, it is
* then ignored for subsequent calls for this image.
*/
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if (!image_size) {
WARN("BL1-FWU: Copy not allowed due to invalid image"
" size\n");
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return -ENOMEM;
}
/* Check that the image size to load is within limit */
if (image_size > image_desc->image_info.image_max_size) {
WARN("BL1-FWU: Image size out of bounds\n");
return -ENOMEM;
}
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/* Save the given image size. */
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image_desc->image_info.image_size = image_size;
/* Make sure the image doesn't overlap other images. */
if (bl1_fwu_image_check_overlaps(image_id)) {
image_desc->image_info.image_size = 0;
WARN("BL1-FWU: This image overlaps another one\n");
return -EPERM;
}
/*
* copied_size must be explicitly initialized here because the
* FWU code doesn't necessarily do it when it resets the state
* machine.
*/
image_desc->copied_size = 0;
}
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/*
* If the given block size is more than the total image size
* then clip the former to the latter.
*/
remaining = image_size - image_desc->copied_size;
if (block_size > remaining) {
WARN("BL1-FWU: Block size is too big, clipping it.\n");
block_size = remaining;
}
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/* Make sure the source image is mapped in memory. */
if (bl1_plat_mem_check(image_src, block_size, flags)) {
WARN("BL1-FWU: Source image is not mapped.\n");
return -ENOMEM;
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}
if (bl1_fwu_add_loaded_id(image_id)) {
WARN("BL1-FWU: Too many images loaded at the same time.\n");
return -ENOMEM;
}
/* Allow the platform to handle pre-image load before copying */
if (image_desc->state == IMAGE_STATE_RESET) {
if (bl1_plat_handle_pre_image_load(image_id) != 0) {
ERROR("BL1-FWU: Failure in pre-image load of image id %d\n",
image_id);
return -EPERM;
}
}
/* Everything looks sane. Go ahead and copy the block of data. */
dest_addr = image_desc->image_info.image_base + image_desc->copied_size;
memcpy((void *) dest_addr, (const void *) image_src, block_size);
flush_dcache_range(dest_addr, block_size);
image_desc->copied_size += block_size;
image_desc->state = (block_size == remaining) ?
IMAGE_STATE_COPIED : IMAGE_STATE_COPYING;
INFO("BL1-FWU: Copy operation successful.\n");
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return 0;
}
/*******************************************************************************
* This function is responsible for authenticating Normal/Secure images.
******************************************************************************/
static int bl1_fwu_image_auth(unsigned int image_id,
uintptr_t image_src,
unsigned int image_size,
unsigned int flags)
{
int result;
uintptr_t base_addr;
unsigned int total_size;
/* Get the image descriptor. */
image_desc_t *image_desc = bl1_plat_get_image_desc(image_id);
if (!image_desc)
return -EPERM;
Fix the inconsistencies in bl1_tbbr_image_descs[] This patch fixes inconsistencies in bl1_tbbr_image_descs[] and miscellaneous fixes in Firmware Update code. Following are the changes: * As part of the original FWU changes, a `copied_size` field was added to `image_info_t`. This was a subtle binary compatibility break because it changed the size of the `bl31_params_t` struct, which could cause problems if somebody used different versions of BL2 or BL31, one with the old `image_info_t` and one with the new version. This patch put the `copied_size` within the `image_desc_t`. * EXECUTABLE flag is now stored in `ep_info.h.attr` in place of `image_info.h.attr`, associating it to an entrypoint. * The `image_info.image_base` is only relevant for secure images that are copied from non-secure memory into secure memory. This patch removes initializing `image_base` for non secure images in the bl1_tbbr_image_descs[]. * A new macro `SET_STATIC_PARAM_HEAD` is added for populating bl1_tbbr_image_descs[].ep_info/image_info.h members statically. The version, image_type and image attributes are now populated using this new macro. * Added PLAT_ARM_NVM_BASE and PLAT_ARM_NVM_SIZE to avoid direct usage of V2M_FLASH0_XXX in plat/arm/common/arm_bl1_fwu.c. * Refactoring of code/macros related to SECURE and EXECUTABLE flags. NOTE: PLATFORM PORTS THAT RELY ON THE SIZE OF `image_info_t` OR USE the "EXECUTABLE" BIT WITHIN `image_info_t.h.attr` OR USE THEIR OWN `image_desc_t` ARRAY IN BL1, MAY BE BROKEN BY THIS CHANGE. THIS IS CONSIDERED UNLIKELY. Change-Id: Id4e5989af7bf0ed263d19d3751939da1169b561d
2016-02-01 11:04:46 +00:00
if (GET_SECURITY_STATE(flags) == SECURE) {
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if (image_desc->state != IMAGE_STATE_RESET) {
WARN("BL1-FWU: Authentication from secure world "
"while in invalid state\n");
return -EPERM;
}
} else {
Fix the inconsistencies in bl1_tbbr_image_descs[] This patch fixes inconsistencies in bl1_tbbr_image_descs[] and miscellaneous fixes in Firmware Update code. Following are the changes: * As part of the original FWU changes, a `copied_size` field was added to `image_info_t`. This was a subtle binary compatibility break because it changed the size of the `bl31_params_t` struct, which could cause problems if somebody used different versions of BL2 or BL31, one with the old `image_info_t` and one with the new version. This patch put the `copied_size` within the `image_desc_t`. * EXECUTABLE flag is now stored in `ep_info.h.attr` in place of `image_info.h.attr`, associating it to an entrypoint. * The `image_info.image_base` is only relevant for secure images that are copied from non-secure memory into secure memory. This patch removes initializing `image_base` for non secure images in the bl1_tbbr_image_descs[]. * A new macro `SET_STATIC_PARAM_HEAD` is added for populating bl1_tbbr_image_descs[].ep_info/image_info.h members statically. The version, image_type and image attributes are now populated using this new macro. * Added PLAT_ARM_NVM_BASE and PLAT_ARM_NVM_SIZE to avoid direct usage of V2M_FLASH0_XXX in plat/arm/common/arm_bl1_fwu.c. * Refactoring of code/macros related to SECURE and EXECUTABLE flags. NOTE: PLATFORM PORTS THAT RELY ON THE SIZE OF `image_info_t` OR USE the "EXECUTABLE" BIT WITHIN `image_info_t.h.attr` OR USE THEIR OWN `image_desc_t` ARRAY IN BL1, MAY BE BROKEN BY THIS CHANGE. THIS IS CONSIDERED UNLIKELY. Change-Id: Id4e5989af7bf0ed263d19d3751939da1169b561d
2016-02-01 11:04:46 +00:00
if (GET_SECURITY_STATE(image_desc->ep_info.h.attr) == SECURE) {
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if (image_desc->state != IMAGE_STATE_COPIED) {
WARN("BL1-FWU: Authentication of secure image "
"from non-secure world while not in copied state\n");
return -EPERM;
}
} else {
if (image_desc->state != IMAGE_STATE_RESET) {
WARN("BL1-FWU: Authentication of non-secure image "
"from non-secure world while in invalid state\n");
return -EPERM;
}
}
}
if (image_desc->state == IMAGE_STATE_COPIED) {
/*
* Image is in COPIED state.
* Use the stored address and size.
*/
base_addr = image_desc->image_info.image_base;
total_size = image_desc->image_info.image_size;
} else {
if ((!image_src) || (!image_size) ||
check_uptr_overflow(image_src, image_size - 1)) {
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WARN("BL1-FWU: Auth not allowed due to invalid"
" image source/size\n");
return -ENOMEM;
}
/*
* Image is in RESET state.
* Check the parameters and authenticate the source image in place.
*/
if (bl1_plat_mem_check(image_src, image_size, \
image_desc->ep_info.h.attr)) {
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WARN("BL1-FWU: Authentication arguments source/size not mapped\n");
return -ENOMEM;
}
if (bl1_fwu_add_loaded_id(image_id)) {
WARN("BL1-FWU: Too many images loaded at the same time.\n");
return -ENOMEM;
}
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base_addr = image_src;
total_size = image_size;
/* Update the image size in the descriptor. */
image_desc->image_info.image_size = total_size;
}
/*
* Authenticate the image.
*/
INFO("BL1-FWU: Authenticating image_id:%d\n", image_id);
result = auth_mod_verify_img(image_id, (void *)base_addr, total_size);
if (result != 0) {
WARN("BL1-FWU: Authentication Failed err=%d\n", result);
/*
* Authentication has failed.
* Clear the memory if the image was copied.
* This is to prevent an attack where this contains
* some malicious code that can somehow be executed later.
*/
if (image_desc->state == IMAGE_STATE_COPIED) {
/* Clear the memory.*/
Introduce unified API to zero memory Introduce zeromem_dczva function on AArch64 that can handle unaligned addresses and make use of DC ZVA instruction to zero a whole block at a time. This zeroing takes place directly in the cache to speed it up without doing external memory access. Remove the zeromem16 function on AArch64 and replace it with an alias to zeromem. This zeromem16 function is now deprecated. Remove the 16-bytes alignment constraint on __BSS_START__ in firmware-design.md as it is now not mandatory anymore (it used to comply with zeromem16 requirements). Change the 16-bytes alignment constraints in SP min's linker script to a 8-bytes alignment constraint as the AArch32 zeromem implementation is now more efficient on 8-bytes aligned addresses. Introduce zero_normalmem and zeromem helpers in platform agnostic header that are implemented this way: * AArch32: * zero_normalmem: zero using usual data access * zeromem: alias for zero_normalmem * AArch64: * zero_normalmem: zero normal memory using DC ZVA instruction (needs MMU enabled) * zeromem: zero using usual data access Usage guidelines: in most cases, zero_normalmem should be preferred. There are 2 scenarios where zeromem (or memset) must be used instead: * Code that must run with MMU disabled (which means all memory is considered device memory for data accesses). * Code that fills device memory with null bytes. Optionally, the following rule can be applied if performance is important: * Code zeroing small areas (few bytes) that are not secrets should use memset to take advantage of compiler optimizations. Note: Code zeroing security-related critical information should use zero_normalmem/zeromem instead of memset to avoid removal by compilers' optimizations in some cases or misbehaving versions of GCC. Fixes ARM-software/tf-issues#408 Change-Id: Iafd9663fc1070413c3e1904e54091cf60effaa82 Signed-off-by: Douglas Raillard <douglas.raillard@arm.com>
2016-12-02 13:51:54 +00:00
zero_normalmem((void *)base_addr, total_size);
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flush_dcache_range(base_addr, total_size);
/* Indicate that image can be copied again*/
image_desc->state = IMAGE_STATE_RESET;
}
/*
* Even if this fails it's ok because the ID isn't in the array.
* The image cannot be in RESET state here, it is checked at the
* beginning of the function.
*/
bl1_fwu_remove_loaded_id(image_id);
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return -EAUTH;
}
/* Indicate that image is in authenticated state. */
image_desc->state = IMAGE_STATE_AUTHENTICATED;
/* Allow the platform to handle post-image load */
result = bl1_plat_handle_post_image_load(image_id);
if (result != 0) {
ERROR("BL1-FWU: Failure %d in post-image load of image id %d\n",
result, image_id);
/*
* Panic here as the platform handling of post-image load is
* not correct.
*/
plat_error_handler(result);
}
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/*
* Flush image_info to memory so that other
* secure world images can see changes.
*/
flush_dcache_range((uintptr_t)&image_desc->image_info,
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sizeof(image_info_t));
INFO("BL1-FWU: Authentication was successful\n");
return 0;
}
/*******************************************************************************
* This function is responsible for executing Secure images.
******************************************************************************/
static int bl1_fwu_image_execute(unsigned int image_id,
void **handle,
unsigned int flags)
{
/* Get the image descriptor. */
image_desc_t *image_desc = bl1_plat_get_image_desc(image_id);
/*
* Execution is NOT allowed if:
* image_id is invalid OR
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* Caller is from Secure world OR
* Image is Non-Secure OR
* Image is Non-Executable OR
* Image is NOT in AUTHENTICATED state.
*/
if ((!image_desc) ||
Fix the inconsistencies in bl1_tbbr_image_descs[] This patch fixes inconsistencies in bl1_tbbr_image_descs[] and miscellaneous fixes in Firmware Update code. Following are the changes: * As part of the original FWU changes, a `copied_size` field was added to `image_info_t`. This was a subtle binary compatibility break because it changed the size of the `bl31_params_t` struct, which could cause problems if somebody used different versions of BL2 or BL31, one with the old `image_info_t` and one with the new version. This patch put the `copied_size` within the `image_desc_t`. * EXECUTABLE flag is now stored in `ep_info.h.attr` in place of `image_info.h.attr`, associating it to an entrypoint. * The `image_info.image_base` is only relevant for secure images that are copied from non-secure memory into secure memory. This patch removes initializing `image_base` for non secure images in the bl1_tbbr_image_descs[]. * A new macro `SET_STATIC_PARAM_HEAD` is added for populating bl1_tbbr_image_descs[].ep_info/image_info.h members statically. The version, image_type and image attributes are now populated using this new macro. * Added PLAT_ARM_NVM_BASE and PLAT_ARM_NVM_SIZE to avoid direct usage of V2M_FLASH0_XXX in plat/arm/common/arm_bl1_fwu.c. * Refactoring of code/macros related to SECURE and EXECUTABLE flags. NOTE: PLATFORM PORTS THAT RELY ON THE SIZE OF `image_info_t` OR USE the "EXECUTABLE" BIT WITHIN `image_info_t.h.attr` OR USE THEIR OWN `image_desc_t` ARRAY IN BL1, MAY BE BROKEN BY THIS CHANGE. THIS IS CONSIDERED UNLIKELY. Change-Id: Id4e5989af7bf0ed263d19d3751939da1169b561d
2016-02-01 11:04:46 +00:00
(GET_SECURITY_STATE(flags) == SECURE) ||
(GET_SECURITY_STATE(image_desc->ep_info.h.attr) == NON_SECURE) ||
(EP_GET_EXE(image_desc->ep_info.h.attr) == NON_EXECUTABLE) ||
(image_desc->state != IMAGE_STATE_AUTHENTICATED)) {
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WARN("BL1-FWU: Execution not allowed due to invalid state/args\n");
return -EPERM;
}
INFO("BL1-FWU: Executing Secure image\n");
#ifdef __aarch64__
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/* Save NS-EL1 system registers. */
cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(NON_SECURE);
#endif
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/* Prepare the image for execution. */
bl1_prepare_next_image(image_id);
/* Update the secure image id. */
sec_exec_image_id = image_id;
#ifdef __aarch64__
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*handle = cm_get_context(SECURE);
#else
*handle = smc_get_ctx(SECURE);
#endif
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return 0;
}
/*******************************************************************************
* This function is responsible for resuming execution in the other security
* world
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******************************************************************************/
static register_t bl1_fwu_image_resume(register_t image_param,
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void **handle,
unsigned int flags)
{
image_desc_t *image_desc;
unsigned int resume_sec_state;
Fix the inconsistencies in bl1_tbbr_image_descs[] This patch fixes inconsistencies in bl1_tbbr_image_descs[] and miscellaneous fixes in Firmware Update code. Following are the changes: * As part of the original FWU changes, a `copied_size` field was added to `image_info_t`. This was a subtle binary compatibility break because it changed the size of the `bl31_params_t` struct, which could cause problems if somebody used different versions of BL2 or BL31, one with the old `image_info_t` and one with the new version. This patch put the `copied_size` within the `image_desc_t`. * EXECUTABLE flag is now stored in `ep_info.h.attr` in place of `image_info.h.attr`, associating it to an entrypoint. * The `image_info.image_base` is only relevant for secure images that are copied from non-secure memory into secure memory. This patch removes initializing `image_base` for non secure images in the bl1_tbbr_image_descs[]. * A new macro `SET_STATIC_PARAM_HEAD` is added for populating bl1_tbbr_image_descs[].ep_info/image_info.h members statically. The version, image_type and image attributes are now populated using this new macro. * Added PLAT_ARM_NVM_BASE and PLAT_ARM_NVM_SIZE to avoid direct usage of V2M_FLASH0_XXX in plat/arm/common/arm_bl1_fwu.c. * Refactoring of code/macros related to SECURE and EXECUTABLE flags. NOTE: PLATFORM PORTS THAT RELY ON THE SIZE OF `image_info_t` OR USE the "EXECUTABLE" BIT WITHIN `image_info_t.h.attr` OR USE THEIR OWN `image_desc_t` ARRAY IN BL1, MAY BE BROKEN BY THIS CHANGE. THIS IS CONSIDERED UNLIKELY. Change-Id: Id4e5989af7bf0ed263d19d3751939da1169b561d
2016-02-01 11:04:46 +00:00
unsigned int caller_sec_state = GET_SECURITY_STATE(flags);
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/* Get the image descriptor for last executed secure image id. */
image_desc = bl1_plat_get_image_desc(sec_exec_image_id);
if (caller_sec_state == NON_SECURE) {
if (!image_desc) {
WARN("BL1-FWU: Resume not allowed due to no available"
"secure image\n");
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return -EPERM;
}
} else {
/* image_desc must be valid for secure world callers */
assert(image_desc);
}
Fix the inconsistencies in bl1_tbbr_image_descs[] This patch fixes inconsistencies in bl1_tbbr_image_descs[] and miscellaneous fixes in Firmware Update code. Following are the changes: * As part of the original FWU changes, a `copied_size` field was added to `image_info_t`. This was a subtle binary compatibility break because it changed the size of the `bl31_params_t` struct, which could cause problems if somebody used different versions of BL2 or BL31, one with the old `image_info_t` and one with the new version. This patch put the `copied_size` within the `image_desc_t`. * EXECUTABLE flag is now stored in `ep_info.h.attr` in place of `image_info.h.attr`, associating it to an entrypoint. * The `image_info.image_base` is only relevant for secure images that are copied from non-secure memory into secure memory. This patch removes initializing `image_base` for non secure images in the bl1_tbbr_image_descs[]. * A new macro `SET_STATIC_PARAM_HEAD` is added for populating bl1_tbbr_image_descs[].ep_info/image_info.h members statically. The version, image_type and image attributes are now populated using this new macro. * Added PLAT_ARM_NVM_BASE and PLAT_ARM_NVM_SIZE to avoid direct usage of V2M_FLASH0_XXX in plat/arm/common/arm_bl1_fwu.c. * Refactoring of code/macros related to SECURE and EXECUTABLE flags. NOTE: PLATFORM PORTS THAT RELY ON THE SIZE OF `image_info_t` OR USE the "EXECUTABLE" BIT WITHIN `image_info_t.h.attr` OR USE THEIR OWN `image_desc_t` ARRAY IN BL1, MAY BE BROKEN BY THIS CHANGE. THIS IS CONSIDERED UNLIKELY. Change-Id: Id4e5989af7bf0ed263d19d3751939da1169b561d
2016-02-01 11:04:46 +00:00
assert(GET_SECURITY_STATE(image_desc->ep_info.h.attr) == SECURE);
assert(EP_GET_EXE(image_desc->ep_info.h.attr) == EXECUTABLE);
if (caller_sec_state == SECURE) {
assert(image_desc->state == IMAGE_STATE_EXECUTED);
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/* Update the flags. */
image_desc->state = IMAGE_STATE_INTERRUPTED;
resume_sec_state = NON_SECURE;
} else {
assert(image_desc->state == IMAGE_STATE_INTERRUPTED);
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/* Update the flags. */
image_desc->state = IMAGE_STATE_EXECUTED;
resume_sec_state = SECURE;
}
INFO("BL1-FWU: Resuming %s world context\n",
(resume_sec_state == SECURE) ? "secure" : "normal");
#ifdef __aarch64__
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/* Save the EL1 system registers of calling world. */
cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(caller_sec_state);
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/* Restore the EL1 system registers of resuming world. */
cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(resume_sec_state);
/* Update the next context. */
cm_set_next_eret_context(resume_sec_state);
*handle = cm_get_context(resume_sec_state);
#else
/* Update the next context. */
cm_set_next_context(cm_get_context(resume_sec_state));
/* Prepare the smc context for the next BL image. */
smc_set_next_ctx(resume_sec_state);
*handle = smc_get_ctx(resume_sec_state);
#endif
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return image_param;
}
/*******************************************************************************
* This function is responsible for resuming normal world context.
******************************************************************************/
static int bl1_fwu_sec_image_done(void **handle, unsigned int flags)
{
image_desc_t *image_desc;
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/* Make sure caller is from the secure world */
Fix the inconsistencies in bl1_tbbr_image_descs[] This patch fixes inconsistencies in bl1_tbbr_image_descs[] and miscellaneous fixes in Firmware Update code. Following are the changes: * As part of the original FWU changes, a `copied_size` field was added to `image_info_t`. This was a subtle binary compatibility break because it changed the size of the `bl31_params_t` struct, which could cause problems if somebody used different versions of BL2 or BL31, one with the old `image_info_t` and one with the new version. This patch put the `copied_size` within the `image_desc_t`. * EXECUTABLE flag is now stored in `ep_info.h.attr` in place of `image_info.h.attr`, associating it to an entrypoint. * The `image_info.image_base` is only relevant for secure images that are copied from non-secure memory into secure memory. This patch removes initializing `image_base` for non secure images in the bl1_tbbr_image_descs[]. * A new macro `SET_STATIC_PARAM_HEAD` is added for populating bl1_tbbr_image_descs[].ep_info/image_info.h members statically. The version, image_type and image attributes are now populated using this new macro. * Added PLAT_ARM_NVM_BASE and PLAT_ARM_NVM_SIZE to avoid direct usage of V2M_FLASH0_XXX in plat/arm/common/arm_bl1_fwu.c. * Refactoring of code/macros related to SECURE and EXECUTABLE flags. NOTE: PLATFORM PORTS THAT RELY ON THE SIZE OF `image_info_t` OR USE the "EXECUTABLE" BIT WITHIN `image_info_t.h.attr` OR USE THEIR OWN `image_desc_t` ARRAY IN BL1, MAY BE BROKEN BY THIS CHANGE. THIS IS CONSIDERED UNLIKELY. Change-Id: Id4e5989af7bf0ed263d19d3751939da1169b561d
2016-02-01 11:04:46 +00:00
if (GET_SECURITY_STATE(flags) == NON_SECURE) {
WARN("BL1-FWU: Image done not allowed from normal world\n");
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return -EPERM;
}
/* Get the image descriptor for last executed secure image id */
image_desc = bl1_plat_get_image_desc(sec_exec_image_id);
/* image_desc must correspond to a valid secure executing image */
assert(image_desc);
Fix the inconsistencies in bl1_tbbr_image_descs[] This patch fixes inconsistencies in bl1_tbbr_image_descs[] and miscellaneous fixes in Firmware Update code. Following are the changes: * As part of the original FWU changes, a `copied_size` field was added to `image_info_t`. This was a subtle binary compatibility break because it changed the size of the `bl31_params_t` struct, which could cause problems if somebody used different versions of BL2 or BL31, one with the old `image_info_t` and one with the new version. This patch put the `copied_size` within the `image_desc_t`. * EXECUTABLE flag is now stored in `ep_info.h.attr` in place of `image_info.h.attr`, associating it to an entrypoint. * The `image_info.image_base` is only relevant for secure images that are copied from non-secure memory into secure memory. This patch removes initializing `image_base` for non secure images in the bl1_tbbr_image_descs[]. * A new macro `SET_STATIC_PARAM_HEAD` is added for populating bl1_tbbr_image_descs[].ep_info/image_info.h members statically. The version, image_type and image attributes are now populated using this new macro. * Added PLAT_ARM_NVM_BASE and PLAT_ARM_NVM_SIZE to avoid direct usage of V2M_FLASH0_XXX in plat/arm/common/arm_bl1_fwu.c. * Refactoring of code/macros related to SECURE and EXECUTABLE flags. NOTE: PLATFORM PORTS THAT RELY ON THE SIZE OF `image_info_t` OR USE the "EXECUTABLE" BIT WITHIN `image_info_t.h.attr` OR USE THEIR OWN `image_desc_t` ARRAY IN BL1, MAY BE BROKEN BY THIS CHANGE. THIS IS CONSIDERED UNLIKELY. Change-Id: Id4e5989af7bf0ed263d19d3751939da1169b561d
2016-02-01 11:04:46 +00:00
assert(GET_SECURITY_STATE(image_desc->ep_info.h.attr) == SECURE);
assert(EP_GET_EXE(image_desc->ep_info.h.attr) == EXECUTABLE);
assert(image_desc->state == IMAGE_STATE_EXECUTED);
#if ENABLE_ASSERTIONS
int rc = bl1_fwu_remove_loaded_id(sec_exec_image_id);
assert(rc == 0);
#else
bl1_fwu_remove_loaded_id(sec_exec_image_id);
#endif
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/* Update the flags. */
image_desc->state = IMAGE_STATE_RESET;
sec_exec_image_id = INVALID_IMAGE_ID;
INFO("BL1-FWU: Resuming Normal world context\n");
#ifdef __aarch64__
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/*
* Secure world is done so no need to save the context.
* Just restore the Non-Secure context.
*/
cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(NON_SECURE);
/* Update the next context. */
cm_set_next_eret_context(NON_SECURE);
*handle = cm_get_context(NON_SECURE);
#else
/* Update the next context. */
cm_set_next_context(cm_get_context(NON_SECURE));
/* Prepare the smc context for the next BL image. */
smc_set_next_ctx(NON_SECURE);
*handle = smc_get_ctx(NON_SECURE);
#endif
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return 0;
}
/*******************************************************************************
* This function provides the opportunity for users to perform any
* platform specific handling after the Firmware update is done.
******************************************************************************/
__dead2 static void bl1_fwu_done(void *client_cookie, void *reserved)
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{
NOTICE("BL1-FWU: *******FWU Process Completed*******\n");
/*
* Call platform done function.
*/
bl1_plat_fwu_done(client_cookie, reserved);
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assert(0);
}
/*******************************************************************************
* This function resets an image to IMAGE_STATE_RESET. It fails if the image is
* being executed.
******************************************************************************/
static int bl1_fwu_image_reset(unsigned int image_id, unsigned int flags)
{
image_desc_t *image_desc = bl1_plat_get_image_desc(image_id);
if ((!image_desc) || (GET_SECURITY_STATE(flags) == SECURE)) {
WARN("BL1-FWU: Reset not allowed due to invalid args\n");
return -EPERM;
}
switch (image_desc->state) {
case IMAGE_STATE_RESET:
/* Nothing to do. */
break;
case IMAGE_STATE_INTERRUPTED:
case IMAGE_STATE_AUTHENTICATED:
case IMAGE_STATE_COPIED:
case IMAGE_STATE_COPYING:
if (bl1_fwu_remove_loaded_id(image_id)) {
WARN("BL1-FWU: Image reset couldn't find the image ID\n");
return -EPERM;
}
if (image_desc->copied_size) {
/* Clear the memory if the image is copied */
assert(GET_SECURITY_STATE(image_desc->ep_info.h.attr) == SECURE);
zero_normalmem((void *)image_desc->image_info.image_base,
image_desc->copied_size);
flush_dcache_range(image_desc->image_info.image_base,
image_desc->copied_size);
}
/* Reset status variables */
image_desc->copied_size = 0;
image_desc->image_info.image_size = 0;
image_desc->state = IMAGE_STATE_RESET;
/* Clear authentication state */
auth_img_flags[image_id] = 0;
break;
case IMAGE_STATE_EXECUTED:
default:
assert(0); /* Unreachable */
break;
}
return 0;
}