aarch32: stop speculative execution past exception returns

aarch32 CPUs speculatively execute instructions following a
ERET as if it was not a jump instruction. This could lead to
cache-based side channel vulnerabilities. The software fix is
to place barrier instructions following ERET.

The counterpart patch for aarch64 is merged:
https://git.trustedfirmware.org/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a.git/commit/?id=f461fe346b728d0e88142fd7b8f2816415af18bc

Change-Id: I2aa3105bee0b92238f389830b3a3b8650f33af3d
Signed-off-by: Madhukar Pappireddy <madhukar.pappireddy@arm.com>
This commit is contained in:
Madhukar Pappireddy 2020-02-26 12:37:05 -06:00
parent 2403813779
commit 6bc243825f
4 changed files with 17 additions and 4 deletions

View File

@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ debug_loop:
add r8, r8, #ENTRY_POINT_INFO_ARGS_OFFSET
ldm r8, {r0, r1, r2, r3}
eret
exception_return
endfunc bl1_aarch32_smc_handler
/* -----------------------------------------------------

View File

@ -87,5 +87,5 @@ func bl2_run_next_image
add r8, r8, #ENTRY_POINT_INFO_ARGS_OFFSET
ldm r8, {r0, r1, r2, r3}
eret
exception_return
endfunc bl2_run_next_image

View File

@ -95,11 +95,24 @@
#if ARM_ARCH_MAJOR == 7 && !defined(ARMV7_SUPPORTS_VIRTUALIZATION)
/*
* Macro for mitigating against speculative execution.
* ARMv7 cores without Virtualization extension do not support the
* eret instruction.
*/
.macro eret
.macro exception_return
movs pc, lr
dsb nsh
isb
.endm
#else
/*
* Macro for mitigating against speculative execution beyond ERET.
*/
.macro exception_return
eret
dsb nsh
isb
.endm
#endif

View File

@ -235,7 +235,7 @@
/* Restore the rest of the general purpose registers */
ldm r0, {r0-r12}
eret
exception_return
.endm
#endif /* SMCCC_MACROS_S */