refactor(el3-runtime): change Cortex-A76 implementation of CVE-2018-3639

Re-factored the prior implementation of workaround for CVE-2018-3639
using branch and link instruction to save vector space to include the
workaround for CVE-2022-23960.

Signed-off-by: Bipin Ravi <bipin.ravi@arm.com>
Change-Id: Ib3fe949583160429b5de8f0a4a8e623eb91d87d4
This commit is contained in:
Bipin Ravi 2022-02-02 23:03:28 -06:00
parent 1fe4a9d181
commit 921081049e
1 changed files with 78 additions and 48 deletions

View File

@ -35,59 +35,17 @@
*
* The macro saves x2-x3 to the context. In the fast path
* x0-x3 registers do not need to be restored as the calling
* context will have saved them.
* context will have saved them. The macro also saves
* x29-x30 to the context in the sync_exception path.
*/
.macro apply_cve_2018_3639_wa _is_sync_exception _esr_el3_val
stp x2, x3, [sp, #CTX_GPREGS_OFFSET + CTX_GPREG_X2]
.if \_is_sync_exception
/*
* Ensure SMC is coming from A64/A32 state on #0
* with W0 = SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2
*
* This sequence evaluates as:
* (W0==SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2) ? (ESR_EL3==SMC#0) : (NE)
* allowing use of a single branch operation
*/
orr w2, wzr, #SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2
cmp x0, x2
mrs x3, esr_el3
mov_imm w2, \_esr_el3_val
ccmp w2, w3, #0, eq
/*
* Static predictor will predict a fall-through, optimizing
* the `SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2` fast path.
*/
bne 1f
/*
* The sequence below implements the `SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2`
* fast path.
*/
cmp x1, xzr /* enable/disable check */
/*
* When the calling context wants mitigation disabled,
* we program the mitigation disable function in the
* CPU context, which gets invoked on subsequent exits from
* EL3 via the `el3_exit` function. Otherwise NULL is
* programmed in the CPU context, which results in caller's
* inheriting the EL3 mitigation state (enabled) on subsequent
* `el3_exit`.
*/
mov x0, xzr
adr x1, cortex_a76_disable_wa_cve_2018_3639
csel x1, x1, x0, eq
str x1, [sp, #CTX_CVE_2018_3639_OFFSET + CTX_CVE_2018_3639_DISABLE]
mrs x2, CORTEX_A76_CPUACTLR2_EL1
orr x1, x2, #CORTEX_A76_CPUACTLR2_EL1_DISABLE_LOAD_PASS_STORE
bic x3, x2, #CORTEX_A76_CPUACTLR2_EL1_DISABLE_LOAD_PASS_STORE
csel x3, x3, x1, eq
msr CORTEX_A76_CPUACTLR2_EL1, x3
exception_return /* exception_return contains ISB */
stp x29, x30, [sp, #CTX_GPREGS_OFFSET + CTX_GPREG_X29]
mov_imm w2, \_esr_el3_val
bl apply_cve_2018_3639_sync_wa
ldp x29, x30, [sp, #CTX_GPREGS_OFFSET + CTX_GPREG_X29]
.endif
1:
/*
* Always enable v4 mitigation during EL3 execution. This is not
* required for the fast path above because it does not perform any
@ -195,6 +153,78 @@ vector_entry cortex_a76_serror_aarch32
apply_cve_2018_3639_wa _is_sync_exception=0 _esr_el3_val=ESR_EL3_A32_SMC0
b serror_aarch32
end_vector_entry cortex_a76_serror_aarch32
/*
* -----------------------------------------------------------------
* This function applies the mitigation for CVE-2018-3639
* specifically for sync exceptions. It implements a fast path
* where `SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2` SMC calls from a lower EL
* running in AArch64 will go through the fast and return early.
*
* In the fast path x0-x3 registers do not need to be restored as the
* calling context will have saved them.
*
* Caller must pass value of esr_el3 to compare via x2.
* Save and restore these registers outside of this function from the
* context before jumping to the main runtime vector table entry.
*
* Shall clobber: x0-x3, x30
* -----------------------------------------------------------------
*/
func apply_cve_2018_3639_sync_wa
/*
* Ensure SMC is coming from A64/A32 state on #0
* with W0 = SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2
*
* This sequence evaluates as:
* (W0==SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2) ? (ESR_EL3==SMC#0) : (NE)
* allowing use of a single branch operation
* X2 populated outside this function with the SMC FID.
*/
orr w3, wzr, #SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2
cmp x0, x3
mrs x3, esr_el3
ccmp w2, w3, #0, eq
/*
* Static predictor will predict a fall-through, optimizing
* the `SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2` fast path.
*/
bne 1f
/*
* The sequence below implements the `SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2`
* fast path.
*/
cmp x1, xzr /* enable/disable check */
/*
* When the calling context wants mitigation disabled,
* we program the mitigation disable function in the
* CPU context, which gets invoked on subsequent exits from
* EL3 via the `el3_exit` function. Otherwise NULL is
* programmed in the CPU context, which results in caller's
* inheriting the EL3 mitigation state (enabled) on subsequent
* `el3_exit`.
*/
mov x0, xzr
adr x1, cortex_a76_disable_wa_cve_2018_3639
csel x1, x1, x0, eq
str x1, [sp, #CTX_CVE_2018_3639_OFFSET + CTX_CVE_2018_3639_DISABLE]
mrs x2, CORTEX_A76_CPUACTLR2_EL1
orr x1, x2, #CORTEX_A76_CPUACTLR2_EL1_DISABLE_LOAD_PASS_STORE
bic x3, x2, #CORTEX_A76_CPUACTLR2_EL1_DISABLE_LOAD_PASS_STORE
csel x3, x3, x1, eq
msr CORTEX_A76_CPUACTLR2_EL1, x3
ldp x29, x30, [sp, #CTX_GPREGS_OFFSET + CTX_GPREG_X29]
/*
* `SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2`fast path return to lower EL.
*/
exception_return /* exception_return contains ISB */
1:
ret
endfunc apply_cve_2018_3639_sync_wa
#endif /* DYNAMIC_WORKAROUND_CVE_2018_3639 */
/* --------------------------------------------------