Commit Graph

8 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Chris Kay 4429b47165 refactor(aarch64): remove `FEAT_BTI` architecture check
BTI instructions are a part of the NOP space in earlier architecture
versions, so it's not inherently incorrect to enable BTI code
or instructions even if the target architecture does not support them.

This change reduces our reliance on architecture versions when checking
for features.

Change-Id: I79f884eec3d65978c61e72e4268021040fd6c96e
Signed-off-by: Chris Kay <chris.kay@arm.com>
2021-06-22 13:42:26 +01:00
Chris Kay 4e04478aac arch: Enable `FEAT_SB` for supported non-Armv8.5-A platforms
The speculation barrier feature (`FEAT_SB`) was introduced with and
made mandatory in the Armv8.5-A extension. It was retroactively made
optional in prior extensions, but the checks in our code-base do not
reflect that, assuming that it is only available in Armv8.5-A or later.

This change introduces the `ENABLE_FEAT_SB` definition, which derives
support for the `sb` instruction in the assembler from the feature
flags passed to it. Note that we assume that if this feature is enabled
then all the cores in the system support it - enabling speculation
barriers for only a subset of the cores is unsupported.

Signed-off-by: Chris Kay <chris.kay@arm.com>
Change-Id: I978ed38829385b221b10ba56d49b78f4756e20ea
2021-03-18 12:34:34 +01:00
Madhukar Pappireddy ccfb5c8134 Use Speculation Barrier instruction for v8.5 cores
Change-Id: Ie1018bfbae2fe95c699e58648665baa75e862000
Signed-off-by: Madhukar Pappireddy <madhukar.pappireddy@arm.com>
2020-03-11 11:11:05 -05:00
Anthony Steinhauser f461fe346b Prevent speculative execution past ERET
Even though ERET always causes a jump to another address, aarch64 CPUs
speculatively execute following instructions as if the ERET
instruction was not a jump instruction.
The speculative execution does not cross privilege-levels (to the jump
target as one would expect), but it continues on the kernel privilege
level as if the ERET instruction did not change the control flow -
thus execution anything that is accidentally linked after the ERET
instruction. Later, the results of this speculative execution are
always architecturally discarded, however they can leak data using
microarchitectural side channels. This speculative execution is very
reliable (seems to be unconditional) and it manages to complete even
relatively performance-heavy operations (e.g. multiple dependent
fetches from uncached memory).

This was fixed in Linux, FreeBSD, OpenBSD and Optee OS:
679db70801
29fb48ace4
3a08873ece
abfd092aa1

It is demonstrated in a SafeSide example:
https://github.com/google/safeside/blob/master/demos/eret_hvc_smc_wrapper.cc
https://github.com/google/safeside/blob/master/kernel_modules/kmod_eret_hvc_smc/eret_hvc_smc_module.c

Signed-off-by: Anthony Steinhauser <asteinhauser@google.com>
Change-Id: Iead39b0b9fb4b8d8b5609daaa8be81497ba63a0f
2020-01-22 21:42:51 +00:00
Alexei Fedorov 9fc59639e6 Add support for Branch Target Identification
This patch adds the functionality needed for platforms to provide
Branch Target Identification (BTI) extension, introduced to AArch64
in Armv8.5-A by adding BTI instruction used to mark valid targets
for indirect branches. The patch sets new GP bit [50] to the stage 1
Translation Table Block and Page entries to denote guarded EL3 code
pages which will cause processor to trap instructions in protected
pages trying to perform an indirect branch to any instruction other
than BTI.
BTI feature is selected by BRANCH_PROTECTION option which supersedes
the previous ENABLE_PAUTH used for Armv8.3-A Pointer Authentication
and is disabled by default. Enabling BTI requires compiler support
and was tested with GCC versions 9.0.0, 9.0.1 and 10.0.0.
The assembly macros and helpers are modified to accommodate the BTI
instruction.
This is an experimental feature.
Note. The previous ENABLE_PAUTH build option to enable PAuth in EL3
is now made as an internal flag and BRANCH_PROTECTION flag should be
used instead to enable Pointer Authentication.
Note. USE_LIBROM=1 option is currently not supported.

Change-Id: Ifaf4438609b16647dc79468b70cd1f47a623362e
Signed-off-by: Alexei Fedorov <Alexei.Fedorov@arm.com>
2019-05-24 14:44:45 +01:00
Soby Mathew f85edcea5f Workaround for cortex-A76 errata 1286807
The workaround for Cortex-A76 errata #1286807 is implemented
in this patch.

Change-Id: I6c15af962ac99ce223e009f6d299cefb41043bed
Signed-off-by: Soby Mathew <soby.mathew@arm.com>
2019-05-07 13:46:47 +01:00
Antonio Nino Diaz 09d40e0e08 Sanitise includes across codebase
Enforce full include path for includes. Deprecate old paths.

The following folders inside include/lib have been left unchanged:

- include/lib/cpus/${ARCH}
- include/lib/el3_runtime/${ARCH}

The reason for this change is that having a global namespace for
includes isn't a good idea. It defeats one of the advantages of having
folders and it introduces problems that are sometimes subtle (because
you may not know the header you are actually including if there are two
of them).

For example, this patch had to be created because two headers were
called the same way: e0ea0928d5 ("Fix gpio includes of mt8173 platform
to avoid collision."). More recently, this patch has had similar
problems: 46f9b2c3a2 ("drivers: add tzc380 support").

This problem was introduced in commit 4ecca33988 ("Move include and
source files to logical locations"). At that time, there weren't too
many headers so it wasn't a real issue. However, time has shown that
this creates problems.

Platforms that want to preserve the way they include headers may add the
removed paths to PLAT_INCLUDES, but this is discouraged.

Change-Id: I39dc53ed98f9e297a5966e723d1936d6ccf2fc8f
Signed-off-by: Antonio Nino Diaz <antonio.ninodiaz@arm.com>
2019-01-04 10:43:17 +00:00
Antonio Nino Diaz f5478dedf9 Reorganize architecture-dependent header files
The architecture dependant header files in include/lib/${ARCH} and
include/common/${ARCH} have been moved to /include/arch/${ARCH}.

Change-Id: I96f30fdb80b191a51448ddf11b1d4a0624c03394
Signed-off-by: Antonio Nino Diaz <antonio.ninodiaz@arm.com>
2019-01-04 10:43:16 +00:00