For dualroot CoT there are two sets of SP certificates, one owned by
Silicon Provider(SiP) and other owned by Platform. Each certificate can
have a maximum of 4 SPs.
This patch reduces the number of SiP owned SPs from 8 to 4 and adds
the remaining 4 to Plat owned SP.
Plat owned SP certificate is signed using Platform RoT key and
protected against anti-rollback using the Non-trusted Non-volatile
counter.
Change-Id: Idc3ddd87d6d85a5506a7435f45a6ec17c4c50425
Signed-off-by: Manish Pandey <manish.pandey2@arm.com>
Currently only single signing domain is supported for SP packages but
there is plan to support dual signing domains if CoT is dualroot.
SP_CONTENT_CERT_ID is the certificate file which is currently generated
and signed with trusted world key which in-turn is derived from Silicon
provider RoT key.
To allow dual signing domain for SP packages, other certificate file
will be derived from Platform owned RoT key.
This patch renames "SP_CONTENT_CERT_ID" to "SIP_SP_CONTENT_CERT_ID" and
does other related changes.
Signed-off-by: Manish Pandey <manish.pandey2@arm.com>
Change-Id: I0bc445a3ab257e2dac03faa64f46e36a9fed5e93
A new certificate "sip-sp-cert" has been added for Silicon Provider(SiP)
owned Secure Partitions(SP). A similar support for Platform owned SP can
be added in future. The certificate is also protected against anti-
rollback using the trusted Non-Volatile counter.
To avoid deviating from TBBR spec, support for SP CoT is only provided
in dualroot.
Secure Partition content certificate is assigned image ID 31 and SP
images follows after it.
The CoT for secure partition look like below.
+------------------+ +-------------------+
| ROTPK/ROTPK Hash |------>| Trusted Key |
+------------------+ | Certificate |
| (Auth Image) |
/+-------------------+
/ |
/ |
/ |
/ |
L v
+------------------+ +-------------------+
| Trusted World |------>| SiP owned SPs |
| Public Key | | Content Cert |
+------------------+ | (Auth Image) |
/ +-------------------+
/ |
/ v|
+------------------+ L +-------------------+
| SP_PKG1 Hash |------>| SP_PKG1 |
| | | (Data Image) |
+------------------+ +-------------------+
. .
. .
. .
+------------------+ +-------------------+
| SP_PKG8 Hash |------>| SP_PKG8 |
| | | (Data Image) |
+------------------+ +-------------------+
Signed-off-by: Manish Pandey <manish.pandey2@arm.com>
Change-Id: Ia31546bac1327a3e0b5d37e8b99c808442d5e53f
CoT used for BL1 and BL2 are moved to tbbr_cot_bl1.c
and tbbr_cot_bl2.c respectively.
Common CoT used across BL1 and BL2 are moved to
tbbr_cot_common.c.
Signed-off-by: Manish V Badarkhe <Manish.Badarkhe@arm.com>
Change-Id: I2252ac8a6960b3431bcaafdb3ea4fb2d01b79cf5
This new chain of trust defines 2 independent signing domains:
1) One for the silicon firmware (BL1, BL2, BL31) and optionally the
Trusted OS. It is rooted in the Silicon ROTPK, just as in the TBBR
CoT.
2) One for the Normal World Bootloader (BL33). It is rooted in a new key
called Platform ROTPK, or PROTPK for short.
In terms of certificates chain,
- Signing domain 1) is similar to what TBBR advocates (see page 21 of
the TBBR specification), except that the Non-Trusted World Public Key
has been removed from the Trusted Key Certificate.
- Signing domain 2) only contains the Non-Trusted World Content
certificate, which provides the hash of the Non-Trusted World
Bootloader. Compared to the TBBR CoT, there's no Non-Trusted World
Key certificate for simplicity.
Change-Id: I62f1e952522d84470acc360cf5ee63e4c4b0b4d9
Signed-off-by: Sandrine Bailleux <sandrine.bailleux@arm.com>
Manish Pandey
Louis Mayencourt
Manish V Badarkhe
Sandrine Bailleux