The flag support the following values:
- sha256 (default)
- sha384
- sha512
Change-Id: I7a49d858c361e993949cf6ada0a86575c3291066
Signed-off-by: Qixiang Xu <qixiang.xu@arm.com>
Factor out SPE operations in a separate file. Use the publish
subscribe framework to drain the SPE buffers before entering secure
world. Additionally, enable SPE before entering normal world.
A side effect of this change is that the profiling buffers are now
only drained when a transition from normal world to secure world
happens. Previously they were drained also on return from secure
world, which is unnecessary as SPE is not supported in S-EL1.
Change-Id: I17582c689b4b525770dbb6db098b3a0b5777b70a
Signed-off-by: Dimitris Papastamos <dimitris.papastamos@arm.com>
Register count is currently declared as unsigned, where as there are
asserts in place to check it being negative during unregister. These are
flagged as never being true.
Change-Id: I34f00f0ac5bf88205791e9c1298a175dababe7c8
Signed-off-by: Jeenu Viswambharan <jeenu.viswambharan@arm.com>
The FPEXC32_EL2 register controls SIMD and FP functionality when the
lower ELs are executing in AArch32 mode. It is architecturally mapped
to AArch32 system register FPEXC.
This patch removes FPEXC32_EL2 register from the System Register context
and adds it to the floating-point context. EL3 only saves / restores the
floating-point context if the build option CTX_INCLUDE_FPREGS is set to 1.
The rationale for this change is that if the Secure world is using FP
functionality and EL3 is not managing the FP context, then the Secure
world will save / restore the appropriate FP registers.
NOTE - this is a break in behaviour in the unlikely case that
CTX_INCLUDE_FPREGS is set to 0 and the platform contains an AArch32
Secure Payload that modifies FPEXC, but does not save and restore
this register
Change-Id: Iab80abcbfe302752d52b323b4abcc334b585c184
Signed-off-by: David Cunado <david.cunado@arm.com>
This allows for other EL3 components to schedule an SDEI event dispatch
to Normal world upon the next ERET. The API usage constrains are set out
in the SDEI dispatcher documentation.
Documentation to follow.
Change-Id: Id534bae0fd85afc94523490098c81f85c4e8f019
Signed-off-by: Jeenu Viswambharan <jeenu.viswambharan@arm.com>
Support SDEI on ARM platforms using frameworks implemented in earlier
patches by defining and exporting SDEI events: this patch defines the
standard event 0, and a handful of shared and private dynamic events.
Change-Id: I9d3d92a92cff646b8cc55eabda78e140deaa24e1
Signed-off-by: Jeenu Viswambharan <jeenu.viswambharan@arm.com>
Define number of priority bits, and allocate priority levels for SDEI.
Change-Id: Ib6bb6c5c09397f7caef950c4caed5a737b3d4112
Signed-off-by: Jeenu Viswambharan <jeenu.viswambharan@arm.com>
Provide a strong definition for plat_sdei_validate_sdei_entrypoint()
which translates client address to Physical Address, and then validating
the address to be present in DRAM.
Change-Id: Ib93eb66b413d638aa5524d1b3de36aa16d38ea11
Signed-off-by: Jeenu Viswambharan <jeenu.viswambharan@arm.com>
The function arm_validate_ns_entrypoint() validates a given non-secure
physical address. This function however specifically returns PSCI error
codes.
Non-secure physical address validation is potentially useful across ARM
platforms, even for non-PSCI use cases. Therefore make this function
common by returning 0 for success or -1 otherwise.
Having made the function common, make arm_validate_psci_entrypoint() a
wrapper around arm_validate_ns_entrypoint() which only translates return
value into PSCI error codes. This wrapper is now used where
arm_validate_ns_entrypoint() was currently used for PSCI entry point
validation.
Change-Id: Ic781fc3105d6d199fd8f53f01aba5baea0ebc310
Signed-off-by: Jeenu Viswambharan <jeenu.viswambharan@arm.com>
The implementation currently supports only interrupt-based SDEI events,
and supports all interfaces as defined by SDEI specification version
1.0 [1].
Introduce the build option SDEI_SUPPORT to include SDEI dispatcher in
BL31.
Update user guide and porting guide. SDEI documentation to follow.
[1] http://infocenter.arm.com/help/topic/com.arm.doc.den0054a/ARM_DEN0054A_Software_Delegated_Exception_Interface.pdf
Change-Id: I758b733084e4ea3b27ac77d0259705565842241a
Co-authored-by: Yousuf A <yousuf.sait@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeenu Viswambharan <jeenu.viswambharan@arm.com>
On GICv3 systems, as a side effect of adding provision to handle EL3
interrupts (unconditionally routing FIQs to EL3), pending Non-secure
interrupts (signalled as FIQs) may preempt execution in lower Secure ELs
[1]. This will inadvertently disrupt the semantics of Fast SMC
(previously called Atomic SMC) calls.
To retain semantics of Fast SMCs, the GIC PMR must be programmed to
prevent Non-secure interrupts from preempting Secure execution. To that
effect, two new functions in the Exception Handling Framework subscribe
to events introduced in an earlier commit:
- Upon 'cm_exited_normal_world', the Non-secure PMR is stashed, and
the PMR is programmed to the highest Non-secure interrupt priority.
- Upon 'cm_entering_normal_world', the previously stashed Non-secure
PMR is restored.
The above sequence however prevents Yielding SMCs from being preempted
by Non-secure interrupts as intended. To facilitate this, the public API
exc_allow_ns_preemption() is introduced that programs the PMR to the
original Non-secure PMR value. Another API
exc_is_ns_preemption_allowed() is also introduced to check if
exc_allow_ns_preemption() had been called previously.
API documentation to follow.
[1] On GICv2 systems, this isn't a problem as, unlike GICv3, pending NS
IRQs during Secure execution are signalled as IRQs, which aren't
routed to EL3.
Change-Id: Ief96b162b0067179b1012332cd991ee1b3051dd0
Signed-off-by: Jeenu Viswambharan <jeenu.viswambharan@arm.com>
EHF is a framework that allows dispatching of EL3 interrupts to their
respective handlers in EL3.
This framework facilitates the firmware-first error handling policy in
which asynchronous exceptions may be routed to EL3. Such exceptions may
be handed over to respective exception handlers. Individual handlers
might further delegate exception handling to lower ELs.
The framework associates the delegated execution to lower ELs with a
priority value. For interrupts, this corresponds to the priorities
programmed in GIC; for other types of exceptions, viz. SErrors or
Synchronous External Aborts, individual dispatchers shall explicitly
associate delegation to a secure priority. In order to prevent lower
priority interrupts from preempting higher priority execution, the
framework provides helpers to control preemption by virtue of
programming Priority Mask register in the interrupt controller.
This commit allows for handling interrupts targeted at EL3. Exception
handlers own interrupts by assigning them a range of secure priorities,
and registering handlers for each priority range it owns.
Support for exception handling in BL31 image is enabled by setting the
build option EL3_EXCEPTION_HANDLING=1.
Documentation to follow.
NOTE: The framework assumes the priority scheme supported by platform
interrupt controller is compliant with that of ARM GIC architecture (v2
or later).
Change-Id: I7224337e4cea47c6ca7d7a4ca22a3716939f7e42
Signed-off-by: Jeenu Viswambharan <jeenu.viswambharan@arm.com>
Acknowledging interrupt shall return a raw value from the interrupt
controller in which the actual interrupt ID may be encoded. Add a
platform API to extract the actual interrupt ID from the raw value
obtained from interrupt controller.
Document the new function. Also clarify the semantics of interrupt
acknowledge.
Change-Id: I818dad7be47661658b16f9807877d259eb127405
Signed-off-by: Jeenu Viswambharan <jeenu.viswambharan@arm.com>
This initial port of the Secure Partitions Manager to FVP supports BL31
in both SRAM and Trusted DRAM.
A document with instructions to build the SPM has been added.
Change-Id: I4ea83ff0a659be77f2cd72eaf2302cdf8ba98b32
Co-authored-by: Douglas Raillard <douglas.raillard@arm.com>
Co-authored-by: Sandrine Bailleux <sandrine.bailleux@arm.com>
Co-authored-by: Achin Gupta <achin.gupta@arm.com>
Co-authored-by: Antonio Nino Diaz <antonio.ninodiaz@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Antonio Nino Diaz <antonio.ninodiaz@arm.com>
A Secure Partition is a software execution environment instantiated in
S-EL0 that can be used to implement simple management and security
services. Since S-EL0 is an unprivileged exception level, a Secure
Partition relies on privileged firmware e.g. ARM Trusted Firmware to be
granted access to system and processor resources. Essentially, it is a
software sandbox that runs under the control of privileged software in
the Secure World and accesses the following system resources:
- Memory and device regions in the system address map.
- PE system registers.
- A range of asynchronous exceptions e.g. interrupts.
- A range of synchronous exceptions e.g. SMC function identifiers.
A Secure Partition enables privileged firmware to implement only the
absolutely essential secure services in EL3 and instantiate the rest in
a partition. Since the partition executes in S-EL0, its implementation
cannot be overly complex.
The component in ARM Trusted Firmware responsible for managing a Secure
Partition is called the Secure Partition Manager (SPM). The SPM is
responsible for the following:
- Validating and allocating resources requested by a Secure Partition.
- Implementing a well defined interface that is used for initialising a
Secure Partition.
- Implementing a well defined interface that is used by the normal world
and other secure services for accessing the services exported by a
Secure Partition.
- Implementing a well defined interface that is used by a Secure
Partition to fulfil service requests.
- Instantiating the software execution environment required by a Secure
Partition to fulfil a service request.
Change-Id: I6f7862d6bba8732db5b73f54e789d717a35e802f
Co-authored-by: Douglas Raillard <douglas.raillard@arm.com>
Co-authored-by: Sandrine Bailleux <sandrine.bailleux@arm.com>
Co-authored-by: Achin Gupta <achin.gupta@arm.com>
Co-authored-by: Antonio Nino Diaz <antonio.ninodiaz@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Antonio Nino Diaz <antonio.ninodiaz@arm.com>
This function can be useful to setup TCR_ELx by callers that don't use
the translation tables library to setup the system registers related
to them. By making it common, it can be reused whenever it is needed
without duplicating code.
Change-Id: Ibfada9e846d2a6cd113b1925ac911bb27327d375
Signed-off-by: Antonio Nino Diaz <antonio.ninodiaz@arm.com>
These macros are only defined for corresponding image,
and they are undefined for other images. It means that we have
to use ifdef or defined() instead of relying on being 0 by default.
Change-Id: Iad11efab9830ddf471599b46286e1c56581ef5a7
Signed-off-by: Roberto Vargas <roberto.vargas@arm.com>
Change sizeof call so it references a static type instead of return of
a function in order to be MISRA compliant.
Change-Id: I6f1adb206073d6cd200156e281b8d76249e3af0e
Signed-off-by: Joel Hutton <joel.hutton@arm.com>
Add events that trigger before entry to normal/secure world. The
events trigger after the normal/secure context has been restored.
Similarly add events that trigger after leaving normal/secure world.
The events trigger after the normal/secure context has been saved.
Change-Id: I1b48a7ea005d56b1f25e2b5313d77e67d2f02bc5
Signed-off-by: Dimitris Papastamos <dimitris.papastamos@arm.com>
For Trusted Board Boot, BL2 needs more space to support the ECDSA
and ECDSA+RSA algorithms.
Change-Id: Ie7eda9a1315ce836dbc6d18d6588f8d17891a92d
Signed-off-by: Qixiang Xu <qixiang.xu@arm.com>
These hooks are intended to allow one platform to try load
images from alternative places. There is a hook to initialize
the sequence of boot locations and a hook to pass to the next
sequence.
Change-Id: Ia0f84c415208dc4fa4f9d060d58476db23efa5b2
Signed-off-by: Roberto Vargas <roberto.vargas@arm.com>
This allows other EL3 components to subscribe to CPU on events.
Update Firmware Design guide to list psci_cpu_on_finish as an available
event.
Change-Id: Ida774afe0f9cdce4021933fcc33a9527ba7aaae2
Signed-off-by: Jeenu Viswambharan <jeenu.viswambharan@arm.com>
This light-weight framework enables some EL3 components to publish
events which other EL3 components can subscribe to. Publisher can
optionally pass opaque data for subscribers. The order in which
subscribers are called is not defined.
Firmware design updated.
Change-Id: I24a3a70b2b1dedcb1f73cf48313818aebf75ebb6
Signed-off-by: Jeenu Viswambharan <jeenu.viswambharan@arm.com>
The implementation is the same as those used to disable it in EL3.
Change-Id: Ibfe7e69034a691fbf57477c5a76a8cdca28f6b26
Signed-off-by: Antonio Nino Diaz <antonio.ninodiaz@arm.com>
This patch introduces a new API in the translation tables library
(v2), that allows to change the memory attributes of a memory
region. It may be used to change its execution permissions and
data access permissions.
As a prerequisite, the memory must be already mapped. Moreover, it
must be mapped at the finest granularity (currently 4 KB).
Change-Id: I242a8c6f0f3ef2b0a81a61e28706540462faca3c
Co-authored-by: Sandrine Bailleux <sandrine.bailleux@arm.com>
Co-authored-by: Antonio Nino Diaz <antonio.ninodiaz@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Antonio Nino Diaz <antonio.ninodiaz@arm.com>
This patch introduces a new API in the translation tables library
(v2), that allows to query the memory attributes of a memory block
or a memory page.
Change-Id: I45a8b39a53da39e7617cbac4bff5658dc1b20a11
Co-authored-by: Sandrine Bailleux <sandrine.bailleux@arm.com>
Co-authored-by: Antonio Nino Diaz <antonio.ninodiaz@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Antonio Nino Diaz <antonio.ninodiaz@arm.com>
Previously, in AArch32, `IMAGE_XLAT_DEFAULT_REGIME` wasn't defined. The
translation regime is only used in the AArch64 port of the translation
tables library v2, so this is not a problem for now, but future patches
will use it.
`IMAGE_EL` isn't used in AArch32, so it isn't needed to define it.
Change-Id: I4acdb01a58658956ab94bd82ed5b7fee1aa6ba90
Signed-off-by: Antonio Nino Diaz <antonio.ninodiaz@arm.com>
The GIC driver initialization currently allows an array of interrupts to
be configured as secure. Future use cases would require more interrupt
configuration other than just security, such as priority.
This patch introduces a new interrupt property array as part of both
GICv2 and GICv3 driver data. The platform can populate the array with
interrupt numbers and respective properties. The corresponding driver
initialization iterates through the array, and applies interrupt
configuration as required.
This capability, and the current way of supplying array (or arrays, in
case of GICv3) of secure interrupts, are however mutually exclusive.
Henceforth, the platform should supply either:
- A list of interrupts to be mapped as secure (the current way).
Platforms that do this will continue working as they were. With this
patch, this scheme is deprecated.
- A list of interrupt properties (properties include interrupt group).
Individual interrupt properties are specified via. descriptors of
type 'interrupt_prop_desc_t', which can be populated with the macro
INTR_PROP_DESC().
A run time assert checks that the platform doesn't specify both.
Henceforth the old scheme of providing list of secure interrupts is
deprecated. When built with ERROR_DEPRECATED=1, GIC drivers will require
that the interrupt properties are supplied instead of an array of secure
interrupts.
Add a section to firmware design about configuring secure interrupts.
FixesARM-software/tf-issues#262
Change-Id: I8eec29e72eb69dbb6bce77879febf32c95376942
Signed-off-by: Jeenu Viswambharan <jeenu.viswambharan@arm.com>
The helpers perform read-modify-write on GIC*_ICFGR registers, but don't
serialise callers. Any serialisation must be taken care of by the
callers.
Change-Id: I71995f82ff2c7f70d37af0ede30d6ee18682fd3f
Signed-off-by: Jeenu Viswambharan <jeenu.viswambharan@arm.com>
An earlier patch added provision for the platform to provide secure
interrupt properties. ARM platforms already has a list of interrupts
that fall into different secure groups.
This patch defines macros that enumerate interrupt properties in the
same fashion, and points the driver driver data to a list of interrupt
properties rather than list of secure interrupts on ARM platforms. The
deprecated interrupt list definitions are however retained to support
legacy builds.
Configuration applied to individual interrupts remain unchanged, so no
runtime behaviour change expected.
NOTE: Platforms that use the arm/common function
plat_arm_gic_driver_init() must replace their PLAT_ARM_G1S_IRQS and
PLAT_ARM_G0_IRQS macro definitions with PLAT_ARM_G1S_IRQ_PROPS and
PLAT_ARM_G0_IRQ_PROPS macros respectively, using the provided
INTR_PROP_DESC macro.
Change-Id: I24d643b83e3333753a3ba97d4b6fb71e16bb0952
Signed-off-by: Jeenu Viswambharan <jeenu.viswambharan@arm.com>
SPIs can be routed to either a specific PE, or to any one of all
available PEs.
API documentation updated.
Change-Id: I28675f634568aaf4ea1aa8aa7ebf25b419a963ed
Co-authored-by: Yousuf A <yousuf.sait@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeenu Viswambharan <jeenu.viswambharan@arm.com>
The back end GIC driver converts and assigns the interrupt type to
suitable group.
For GICv2, a build option GICV2_G0_FOR_EL3 is introduced, which
determines to which type Group 0 interrupts maps to.
- When the build option is set 0 (the default), Group 0 interrupts are
meant for Secure EL1. This is presently the case.
- Otherwise, Group 0 interrupts are meant for EL3. This means the SPD
will have to synchronously hand over the interrupt to Secure EL1.
The query API allows the platform to query whether the platform supports
interrupts of a given type.
API documentation updated.
Change-Id: I60fdb4053ffe0bd006b3b20914914ebd311fc858
Co-authored-by: Yousuf A <yousuf.sait@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeenu Viswambharan <jeenu.viswambharan@arm.com>
davidcunado-arm
Qixiang Xu
Dimitris Papastamos
Jeenu Viswambharan
Antonio Nino Diaz
Roberto Vargas
Joel Hutton
Sandrine Bailleux