/* * Copyright (c) 2015-2020, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2020, NVIDIA Corporation. All rights reserved. * * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause */ /******************************************************************************* * This is the Secure Payload Dispatcher (SPD). The dispatcher is meant to be a * plug-in component to the Secure Monitor, registered as a runtime service. The * SPD is expected to be a functional extension of the Secure Payload (SP) that * executes in Secure EL1. The Secure Monitor will delegate all SMCs targeting * the Trusted OS/Applications range to the dispatcher. The SPD will either * handle the request locally or delegate it to the Secure Payload. It is also * responsible for initialising and maintaining communication with the SP. ******************************************************************************/ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "tlkd_private.h" extern const spd_pm_ops_t tlkd_pm_ops; /******************************************************************************* * Per-cpu Secure Payload state ******************************************************************************/ tlk_context_t tlk_ctx; /******************************************************************************* * CPU number on which TLK booted up ******************************************************************************/ static uint32_t boot_cpu; /* TLK UID: RFC-4122 compliant UUID (version-5, sha-1) */ DEFINE_SVC_UUID2(tlk_uuid, 0xc9e911bd, 0xba2b, 0xee52, 0xb1, 0x72, 0x46, 0x1f, 0xba, 0x97, 0x7f, 0x63); static int32_t tlkd_init(void); /******************************************************************************* * Secure Payload Dispatcher's timer interrupt handler ******************************************************************************/ static uint64_t tlkd_interrupt_handler(uint32_t id, uint32_t flags, void *handle, void *cookie) { cpu_context_t *s_cpu_context; int irq = plat_ic_get_pending_interrupt_id(); /* acknowledge the interrupt and mark it complete */ (void)plat_ic_acknowledge_interrupt(); plat_ic_end_of_interrupt(irq); /* * Disable the routing of NS interrupts from secure world to * EL3 while interrupted on this core. */ disable_intr_rm_local(INTR_TYPE_S_EL1, SECURE); /* Check the security state when the exception was generated */ assert(get_interrupt_src_ss(flags) == NON_SECURE); assert(handle == cm_get_context(NON_SECURE)); /* Save non-secure state */ cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(NON_SECURE); /* Get a reference to the secure context */ s_cpu_context = cm_get_context(SECURE); assert(s_cpu_context); /* * Restore non-secure state. There is no need to save the * secure system register context since the SP was supposed * to preserve it during S-EL1 interrupt handling. */ cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(SECURE); cm_set_next_eret_context(SECURE); /* Provide the IRQ number to the SPD */ SMC_RET4(s_cpu_context, (uint32_t)TLK_IRQ_FIRED, 0, (uint32_t)irq, 0); } /******************************************************************************* * Secure Payload Dispatcher setup. The SPD finds out the SP entrypoint and type * (aarch32/aarch64) if not already known and initialises the context for entry * into the SP for its initialisation. ******************************************************************************/ static int32_t tlkd_setup(void) { entry_point_info_t *tlk_ep_info; uint32_t flags; int32_t ret; /* * Get information about the Secure Payload (BL32) image. Its * absence is a critical failure. */ tlk_ep_info = bl31_plat_get_next_image_ep_info(SECURE); if (!tlk_ep_info) { WARN("No SP provided. Booting device without SP" " initialization. SMC`s destined for SP" " will return SMC_UNK\n"); return 1; } /* * If there's no valid entry point for SP, we return a non-zero value * signalling failure initializing the service. We bail out without * registering any handlers */ if (!tlk_ep_info->pc) return 1; /* * Inspect the SP image's SPSR and determine it's execution state * i.e whether AArch32 or AArch64. */ tlkd_init_tlk_ep_state(tlk_ep_info, (tlk_ep_info->spsr >> MODE_RW_SHIFT) & MODE_RW_MASK, tlk_ep_info->pc, &tlk_ctx); /* get a list of all S-EL1 IRQs from the platform */ /* register interrupt handler */ flags = 0; set_interrupt_rm_flag(flags, NON_SECURE); ret = register_interrupt_type_handler(INTR_TYPE_S_EL1, tlkd_interrupt_handler, flags); if (ret != 0) { ERROR("failed to register tlkd interrupt handler (%d)\n", ret); } /* * All TLK SPD initialization done. Now register our init function * with BL31 for deferred invocation */ bl31_register_bl32_init(&tlkd_init); return 0; } /******************************************************************************* * This function passes control to the Secure Payload image (BL32) for the first * time on the primary cpu after a cold boot. It assumes that a valid secure * context has already been created by tlkd_setup() which can be directly * used. This function performs a synchronous entry into the Secure payload. * The SP passes control back to this routine through a SMC. ******************************************************************************/ static int32_t tlkd_init(void) { entry_point_info_t *tlk_entry_point; /* * Get information about the Secure Payload (BL32) image. Its * absence is a critical failure. */ tlk_entry_point = bl31_plat_get_next_image_ep_info(SECURE); assert(tlk_entry_point); cm_init_my_context(tlk_entry_point); /* * TLK runs only on a single CPU. Store the value of the boot * CPU for sanity checking later. */ boot_cpu = plat_my_core_pos(); /* * Arrange for an entry into the test secure payload. */ return tlkd_synchronous_sp_entry(&tlk_ctx); } /******************************************************************************* * This function is responsible for handling all SMCs in the Trusted OS/App * range from the non-secure state as defined in the SMC Calling Convention * Document. It is also responsible for communicating with the Secure payload * to delegate work and return results back to the non-secure state. Lastly it * will also return any information that the secure payload needs to do the * work assigned to it. ******************************************************************************/ static uintptr_t tlkd_smc_handler(uint32_t smc_fid, u_register_t x1, u_register_t x2, u_register_t x3, u_register_t x4, void *cookie, void *handle, u_register_t flags) { cpu_context_t *ns_cpu_context; gp_regs_t *gp_regs; uint32_t ns; uint64_t par; /* Passing a NULL context is a critical programming error */ assert(handle); /* These SMCs are only supported by a single CPU */ if (boot_cpu != plat_my_core_pos()) SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK); /* Determine which security state this SMC originated from */ ns = is_caller_non_secure(flags); switch (smc_fid) { /* * This function ID is used by SP to indicate that it was * preempted by a non-secure world IRQ. */ case TLK_PREEMPTED: if (ns) SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK); assert(handle == cm_get_context(SECURE)); cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(SECURE); /* Get a reference to the non-secure context */ ns_cpu_context = cm_get_context(NON_SECURE); assert(ns_cpu_context); /* * Restore non-secure state. There is no need to save the * secure system register context since the SP was supposed * to preserve it during S-EL1 interrupt handling. */ cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(NON_SECURE); cm_set_next_eret_context(NON_SECURE); SMC_RET1(ns_cpu_context, x1); /* * This is a request from the non-secure context to: * * a. register shared memory with the SP for storing it's * activity logs. * b. register shared memory with the SP for passing args * required for maintaining sessions with the Trusted * Applications. * c. register shared persistent buffers for secure storage * d. register NS DRAM ranges passed by Cboot * e. register Root of Trust parameters from Cboot for Verified Boot * f. open/close sessions * g. issue commands to the Trusted Apps * h. resume the preempted yielding SMC call. */ case TLK_REGISTER_LOGBUF: case TLK_REGISTER_REQBUF: case TLK_SS_REGISTER_HANDLER: case TLK_REGISTER_NS_DRAM_RANGES: case TLK_SET_ROOT_OF_TRUST: case TLK_OPEN_TA_SESSION: case TLK_CLOSE_TA_SESSION: case TLK_TA_LAUNCH_OP: case TLK_TA_SEND_EVENT: case TLK_RESUME_FID: case TLK_SET_BL_VERSION: case TLK_LOCK_BL_INTERFACE: case TLK_BL_RPMB_SERVICE: if (!ns) SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK); /* * This is a fresh request from the non-secure client. * The parameters are in x1 and x2. Figure out which * registers need to be preserved, save the non-secure * state and send the request to the secure payload. */ assert(handle == cm_get_context(NON_SECURE)); /* * Check if we are already processing a yielding SMC * call. Of all the supported fids, only the "resume" * fid expects the flag to be set. */ if (smc_fid == TLK_RESUME_FID) { if (!get_yield_smc_active_flag(tlk_ctx.state)) SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK); } else { if (get_yield_smc_active_flag(tlk_ctx.state)) SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK); } cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(NON_SECURE); /* * Verify if there is a valid context to use. */ assert(&tlk_ctx.cpu_ctx == cm_get_context(SECURE)); /* * Mark the SP state as active. */ set_yield_smc_active_flag(tlk_ctx.state); /* * We are done stashing the non-secure context. Ask the * secure payload to do the work now. */ cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(SECURE); cm_set_next_eret_context(SECURE); /* * TLK is a 32-bit Trusted OS and so expects the SMC * arguments via r0-r7. TLK expects the monitor frame * registers to be 64-bits long. Hence, we pass x0 in * r0-r1, x1 in r2-r3, x3 in r4-r5 and x4 in r6-r7. * * As smc_fid is a uint32 value, r1 contains 0. */ gp_regs = get_gpregs_ctx(&tlk_ctx.cpu_ctx); write_ctx_reg(gp_regs, CTX_GPREG_X4, (uint32_t)x2); write_ctx_reg(gp_regs, CTX_GPREG_X5, (uint32_t)(x2 >> 32)); write_ctx_reg(gp_regs, CTX_GPREG_X6, (uint32_t)x3); write_ctx_reg(gp_regs, CTX_GPREG_X7, (uint32_t)(x3 >> 32)); SMC_RET4(&tlk_ctx.cpu_ctx, smc_fid, 0, (uint32_t)x1, (uint32_t)(x1 >> 32)); /* * Translate NS/EL1-S virtual addresses. * * x1 = virtual address * x3 = type (NS/S) * * Returns PA:lo in r0, PA:hi in r1. */ case TLK_VA_TRANSLATE: /* Should be invoked only by secure world */ if (ns) SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK); /* NS virtual addresses are 64-bit long */ if (x3 & TLK_TRANSLATE_NS_VADDR) x1 = (uint32_t)x1 | (x2 << 32); if (!x1) SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK); /* * TODO: Sanity check x1. This would require platform * support. */ /* virtual address and type: ns/s */ par = tlkd_va_translate(x1, x3); /* return physical address in r0-r1 */ SMC_RET4(handle, (uint32_t)par, (uint32_t)(par >> 32), 0, 0); /* * This is a request from the SP to mark completion of * a yielding function ID. */ case TLK_REQUEST_DONE: if (ns) SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK); /* * Mark the SP state as inactive. */ clr_yield_smc_active_flag(tlk_ctx.state); /* Get a reference to the non-secure context */ ns_cpu_context = cm_get_context(NON_SECURE); assert(ns_cpu_context); /* * This is a request completion SMC and we must switch to * the non-secure world to pass the result. */ cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(SECURE); /* * We are done stashing the secure context. Switch to the * non-secure context and return the result. */ cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(NON_SECURE); cm_set_next_eret_context(NON_SECURE); SMC_RET1(ns_cpu_context, x1); /* * This function ID is used only by the SP to indicate it has * finished initialising itself after a cold boot */ case TLK_ENTRY_DONE: if (ns) SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK); /* * SP has been successfully initialized. Register power * management hooks with PSCI */ psci_register_spd_pm_hook(&tlkd_pm_ops); /* * TLK reports completion. The SPD must have initiated * the original request through a synchronous entry * into the SP. Jump back to the original C runtime * context. */ tlkd_synchronous_sp_exit(&tlk_ctx, x1); break; /* * These function IDs are used only by TLK to indicate it has * finished: * 1. suspending itself after an earlier psci cpu_suspend * request. * 2. resuming itself after an earlier psci cpu_suspend * request. * 3. powering down after an earlier psci system_off/system_reset * request. */ case TLK_SUSPEND_DONE: case TLK_RESUME_DONE: if (ns) SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK); /* * TLK reports completion. TLKD must have initiated the * original request through a synchronous entry into the SP. * Jump back to the original C runtime context, and pass x1 as * return value to the caller */ tlkd_synchronous_sp_exit(&tlk_ctx, x1); break; /* * This function ID is used by SP to indicate that it has completed * handling the secure interrupt. */ case TLK_IRQ_DONE: if (ns) SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK); assert(handle == cm_get_context(SECURE)); /* save secure world context */ cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(SECURE); /* Get a reference to the non-secure context */ ns_cpu_context = cm_get_context(NON_SECURE); assert(ns_cpu_context); /* * Restore non-secure state. There is no need to save the * secure system register context since the SP was supposed * to preserve it during S-EL1 interrupt handling. */ cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(NON_SECURE); cm_set_next_eret_context(NON_SECURE); SMC_RET0(ns_cpu_context); /* * Return the number of service function IDs implemented to * provide service to non-secure */ case TOS_CALL_COUNT: SMC_RET1(handle, TLK_NUM_FID); /* * Return TLK's UID to the caller */ case TOS_UID: SMC_UUID_RET(handle, tlk_uuid); /* * Return the version of current implementation */ case TOS_CALL_VERSION: SMC_RET2(handle, TLK_VERSION_MAJOR, TLK_VERSION_MINOR); default: WARN("%s: Unhandled SMC: 0x%x\n", __func__, smc_fid); break; } SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK); } /* Define a SPD runtime service descriptor for fast SMC calls */ DECLARE_RT_SVC( tlkd_tos_fast, OEN_TOS_START, OEN_TOS_END, SMC_TYPE_FAST, tlkd_setup, tlkd_smc_handler ); /* Define a SPD runtime service descriptor for yielding SMC calls */ DECLARE_RT_SVC( tlkd_tos_std, OEN_TOS_START, OEN_TOS_END, SMC_TYPE_YIELD, NULL, tlkd_smc_handler ); /* Define a SPD runtime service descriptor for fast SMC calls */ DECLARE_RT_SVC( tlkd_tap_fast, OEN_TAP_START, OEN_TAP_END, SMC_TYPE_FAST, NULL, tlkd_smc_handler ); /* Define a SPD runtime service descriptor for yielding SMC calls */ DECLARE_RT_SVC( tlkd_tap_std, OEN_TAP_START, OEN_TAP_END, SMC_TYPE_YIELD, NULL, tlkd_smc_handler );