arm-trusted-firmware/bl1
Douglas Raillard 51faada71a Add support for GCC stack protection
Introduce new build option ENABLE_STACK_PROTECTOR. It enables
compilation of all BL images with one of the GCC -fstack-protector-*
options.

A new platform function plat_get_stack_protector_canary() is introduced.
It returns a value that is used to initialize the canary for stack
corruption detection. Returning a random value will prevent an attacker
from predicting the value and greatly increase the effectiveness of the
protection.

A message is printed at the ERROR level when a stack corruption is
detected.

To be effective, the global data must be stored at an address
lower than the base of the stacks. Failure to do so would allow an
attacker to overwrite the canary as part of an attack which would void
the protection.

FVP implementation of plat_get_stack_protector_canary is weak as
there is no real source of entropy on the FVP. It therefore relies on a
timer's value, which could be predictable.

Change-Id: Icaaee96392733b721fa7c86a81d03660d3c1bc06
Signed-off-by: Douglas Raillard <douglas.raillard@arm.com>
2017-03-31 13:58:48 +01:00
..
aarch32 AArch32: Fix detection of virtualization support 2016-09-23 14:34:29 +01:00
aarch64 Define and use no_ret macro where no return is expected 2016-12-05 14:55:35 +00:00
tbbr Enable TRUSTED_BOARD_BOOT support for LOAD_IMAGE_V2=1 2016-12-14 14:37:53 +00:00
bl1.ld.S Add support for GCC stack protection 2017-03-31 13:58:48 +01:00
bl1.mk Move plat/common source file definitions to generic Makefiles 2017-03-20 14:58:25 +00:00
bl1_fwu.c Introduce unified API to zero memory 2017-02-06 17:01:39 +00:00
bl1_main.c Report errata workaround status to console 2017-01-30 14:53:19 +00:00
bl1_private.h AArch32: Add generic changes in BL1 2016-09-21 16:27:27 +01:00