949a52d24e
Before adding a base address and a size to compute the end address of an image to copy or authenticate, check this won't result in an integer overflow. If it does then consider the input arguments are invalid. As a result, bl1_plat_mem_check() can now safely assume the end address (computed as the sum of the base address and size of the memory region) doesn't overflow, as the validation is done upfront in bl1_fwu_image_copy/auth(). A debug assertion has been added nonetheless in the ARM implementation in order to help catching such problems, should bl1_plat_mem_check() be called in a different context in the future. Fixes TFV-1: Malformed Firmware Update SMC can result in copy of unexpectedly large data into secure memory Change-Id: I8b8f8dd4c8777705722c7bd0e8b57addcba07e25 Signed-off-by: Sandrine Bailleux <sandrine.bailleux@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Dan Handley <dan.handley@arm.com> |
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| .. | ||
| aarch32 | ||
| aarch64 | ||
| tbbr | ||
| bl1.ld.S | ||
| bl1.mk | ||
| bl1_fwu.c | ||
| bl1_main.c | ||
| bl1_private.h | ||