294 lines
8.8 KiB
C
294 lines
8.8 KiB
C
/*
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* Copyright (c) 2015-2017, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
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*
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* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
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*/
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#include <arm_def.h>
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#include <assert.h>
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#include <cassert.h>
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#include <platform.h>
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#include <stdint.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <tbbr_oid.h>
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/* SHA256 algorithm */
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#define SHA256_BYTES 32
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/* ROTPK locations */
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#define ARM_ROTPK_REGS_ID 1
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#define ARM_ROTPK_DEVEL_RSA_ID 2
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#define ARM_ROTPK_DEVEL_ECDSA_ID 3
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static const unsigned char rotpk_hash_hdr[] = \
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"\x30\x31\x30\x0D\x06\x09\x60\x86\x48" \
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"\x01\x65\x03\x04\x02\x01\x05\x00\x04\x20";
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static const unsigned int rotpk_hash_hdr_len = sizeof(rotpk_hash_hdr) - 1;
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static unsigned char rotpk_hash_der[sizeof(rotpk_hash_hdr) - 1 + SHA256_BYTES];
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/* Use the cryptocell variants if Cryptocell is present */
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#if !ARM_CRYPTOCELL_INTEG
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#if !ARM_ROTPK_LOCATION_ID
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#error "ARM_ROTPK_LOCATION_ID not defined"
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#endif
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/* Weak definition may be overridden in specific platform */
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#pragma weak plat_get_nv_ctr
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#pragma weak plat_set_nv_ctr
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#if (ARM_ROTPK_LOCATION_ID == ARM_ROTPK_DEVEL_RSA_ID)
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static const unsigned char arm_devel_rotpk_hash[] = \
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"\xB0\xF3\x82\x09\x12\x97\xD8\x3A" \
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"\x37\x7A\x72\x47\x1B\xEC\x32\x73" \
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"\xE9\x92\x32\xE2\x49\x59\xF6\x5E" \
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"\x8B\x4A\x4A\x46\xD8\x22\x9A\xDA";
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#elif (ARM_ROTPK_LOCATION_ID == ARM_ROTPK_DEVEL_ECDSA_ID)
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static const unsigned char arm_devel_rotpk_hash[] = \
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"\x2E\x40\xBF\x6E\xF9\x12\xBB\x98" \
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"\x31\x71\x09\x0E\x1E\x15\x3D\x0B" \
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"\xFD\xD1\xCC\x69\x4A\x98\xEB\x8B" \
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"\xA0\xB0\x20\x86\x4E\x6C\x07\x17";
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#endif
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/*
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* Return the ROTPK hash in the following ASN.1 structure in DER format:
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*
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* AlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE {
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* algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
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* parameters ANY DEFINED BY algorithm OPTIONAL
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* }
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*
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* DigestInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
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* digestAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
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* digest OCTET STRING
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* }
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*/
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int plat_get_rotpk_info(void *cookie, void **key_ptr, unsigned int *key_len,
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unsigned int *flags)
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{
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uint8_t *dst;
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assert(key_ptr != NULL);
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assert(key_len != NULL);
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assert(flags != NULL);
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/* Copy the DER header */
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memcpy(rotpk_hash_der, rotpk_hash_hdr, rotpk_hash_hdr_len);
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dst = (uint8_t *)&rotpk_hash_der[rotpk_hash_hdr_len];
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#if (ARM_ROTPK_LOCATION_ID == ARM_ROTPK_DEVEL_RSA_ID) \
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|| (ARM_ROTPK_LOCATION_ID == ARM_ROTPK_DEVEL_ECDSA_ID)
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memcpy(dst, arm_devel_rotpk_hash, SHA256_BYTES);
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#elif (ARM_ROTPK_LOCATION_ID == ARM_ROTPK_REGS_ID)
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uint32_t *src, tmp;
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unsigned int words, i;
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/*
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* Append the hash from Trusted Root-Key Storage registers. The hash has
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* not been written linearly into the registers, so we have to do a bit
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* of byte swapping:
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*
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* 0x00 0x04 0x08 0x0C 0x10 0x14 0x18 0x1C
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* +---------------------------------------------------------------+
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* | Reg0 | Reg1 | Reg2 | Reg3 | Reg4 | Reg5 | Reg6 | Reg7 |
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* +---------------------------------------------------------------+
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* | ... ... | | ... ... |
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* | +--------------------+ | +-------+
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* | | | |
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* +----------------------------+ +----------------------------+
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* | | | |
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* +-------+ | +--------------------+ |
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* | | | |
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* v v v v
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* +---------------------------------------------------------------+
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* | | |
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* +---------------------------------------------------------------+
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* 0 15 16 31
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*
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* Additionally, we have to access the registers in 32-bit words
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*/
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words = SHA256_BYTES >> 3;
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/* Swap bytes 0-15 (first four registers) */
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src = (uint32_t *)TZ_PUB_KEY_HASH_BASE;
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for (i = 0 ; i < words ; i++) {
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tmp = src[words - 1 - i];
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/* Words are read in little endian */
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*dst++ = (uint8_t)((tmp >> 24) & 0xFF);
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*dst++ = (uint8_t)((tmp >> 16) & 0xFF);
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*dst++ = (uint8_t)((tmp >> 8) & 0xFF);
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*dst++ = (uint8_t)(tmp & 0xFF);
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}
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/* Swap bytes 16-31 (last four registers) */
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src = (uint32_t *)(TZ_PUB_KEY_HASH_BASE + SHA256_BYTES / 2);
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for (i = 0 ; i < words ; i++) {
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tmp = src[words - 1 - i];
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*dst++ = (uint8_t)((tmp >> 24) & 0xFF);
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*dst++ = (uint8_t)((tmp >> 16) & 0xFF);
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*dst++ = (uint8_t)((tmp >> 8) & 0xFF);
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*dst++ = (uint8_t)(tmp & 0xFF);
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}
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#endif /* (ARM_ROTPK_LOCATION_ID == ARM_ROTPK_DEVEL_RSA_ID) \
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|| (ARM_ROTPK_LOCATION_ID == ARM_ROTPK_DEVEL_ECDSA_ID) */
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*key_ptr = (void *)rotpk_hash_der;
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*key_len = (unsigned int)sizeof(rotpk_hash_der);
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*flags = ROTPK_IS_HASH;
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return 0;
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}
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/*
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* Return the non-volatile counter value stored in the platform. The cookie
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* will contain the OID of the counter in the certificate.
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*
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* Return: 0 = success, Otherwise = error
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*/
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int plat_get_nv_ctr(void *cookie, unsigned int *nv_ctr)
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{
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const char *oid;
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uint32_t *nv_ctr_addr;
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assert(cookie != NULL);
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assert(nv_ctr != NULL);
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oid = (const char *)cookie;
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if (strcmp(oid, TRUSTED_FW_NVCOUNTER_OID) == 0) {
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nv_ctr_addr = (uint32_t *)TFW_NVCTR_BASE;
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} else if (strcmp(oid, NON_TRUSTED_FW_NVCOUNTER_OID) == 0) {
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nv_ctr_addr = (uint32_t *)NTFW_CTR_BASE;
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} else {
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return 1;
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}
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*nv_ctr = (unsigned int)(*nv_ctr_addr);
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return 0;
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}
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/*
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* Store a new non-volatile counter value. By default on ARM development
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* platforms, the non-volatile counters are RO and cannot be modified. We expect
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* the values in the certificates to always match the RO values so that this
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* function is never called.
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*
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* Return: 0 = success, Otherwise = error
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*/
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int plat_set_nv_ctr(void *cookie, unsigned int nv_ctr)
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{
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return 1;
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}
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#else /* ARM_CRYPTOCELL_INTEG */
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#include <nvm.h>
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#include <nvm_otp.h>
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#include <sbrom_bsv_api.h>
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CASSERT(HASH_RESULT_SIZE_IN_BYTES == SHA256_BYTES,
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assert_mismatch_in_hash_result_size);
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/*
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* Return the ROTPK hash in the following ASN.1 structure in DER format:
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*
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* AlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE {
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* algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
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* parameters ANY DEFINED BY algorithm OPTIONAL
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* }
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*
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* DigestInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
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* digestAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
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* digest OCTET STRING
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* }
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*/
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int plat_get_rotpk_info(void *cookie, void **key_ptr, unsigned int *key_len,
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unsigned int *flags)
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{
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unsigned char *dst;
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CCError_t error;
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uint32_t lcs;
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assert(key_ptr != NULL);
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assert(key_len != NULL);
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assert(flags != NULL);
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error = NVM_GetLCS(PLAT_CRYPTOCELL_BASE, &lcs);
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if (error != CC_OK)
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return 1;
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/* If the lifecycle state is `SD`, return failure */
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if (lcs == CC_BSV_SECURITY_DISABLED_LCS)
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return 1;
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/*
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* If the lifecycle state is `CM` or `DM`, ROTPK shouldn't be verified.
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* Return success after setting ROTPK_NOT_DEPLOYED flag
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*/
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if ((lcs == CC_BSV_CHIP_MANUFACTURE_LCS) ||
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(lcs == CC_BSV_DEVICE_MANUFACTURE_LCS)) {
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*key_len = 0;
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*flags = ROTPK_NOT_DEPLOYED;
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return 0;
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}
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/* Copy the DER header */
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memcpy(rotpk_hash_der, rotpk_hash_hdr, rotpk_hash_hdr_len);
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dst = &rotpk_hash_der[rotpk_hash_hdr_len];
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error = NVM_ReadHASHPubKey(PLAT_CRYPTOCELL_BASE,
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CC_SB_HASH_BOOT_KEY_256B,
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(uint32_t *)dst, HASH_RESULT_SIZE_IN_WORDS);
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if (error != CC_OK)
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return 1;
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*key_ptr = rotpk_hash_der;
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*key_len = sizeof(rotpk_hash_der);
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*flags = ROTPK_IS_HASH;
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return 0;
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}
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/*
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* Return the non-volatile counter value stored in the platform. The cookie
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* specifies the OID of the counter in the certificate.
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*
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* Return: 0 = success, Otherwise = error
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*/
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int plat_get_nv_ctr(void *cookie, unsigned int *nv_ctr)
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{
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CCError_t error = CC_FAIL;
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if (strcmp(cookie, TRUSTED_FW_NVCOUNTER_OID) == 0) {
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error = NVM_GetSwVersion(PLAT_CRYPTOCELL_BASE,
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CC_SW_VERSION_COUNTER1, nv_ctr);
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} else if (strcmp(cookie, NON_TRUSTED_FW_NVCOUNTER_OID) == 0) {
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error = NVM_GetSwVersion(PLAT_CRYPTOCELL_BASE,
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CC_SW_VERSION_COUNTER2, nv_ctr);
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}
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return (error != CC_OK);
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}
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/*
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* Store a new non-volatile counter value in the counter specified by the OID
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* in the cookie. This function is not expected to be called if the Lifecycle
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* state is RMA as the values in the certificate are expected to always match
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* the nvcounter values. But if called when the LCS is RMA, the underlying
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* helper functions will return success but without updating the counter.
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*
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* Return: 0 = success, Otherwise = error
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*/
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int plat_set_nv_ctr(void *cookie, unsigned int nv_ctr)
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{
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CCError_t error = CC_FAIL;
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if (strcmp(cookie, TRUSTED_FW_NVCOUNTER_OID) == 0) {
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error = NVM_SetSwVersion(PLAT_CRYPTOCELL_BASE,
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CC_SW_VERSION_COUNTER1, nv_ctr);
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} else if (strcmp(cookie, NON_TRUSTED_FW_NVCOUNTER_OID) == 0) {
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error = NVM_SetSwVersion(PLAT_CRYPTOCELL_BASE,
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CC_SW_VERSION_COUNTER2, nv_ctr);
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}
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return (error != CC_OK);
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}
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#endif /* ARM_CRYPTOCELL_INTEG */
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