arm-trusted-firmware/include/lib/xlat_tables/xlat_tables_v2_helpers.h

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/*
Read-only xlat tables for BL31 memory This patch introduces a build flag which allows the xlat tables to be mapped in a read-only region within BL31 memory. It makes it much harder for someone who has acquired the ability to write to arbitrary secure memory addresses to gain control of the translation tables. The memory attributes of the descriptors describing the tables themselves are changed to read-only secure data. This change happens at the end of BL31 runtime setup. Until this point, the tables have read-write permissions. This gives a window of opportunity for changes to be made to the tables with the MMU on (e.g. reclaiming init code). No changes can be made to the tables with the MMU turned on from this point onwards. This change is also enabled for sp_min and tspd. To make all this possible, the base table was moved to .rodata. The penalty we pay is that now .rodata must be aligned to the size of the base table (512B alignment). Still, this is better than putting the base table with the higher level tables in the xlat_table section, as that would cost us a full 4KB page. Changing the tables from read-write to read-only cannot be done with the MMU on, as the break-before-make sequence would invalidate the descriptor which resolves the level 3 page table where that very descriptor is located. This would make the translation required for writing the changes impossible, generating an MMU fault. The caches are also flushed. Signed-off-by: Petre-Ionut Tudor <petre-ionut.tudor@arm.com> Change-Id: Ibe5de307e6dc94c67d6186139ac3973516430466
2019-11-07 15:18:03 +00:00
* Copyright (c) 2017-2020, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
*
* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
*/
/*
* This header file contains internal definitions that are not supposed to be
* used outside of this library code.
*/
#ifndef XLAT_TABLES_V2_HELPERS_H
#define XLAT_TABLES_V2_HELPERS_H
#ifndef XLAT_TABLES_V2_H
#error "Do not include this header file directly. Include xlat_tables_v2.h instead."
#endif
#ifndef __ASSEMBLER__
#include <stdbool.h>
#include <stddef.h>
#include <platform_def.h>
#include <lib/cassert.h>
#include <lib/xlat_tables/xlat_tables_arch.h>
#include <lib/xlat_tables/xlat_tables_defs.h>
/* Forward declaration */
struct mmap_region;
/*
* Helper macro to define an mmap_region_t. This macro allows to specify all
* the fields of the structure but its parameter list is not guaranteed to
* remain stable as we add members to mmap_region_t.
*/
#define MAP_REGION_FULL_SPEC(_pa, _va, _sz, _attr, _gr) \
{ \
.base_pa = (_pa), \
.base_va = (_va), \
.size = (_sz), \
.attr = (_attr), \
.granularity = (_gr), \
}
/* Struct that holds all information about the translation tables. */
struct xlat_ctx {
/*
* Max allowed Virtual and Physical Addresses.
*/
unsigned long long pa_max_address;
uintptr_t va_max_address;
/*
* Array of all memory regions stored in order of ascending end address
* and ascending size to simplify the code that allows overlapping
* regions. The list is terminated by the first entry with size == 0.
* The max size of the list is stored in `mmap_num`. `mmap` points to an
* array of mmap_num + 1 elements, so that there is space for the final
* null entry.
*/
struct mmap_region *mmap;
int mmap_num;
/*
* Array of finer-grain translation tables.
* For example, if the initial lookup level is 1 then this array would
* contain both level-2 and level-3 entries.
*/
uint64_t (*tables)[XLAT_TABLE_ENTRIES];
int tables_num;
Read-only xlat tables for BL31 memory This patch introduces a build flag which allows the xlat tables to be mapped in a read-only region within BL31 memory. It makes it much harder for someone who has acquired the ability to write to arbitrary secure memory addresses to gain control of the translation tables. The memory attributes of the descriptors describing the tables themselves are changed to read-only secure data. This change happens at the end of BL31 runtime setup. Until this point, the tables have read-write permissions. This gives a window of opportunity for changes to be made to the tables with the MMU on (e.g. reclaiming init code). No changes can be made to the tables with the MMU turned on from this point onwards. This change is also enabled for sp_min and tspd. To make all this possible, the base table was moved to .rodata. The penalty we pay is that now .rodata must be aligned to the size of the base table (512B alignment). Still, this is better than putting the base table with the higher level tables in the xlat_table section, as that would cost us a full 4KB page. Changing the tables from read-write to read-only cannot be done with the MMU on, as the break-before-make sequence would invalidate the descriptor which resolves the level 3 page table where that very descriptor is located. This would make the translation required for writing the changes impossible, generating an MMU fault. The caches are also flushed. Signed-off-by: Petre-Ionut Tudor <petre-ionut.tudor@arm.com> Change-Id: Ibe5de307e6dc94c67d6186139ac3973516430466
2019-11-07 15:18:03 +00:00
#if PLAT_RO_XLAT_TABLES
bool readonly_tables;
#endif
/*
* Keep track of how many regions are mapped in each table. The base
* table can't be unmapped so it isn't needed to keep track of it.
*/
#if PLAT_XLAT_TABLES_DYNAMIC
int *tables_mapped_regions;
#endif /* PLAT_XLAT_TABLES_DYNAMIC */
int next_table;
/*
* Base translation table. It doesn't need to have the same amount of
* entries as the ones used for other levels.
*/
uint64_t *base_table;
unsigned int base_table_entries;
/*
* Max Physical and Virtual addresses currently in use by the
* translation tables. These might get updated as we map/unmap memory
* regions but they will never go beyond pa/va_max_address.
*/
unsigned long long max_pa;
uintptr_t max_va;
/* Level of the base translation table. */
unsigned int base_level;
/* Set to true when the translation tables are initialized. */
bool initialized;
/*
* Translation regime managed by this xlat_ctx_t. It should be one of
* the EL*_REGIME defines.
*/
int xlat_regime;
};
#if PLAT_XLAT_TABLES_DYNAMIC
#define XLAT_ALLOC_DYNMAP_STRUCT(_ctx_name, _xlat_tables_count) \
static int _ctx_name##_mapped_regions[_xlat_tables_count];
#define XLAT_REGISTER_DYNMAP_STRUCT(_ctx_name) \
.tables_mapped_regions = _ctx_name##_mapped_regions,
#else
#define XLAT_ALLOC_DYNMAP_STRUCT(_ctx_name, _xlat_tables_count) \
/* do nothing */
#define XLAT_REGISTER_DYNMAP_STRUCT(_ctx_name) \
/* do nothing */
#endif /* PLAT_XLAT_TABLES_DYNAMIC */
Read-only xlat tables for BL31 memory This patch introduces a build flag which allows the xlat tables to be mapped in a read-only region within BL31 memory. It makes it much harder for someone who has acquired the ability to write to arbitrary secure memory addresses to gain control of the translation tables. The memory attributes of the descriptors describing the tables themselves are changed to read-only secure data. This change happens at the end of BL31 runtime setup. Until this point, the tables have read-write permissions. This gives a window of opportunity for changes to be made to the tables with the MMU on (e.g. reclaiming init code). No changes can be made to the tables with the MMU turned on from this point onwards. This change is also enabled for sp_min and tspd. To make all this possible, the base table was moved to .rodata. The penalty we pay is that now .rodata must be aligned to the size of the base table (512B alignment). Still, this is better than putting the base table with the higher level tables in the xlat_table section, as that would cost us a full 4KB page. Changing the tables from read-write to read-only cannot be done with the MMU on, as the break-before-make sequence would invalidate the descriptor which resolves the level 3 page table where that very descriptor is located. This would make the translation required for writing the changes impossible, generating an MMU fault. The caches are also flushed. Signed-off-by: Petre-Ionut Tudor <petre-ionut.tudor@arm.com> Change-Id: Ibe5de307e6dc94c67d6186139ac3973516430466
2019-11-07 15:18:03 +00:00
#if PLAT_RO_XLAT_TABLES
#define XLAT_CTX_INIT_TABLE_ATTR() \
.readonly_tables = false,
#else
#define XLAT_CTX_INIT_TABLE_ATTR()
/* do nothing */
#endif
#define REGISTER_XLAT_CONTEXT_FULL_SPEC(_ctx_name, _mmap_count, \
_xlat_tables_count, _virt_addr_space_size, \
_phy_addr_space_size, _xlat_regime, _section_name)\
CASSERT(CHECK_PHY_ADDR_SPACE_SIZE(_phy_addr_space_size), \
assert_invalid_physical_addr_space_sizefor_##_ctx_name);\
\
static mmap_region_t _ctx_name##_mmap[_mmap_count + 1]; \
\
static uint64_t _ctx_name##_xlat_tables[_xlat_tables_count] \
[XLAT_TABLE_ENTRIES] \
__aligned(XLAT_TABLE_SIZE) __section(_section_name); \
\
static uint64_t _ctx_name##_base_xlat_table \
[GET_NUM_BASE_LEVEL_ENTRIES(_virt_addr_space_size)] \
__aligned(GET_NUM_BASE_LEVEL_ENTRIES(_virt_addr_space_size)\
* sizeof(uint64_t)); \
\
XLAT_ALLOC_DYNMAP_STRUCT(_ctx_name, _xlat_tables_count) \
\
static xlat_ctx_t _ctx_name##_xlat_ctx = { \
.pa_max_address = (_phy_addr_space_size) - 1ULL, \
Read-only xlat tables for BL31 memory This patch introduces a build flag which allows the xlat tables to be mapped in a read-only region within BL31 memory. It makes it much harder for someone who has acquired the ability to write to arbitrary secure memory addresses to gain control of the translation tables. The memory attributes of the descriptors describing the tables themselves are changed to read-only secure data. This change happens at the end of BL31 runtime setup. Until this point, the tables have read-write permissions. This gives a window of opportunity for changes to be made to the tables with the MMU on (e.g. reclaiming init code). No changes can be made to the tables with the MMU turned on from this point onwards. This change is also enabled for sp_min and tspd. To make all this possible, the base table was moved to .rodata. The penalty we pay is that now .rodata must be aligned to the size of the base table (512B alignment). Still, this is better than putting the base table with the higher level tables in the xlat_table section, as that would cost us a full 4KB page. Changing the tables from read-write to read-only cannot be done with the MMU on, as the break-before-make sequence would invalidate the descriptor which resolves the level 3 page table where that very descriptor is located. This would make the translation required for writing the changes impossible, generating an MMU fault. The caches are also flushed. Signed-off-by: Petre-Ionut Tudor <petre-ionut.tudor@arm.com> Change-Id: Ibe5de307e6dc94c67d6186139ac3973516430466
2019-11-07 15:18:03 +00:00
.va_max_address = (_virt_addr_space_size) - 1UL, \
.mmap = _ctx_name##_mmap, \
.mmap_num = (_mmap_count), \
Read-only xlat tables for BL31 memory This patch introduces a build flag which allows the xlat tables to be mapped in a read-only region within BL31 memory. It makes it much harder for someone who has acquired the ability to write to arbitrary secure memory addresses to gain control of the translation tables. The memory attributes of the descriptors describing the tables themselves are changed to read-only secure data. This change happens at the end of BL31 runtime setup. Until this point, the tables have read-write permissions. This gives a window of opportunity for changes to be made to the tables with the MMU on (e.g. reclaiming init code). No changes can be made to the tables with the MMU turned on from this point onwards. This change is also enabled for sp_min and tspd. To make all this possible, the base table was moved to .rodata. The penalty we pay is that now .rodata must be aligned to the size of the base table (512B alignment). Still, this is better than putting the base table with the higher level tables in the xlat_table section, as that would cost us a full 4KB page. Changing the tables from read-write to read-only cannot be done with the MMU on, as the break-before-make sequence would invalidate the descriptor which resolves the level 3 page table where that very descriptor is located. This would make the translation required for writing the changes impossible, generating an MMU fault. The caches are also flushed. Signed-off-by: Petre-Ionut Tudor <petre-ionut.tudor@arm.com> Change-Id: Ibe5de307e6dc94c67d6186139ac3973516430466
2019-11-07 15:18:03 +00:00
.tables = _ctx_name##_xlat_tables, \
.tables_num = _xlat_tables_count, \
XLAT_CTX_INIT_TABLE_ATTR() \
XLAT_REGISTER_DYNMAP_STRUCT(_ctx_name) \
.next_table = 0, \
.base_table = _ctx_name##_base_xlat_table, \
.base_table_entries = \
GET_NUM_BASE_LEVEL_ENTRIES(_virt_addr_space_size),\
Read-only xlat tables for BL31 memory This patch introduces a build flag which allows the xlat tables to be mapped in a read-only region within BL31 memory. It makes it much harder for someone who has acquired the ability to write to arbitrary secure memory addresses to gain control of the translation tables. The memory attributes of the descriptors describing the tables themselves are changed to read-only secure data. This change happens at the end of BL31 runtime setup. Until this point, the tables have read-write permissions. This gives a window of opportunity for changes to be made to the tables with the MMU on (e.g. reclaiming init code). No changes can be made to the tables with the MMU turned on from this point onwards. This change is also enabled for sp_min and tspd. To make all this possible, the base table was moved to .rodata. The penalty we pay is that now .rodata must be aligned to the size of the base table (512B alignment). Still, this is better than putting the base table with the higher level tables in the xlat_table section, as that would cost us a full 4KB page. Changing the tables from read-write to read-only cannot be done with the MMU on, as the break-before-make sequence would invalidate the descriptor which resolves the level 3 page table where that very descriptor is located. This would make the translation required for writing the changes impossible, generating an MMU fault. The caches are also flushed. Signed-off-by: Petre-Ionut Tudor <petre-ionut.tudor@arm.com> Change-Id: Ibe5de307e6dc94c67d6186139ac3973516430466
2019-11-07 15:18:03 +00:00
.max_pa = 0U, \
.max_va = 0U, \
.base_level = GET_XLAT_TABLE_LEVEL_BASE(_virt_addr_space_size),\
.initialized = false, \
.xlat_regime = (_xlat_regime) \
}
#define REGISTER_XLAT_CONTEXT_RO_BASE_TABLE(_ctx_name, _mmap_count, \
_xlat_tables_count, _virt_addr_space_size, \
_phy_addr_space_size, _xlat_regime, _section_name)\
CASSERT(CHECK_PHY_ADDR_SPACE_SIZE(_phy_addr_space_size), \
assert_invalid_physical_addr_space_sizefor_##_ctx_name);\
\
static mmap_region_t _ctx_name##_mmap[_mmap_count + 1]; \
\
static uint64_t _ctx_name##_xlat_tables[_xlat_tables_count] \
[XLAT_TABLE_ENTRIES] \
__aligned(XLAT_TABLE_SIZE) __section(_section_name); \
\
static uint64_t _ctx_name##_base_xlat_table \
[GET_NUM_BASE_LEVEL_ENTRIES(_virt_addr_space_size)] \
__aligned(GET_NUM_BASE_LEVEL_ENTRIES(_virt_addr_space_size)\
* sizeof(uint64_t)) \
__section(".rodata"); \
\
XLAT_ALLOC_DYNMAP_STRUCT(_ctx_name, _xlat_tables_count) \
\
static xlat_ctx_t _ctx_name##_xlat_ctx = { \
.pa_max_address = (_phy_addr_space_size) - 1ULL, \
.va_max_address = (_virt_addr_space_size) - 1UL, \
.mmap = _ctx_name##_mmap, \
.mmap_num = (_mmap_count), \
.tables = _ctx_name##_xlat_tables, \
.tables_num = _xlat_tables_count, \
Read-only xlat tables for BL31 memory This patch introduces a build flag which allows the xlat tables to be mapped in a read-only region within BL31 memory. It makes it much harder for someone who has acquired the ability to write to arbitrary secure memory addresses to gain control of the translation tables. The memory attributes of the descriptors describing the tables themselves are changed to read-only secure data. This change happens at the end of BL31 runtime setup. Until this point, the tables have read-write permissions. This gives a window of opportunity for changes to be made to the tables with the MMU on (e.g. reclaiming init code). No changes can be made to the tables with the MMU turned on from this point onwards. This change is also enabled for sp_min and tspd. To make all this possible, the base table was moved to .rodata. The penalty we pay is that now .rodata must be aligned to the size of the base table (512B alignment). Still, this is better than putting the base table with the higher level tables in the xlat_table section, as that would cost us a full 4KB page. Changing the tables from read-write to read-only cannot be done with the MMU on, as the break-before-make sequence would invalidate the descriptor which resolves the level 3 page table where that very descriptor is located. This would make the translation required for writing the changes impossible, generating an MMU fault. The caches are also flushed. Signed-off-by: Petre-Ionut Tudor <petre-ionut.tudor@arm.com> Change-Id: Ibe5de307e6dc94c67d6186139ac3973516430466
2019-11-07 15:18:03 +00:00
XLAT_CTX_INIT_TABLE_ATTR() \
XLAT_REGISTER_DYNMAP_STRUCT(_ctx_name) \
Read-only xlat tables for BL31 memory This patch introduces a build flag which allows the xlat tables to be mapped in a read-only region within BL31 memory. It makes it much harder for someone who has acquired the ability to write to arbitrary secure memory addresses to gain control of the translation tables. The memory attributes of the descriptors describing the tables themselves are changed to read-only secure data. This change happens at the end of BL31 runtime setup. Until this point, the tables have read-write permissions. This gives a window of opportunity for changes to be made to the tables with the MMU on (e.g. reclaiming init code). No changes can be made to the tables with the MMU turned on from this point onwards. This change is also enabled for sp_min and tspd. To make all this possible, the base table was moved to .rodata. The penalty we pay is that now .rodata must be aligned to the size of the base table (512B alignment). Still, this is better than putting the base table with the higher level tables in the xlat_table section, as that would cost us a full 4KB page. Changing the tables from read-write to read-only cannot be done with the MMU on, as the break-before-make sequence would invalidate the descriptor which resolves the level 3 page table where that very descriptor is located. This would make the translation required for writing the changes impossible, generating an MMU fault. The caches are also flushed. Signed-off-by: Petre-Ionut Tudor <petre-ionut.tudor@arm.com> Change-Id: Ibe5de307e6dc94c67d6186139ac3973516430466
2019-11-07 15:18:03 +00:00
.next_table = 0, \
.base_table = _ctx_name##_base_xlat_table, \
.base_table_entries = \
GET_NUM_BASE_LEVEL_ENTRIES(_virt_addr_space_size),\
.max_pa = 0U, \
.max_va = 0U, \
Read-only xlat tables for BL31 memory This patch introduces a build flag which allows the xlat tables to be mapped in a read-only region within BL31 memory. It makes it much harder for someone who has acquired the ability to write to arbitrary secure memory addresses to gain control of the translation tables. The memory attributes of the descriptors describing the tables themselves are changed to read-only secure data. This change happens at the end of BL31 runtime setup. Until this point, the tables have read-write permissions. This gives a window of opportunity for changes to be made to the tables with the MMU on (e.g. reclaiming init code). No changes can be made to the tables with the MMU turned on from this point onwards. This change is also enabled for sp_min and tspd. To make all this possible, the base table was moved to .rodata. The penalty we pay is that now .rodata must be aligned to the size of the base table (512B alignment). Still, this is better than putting the base table with the higher level tables in the xlat_table section, as that would cost us a full 4KB page. Changing the tables from read-write to read-only cannot be done with the MMU on, as the break-before-make sequence would invalidate the descriptor which resolves the level 3 page table where that very descriptor is located. This would make the translation required for writing the changes impossible, generating an MMU fault. The caches are also flushed. Signed-off-by: Petre-Ionut Tudor <petre-ionut.tudor@arm.com> Change-Id: Ibe5de307e6dc94c67d6186139ac3973516430466
2019-11-07 15:18:03 +00:00
.base_level = GET_XLAT_TABLE_LEVEL_BASE(_virt_addr_space_size),\
.initialized = false, \
Read-only xlat tables for BL31 memory This patch introduces a build flag which allows the xlat tables to be mapped in a read-only region within BL31 memory. It makes it much harder for someone who has acquired the ability to write to arbitrary secure memory addresses to gain control of the translation tables. The memory attributes of the descriptors describing the tables themselves are changed to read-only secure data. This change happens at the end of BL31 runtime setup. Until this point, the tables have read-write permissions. This gives a window of opportunity for changes to be made to the tables with the MMU on (e.g. reclaiming init code). No changes can be made to the tables with the MMU turned on from this point onwards. This change is also enabled for sp_min and tspd. To make all this possible, the base table was moved to .rodata. The penalty we pay is that now .rodata must be aligned to the size of the base table (512B alignment). Still, this is better than putting the base table with the higher level tables in the xlat_table section, as that would cost us a full 4KB page. Changing the tables from read-write to read-only cannot be done with the MMU on, as the break-before-make sequence would invalidate the descriptor which resolves the level 3 page table where that very descriptor is located. This would make the translation required for writing the changes impossible, generating an MMU fault. The caches are also flushed. Signed-off-by: Petre-Ionut Tudor <petre-ionut.tudor@arm.com> Change-Id: Ibe5de307e6dc94c67d6186139ac3973516430466
2019-11-07 15:18:03 +00:00
.xlat_regime = (_xlat_regime) \
}
#endif /*__ASSEMBLER__*/
#endif /* XLAT_TABLES_V2_HELPERS_H */