arm-trusted-firmware/bl32/tsp/aarch64/tsp_exceptions.S

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/*
Prevent speculative execution past ERET Even though ERET always causes a jump to another address, aarch64 CPUs speculatively execute following instructions as if the ERET instruction was not a jump instruction. The speculative execution does not cross privilege-levels (to the jump target as one would expect), but it continues on the kernel privilege level as if the ERET instruction did not change the control flow - thus execution anything that is accidentally linked after the ERET instruction. Later, the results of this speculative execution are always architecturally discarded, however they can leak data using microarchitectural side channels. This speculative execution is very reliable (seems to be unconditional) and it manages to complete even relatively performance-heavy operations (e.g. multiple dependent fetches from uncached memory). This was fixed in Linux, FreeBSD, OpenBSD and Optee OS: https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/679db70801da9fda91d26caf13bf5b5ccc74e8e8 https://github.com/freebsd/freebsd/commit/29fb48ace4186a41c409fde52bcf4216e9e50b61 https://github.com/openbsd/src/commit/3a08873ece1cb28ace89fd65e8f3c1375cc98de2 https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/commit/abfd092aa19f9c0251e3d5551e2d68a9ebcfec8a It is demonstrated in a SafeSide example: https://github.com/google/safeside/blob/master/demos/eret_hvc_smc_wrapper.cc https://github.com/google/safeside/blob/master/kernel_modules/kmod_eret_hvc_smc/eret_hvc_smc_module.c Signed-off-by: Anthony Steinhauser <asteinhauser@google.com> Change-Id: Iead39b0b9fb4b8d8b5609daaa8be81497ba63a0f
2020-01-07 23:44:06 +00:00
* Copyright (c) 2013-2020, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
*
* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
*/
#include <arch.h>
#include <asm_macros.S>
#include <bl32/tsp/tsp.h>
#include <common/bl_common.h>
/* ----------------------------------------------------
* The caller-saved registers x0-x18 and LR are saved
* here.
* ----------------------------------------------------
*/
#define SCRATCH_REG_SIZE #(20 * 8)
.macro save_caller_regs_and_lr
sub sp, sp, SCRATCH_REG_SIZE
stp x0, x1, [sp]
stp x2, x3, [sp, #0x10]
stp x4, x5, [sp, #0x20]
stp x6, x7, [sp, #0x30]
stp x8, x9, [sp, #0x40]
stp x10, x11, [sp, #0x50]
stp x12, x13, [sp, #0x60]
stp x14, x15, [sp, #0x70]
stp x16, x17, [sp, #0x80]
stp x18, x30, [sp, #0x90]
.endm
.macro restore_caller_regs_and_lr
ldp x0, x1, [sp]
ldp x2, x3, [sp, #0x10]
ldp x4, x5, [sp, #0x20]
ldp x6, x7, [sp, #0x30]
ldp x8, x9, [sp, #0x40]
ldp x10, x11, [sp, #0x50]
ldp x12, x13, [sp, #0x60]
ldp x14, x15, [sp, #0x70]
ldp x16, x17, [sp, #0x80]
ldp x18, x30, [sp, #0x90]
add sp, sp, SCRATCH_REG_SIZE
.endm
/* ----------------------------------------------------
* Common TSP interrupt handling routine
* ----------------------------------------------------
*/
.macro handle_tsp_interrupt label
/* Enable the SError interrupt */
msr daifclr, #DAIF_ABT_BIT
save_caller_regs_and_lr
bl tsp_common_int_handler
cbz x0, interrupt_exit_\label
/*
* This interrupt was not targetted to S-EL1 so send it to
* the monitor and wait for execution to resume.
*/
smc #0
interrupt_exit_\label:
restore_caller_regs_and_lr
Prevent speculative execution past ERET Even though ERET always causes a jump to another address, aarch64 CPUs speculatively execute following instructions as if the ERET instruction was not a jump instruction. The speculative execution does not cross privilege-levels (to the jump target as one would expect), but it continues on the kernel privilege level as if the ERET instruction did not change the control flow - thus execution anything that is accidentally linked after the ERET instruction. Later, the results of this speculative execution are always architecturally discarded, however they can leak data using microarchitectural side channels. This speculative execution is very reliable (seems to be unconditional) and it manages to complete even relatively performance-heavy operations (e.g. multiple dependent fetches from uncached memory). This was fixed in Linux, FreeBSD, OpenBSD and Optee OS: https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/679db70801da9fda91d26caf13bf5b5ccc74e8e8 https://github.com/freebsd/freebsd/commit/29fb48ace4186a41c409fde52bcf4216e9e50b61 https://github.com/openbsd/src/commit/3a08873ece1cb28ace89fd65e8f3c1375cc98de2 https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/commit/abfd092aa19f9c0251e3d5551e2d68a9ebcfec8a It is demonstrated in a SafeSide example: https://github.com/google/safeside/blob/master/demos/eret_hvc_smc_wrapper.cc https://github.com/google/safeside/blob/master/kernel_modules/kmod_eret_hvc_smc/eret_hvc_smc_module.c Signed-off-by: Anthony Steinhauser <asteinhauser@google.com> Change-Id: Iead39b0b9fb4b8d8b5609daaa8be81497ba63a0f
2020-01-07 23:44:06 +00:00
exception_return
.endm
.globl tsp_exceptions
/* -----------------------------------------------------
* TSP exception handlers.
* -----------------------------------------------------
*/
vector_base tsp_exceptions
/* -----------------------------------------------------
* Current EL with _sp_el0 : 0x0 - 0x200. No exceptions
* are expected and treated as irrecoverable errors.
* -----------------------------------------------------
*/
vector_entry sync_exception_sp_el0
b plat_panic_handler
end_vector_entry sync_exception_sp_el0
vector_entry irq_sp_el0
b plat_panic_handler
end_vector_entry irq_sp_el0
vector_entry fiq_sp_el0
b plat_panic_handler
end_vector_entry fiq_sp_el0
vector_entry serror_sp_el0
b plat_panic_handler
end_vector_entry serror_sp_el0
/* -----------------------------------------------------
* Current EL with SPx: 0x200 - 0x400. Only IRQs/FIQs
* are expected and handled
* -----------------------------------------------------
*/
vector_entry sync_exception_sp_elx
b plat_panic_handler
end_vector_entry sync_exception_sp_elx
vector_entry irq_sp_elx
handle_tsp_interrupt irq_sp_elx
end_vector_entry irq_sp_elx
vector_entry fiq_sp_elx
handle_tsp_interrupt fiq_sp_elx
end_vector_entry fiq_sp_elx
vector_entry serror_sp_elx
b plat_panic_handler
end_vector_entry serror_sp_elx
/* -----------------------------------------------------
* Lower EL using AArch64 : 0x400 - 0x600. No exceptions
* are handled since TSP does not implement a lower EL
* -----------------------------------------------------
*/
vector_entry sync_exception_aarch64
b plat_panic_handler
end_vector_entry sync_exception_aarch64
vector_entry irq_aarch64
b plat_panic_handler
end_vector_entry irq_aarch64
vector_entry fiq_aarch64
b plat_panic_handler
end_vector_entry fiq_aarch64
vector_entry serror_aarch64
b plat_panic_handler
end_vector_entry serror_aarch64
/* -----------------------------------------------------
* Lower EL using AArch32 : 0x600 - 0x800. No exceptions
* handled since the TSP does not implement a lower EL.
* -----------------------------------------------------
*/
vector_entry sync_exception_aarch32
b plat_panic_handler
end_vector_entry sync_exception_aarch32
vector_entry irq_aarch32
b plat_panic_handler
end_vector_entry irq_aarch32
vector_entry fiq_aarch32
b plat_panic_handler
end_vector_entry fiq_aarch32
vector_entry serror_aarch32
b plat_panic_handler
end_vector_entry serror_aarch32