Merge changes from topic "pb/sphinx-doc" into integration

* changes:
  doc: Use proper note and warning annotations
  doc: Refactor contributor acknowledgements
  doc: Reorganise images and update links
  doc: Set correct syntax highlighting style
  doc: Add minimal glossary
  doc: Remove per-page contents lists
  doc: Make checkpatch ignore rst files
  doc: Format security advisory titles and headings
  doc: Reformat platform port documents
  doc: Normalise section numbering and headings
  doc: Reword document titles
This commit is contained in:
Sandrine Bailleux 2019-05-23 13:14:00 +00:00 committed by TrustedFirmware Code Review
commit ced1711297
100 changed files with 750 additions and 559 deletions

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@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ ROOT_DIRS_TO_CHECK := $(sort $(filter-out \
lib \
include \
docs \
%.md, \
%.rst, \
$(wildcard *)))
CHECK_PATHS := ${ROOT_DIRS_TO_CHECK} \
${INC_DIRS_TO_CHECK} \
@ -815,7 +815,7 @@ realclean distclean:
checkcodebase: locate-checkpatch
@echo " CHECKING STYLE"
@if test -d .git ; then \
git ls-files | grep -E -v 'libfdt|libc|docs|\.md' | \
git ls-files | grep -E -v 'libfdt|libc|docs|\.rst' | \
while read GIT_FILE ; \
do ${CHECKPATCH} ${CHECKCODE_ARGS} -f $$GIT_FILE ; \
done ; \
@ -825,7 +825,7 @@ checkcodebase: locate-checkpatch
-not -iwholename "*libfdt*" \
-not -iwholename "*libc*" \
-not -iwholename "*docs*" \
-not -iwholename "*.md" \
-not -iwholename "*.rst" \
-exec ${CHECKPATCH} ${CHECKCODE_ARGS} -f {} \; ; \
fi

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@ -1,28 +1,17 @@
**Note: This file is only relevant for legacy contributions, to acknowledge the
specific contributors referred to in "Arm Limited and Contributors" copyright
notices. As contributors are now encouraged to put their name or company name
directly into the copyright notices, this file is not relevant for new
contributions.**
Contributor Acknowledgements
============================
Companies
---------
.. note::
This file is only relevant for legacy contributions, to acknowledge the
specific contributors referred to in "Arm Limited and Contributors" copyright
notices. As contributors are now encouraged to put their name or company name
directly into the copyright notices, this file is not relevant for new
contributions.
Linaro Limited
NVIDIA Corporation
Socionext Inc.
Xilinx, Inc.
NXP Semiconductors
Marvell International Ltd.
STMicroelectronics
Individuals
-----------
- Linaro Limited
- Marvell International Ltd.
- NVIDIA Corporation
- NXP Semiconductors
- Socionext Inc.
- STMicroelectronics
- Xilinx, Inc.

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@ -1,11 +1,9 @@
Trusted Firmware-A Release Notes
================================
Change Log & Release Notes
==========================
This document contains a summary of the new features, changes, fixes and known
issues in each release of Trusted Firmware-A.
.. contents::
Version 2.1
-----------
@ -296,12 +294,12 @@ Changed
- SDEI
- Added support for unconditionally resuming secure world execution after
SDEI event processing completes
|SDEI| event processing completes
SDEI interrupts, although targeting EL3, occur on behalf of the non-secure
|SDEI| interrupts, although targeting EL3, occur on behalf of the non-secure
world, and may have higher priority than secure world
interrupts. Therefore they might preempt secure execution and yield
execution to the non-secure SDEI handler. Upon completion of SDEI event
execution to the non-secure |SDEI| handler. Upon completion of |SDEI| event
handling, resume secure execution if it was preempted.
- Translation Tables (XLAT)
@ -503,7 +501,7 @@ New Features
- Implement dynamic mitigation for CVE-2018-3639 on Cortex-A76
- Ensure SDEI handler executes with CVE-2018-3639 mitigation enabled
- Ensure |SDEI| handler executes with CVE-2018-3639 mitigation enabled
- Introduce RAS handling on AArch64
@ -623,7 +621,7 @@ New Features
- Introduce jump primitives for BL31
- Mask events after CPU wakeup in SDEI dispatcher to conform to the
- Mask events after CPU wakeup in |SDEI| dispatcher to conform to the
specification
- Misc TF-A Core Common Code Enhancements
@ -787,8 +785,8 @@ New features
management and security services. The SPM is the firmware component that
is responsible for managing a Secure Partition.
- SDEI dispatcher: Support for interrupt-based SDEI events and all
interfaces as defined by the SDEI specification v1.0, see
- SDEI dispatcher: Support for interrupt-based |SDEI| events and all
interfaces as defined by the |SDEI| specification v1.0, see
`SDEI Specification`_
- Exception Handling Framework (EHF): Framework that allows dispatching of
@ -1188,7 +1186,8 @@ New features
- Migrated to use SPDX[0] license identifiers to make software license
auditing simpler.
*NOTE:* Files that have been imported by FreeBSD have not been modified.
.. note::
Files that have been imported by FreeBSD have not been modified.
[0]: https://spdx.org/
@ -2207,7 +2206,8 @@ New features
be used on the AEMv8 and Cortex-A57-A53 Base FVPs, as well as the Foundation
FVP.
NOTE: The software will not work on Version 1.0 of the Foundation FVP.
.. note::
The software will not work on Version 1.0 of the Foundation FVP.
- Enabled third party contributions. Added a new contributing.md containing
instructions for how to contribute and updated copyright text in all files
@ -2238,15 +2238,18 @@ New features
FIP from NOR flash, although some support for image loading using semi-
hosting is retained.
NOTE: Building a FIP by default is a non-backwards-compatible change.
.. note::
Building a FIP by default is a non-backwards-compatible change.
NOTE: Generic BL2 code now loads a BL3-3 (non-trusted firmware) image into
DRAM instead of expecting this to be pre-loaded at known location. This is
also a non-backwards-compatible change.
.. note::
Generic BL2 code now loads a BL3-3 (non-trusted firmware) image into
DRAM instead of expecting this to be pre-loaded at known location. This is
also a non-backwards-compatible change.
NOTE: Some non-trusted firmware (e.g. UEFI) will need to be rebuilt so that
it knows the new location to execute from and no longer needs to copy
particular code modules to DRAM itself.
.. note::
Some non-trusted firmware (e.g. UEFI) will need to be rebuilt so that
it knows the new location to execute from and no longer needs to copy
particular code modules to DRAM itself.
- Reworked BL2 to BL3-1 handover interface. A new composite structure
(bl31_args) holds the superset of information that needs to be passed from
@ -2272,8 +2275,11 @@ New features
Dispatcher (TSPD), which is loaded as an EL3 runtime service. The TSPD
implements Secure Monitor functionality such as world switching and
EL1 context management, and is responsible for communication with the TSP.
NOTE: The TSPD does not yet contain support for secure world interrupts.
NOTE: The TSP/TSPD is not built by default.
.. note::
The TSPD does not yet contain support for secure world interrupts.
.. note::
The TSP/TSPD is not built by default.
Issues resolved since last release
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

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@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
Arm SiP Service
===============
Arm SiP Services
================
This document enumerates and describes the Arm SiP (Silicon Provider) services.

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@ -1,14 +1,5 @@
Exception Handling Framework in Trusted Firmware-A
==================================================
.. contents::
:depth: 2
.. |EHF| replace:: Exception Handling Framework
.. |TF-A| replace:: Trusted Firmware-A
Exception Handling Framework
============================
This document describes various aspects of handling exceptions by Runtime
Firmware (BL31) that are targeted at EL3, other than SMCs. The |EHF| takes care
@ -54,11 +45,11 @@ exceptions are targeted at and handled in EL3. For instance:
- The Arm `SDEI specification`_ defines interfaces through which Normal world
interacts with the Runtime Firmware in order to request notification of
system events. The SDEI specification requires that these events are notified
even when the Normal world executes with the exceptions masked. This too
implies that firmware-first handling is required, where the events are first
received by the EL3 firmware, and then dispatched to Normal world through
purely software mechanism.
system events. The |SDEI| specification requires that these events are
notified even when the Normal world executes with the exceptions masked. This
too implies that firmware-first handling is required, where the events are
first received by the EL3 firmware, and then dispatched to Normal world
through purely software mechanism.
For |TF-A|, firmware-first handling means that asynchronous exceptions are
suitably routed to EL3, and the Runtime Firmware (BL31) is extended to include
@ -79,8 +70,8 @@ choose to:
processing of the error to dedicated software stack running at lower secure
ELs (as above); additionally, the Normal world may also be required to
participate in the handling, or be notified of such events (for example, as
an SDEI event). In this scheme, exception handling potentially and maximally
spans all ELs in both Secure and Normal worlds.
an |SDEI| event). In this scheme, exception handling potentially and
maximally spans all ELs in both Secure and Normal worlds.
On any given system, all of the above handling models may be employed
independently depending on platform choice and the nature of the exception
@ -116,7 +107,7 @@ for more than one priority level.
.. _ehf-figure:
.. image:: ../draw.io/ehf.svg
.. image:: ../resources/diagrams/draw.io/ehf.svg
A priority level is *active* when a handler at that priority level is currently
executing in EL3, or has delegated the execution to a lower EL. For interrupts,
@ -202,7 +193,7 @@ priority assignment:
6 and 5), the platform can partition into 4 secure priority ranges: ``0x0``,
``0x20``, ``0x40``, and ``0x60``. See `Interrupt handling example`_.
Note:
.. note::
The Arm GIC architecture requires that a GIC implementation that supports two
security states must implement at least 32 priority levels; i.e., at least 5
@ -224,7 +215,7 @@ priority level descriptors. Each entry in the array is of type
``ehf_pri_desc_t``, and declares a priority level, and shall be populated by the
``EHF_PRI_DESC()`` macro.
Note:
.. warning::
The macro ``EHF_PRI_DESC()`` installs the descriptors in the array at a
computed index, and not necessarily where the macro is placed in the array.
@ -609,8 +600,8 @@ should carefully consider the assignment of priorities to dispatchers integrated
into runtime firmware. The platform should sensibly delineate priority to
various dispatchers according to their nature. In particular, dispatchers of
critical nature (RAS, for example) should be assigned higher priority than
others (SDEI, for example); and within SDEI, Critical priority SDEI should be
assigned higher priority than Normal ones.
others (|SDEI|, for example); and within |SDEI|, Critical priority
|SDEI| should be assigned higher priority than Normal ones.
Limitations
-----------

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@ -1,12 +1,5 @@
Trusted Firmware-A - Firmware Update design guide
=================================================
.. contents::
--------------
Firmware Update (FWU)
=====================
Introduction
------------
@ -407,5 +400,5 @@ This is only allowed if the image is not being executed.
.. _Authentication Framework Design: ./auth-framework.rst
.. _Universally Unique Identifier: https://tools.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4122.txt
.. |Flow Diagram| image:: diagrams/fwu_flow.png?raw=true
.. |FWU state machine| image:: diagrams/fwu_states.png?raw=true
.. |Flow Diagram| image:: ../resources/diagrams/fwu_flow.png
.. |FWU state machine| image:: ../resources/diagrams/fwu_states.png

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@ -1,9 +1,5 @@
Platform Interrupt Controller API documentation
===============================================
.. contents::
Platform Interrupt Controller API
=================================
This document lists the optional platform interrupt controller API that
abstracts the runtime configuration and control of interrupt controller from the

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@ -1,10 +1,5 @@
RAS support in Trusted Firmware-A
=================================
.. contents::
:depth: 2
Reliability, Availability, and Serviceability (RAS) Extensions
==============================================================
.. |EHF| replace:: Exception Handling Framework
.. |TF-A| replace:: Trusted Firmware-A
@ -44,7 +39,7 @@ be set ``1``.
.. _ras-figure:
.. image:: ../draw.io/ras.svg
.. image:: ../resources/diagrams/draw.io/ras.svg
See more on `Engaging the RAS framework`_.

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@ -1,11 +1,6 @@
Library at ROM
==============
.. section-numbering::
:suffix: .
.. contents::
This document provides an overview of the "library at ROM" implementation in
Trusted Firmware-A (TF-A).
@ -28,7 +23,7 @@ are placed in ROM. The capabilities of the "library at ROM" are:
Index file
~~~~~~~~~~
.. image:: diagrams/romlib_design.png
.. image:: ../resources/diagrams/romlib_design.png
:width: 600
Library at ROM is described by an index file with the list of functions to be
@ -59,7 +54,7 @@ For an index file example, refer to ``lib/romlib/jmptbl.i``.
Wrapper functions
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
.. image:: diagrams/romlib_wrapper.png
.. image:: ../resources/diagrams/romlib_wrapper.png
:width: 600
When invoking a function of the "library at ROM", the calling sequence is as
@ -111,7 +106,7 @@ The environment variable ``CROSS_COMPILE`` must be set as per the user guide.
In the below example the usage of ROMLIB together with mbed TLS is demonstrated
to showcase the benefits of library at ROM - it's not mandatory.
::
.. code:: shell
make PLAT=fvp \
MBEDTLS_DIR=</path/to/mbedtls/> \

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@ -1,9 +1,6 @@
SDEI: Software Delegated Exception Interface
============================================
.. contents::
:depth: 2
This document provides an overview of the SDEI dispatcher implementation in
Trusted Firmware-A (TF-A).
@ -29,7 +26,7 @@ The following figure depicts a general sequence involving SDEI client executing
at EL2 and an event dispatch resulting from the triggering of a bound interrupt.
A commentary is provided below:
.. image:: ../plantuml/sdei_general.svg
.. image:: ../resources/diagrams/plantuml/sdei_general.svg
As part of initialisation, the SDEI client binds a Non-secure interrupt [1], and
the SDEI dispatcher returns a platform dynamic event number [2]. The client then
@ -227,7 +224,7 @@ activity, such as receiving a Secure interrupt or an exception.
The SDEI dispatcher implementation provides ``sdei_dispatch_event()`` API for
this purpose. The API has the following signature:
::
.. code:: c
int sdei_dispatch_event(int ev_num);
@ -237,7 +234,7 @@ on success, or ``-1`` on failure.
The following figure depicts a scenario involving explicit dispatch of SDEI
event. A commentary is provided below:
.. image:: ../plantuml/sdei_explicit_dispatch.svg
.. image:: ../resources/diagrams/plantuml/sdei_explicit_dispatch.svg
As part of initialisation, the SDEI client registers a handler for a platform
event [1], enables the event [3], and unmasks the current PE [5]. Note that,

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@ -1,10 +1,5 @@
*******************************
Secure Partition Manager Design
*******************************
.. contents::
Secure Partition Manager
************************
Background
==========
@ -135,7 +130,7 @@ First, build the Standalone MM Secure Partition. To build it, refer to the
Then build TF-A with SPM support and include the Standalone MM Secure Partition
image in the FIP:
::
.. code:: shell
BL32=path/to/standalone/mm/sp BL33=path/to/bl33.bin \
make PLAT=fvp ENABLE_SPM=1 ARM_BL31_IN_DRAM=1 fip all
@ -819,5 +814,5 @@ Error Codes
.. _SDEI Specification: http://infocenter.arm.com/help/topic/com.arm.doc.den0054a/ARM_DEN0054A_Software_Delegated_Exception_Interface.pdf
.. _SMC Calling Convention: http://infocenter.arm.com/help/topic/com.arm.doc.den0028b/ARM_DEN0028B_SMC_Calling_Convention.pdf
.. |Image 1| image:: ../diagrams/secure_sw_stack_tos.png
.. |Image 2| image:: ../diagrams/secure_sw_stack_sp.png
.. |Image 1| image:: ../resources/diagrams/secure_sw_stack_tos.png
.. |Image 2| image:: ../resources/diagrams/secure_sw_stack_sp.png

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@ -4,7 +4,6 @@ Secure Payload Dispatcher (SPD)
.. toctree::
:maxdepth: 1
:caption: Contents
:numbered:
optee-dispatcher
tlk-dispatcher

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@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ Once a BL32 is ready, TLKD can be included in the image by adding "SPD=tlkd"
to the build command.
Trusted Little Kernel (TLK)
===========================
---------------------------
TLK is a Trusted OS running as Secure EL1. It is a Free Open Source Software
(FOSS) release of the NVIDIA® Trusted Little Kernel (TLK) technology, which
@ -54,20 +54,20 @@ TLK and OTE can be found in the Tegra\_BSP\_for\_Android\_TLK\_FOSS\_Reference.p
manual located under the "documentation" directory\_.
Build TLK
=========
---------
To build and execute TLK, follow the instructions from "Building a TLK Device"
section from Tegra\_BSP\_for\_Android\_TLK\_FOSS\_Reference.pdf manual.
Input parameters to TLK
=======================
-----------------------
TLK expects the TZDRAM size and a structure containing the boot arguments. BL2
passes this information to the EL3 software as members of the bl32\_ep\_info
struct, where bl32\_ep\_info is part of bl31\_params\_t (passed by BL2 in X0)
Example:
--------
Example
~~~~~~~
::

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@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Open Source Project (AOSP) webpage for Trusty hosted at
https://source.android.com/security/trusty
Boot parameters
===============
---------------
Custom boot parameters can be passed to Trusty by providing a platform
specific function:
@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ can be set to a platform specific parameter block, and ``args->arg2``
should then be set to the size of that block.
Supported platforms
===================
-------------------
Out of all the platforms supported by Trusted Firmware-A, Trusty is only
verified and supported by NVIDIA's Tegra SoCs.

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@ -1,12 +1,6 @@
Translation Tables Library Design
Translation (XLAT) Tables Library
=================================
.. contents::
This document describes the design of the translation tables library (version 2)
used by Trusted Firmware-A (TF-A). This library provides APIs to create page
tables based on a description of the memory layout, as well as setting up system
@ -424,4 +418,4 @@ mapping cannot be cached in the TLBs.
.. _aarch32/xlat_tables_arch.c: ../../lib/xlat_tables_v2/aarch32/xlat_tables_arch.c
.. _aarch64/xlat_tables_arch.c: ../../lib/xlat_tables_v2/aarch64/xlat_tables_arch.c
.. _Porting Guide: ../getting_started/porting-guide.rst
.. |Alignment Example| image:: ../diagrams/xlat_align.png?raw=true
.. |Alignment Example| image:: ../resources/diagrams/xlat_align.png

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@ -9,6 +9,8 @@
#
# See the options documentation at http://www.sphinx-doc.org/en/master/config
import os
# -- Project information -----------------------------------------------------
project = 'Trusted Firmware-A'
@ -16,7 +18,6 @@ project = 'Trusted Firmware-A'
version = '2.1'
release = version # We don't need these to be distinct
# -- General configuration ---------------------------------------------------
# Add any Sphinx extension module names here, as strings. They can be
@ -48,6 +49,10 @@ exclude_patterns = []
# The name of the Pygments (syntax highlighting) style to use.
pygments_style = 'sphinx'
# Load the contents of the global substitutions file into the 'rst_prolog'
# variable. This ensures that the substitutions are all inserted into each page.
with open('global_substitutions.txt', 'r') as subs:
rst_prolog = subs.read()
# -- Options for HTML output -------------------------------------------------

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@ -1,10 +1,5 @@
Abstracting a Chain of Trust
============================
.. contents::
Authentication Framework & Chain of Trust
=========================================
The aim of this document is to describe the authentication framework
implemented in Trusted Firmware-A (TF-A). This framework fulfills the
@ -413,7 +408,7 @@ An IPL must provide functions with the following prototypes:
An IPL for each type must be registered using the following macro:
::
.. code:: c
REGISTER_IMG_PARSER_LIB(_type, _name, _init, _check_int, _get_param)
@ -958,9 +953,11 @@ sources in the build for the various algorithms. Setting the variable to
`rsa+ecdsa` enables support for both rsa and ecdsa algorithms in the mbedTLS
library.
Note: If code size is a concern, the build option ``MBEDTLS_SHA256_SMALLER`` can
be defined in the platform Makefile. It will make mbed TLS use an implementation
of SHA-256 with smaller memory footprint (~1.5 KB less) but slower (~30%).
.. note::
If code size is a concern, the build option ``MBEDTLS_SHA256_SMALLER`` can
be defined in the platform Makefile. It will make mbed TLS use an
implementation of SHA-256 with smaller memory footprint (~1.5 KB less) but
slower (~30%).
--------------

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@ -1,11 +1,6 @@
Arm CPU Specific Build Macros
=============================
.. contents::
This document describes the various build options present in the CPU specific
operations framework to enable errata workarounds and to enable optimizations
for a specific CPU on a platform.

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@ -1,10 +1,5 @@
Trusted Firmware-A design
=========================
.. contents::
Firmware Design
===============
Trusted Firmware-A (TF-A) implements a subset of the Trusted Board Boot
Requirements (TBBR) Platform Design Document (PDD) [1]_ for Arm reference
@ -1146,8 +1141,10 @@ returning through EL3 and running the non-trusted firmware (BL33):
``bl31_register_bl32_init()`` which provides a SPD-defined mechanism to
invoke a 'world-switch synchronous call' to Secure-EL1 to run the BL32
entrypoint.
NOTE: The Test SPD service included with TF-A provides one implementation
of such a mechanism.
.. note::
The Test SPD service included with TF-A provides one implementation
of such a mechanism.
On completion BL32 returns control to BL31 via a SMC, and on receipt the
SPD service handler invokes the synchronous call return mechanism to return
@ -1680,8 +1677,9 @@ The location of the BL32 image will result in different memory maps. This is
illustrated for both FVP and Juno in the following diagrams, using the TSP as
an example.
Note: Loading the BL32 image in TZC secured DRAM doesn't change the memory
layout of the other images in Trusted SRAM.
.. note::
Loading the BL32 image in TZC secured DRAM doesn't change the memory
layout of the other images in Trusted SRAM.
CONFIG section in memory layouts shown below contains:
@ -2220,8 +2218,9 @@ The default memory layout for each BL image is as follows:
| Code |
+-------------------+ BLx_BASE
Note: The 2KB alignment for the exception vectors is an architectural
requirement.
.. note::
The 2KB alignment for the exception vectors is an architectural
requirement.
The read-write data start on a new memory page so that they can be mapped with
read-write permissions, whereas the code and read-only data below are configured
@ -2309,7 +2308,7 @@ result in build error. Subscribing to an undefined event however won't.
Subscribed handlers must be of type ``pubsub_cb_t``, with following function
signature:
::
.. code:: c
typedef void* (*pubsub_cb_t)(const void *arg);
@ -2336,7 +2335,7 @@ A publisher that wants to publish event ``foo`` would:
- Define the event ``foo`` in the ``pubsub_events.h``.
::
.. code:: c
REGISTER_PUBSUB_EVENT(foo);
@ -2472,7 +2471,7 @@ respectively.
From outside TF-A, timestamps for individual CPUs can be retrieved by calling
into ``pmf_smc_handler()``.
.. code:: c
::
Interface : pmf_smc_handler()
Argument : unsigned int smc_fid, u_register_t x1,
@ -2602,7 +2601,7 @@ Platform may choose to not define straight the toolchain target architecture
directive by defining ``MARCH32_DIRECTIVE``.
I.e:
::
.. code:: make
MARCH32_DIRECTIVE := -mach=armv7-a
@ -2684,4 +2683,4 @@ References
.. _ROMLIB Design: romlib-design.rst
.. _Trusted Board Boot Requirements CLIENT (TBBR-CLIENT) Armv8-A (ARM DEN0006D): https://developer.arm.com/docs/den0006/latest/trusted-board-boot-requirements-client-tbbr-client-armv8-a
.. |Image 1| image:: diagrams/rt-svc-descs-layout.png?raw=true
.. |Image 1| image:: ../resources/diagrams/rt-svc-descs-layout.png

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@ -1,10 +1,5 @@
Trusted Firmware-A interrupt management design guide
====================================================
.. contents::
Interrupt Management Framework
==============================
This framework is responsible for managing interrupts routed to EL3. It also
allows EL3 software to configure the interrupt routing behavior. Its main
@ -53,7 +48,7 @@ the exception level(s) it is handled in.
The following constants define the various interrupt types in the framework
implementation.
::
.. code:: c
#define INTR_TYPE_S_EL1 0
#define INTR_TYPE_EL3 1
@ -421,8 +416,9 @@ runtime.
Test secure payload dispatcher behavior
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
**Note:** where this document discusses ``TSP_NS_INTR_ASYNC_PREEMPT`` as being
``1``, the same results also apply when ``EL3_EXCEPTION_HANDLING`` is ``1``.
.. note::
Where this document discusses ``TSP_NS_INTR_ASYNC_PREEMPT`` as being
``1``, the same results also apply when ``EL3_EXCEPTION_HANDLING`` is ``1``.
The TSPD only handles Secure-EL1 interrupts and is provided with the following
routing model at build time.
@ -1020,5 +1016,5 @@ TSP by returning ``SMC_UNK`` error.
.. _Porting Guide: ../getting_started/porting-guide.rst
.. _SMC calling convention: http://infocenter.arm.com/help/topic/com.arm.doc.den0028a/index.html
.. |Image 1| image:: diagrams/sec-int-handling.png?raw=true
.. |Image 2| image:: diagrams/non-sec-int-handling.png?raw=true
.. |Image 1| image:: ../resources/diagrams/sec-int-handling.png
.. |Image 2| image:: ../resources/diagrams/non-sec-int-handling.png

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@ -1,12 +1,5 @@
PSCI Power Domain Tree design
=============================
.. contents::
--------------
PSCI Power Domain Tree Structure
================================
Requirements
------------
@ -116,7 +109,7 @@ separately.
This tree is defined by the platform as the array described above as follows:
::
.. code:: c
#define PLAT_NUM_POWER_DOMAINS 20
#define PLATFORM_CORE_COUNT 13
@ -226,7 +219,7 @@ to represent leaf and non-leaf power domain nodes in the tree.
The power domain tree is implemented as a combination of the following data
structures.
::
.. code:: c
non_cpu_pd_node_t psci_non_cpu_pd_nodes[PSCI_NUM_NON_CPU_PWR_DOMAINS];
cpu_pd_node_t psci_cpu_pd_nodes[PLATFORM_CORE_COUNT];

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@ -1,10 +1,5 @@
Trusted Firmware-A reset design
===============================
.. contents::
CPU Reset
=========
This document describes the high-level design of the framework to handle CPU
resets in Trusted Firmware-A (TF-A). It also describes how the platform
@ -28,10 +23,11 @@ configuration, some of these steps might be unnecessary. The following sections
guide the platform integrator by indicating which build options exclude which
steps, depending on the capability of the platform.
Note: If BL31 is used as the TF-A entry point instead of BL1, the diagram
above is still relevant, as all these operations will occur in BL31 in
this case. Please refer to section 6 "Using BL31 entrypoint as the reset
address" for more information.
.. note::
If BL31 is used as the TF-A entry point instead of BL1, the diagram
above is still relevant, as all these operations will occur in BL31 in
this case. Please refer to section 6 "Using BL31 entrypoint as the reset
address" for more information.
Programmable CPU reset address
------------------------------
@ -159,7 +155,7 @@ This might be done by the Trusted Boot Firmware or by platform code in BL31.
.. _Firmware Design: firmware-design.rst
.. _User Guide: ../getting_started/user-guide.rst
.. |Default reset code flow| image:: ../diagrams/default_reset_code.png?raw=true
.. |Reset code flow with programmable reset address| image:: ../diagrams/reset_code_no_boot_type_check.png?raw=true
.. |Reset code flow with single CPU released out of reset| image:: ../diagrams/reset_code_no_cpu_check.png?raw=true
.. |Reset code flow with programmable reset address and single CPU released out of reset| image:: ../diagrams/reset_code_no_checks.png?raw=true
.. |Default reset code flow| image:: ../resources/diagrams/default_reset_code.png
.. |Reset code flow with programmable reset address| image:: ../resources/diagrams/reset_code_no_boot_type_check.png
.. |Reset code flow with single CPU released out of reset| image:: ../resources/diagrams/reset_code_no_cpu_check.png
.. |Reset code flow with programmable reset address and single CPU released out of reset| image:: ../resources/diagrams/reset_code_no_checks.png

View File

@ -1,10 +1,5 @@
Trusted Board Boot Design Guide
===============================
.. contents::
Trusted Board Boot
==================
The Trusted Board Boot (TBB) feature prevents malicious firmware from running on
the platform by authenticating all firmware images up to and including the
@ -146,8 +141,9 @@ if any of the steps fail.
compared with the hash of the ROTPK read from the trusted root-key storage
registers. If they match, the BL2 hash is read from the certificate.
Note: the matching operation is platform specific and is currently
unimplemented on the Arm development platforms.
.. note::
The matching operation is platform specific and is currently
unimplemented on the Arm development platforms.
- BL1 loads the BL2 image. Its hash is calculated and compared with the hash
read from the certificate. Control is transferred to the BL2 image if all

View File

@ -1,11 +1,6 @@
Image Terminology
=================
.. section-numbering::
:suffix: .
.. contents::
This page contains the current name, abbreviated name and purpose of the various
images referred to in the Trusted Firmware project.

View File

@ -1,9 +1,5 @@
Trusted Firmware-A Porting Guide
================================
.. contents::
Porting Guide
=============
Introduction
------------
@ -335,7 +331,9 @@ must also be defined:
SCP_BL2U image identifier, used by BL1 to fetch an image descriptor
corresponding to SCP_BL2U.
NOTE: TF-A does not provide source code for this image.
.. note::
TF-A does not provide source code for this image.
If the Non-Secure Firmware Updater ROM, NS_BL1U is used, the following must
also be defined:
@ -344,7 +342,9 @@ also be defined:
Defines the base address in non-secure ROM where NS_BL1U executes.
Must be aligned on a page-size boundary.
NOTE: TF-A does not provide source code for this image.
.. note::
TF-A does not provide source code for this image.
- **#define : NS_BL1U_IMAGE_ID**
@ -358,7 +358,9 @@ be defined:
Defines the base address in non-secure memory where NS_BL2U executes.
Must be aligned on a page-size boundary.
NOTE: TF-A does not provide source code for this image.
.. note::
TF-A does not provide source code for this image.
- **#define : NS_BL2U_IMAGE_ID**
@ -1004,8 +1006,9 @@ situation from which it cannot recover. This function must not return,
and must be implemented in assembly because it may be called before the C
environment is initialized.
Note: The address from where it was called is stored in x30 (Link Register).
The default implementation simply spins.
.. note::
The address from where it was called is stored in x30 (Link Register).
The default implementation simply spins.
Function : plat_get_bl_image_load_info()
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
@ -1046,9 +1049,10 @@ value will weaken the protection as the attacker could easily write the right
value as part of the attack most of the time. Therefore, it should return a
true random number.
Note: For the protection to be effective, the global data need to be placed at
a lower address than the stack bases. Failure to do so would allow an attacker
to overwrite the canary as part of the stack buffer overflow attack.
.. warning::
For the protection to be effective, the global data need to be placed at
a lower address than the stack bases. Failure to do so would allow an
attacker to overwrite the canary as part of the stack buffer overflow attack.
Function : plat_flush_next_bl_params()
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
@ -1844,7 +1848,7 @@ line boundary.
SDEI porting requirements
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
The SDEI dispatcher requires the platform to provide the following macros
The |SDEI| dispatcher requires the platform to provide the following macros
and functions, of which some are optional, and some others mandatory.
Macros
@ -1854,19 +1858,19 @@ Macro: PLAT_SDEI_NORMAL_PRI [mandatory]
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
This macro must be defined to the EL3 exception priority level associated with
Normal SDEI events on the platform. This must have a higher value (therefore of
lower priority) than ``PLAT_SDEI_CRITICAL_PRI``.
Normal |SDEI| events on the platform. This must have a higher value
(therefore of lower priority) than ``PLAT_SDEI_CRITICAL_PRI``.
Macro: PLAT_SDEI_CRITICAL_PRI [mandatory]
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
This macro must be defined to the EL3 exception priority level associated with
Critical SDEI events on the platform. This must have a lower value (therefore of
higher priority) than ``PLAT_SDEI_NORMAL_PRI``.
Critical |SDEI| events on the platform. This must have a lower value
(therefore of higher priority) than ``PLAT_SDEI_NORMAL_PRI``.
**Note**: SDEI exception priorities must be the lowest among Secure priorities.
Among the SDEI exceptions, Critical SDEI priority must be higher than Normal
SDEI priority.
**Note**: |SDEI| exception priorities must be the lowest among Secure
priorities. Among the |SDEI| exceptions, Critical |SDEI| priority must
be higher than Normal |SDEI| priority.
Functions
.........
@ -1880,10 +1884,10 @@ Function: int plat_sdei_validate_entry_point(uintptr_t ep) [optional]
Return: int
This function validates the address of client entry points provided for both
event registration and *Complete and Resume* SDEI calls. The function takes one
argument, which is the address of the handler the SDEI client requested to
register. The function must return ``0`` for successful validation, or ``-1``
upon failure.
event registration and *Complete and Resume* |SDEI| calls. The function
takes one argument, which is the address of the handler the |SDEI| client
requested to register. The function must return ``0`` for successful validation,
or ``-1`` upon failure.
The default implementation always returns ``0``. On Arm platforms, this function
is implemented to translate the entry point to physical address, and further to
@ -1898,11 +1902,12 @@ Function: void plat_sdei_handle_masked_trigger(uint64_t mpidr, unsigned int intr
Argument: unsigned int
Return: void
SDEI specification requires that a PE comes out of reset with the events masked.
The client therefore is expected to call ``PE_UNMASK`` to unmask SDEI events on
the PE. No SDEI events can be dispatched until such time.
|SDEI| specification requires that a PE comes out of reset with the events
masked. The client therefore is expected to call ``PE_UNMASK`` to unmask
|SDEI| events on the PE. No |SDEI| events can be dispatched until such
time.
Should a PE receive an interrupt that was bound to an SDEI event while the
Should a PE receive an interrupt that was bound to an |SDEI| event while the
events are masked on the PE, the dispatcher implementation invokes the function
``plat_sdei_handle_masked_trigger``. The MPIDR of the PE that received the
interrupt and the interrupt ID are passed as parameters.
@ -2567,10 +2572,12 @@ makefiles in order to benefit from them. By default, they will cause the crash
output to be routed over the normal console infrastructure and get printed on
consoles configured to output in crash state. ``console_set_scope()`` can be
used to control whether a console is used for crash output.
NOTE: Platforms are responsible for making sure that they only mark consoles for
use in the crash scope that are able to support this, i.e. that are written in
assembly and conform with the register clobber rules for putc() (x0-x2, x16-x17)
and flush() (x0-x3, x16-x17) crash callbacks.
.. note::
Platforms are responsible for making sure that they only mark consoles for
use in the crash scope that are able to support this, i.e. that are written
in assembly and conform with the register clobber rules for putc()
(x0-x2, x16-x17) and flush() (x0-x3, x16-x17) crash callbacks.
In some cases (such as debugging very early crashes that happen before the
normal boot console can be set up), platforms may want to control crash output

View File

@ -1,10 +1,6 @@
PSCI Library Integration guide for Armv8-A AArch32 systems
==========================================================
.. contents::
This document describes the PSCI library interface with a focus on how to
integrate with a suitable Trusted OS for an Armv8-A AArch32 system. The PSCI
Library implements the PSCI Standard as described in `PSCI spec`_ and is meant

View File

@ -1,10 +1,6 @@
Trusted Firmware-A EL3 runtime service writer's guide
EL3 Runtime Service Writer's Guide
=====================================================
.. contents::
Introduction
------------
@ -96,7 +92,7 @@ A runtime service is registered using the ``DECLARE_RT_SVC()`` macro, specifying
the name of the service, the range of OENs covered, the type of service and
initialization and call handler functions.
::
.. code:: c
#define DECLARE_RT_SVC(_name, _start, _end, _type, _setup, _smch)
@ -264,8 +260,9 @@ The ``cookie`` parameter to the handler is reserved for future use and can be
ignored. The ``handle`` is returned by the SMC handler - completion of the
handler function must always be via one of the ``SMC_RETn()`` macros.
NOTE: The PSCI and Test Secure-EL1 Payload Dispatcher services do not follow
all of the above requirements yet.
.. note::
The PSCI and Test Secure-EL1 Payload Dispatcher services do not follow
all of the above requirements yet.
Services that contain multiple sub-services
-------------------------------------------

View File

@ -1,10 +1,5 @@
Trusted Firmware-A User Guide
=============================
.. contents::
User Guide
==========
This document describes how to build Trusted Firmware-A (TF-A) and run it with a
tested set of other software components using defined configurations on the Juno
@ -49,7 +44,7 @@ Tools
Install the required packages to build TF-A with the following command:
::
.. code:: shell
sudo apt-get install device-tree-compiler build-essential gcc make git libssl-dev
@ -101,9 +96,10 @@ targets which both utilise the `checkpatch.pl` script that ships with the Linux
source tree. The project also defines certain *checkpatch* options in the
``.checkpatch.conf`` file in the top-level directory.
**Note:** Checkpatch errors will gate upstream merging of pull requests.
Checkpatch warnings will not gate merging but should be reviewed and fixed if
possible.
.. note::
Checkpatch errors will gate upstream merging of pull requests.
Checkpatch warnings will not gate merging but should be reviewed and fixed if
possible.
To check the entire source tree, you must first download copies of
``checkpatch.pl``, ``spelling.txt`` and ``const_structs.checkpatch`` available
@ -111,14 +107,14 @@ in the `Linux master tree`_ *scripts* directory, then set the ``CHECKPATCH``
environment variable to point to ``checkpatch.pl`` (with the other 2 files in
the same directory) and build the `checkcodebase` target:
::
.. code:: shell
make CHECKPATCH=<path-to-linux>/linux/scripts/checkpatch.pl checkcodebase
To just check the style on the files that differ between your local branch and
the remote master, use:
::
.. code:: shell
make CHECKPATCH=<path-to-linux>/linux/scripts/checkpatch.pl checkpatch
@ -134,13 +130,13 @@ Building TF-A
For AArch64:
::
.. code:: shell
export CROSS_COMPILE=<path-to-aarch64-gcc>/bin/aarch64-linux-gnu-
For AArch32:
::
.. code:: shell
export CROSS_COMPILE=<path-to-aarch32-gcc>/bin/arm-linux-gnueabihf-
@ -158,7 +154,7 @@ Building TF-A
For AArch64 using Arm Compiler 6:
::
.. code:: shell
export CROSS_COMPILE=<path-to-aarch64-gcc>/bin/aarch64-linux-gnu-
make CC=<path-to-armclang>/bin/armclang PLAT=<platform> all
@ -169,7 +165,7 @@ Building TF-A
For AArch64 using clang:
::
.. code:: shell
export CROSS_COMPILE=<path-to-aarch64-gcc>/bin/aarch64-linux-gnu-
make CC=<path-to-clang>/bin/clang PLAT=<platform> all
@ -178,13 +174,13 @@ Building TF-A
For AArch64:
::
.. code:: shell
make PLAT=<platform> all
For AArch32:
::
.. code:: shell
make PLAT=<platform> ARCH=aarch32 AARCH32_SP=sp_min all
@ -227,7 +223,7 @@ Building TF-A
- Build products for a specific build variant can be removed using:
::
.. code:: shell
make DEBUG=<D> PLAT=<platform> clean
@ -235,7 +231,7 @@ Building TF-A
The build tree can be removed completely using:
::
.. code:: shell
make realclean
@ -723,8 +719,9 @@ Common build options
of certificates in the FIP and FWU_FIP depends upon the value of the
``GENERATE_COT`` option.
Note: This option depends on ``CREATE_KEYS`` to be enabled. If the keys
already exist in disk, they will be overwritten without further notice.
.. warning::
This option depends on ``CREATE_KEYS`` to be enabled. If the keys
already exist in disk, they will be overwritten without further notice.
- ``TRUSTED_WORLD_KEY``: This option is used when ``GENERATE_COT=1``. It
specifies the file that contains the Trusted World private key in PEM
@ -744,8 +741,9 @@ Common build options
interrupts to TSP allowing it to save its context and hand over
synchronously to EL3 via an SMC.
Note: when ``EL3_EXCEPTION_HANDLING`` is ``1``, ``TSP_NS_INTR_ASYNC_PREEMPT``
must also be set to ``1``.
.. note::
When ``EL3_EXCEPTION_HANDLING`` is ``1``, ``TSP_NS_INTR_ASYNC_PREEMPT``
must also be set to ``1``.
- ``USE_ARM_LINK``: This flag determines whether to enable support for ARM
linker. When the ``LINKER`` build variable points to the armlink linker,
@ -940,7 +938,7 @@ Debugging options
To compile a debug version and make the build more verbose use
::
.. code:: shell
make PLAT=<platform> DEBUG=1 V=1 all
@ -953,14 +951,15 @@ version to 2 is recommended for DS-5 versions older than 5.16.
When debugging logic problems it might also be useful to disable all compiler
optimizations by using ``-O0``.
NOTE: Using ``-O0`` could cause output images to be larger and base addresses
might need to be recalculated (see the **Memory layout on Arm development
platforms** section in the `Firmware Design`_).
.. warning::
Using ``-O0`` could cause output images to be larger and base addresses
might need to be recalculated (see the **Memory layout on Arm development
platforms** section in the `Firmware Design`_).
Extra debug options can be passed to the build system by setting ``CFLAGS`` or
``LDFLAGS``:
.. code:: makefile
.. code:: shell
CFLAGS='-O0 -gdwarf-2' \
make PLAT=<platform> DEBUG=1 V=1 all
@ -1001,7 +1000,7 @@ must be recompiled as well. For more information on SPs and SPDs, see the
First clean the TF-A build directory to get rid of any previous BL31 binary.
Then to build the TSP image use:
::
.. code:: shell
make PLAT=<platform> SPD=tspd all
@ -1029,13 +1028,13 @@ and BL33 images.
For AArch64:
::
.. code:: shell
make PLAT=fvp BL33=<path-to>/bl33.bin fip
For AArch32:
::
.. code:: shell
make PLAT=fvp ARCH=aarch32 AARCH32_SP=sp_min BL33=<path-to>/bl33.bin fip
@ -1051,13 +1050,13 @@ steps:
It is recommended to remove old artifacts before building the tool:
::
.. code:: shell
make -C tools/fiptool clean
Build the tool:
::
.. code:: shell
make [DEBUG=1] [V=1] fiptool
@ -1072,7 +1071,7 @@ options.
Example 1: create a new Firmware package ``fip.bin`` that contains BL2 and BL31:
::
.. code:: shell
./tools/fiptool/fiptool create \
--tb-fw build/<platform>/<build-type>/bl2.bin \
@ -1081,13 +1080,13 @@ Example 1: create a new Firmware package ``fip.bin`` that contains BL2 and BL31:
Example 2: view the contents of an existing Firmware package:
::
.. code:: shell
./tools/fiptool/fiptool info <path-to>/fip.bin
Example 3: update the entries of an existing Firmware package:
::
.. code:: shell
# Change the BL2 from Debug to Release version
./tools/fiptool/fiptool update \
@ -1096,14 +1095,14 @@ Example 3: update the entries of an existing Firmware package:
Example 4: unpack all entries from an existing Firmware package:
::
.. code:: shell
# Images will be unpacked to the working directory
./tools/fiptool/fiptool unpack <path-to>/fip.bin
Example 5: remove an entry from an existing Firmware package:
::
.. code:: shell
./tools/fiptool/fiptool remove \
--tb-fw build/<platform>/debug/fip.bin
@ -1173,7 +1172,7 @@ images with support for these features:
Example of command line using RSA development keys:
::
.. code:: shell
MBEDTLS_DIR=<path of the directory containing mbed TLS sources> \
make PLAT=<platform> TRUSTED_BOARD_BOOT=1 GENERATE_COT=1 \
@ -1210,12 +1209,14 @@ images with support for these features:
NS_BL2U=<path-to>/<ns_bl2u_image> \
all fip fwu_fip
Note: The BL2U image will be built by default and added to the FWU_FIP.
The user may override this by adding ``BL2U=<path-to>/<bl2u_image>``
to the command line above.
.. note::
The BL2U image will be built by default and added to the FWU_FIP.
The user may override this by adding ``BL2U=<path-to>/<bl2u_image>``
to the command line above.
Note: Building and installing the non-secure and SCP FWU images (NS_BL1U,
NS_BL2U and SCP_BL2U) is outside the scope of this document.
.. note::
Building and installing the non-secure and SCP FWU images (NS_BL1U,
NS_BL2U and SCP_BL2U) is outside the scope of this document.
The result of this build will be bl1.bin, fip.bin and fwu_fip.bin binaries.
Both the FIP and FWU_FIP will include the certificates corresponding to the
@ -1230,7 +1231,7 @@ The ``cert_create`` tool is built as part of the TF-A build process when the
previous section), but it can also be built separately with the following
command:
::
.. code:: shell
make PLAT=<platform> [DEBUG=1] [V=1] certtool
@ -1239,14 +1240,14 @@ For platforms that require their own IDs in certificate files, the generic
platform must define its IDs within a ``platform_oid.h`` header file for the
build to succeed.
::
.. code:: shell
make PLAT=<platform> USE_TBBR_DEFS=0 [DEBUG=1] [V=1] certtool
``DEBUG=1`` builds the tool in debug mode. ``V=1`` makes the build process more
verbose. The following command should be used to obtain help about the tool:
::
.. code:: shell
./tools/cert_create/cert_create -h
@ -1257,25 +1258,30 @@ This section provides Juno and FVP specific instructions to build Trusted
Firmware, obtain the additional required firmware, and pack it all together in
a single FIP binary. It assumes that a `Linaro Release`_ has been installed.
Note: Pre-built binaries for AArch32 are available from Linaro Release 16.12
onwards. Before that release, pre-built binaries are only available for AArch64.
.. note::
Pre-built binaries for AArch32 are available from Linaro Release 16.12
onwards. Before that release, pre-built binaries are only available for
AArch64.
Note: Follow the full instructions for one platform before switching to a
different one. Mixing instructions for different platforms may result in
corrupted binaries.
.. warning::
Follow the full instructions for one platform before switching to a
different one. Mixing instructions for different platforms may result in
corrupted binaries.
Note: The uboot image downloaded by the Linaro workspace script does not always
match the uboot image packaged as BL33 in the corresponding fip file. It is
recommended to use the version that is packaged in the fip file using the
instructions below.
.. warning::
The uboot image downloaded by the Linaro workspace script does not always
match the uboot image packaged as BL33 in the corresponding fip file. It is
recommended to use the version that is packaged in the fip file using the
instructions below.
Note: For the FVP, the kernel FDT is packaged in FIP during build and loaded
by the firmware at runtime. See `Obtaining the Flattened Device Trees`_
section for more info on selecting the right FDT to use.
.. note::
For the FVP, the kernel FDT is packaged in FIP during build and loaded
by the firmware at runtime. See `Obtaining the Flattened Device Trees`_
section for more info on selecting the right FDT to use.
#. Clean the working directory
::
.. code:: shell
make realclean
@ -1284,7 +1290,7 @@ section for more info on selecting the right FDT to use.
Use the fiptool to extract the SCP_BL2 and BL33 images from the FIP
package included in the Linaro release:
::
.. code:: shell
# Build the fiptool
make [DEBUG=1] [V=1] fiptool
@ -1296,16 +1302,18 @@ section for more info on selecting the right FDT to use.
current working directory. The SCP_BL2 image corresponds to
``scp-fw.bin`` and BL33 corresponds to ``nt-fw.bin``.
Note: The fiptool will complain if the images to be unpacked already
exist in the current directory. If that is the case, either delete those
files or use the ``--force`` option to overwrite.
.. note::
The fiptool will complain if the images to be unpacked already
exist in the current directory. If that is the case, either delete those
files or use the ``--force`` option to overwrite.
Note: For AArch32, the instructions below assume that nt-fw.bin is a normal
world boot loader that supports AArch32.
.. note::
For AArch32, the instructions below assume that nt-fw.bin is a
normal world boot loader that supports AArch32.
#. Build TF-A images and create a new FIP for FVP
::
.. code:: shell
# AArch64
make PLAT=fvp BL33=nt-fw.bin all fip
@ -1320,7 +1328,7 @@ section for more info on selecting the right FDT to use.
Building for AArch64 on Juno simply requires the addition of ``SCP_BL2``
as a build parameter.
::
.. code:: shell
make PLAT=juno BL33=nt-fw.bin SCP_BL2=scp-fw.bin all fip
@ -1333,13 +1341,13 @@ section for more info on selecting the right FDT to use.
- Before building BL32, the environment variable ``CROSS_COMPILE`` must point
to the AArch32 Linaro cross compiler.
::
.. code:: shell
export CROSS_COMPILE=<path-to-aarch32-gcc>/bin/arm-linux-gnueabihf-
- Build BL32 in AArch32.
::
.. code:: shell
make ARCH=aarch32 PLAT=juno AARCH32_SP=sp_min \
RESET_TO_SP_MIN=1 JUNO_AARCH32_EL3_RUNTIME=1 bl32
@ -1354,14 +1362,14 @@ section for more info on selecting the right FDT to use.
- Before building BL1 and BL2, the environment variable ``CROSS_COMPILE``
must point to the AArch64 Linaro cross compiler.
::
.. code:: shell
export CROSS_COMPILE=<path-to-aarch64-gcc>/bin/aarch64-linux-gnu-
- The following parameters should be used to build BL1 and BL2 in AArch64
and point to the BL32 file.
::
.. code:: shell
make ARCH=aarch64 PLAT=juno JUNO_AARCH32_EL3_RUNTIME=1 \
BL33=nt-fw.bin SCP_BL2=scp-fw.bin \
@ -1499,7 +1507,7 @@ clear the mailbox at start-up.
One way to do that is to create an 8-byte file containing all zero bytes using
the following command:
::
.. code:: shell
dd if=/dev/zero of=mailbox.dat bs=1 count=8
@ -1569,7 +1577,7 @@ used when compiling TF-A. For example, the following command will create a FIP
without a BL33 and prepare to jump to a BL33 image loaded at address
0x80000000:
::
.. code:: shell
make PRELOADED_BL33_BASE=0x80000000 PLAT=fvp all fip
@ -1584,7 +1592,7 @@ memory (like in FVP).
For example, if the kernel is loaded at ``0x80080000`` and the DTB is loaded at
address ``0x82000000``, the firmware can be built like this:
::
.. code:: shell
CROSS_COMPILE=aarch64-linux-gnu- \
make PLAT=fvp DEBUG=1 \
@ -1632,7 +1640,7 @@ offset in ``INITRD_START`` has to be removed.
And the FVP binary can be run with the following command:
::
.. code:: shell
<path-to>/FVP_Base_AEMv8A-AEMv8A \
-C pctl.startup=0.0.0.0 \
@ -1667,7 +1675,8 @@ The latest version of the AArch64 build of TF-A has been tested on the following
Arm FVPs without shifted affinities, and that do not support threaded CPU cores
(64-bit host machine only).
The FVP models used are Version 11.6 Build 45, unless otherwise stated.
.. note::
The FVP models used are Version 11.6 Build 45, unless otherwise stated.
- ``FVP_Base_AEMv8A-AEMv8A``
- ``FVP_Base_AEMv8A-AEMv8A-AEMv8A-AEMv8A-CCN502``
@ -1704,30 +1713,36 @@ Arm FVPs without shifted affinities, and that do not support threaded CPU cores
- ``FVP_Base_AEMv8A-AEMv8A``
- ``FVP_Base_Cortex-A32x4``
NOTE: The ``FVP_Base_RevC-2xAEMv8A`` FVP only supports shifted affinities, which
is not compatible with legacy GIC configurations. Therefore this FVP does not
support these legacy GIC configurations.
.. note::
The ``FVP_Base_RevC-2xAEMv8A`` FVP only supports shifted affinities, which
is not compatible with legacy GIC configurations. Therefore this FVP does not
support these legacy GIC configurations.
NOTE: The build numbers quoted above are those reported by launching the FVP
with the ``--version`` parameter.
.. note::
The build numbers quoted above are those reported by launching the FVP
with the ``--version`` parameter.
NOTE: Linaro provides a ramdisk image in prebuilt FVP configurations and full
file systems that can be downloaded separately. To run an FVP with a virtio
file system image an additional FVP configuration option
``-C bp.virtioblockdevice.image_path="<path-to>/<file-system-image>`` can be
used.
.. note::
Linaro provides a ramdisk image in prebuilt FVP configurations and full
file systems that can be downloaded separately. To run an FVP with a virtio
file system image an additional FVP configuration option
``-C bp.virtioblockdevice.image_path="<path-to>/<file-system-image>`` can be
used.
NOTE: The software will not work on Version 1.0 of the Foundation FVP.
The commands below would report an ``unhandled argument`` error in this case.
.. note::
The software will not work on Version 1.0 of the Foundation FVP.
The commands below would report an ``unhandled argument`` error in this case.
NOTE: FVPs can be launched with ``--cadi-server`` option such that a
CADI-compliant debugger (for example, Arm DS-5) can connect to and control its
execution.
.. note::
FVPs can be launched with ``--cadi-server`` option such that a
CADI-compliant debugger (for example, Arm DS-5) can connect to and control
its execution.
NOTE: Since FVP model Version 11.0 Build 11.0.34 and Version 8.5 Build 0.8.5202
the internal synchronisation timings changed compared to older versions of the
models. The models can be launched with ``-Q 100`` option if they are required
to match the run time characteristics of the older versions.
.. warning::
Since FVP model Version 11.0 Build 11.0.34 and Version 8.5 Build 0.8.5202
the internal synchronisation timings changed compared to older versions of
the models. The models can be launched with ``-Q 100`` option if they are
required to match the run time characteristics of the older versions.
The Foundation FVP is a cut down version of the AArch64 Base FVP. It can be
downloaded for free from `Arm's website`_.
@ -1748,8 +1763,9 @@ be found in the TF-A source directory under ``fdts/``. The Foundation FVP has
a subset of the Base FVP components. For example, the Foundation FVP lacks
CLCD and MMC support, and has only one CPU cluster.
Note: It is not recommended to use the FDTs built along the kernel because not
all FDTs are available from there.
.. note::
It is not recommended to use the FDTs built along the kernel because not
all FDTs are available from there.
The dynamic configuration capability is enabled in the firmware for FVPs.
This means that the firmware can authenticate and load the FDT if present in
@ -1806,7 +1822,7 @@ Running on the Foundation FVP with reset to BL1 entrypoint
The following ``Foundation_Platform`` parameters should be used to boot Linux with
4 CPUs using the AArch64 build of TF-A.
::
.. code:: shell
<path-to>/Foundation_Platform \
--cores=4 \
@ -1842,7 +1858,7 @@ Running on the AEMv8 Base FVP with reset to BL1 entrypoint
The following ``FVP_Base_RevC-2xAEMv8A`` parameters should be used to boot Linux
with 8 CPUs using the AArch64 build of TF-A.
::
.. code:: shell
<path-to>/FVP_Base_RevC-2xAEMv8A \
-C pctl.startup=0.0.0.0 \
@ -1856,8 +1872,9 @@ with 8 CPUs using the AArch64 build of TF-A.
--data cluster0.cpu0="<path-to>/<kernel-binary>"@0x80080000 \
--data cluster0.cpu0="<path-to>/<ramdisk>"@0x84000000
Note: The ``FVP_Base_RevC-2xAEMv8A`` has shifted affinities and requires a
specific DTS for all the CPUs to be loaded.
.. note::
The ``FVP_Base_RevC-2xAEMv8A`` has shifted affinities and requires
a specific DTS for all the CPUs to be loaded.
Running on the AEMv8 Base FVP (AArch32) with reset to BL1 entrypoint
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
@ -1865,7 +1882,7 @@ Running on the AEMv8 Base FVP (AArch32) with reset to BL1 entrypoint
The following ``FVP_Base_AEMv8A-AEMv8A`` parameters should be used to boot Linux
with 8 CPUs using the AArch32 build of TF-A.
::
.. code:: shell
<path-to>/FVP_Base_AEMv8A-AEMv8A \
-C pctl.startup=0.0.0.0 \
@ -1893,7 +1910,7 @@ Running on the Cortex-A57-A53 Base FVP with reset to BL1 entrypoint
The following ``FVP_Base_Cortex-A57x4-A53x4`` model parameters should be used to
boot Linux with 8 CPUs using the AArch64 build of TF-A.
::
.. code:: shell
<path-to>/FVP_Base_Cortex-A57x4-A53x4 \
-C pctl.startup=0.0.0.0 \
@ -1911,7 +1928,7 @@ Running on the Cortex-A32 Base FVP (AArch32) with reset to BL1 entrypoint
The following ``FVP_Base_Cortex-A32x4`` model parameters should be used to
boot Linux with 4 CPUs using the AArch32 build of TF-A.
::
.. code:: shell
<path-to>/FVP_Base_Cortex-A32x4 \
-C pctl.startup=0.0.0.0 \
@ -1929,7 +1946,7 @@ Running on the AEMv8 Base FVP with reset to BL31 entrypoint
The following ``FVP_Base_RevC-2xAEMv8A`` parameters should be used to boot Linux
with 8 CPUs using the AArch64 build of TF-A.
::
.. code:: shell
<path-to>/FVP_Base_RevC-2xAEMv8A \
-C pctl.startup=0.0.0.0 \
@ -1984,7 +2001,7 @@ Running on the AEMv8 Base FVP (AArch32) with reset to SP_MIN entrypoint
The following ``FVP_Base_AEMv8A-AEMv8A`` parameters should be used to boot Linux
with 8 CPUs using the AArch32 build of TF-A.
::
.. code:: shell
<path-to>/FVP_Base_AEMv8A-AEMv8A \
-C pctl.startup=0.0.0.0 \
@ -2015,8 +2032,9 @@ with 8 CPUs using the AArch32 build of TF-A.
--data cluster0.cpu0="<path-to>/<kernel-binary>"@0x80080000 \
--data cluster0.cpu0="<path-to>/<ramdisk>"@0x84000000
Note: The load address of ``<bl32-binary>`` depends on the value ``BL32_BASE``.
It should match the address programmed into the RVBAR register as well.
.. note::
The load address of ``<bl32-binary>`` depends on the value ``BL32_BASE``.
It should match the address programmed into the RVBAR register as well.
Running on the Cortex-A57-A53 Base FVP with reset to BL31 entrypoint
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
@ -2024,7 +2042,7 @@ Running on the Cortex-A57-A53 Base FVP with reset to BL31 entrypoint
The following ``FVP_Base_Cortex-A57x4-A53x4`` model parameters should be used to
boot Linux with 8 CPUs using the AArch64 build of TF-A.
::
.. code:: shell
<path-to>/FVP_Base_Cortex-A57x4-A53x4 \
-C pctl.startup=0.0.0.0 \
@ -2052,7 +2070,7 @@ Running on the Cortex-A32 Base FVP (AArch32) with reset to SP_MIN entrypoint
The following ``FVP_Base_Cortex-A32x4`` model parameters should be used to
boot Linux with 4 CPUs using the AArch32 build of TF-A.
::
.. code:: shell
<path-to>/FVP_Base_Cortex-A32x4 \
-C pctl.startup=0.0.0.0 \
@ -2101,7 +2119,7 @@ The SYSTEM SUSPEND is a PSCI API which can be used to implement system suspend
to RAM. For more details refer to section 5.16 of `PSCI`_. To test system suspend
on Juno, at the linux shell prompt, issue the following command:
::
.. code:: shell
echo +10 > /sys/class/rtc/rtc0/wakealarm
echo -n mem > /sys/power/state

View File

@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
.. |AArch32| replace:: :term:`AArch32`
.. |AArch64| replace:: :term:`AArch64`
.. |API| replace:: :term:`API`
.. |CoT| replace:: :term:`CoT`
.. |COT| replace:: :term:`COT`
.. |CSS| replace:: :term:`CSS`
.. |CVE| replace:: :term:`CVE`
.. |DS-5| replace:: :term:`DS-5`
.. |DT| replace:: :term:`DT`
.. |EL| replace:: :term:`EL`
.. |EHF| replace:: :term:`EHF`
.. |FDT| replace:: :term:`FDT`
.. |FIP| replace:: :term:`FIP`
.. |FVP| replace:: :term:`FVP`
.. |FWU| replace:: :term:`FWU`
.. |GIC| replace:: :term:`GIC`
.. |ISA| replace:: :term:`ISA`
.. |Linaro| replace:: :term:`Linaro`
.. |MMU| replace:: :term:`MMU`
.. |MPAM| replace:: :term:`MPAM`
.. |MPIDR| replace:: :term:`MPIDR`
.. |OEN| replace:: :term:`OEN`
.. |OP-TEE| replace:: :term:`OP-TEE`
.. |OTE| replace:: :term:`OTE`
.. |PDD| replace:: :term:`PDD`
.. |PMF| replace:: :term:`PMF`
.. |PSCI| replace:: :term:`PSCI`
.. |RAS| replace:: :term:`RAS`
.. |ROT| replace:: :term:`ROT`
.. |SCMI| replace:: :term:`SCMI`
.. |SCP| replace:: :term:`SCP`
.. |SDEI| replace:: :term:`SDEI`
.. |SDS| replace:: :term:`SDS`
.. |SEA| replace:: :term:`SEA`
.. |SiP| replace:: :term:`SiP`
.. |SIP| replace:: :term:`SIP`
.. |SMC| replace:: :term:`SMC`
.. |SMCCC| replace:: :term:`SMCCC`
.. |SoC| replace:: :term:`SoC`
.. |SP| replace:: :term:`SP`
.. |SPD| replace:: :term:`SPD`
.. |SPM| replace:: :term:`SPM`
.. |SVE| replace:: :term:`SVE`
.. |TBB| replace:: :term:`TBB`
.. |TBBR| replace:: :term:`TBBR`
.. |TEE| replace:: :term:`TEE`
.. |TF-A| replace:: :term:`TF-A`
.. |TF-M| replace:: :term:`TF-M`
.. |TLB| replace:: :term:`TLB`
.. |TLK| replace:: :term:`TLK`
.. |TSP| replace:: :term:`TSP`
.. |TZC| replace:: :term:`TZC`
.. |UEFI| replace:: :term:`UEFI`
.. |WDOG| replace:: :term:`WDOG`
.. |XLAT| replace:: :term:`XLAT`

177
docs/glossary.rst Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,177 @@
Glossary
========
This glossary provides definitions for terms and abbreviations used in the TF-A
documentation.
You can find additional definitions in the `Arm Glossary`_.
.. glossary::
:sorted:
AArch32
32-bit execution state of the ARMv8 ISA
AArch64
64-bit execution state of the ARMv8 ISA
API
Application Programming Interface
CoT
COT
Chain of Trust
CSS
Compute Sub-System
CVE
Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures. A CVE document is commonly used to
describe a publicly-known security vulnerability.
DS-5
Arm Development Studio 5
DT
Device Tree
EL
Exception Level
EHF
Exception Handling Framework
FDT
Flattened Device Tree
FIP
Firmware Image Package
FVP
Fixed Virtual Platform
FWU
FirmWare Update
GIC
Generic Interrupt Controller
ISA
Instruction Set Architecture
Linaro
A collaborative engineering organization consolidating
and optimizing open source software and tools for the Arm architecture.
MMU
Memory Management Unit
MPAM
Memory Partitioning And Monitoring. An optional Armv8.4 extension.
MPIDR
Multiprocessor Affinity Register
OEN
Owning Entity Number
OP-TEE
Open Portable Trusted Execution Environment. An example of a :term:`TEE`
OTE
Open-source Trusted Execution Environment
PDD
Platform Design Document
PMF
Performance Measurement Framework
PSCI
Power State Coordination Interface
RAS
Reliability, Availability, and Serviceability extensions. A mandatory
extension for the Armv8.2 architecture and later. An optional extension to
the base Armv8 architecture.
ROT
Root of Trust
SCMI
System Control and Management Interface
SCP
System Control Processor
SDEI
Software Delegated Exception Interface
SDS
Shared Data Storage
SEA
Synchronous External Abort
SiP
SIP
Silicon Provider
SMC
Secure Monitor Call
SMCCC
:term:`SMC` Calling Convention
SoC
System on Chip
SP
Secure Partition
SPD
Secure Payload Dispatcher
SPM
Secure Partition Manager
SVE
Scalable Vector Extension
TBB
Trusted Board Boot
TBBR
Trusted Board Boot Requirements
TEE
Trusted Execution Environment
TF-A
Trusted Firmware-A
TF-M
Trusted Firmware-M
TLB
Translation Lookaside Buffer
TLK
Trusted Little Kernel. A Trusted OS from NVIDIA.
TSP
Test Secure Payload
TZC
TrustZone Controller
UEFI
Unified Extensible Firmware Interface
WDOG
Watchdog
XLAT
Translation (abbr.). For example, "XLAT table".
.. _`Arm Glossary`: https://developer.arm.com/support/arm-glossary

View File

@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ Trusted Firmware-A Documentation
.. toctree::
:maxdepth: 1
:caption: Contents
:hidden:
Home<self>
getting_started/index
@ -14,10 +14,14 @@ Trusted Firmware-A Documentation
perf/index
security_advisories/index
change-log
maintainers
acknowledgements
glossary
maintainers
license
.. contents:: On This Page
:depth: 3
Trusted Firmware-A (TF-A) provides a reference implementation of secure world
software for `Armv7-A and Armv8-A`_, including a `Secure Monitor`_ executing
at Exception Level 3 (EL3). It implements various Arm interface standards,
@ -99,7 +103,7 @@ Functionality
Secure-EL0, which can be used to implement simple management and
security services.
- An SDEI dispatcher to route interrupt-based SDEI events.
- An |SDEI| dispatcher to route interrupt-based |SDEI| events.
- An Exception Handling Framework (EHF) that allows dispatching of EL3
interrupts to their registered handlers, to facilitate firmware-first
@ -149,7 +153,8 @@ The latest version of the AArch64 build of TF-A has been tested on the following
Arm FVPs without shifted affinities, and that do not support threaded CPU cores
(64-bit host machine only).
The FVP models used are Version 11.5 Build 33, unless otherwise stated.
.. note::
The FVP models used are Version 11.5 Build 33, unless otherwise stated.
- ``FVP_Base_AEMv8A-AEMv8A``
- ``FVP_Base_AEMv8A-AEMv8A-AEMv8A-AEMv8A-CCN502``
@ -186,7 +191,8 @@ Arm FVPs without shifted affinities, and that do not support threaded CPU cores
- ``FVP_Base_AEMv8A-AEMv8A``
- ``FVP_Base_Cortex-A32x4``
NOTE: The ``FVP_Base_RevC-2xAEMv8A`` FVP only supports shifted affinities.
.. note::
The ``FVP_Base_RevC-2xAEMv8A`` FVP only supports shifted affinities.
The Foundation FVP can be downloaded free of charge. The Base FVPs can be
licensed from Arm. See the `Arm FVP website`_.

View File

@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
Trusted Firmware-A maintainers
==============================
Maintainers
===========
Trusted Firmware-A (TF-A) is an Arm maintained project. All contributions are
ultimately merged by the maintainers listed below. Technical ownership of some

View File

@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ levels 0, 1 and 2 respectively. It does not support any retention states.
We used the upstream `TF master as of 31/01/2017`_, building the platform using
the ``ENABLE_RUNTIME_INSTRUMENTATION`` option:
::
.. code:: shell
make PLAT=juno ENABLE_RUNTIME_INSTRUMENTATION=1 \
SCP_BL2=<path/to/scp-fw.bin> \

View File

@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
Trusted Firmware-A for Allwinner ARMv8 SoCs
===========================================
Allwinner ARMv8 SoCs
====================
Trusted Firmware-A (TF-A) implements the EL3 firmware layer for Allwinner
SoCs with ARMv8 cores. Only BL31 is used to provide proper EL3 setup and
@ -24,24 +24,23 @@ See the respective `U-Boot documentation`_ for more details.
To build for machines with an A64 or H5 SoC:
::
.. code:: shell
make CROSS_COMPILE=aarch64-linux-gnu- PLAT=sun50i_a64 DEBUG=1 bl31
To build for machines with an H6 SoC:
::
.. code:: shell
make CROSS_COMPILE=aarch64-linux-gnu- PLAT=sun50i_h6 DEBUG=1 bl31
.. _U-Boot documentation: http://git.denx.de/?p=u-boot.git;f=board/sunxi/README.sunxi64;hb=HEAD
Trusted OS dispatcher
=====================
---------------------
One can boot Trusted OS(OP-TEE OS, bl32 image) along side bl31 image on Allwinner A64.
In order to include the 'opteed' dispatcher in the image, pass 'SPD=opteed' on the command line
while compiling the bl31 image and make sure the loader (SPL) loads the Trusted OS binary to
the beginning of DRAM (0x40000000).

View File

@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
Description
===========
Arm Versatile Express
=====================
Versatile Express (VE) family development platform provides an
ultra fast environment for prototyping arm-v7 System-on-Chip designs.
@ -9,21 +9,21 @@ and Cortex-A7 VE FVP's. This platform is tested on and only expected to work
with single core models.
Boot Sequence
=============
-------------
BL1 --> BL2 --> BL32(sp_min) --> BL33(u-boot) --> Linux kernel
How to build
============
------------
Code Locations
---------------
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
- `U-boot <https://git.linaro.org/landing-teams/working/arm/u-boot.git>`__
- `arm-trusted-firmware <https://github.com/ARM-software/arm-trusted-firmware>`__
Build Procedure
---------------
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
- Obtain arm toolchain. The software stack has been verified with linaro 6.2
`arm-linux-gnueabihf <https://releases.linaro.org/components/toolchain/binaries/6.2-2016.11/arm-linux-gnueabihf/>`__.
@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ Build Procedure
BL33=<path_to_u-boot.bin> all fip
Run Procedure
-------------
~~~~~~~~~~~~~
The following model parameters should be used to boot Linux using the build of
arm-trusted-firmware-a made using the above make commands:

View File

@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
Description
===========
NXP i.MX 8 Series
=================
The i.MX 8 series of applications processors is a feature- and
performance-scalable multi-core platform that includes single-,
@ -20,15 +20,15 @@ control for system-level resources on i.MX8. The heart of the system
controller is a Cortex-M4 that executes system controller firmware.
Boot Sequence
=============
-------------
Bootrom --> BL31 --> BL33(u-boot) --> Linux kernel
How to build
============
------------
Build Procedure
---------------
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
- Prepare AARCH64 toolchain.
@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ Build Procedure
Target_SoC should be "imx8qx" for i.MX8QX SoC.
Deploy TF-A Images
-----------------
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
TF-A binary(bl31.bin), scfw_tcm.bin and u-boot.bin are combined together
to generate a binary file called flash.bin, the imx-mkimage tool is used

View File

@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
Description
===========
NXP i.MX 8M Series
==================
The i.MX 8M family of applications processors based on Arm Corte-A53 and Cortex-M4
cores provide high-performance computing, power efficiency, enhanced system
@ -7,15 +7,15 @@ reliability and embedded security needed to drive the growth of fast-growing
edge node computing, streaming multimedia, and machine learning applications.
Boot Sequence
=============
-------------
Bootrom --> SPL --> BL31 --> BL33(u-boot) --> Linux kernel
How to build
============
------------
Build Procedure
---------------
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
- Prepare AARCH64 toolchain.
@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ Build Procedure
Target_SoC should be "imx8mm" for i.MX8MM SoC.
Deploy TF-A Images
-----------------
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
TF-A binary(bl31.bin), u-boot-spl.bin u-boot-nodtb.bin and dtb are combined
together to generate a binary file called flash.bin, the imx-mkimage tool is

View File

@ -16,7 +16,6 @@ Platform Ports
meson-gxl
mt8183
nvidia-tegra
poplar
qemu
rcar-gen3
rockchip
@ -26,4 +25,5 @@ Platform Ports
synquacer
ti-k3
warp7
xilinx-versal
xilinx-zynqmp

View File

@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
Description
===========
Intel Stratix 10 SoCFPGA
========================
Stratix 10 SoCFPGA is a FPGA with integrated quad-core 64-bit Arm Cortex A53 processor.
@ -11,10 +11,10 @@ the hardware, then loads bl31 and bl33 (UEFI) into DDR and boots to bl33.
Boot ROM --> Trusted Firmware-A --> UEFI
How to build
============
------------
Code Locations
--------------
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
- Trusted Firmware-A:
`link <https://github.com/ARM-software/arm-trusted-firmware>`__
@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ Code Locations
`link <https://github.com/altera-opensource/uefi-socfpga>`__
Build Procedure
---------------
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
- Fetch all the above 2 repositories into local host.
Make all the repositories in the same ${BUILD\_PATH}.
@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ Build Procedure
BL33=PEI.ROM
Install Procedure
-----------------
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
- dd fip.bin to a A2 partition on the MMC drive to be booted in Stratix 10
board.
@ -53,16 +53,18 @@ Install Procedure
- Generate a SOF containing bl2
.. code:: bash
aarch64-linux-gnu-objcopy -I binary -O ihex --change-addresses 0xffe00000 bl2.bin bl2.hex
quartus_cpf --bootloader bl2.hex <quartus_generated_sof> <output_sof_with_bl2>
- Configure SOF to board
.. code:: bash
nios2-configure-sof <output_sof_with_bl2>
Boot trace
==========
----------
::
INFO: DDR: DRAM calibration success.

View File

@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
Description
===========
NXP QorIQ® LS1043A
==================
The QorIQ® LS1043A processor is NXP's first quad-core, 64-bit Arm®-based
processor for embedded networking. The LS1023A (two core version) and the
@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ UART: supports two UARTs up to 115200 bps for console
More information are listed in `ls1043`_.
Boot Sequence
=============
-------------
Bootrom --> TF-A BL1 --> TF-A BL2 --> TF-A BL1 --> TF-A BL31
@ -44,10 +44,10 @@ Bootrom --> TF-A BL1 --> TF-A BL2 --> TF-A BL1 --> TF-A BL31
How to build
============
------------
Build Procedure
---------------
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
- Prepare AARCH64 toolchain.
@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ Build Procedure
BL33=u-boot.bin NEED_BL32=yes BL32=tee.bin SPD=opteed
Deploy TF-A Images
-----------------
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
- Deploy TF-A images on Nor flash Alt Bank.

View File

@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
Trusted Firmware-A for Amlogic Meson S905 (GXBB)
================================================
Amlogic Meson S905 (GXBB)
=========================
The Amlogic Meson S905 is a SoC with a quad core Arm Cortex-A53 running at
1.5Ghz. It also contains a Cortex-M3 used as SCP.
@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ and Linux:
In order to build it:
::
.. code:: shell
CROSS_COMPILE=aarch64-linux-gnu- make DEBUG=1 PLAT=gxbb bl31

View File

@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
Trusted Firmware-A for Amlogic Meson S905x (GXL)
================================================
Amlogic Meson S905x (GXL)
=========================
The Amlogic Meson S905x is a SoC with a quad core Arm Cortex-A53 running at
1.5Ghz. It also contains a Cortex-M3 used as SCP.
@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ and Linux:
In order to build it:
::
.. code:: shell
CROSS_COMPILE=aarch64-linux-gnu- make DEBUG=1 PLAT=gxl

View File

@ -1,19 +1,19 @@
Description
===========
MediaTek 8183
=============
MediaTek 8183 (MT8183) is a 64-bit ARM SoC introduced by MediaTek in early 2018.
The chip incorporates eight cores - four Cortex-A53 little cores and Cortex-A73.
Both clusters can operate at up to 2 GHz.
Boot Sequence
=============
-------------
::
Boot Rom --> Coreboot --> TF-A BL31 --> Depthcharge --> Linux Kernel
How to Build
============
------------
.. code:: shell

View File

@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
Tegra SoCs - Overview
=====================
NVIDIA Tegra
============
- .. rubric:: T186
:name: t186
@ -58,13 +58,13 @@ to extensive power-gating and dynamic voltage and clock scaling based on
workloads.
Directory structure
===================
-------------------
- plat/nvidia/tegra/common - Common code for all Tegra SoCs
- plat/nvidia/tegra/soc/txxx - Chip specific code
Trusted OS dispatcher
=====================
---------------------
Tegra supports multiple Trusted OS'.
@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ Tegra210: TLK and Trusty
Tegra186: Trusty
Scatter files
=============
-------------
Tegra platforms currently support scatter files and ld.S scripts. The scatter
files help support ARMLINK linker to generate BL31 binaries. For now, there
@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ the scatter file to be used. Tegra platforms have verified BL31 image generation
with ARMCLANG (compilation) and ARMLINK (linking) for the Tegra186 platforms.
Preparing the BL31 image to run on Tegra SoCs
=============================================
---------------------------------------------
.. code:: shell
@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ uint64\_t boot\_profiler\_shmem\_base;
} plat\_params\_from\_bl2\_t;
Power Management
================
----------------
The PSCI implementation expects each platform to expose the 'power state'
parameter to be used during the 'SYSTEM SUSPEND' call. The state-id field
@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ is implementation defined on Tegra SoCs and is preferably defined by
tegra\_def.h.
Tegra configs
=============
-------------
- 'tegra\_enable\_l2\_ecc\_parity\_prot': This flag enables the L2 ECC and Parity
Protection bit, for Arm Cortex-A57 CPUs, during CPU boot. This flag will

View File

@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
Trusted Firmware-A for QEMU virt Armv8-A
========================================
QEMU virt Armv8-A
=================
Trusted Firmware-A (TF-A) implements the EL3 firmware layer for QEMU virt
Armv8-A. BL1 is used as the BootROM, supplied with the -bios argument.
@ -33,13 +33,13 @@ is conveniently achieved with symlinks the local names as:
To build:
::
.. code:: shell
make CROSS_COMPILE=aarch64-none-elf- PLAT=qemu
make CROSS_COMPILE=aarch64-none-elf- PLAT=qemu
To start (QEMU v2.6.0):
::
.. code:: shell
qemu-system-aarch64 -nographic -machine virt,secure=on -cpu cortex-a57 \
-kernel Image \

View File

@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
Description
===========
Renesas R-Car
=============
"R-Car" is the nickname for Renesas' system-on-chip (SoC) family for
car information systems designed for the next-generation of automotive
@ -97,14 +97,14 @@ program counters.
How to build
============
------------
The TF-A build options depend on the target board so you will have to
refer to those specific instructions. What follows is customized to
the H3 SiP Salvator-X development system used in this port.
Build Tested:
-------------
~~~~~~~~~~~~~
RCAR_OPT="LSI=H3 RCAR_DRAM_SPLIT=1 RCAR_LOSSY_ENABLE=1"
MBEDTLS_DIR=$mbedtls_src
@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ $ MBEDTLS_DIR=$mbedtls_src_tree make clean bl2 bl31 rcar_layout_tool \
PLAT=rcar ${RCAR_OPT} SPD=opteed
System Tested:
--------------------
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
* mbed_tls:
git@github.com:ARMmbed/mbedtls.git [devel]
@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ System Tested:
Linux 4.19-rc4
TF-A Build Procedure
--------------------
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
- Fetch all the above 4 repositories.
@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ TF-A Build Procedure
make -j8 PLATFORM="rcar" CFG_ARM64_core=y
Install Procedure
-----------------
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
- Boot the board in Mini-monitor mode and enable access to the
Hyperflash.
@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ Install Procedure
Boot trace
==========
----------
Notice that BL31 traces are not accessible via the console and that in
order to verbose the BL2 output you will have to compile TF-A with
@ -266,4 +266,3 @@ LOG_LEVEL=50 and DEBUG=1
Net: eth0: ethernet@e6800000
Hit any key to stop autoboot: 0
=>

View File

@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
Trusted Firmware-A for Rockchip SoCs
====================================
Rockchip SoCs
=============
Trusted Firmware-A supports a number of Rockchip ARM SoCs from both
AARCH32 and AARCH64 fields.
@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ This includes right now:
Boot Sequence
=============
-------------
For AARCH32:
Bootrom --> BL1/BL2 --> BL32 --> BL33 --> Linux kernel
@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ BL1/2 and BL33 can currently be supplied from either:
How to build
============
------------
Rockchip SoCs expect TF-A's BL31 (AARCH64) or BL32 (AARCH32) to get
integrated with other boot software like U-Boot or Coreboot, so only
@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ compilation toolchain.
How to deploy
=============
-------------
Both upstream U-Boot and Coreboot projects contain instructions on where
to put the built images during their respective build process.

View File

@ -1,9 +1,5 @@
Trusted Firmware-A for Raspberry Pi 3
=====================================
.. contents::
Raspberry Pi 3
==============
The `Raspberry Pi 3`_ is an inexpensive single-board computer that contains four
Arm Cortex-A53 cores.
@ -167,7 +163,7 @@ Secondary cores
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
This port of the Trusted Firmware-A supports ``PSCI_CPU_ON``,
`PSCI_SYSTEM_RESET`` and ``PSCI_SYSTEM_OFF``. The last one doesn't really turn
``PSCI_SYSTEM_RESET`` and ``PSCI_SYSTEM_OFF``. The last one doesn't really turn
the system off, it simply reboots it and asks the VideoCore firmware to keep it
in a low power mode permanently.
@ -274,11 +270,12 @@ The following build options are supported:
BL32_EXTRA1=tee-pager_v2.bin BL32_EXTRA2=tee-pageable_v2.bin``
to put the binaries into the FIP.
Note: If OP-TEE is used it may be needed to add the following options to the
Linux command line so that the USB driver doesn't use FIQs:
``dwc_otg.fiq_enable=0 dwc_otg.fiq_fsm_enable=0 dwc_otg.nak_holdoff=0``.
This will unfortunately reduce the performance of the USB driver. It is needed
when using Raspbian, for example.
.. warning::
If OP-TEE is used it may be needed to add the following options to the
Linux command line so that the USB driver doesn't use FIQs:
``dwc_otg.fiq_enable=0 dwc_otg.fiq_fsm_enable=0 dwc_otg.nak_holdoff=0``.
This will unfortunately reduce the performance of the USB driver. It is
needed when using Raspbian, for example.
- ``TRUSTED_BOARD_BOOT``: This port supports TBB. Set this option to 1 to enable
it. In order to use TBB, you might want to set ``GENERATE_COT=1`` to let the

View File

@ -1,6 +1,5 @@
Trusted Firmware-A for Socionext UniPhier SoCs
==============================================
Socionext UniPhier
==================
Socionext UniPhier Armv8-A SoCs use Trusted Firmware-A (TF-A) as the secure
world firmware, supporting BL2 and BL31.

View File

@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
Trusted Firmware-A for STM32MP1
===============================
STMicroelectronics STM32MP1
===========================
STM32MP1 is a microprocessor designed by STMicroelectronics
based on a dual Arm Cortex-A7.

View File

@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
Trusted Firmware-A for Socionext Synquacer SoCs
===============================================
Socionext Synquacer
===================
Socionext's Synquacer SC2A11 is a multi-core processor with 24 cores of Arm
Cortex-A53. The Developerbox, of 96boards, is a platform that contains this
@ -9,10 +9,10 @@ the moment.
More information are listed in `link`_.
How to build
============
------------
Code Locations
--------------
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
- Trusted Firmware-A:
`link <https://github.com/ARM-software/arm-trusted-firmware>`__
@ -27,12 +27,12 @@ Code Locations
`link <https://github.com/tianocore/edk2-non-osi>`__
Boot Flow
---------
~~~~~~~~~
SCP firmware --> TF-A BL31 --> UEFI(edk2)
Build Procedure
---------------
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
- Firstly, in addition to the “normal” build tools you will also need a
few specialist tools. On a Debian or Ubuntu operating system try:
@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ Build Procedure
Note #2: Replace -b RELEASE with -b DEBUG to build a debug.
Install the System Firmware
---------------------------
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
- Providing your Developerbox is fully working and has on operating system
installed then you can adopt your the newly compiled system firmware using

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@ -1,15 +1,17 @@
Trusted Firmware-A for Texas Instruments K3 SoCs
================================================
Texas Instruments K3
====================
Trusted Firmware-A (TF-A) implements the EL3 firmware layer for Texas Instruments K3 SoCs.
Boot Flow
---------
R5(U-Boot) --> TF-A BL31 --> BL32(OP-TEE) --> TF-A BL31 --> BL33(U-Boot) --> Linux
::
R5(U-Boot) --> TF-A BL31 --> BL32(OP-TEE) --> TF-A BL31 --> BL33(U-Boot) --> Linux
\
Optional direct to Linux boot
\
Optional direct to Linux boot
\
--> BL33(Linux)
Texas Instruments K3 SoCs contain an R5 processor used as the boot master, it

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@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
Trusted Firmware-A for i.MX7 WaRP7
==================================
NXP i.MX7 WaRP7
===============
The Trusted Firmware-A port for the i.MX7Solo WaRP7 implements BL2 at EL3.
The i.MX7S contains a BootROM with a High Assurance Boot (HAB) functionality.
@ -7,21 +7,23 @@ This functionality provides a mechanism for establishing a root-of-trust from
the reset vector to the command-line in user-space.
Boot Flow
=========
---------
BootROM --> TF-A BL2 --> BL32(OP-TEE) --> BL33(U-Boot) --> Linux
In the WaRP7 port we encapsulate OP-TEE, DTB and U-Boot into a FIP. This FIP is
expected and required
# Build Instructions
Build Instructions
------------------
We need to use a file generated by u-boot in order to generate a .imx image the
BootROM will boot. It is therefore _required_ to build u-boot before TF-A and
furthermore it is _recommended_ to use the mkimage in the u-boot/tools directory
to generate the TF-A .imx image.
## U-Boot:
U-Boot
~~~~~~
https://git.linaro.org/landing-teams/working/mbl/u-boot.git
@ -31,7 +33,8 @@ https://git.linaro.org/landing-teams/working/mbl/u-boot.git
make warp7_bl33_defconfig;
make u-boot.imx arch=ARM CROSS_COMPILE=arm-linux-gnueabihf-
## OP-TEE:
OP-TEE
~~~~~~
https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os.git
@ -39,7 +42,8 @@ https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os.git
make ARCH=arm CROSS_COMPILE=arm-linux-gnueabihf- PLATFORM=imx PLATFORM_FLAVOR=mx7swarp7 ARCH=arm CFG_PAGEABLE_ADDR=0 CFG_DT_ADDR=0x83000000 CFG_NS_ENTRY_ADDR=0x87800000
## TF-A:
TF-A
~~~~
https://github.com/ARM-software/arm-trusted-firmware.git
@ -75,7 +79,8 @@ It is also assumed copy of mbedtls is available on the path path ../mbedtls
/path/to/u-boot/tools/mkimage -n /path/to/u-boot/u-boot.cfgout -T imximage -e 0x9df00000 -d ./build/warp7/debug/bl2.bin ./build/warp7/debug/bl2.bin.imx
## FIP:
FIP
~~~
.. code:: shell
@ -110,8 +115,8 @@ It is also assumed copy of mbedtls is available on the path path ../mbedtls
--trusted-key-cert fiptool_images/trusted-key-cert.key-crt \
--tb-fw-cert fiptool_images/trusted-boot-fw.key-crt warp7.fip
# Deploy Images
Deploy Images
-------------
First place the WaRP7 into UMS mode in u-boot this should produce an entry in
/dev like /dev/disk/by-id/usb-Linux_UMS_disk_0_WaRP7-0xf42400d3000001d4-0\:0
@ -138,7 +143,8 @@ Remember to umount the USB device pefore proceeding
sudo umount /dev/disk/by-id/usb-Linux_UMS_disk_0_WaRP7-0xf42400d3000001d4-0\:0*
# Signing BL2
Signing BL2
-----------
A further step is to sign BL2.

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@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
Trusted Firmware-A for Xilinx Versal
================================
Xilinx Versal
=============
Trusted Firmware-A implements the EL3 firmware layer for Xilinx Versal.
The platform only uses the runtime part of TF-A as Xilinx Versal already has a
@ -19,7 +19,9 @@ To build ATF for different platform (for now its just versal virtual "versal_vir
make RESET_TO_BL31=1 CROSS_COMPILE=aarch64-none-elf- PLAT=versal VERSAL_PLATFORM=versal_virt bl31
```
# Xilinx Versal platform specific build options
Xilinx Versal platform specific build options
---------------------------------------------
* `VERSAL_ATF_MEM_BASE`: Specifies the base address of the bl31 binary.
* `VERSAL_ATF_MEM_SIZE`: Specifies the size of the memory region of the bl31 binary.
* `VERSAL_BL32_MEM_BASE`: Specifies the base address of the bl32 binary.

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@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
Trusted Firmware-A for Xilinx Zynq UltraScale+ MPSoC
====================================================
Xilinx Zynq UltraScale+ MPSoC
=============================
Trusted Firmware-A (TF-A) implements the EL3 firmware layer for Xilinx Zynq
UltraScale + MPSoC.
@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ To build bl32 TSP you have to rebuild bl31 too:
make CROSS_COMPILE=aarch64-none-elf- PLAT=zynqmp SPD=tspd bl31 bl32
ZynqMP platform specific build options
======================================
--------------------------------------
- ``ZYNQMP_ATF_MEM_BASE``: Specifies the base address of the bl31 binary.
- ``ZYNQMP_ATF_MEM_SIZE``: Specifies the size of the memory region of the bl31 binary.
@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ ZynqMP platform specific build options
- ``cadence1`` : Cadence UART 1
FSBL->TF-A Parameter Passing
===========================
----------------------------
The FSBL populates a data structure with image information for TF-A. TF-A uses
that data to hand off to the loaded images. The address of the handoff data
@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ register is free to be used by other software once TF-A has brought up
further firmware images.
Power Domain Tree
=================
-----------------
The following power domain tree represents the power domain model used by TF-A
for ZynqMP:

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@ -1,9 +1,5 @@
Trusted Firmware-A Coding Guidelines
====================================
.. contents::
Coding Style & Guidelines
=========================
The following sections contain TF coding guidelines. They are continually
evolving and should not be considered "set in stone". Feel free to question them
@ -11,8 +7,9 @@ and provide feedback.
Some of the guidelines may also apply to other codebases.
**Note:** the existing TF codebase does not necessarily comply with all the
below guidelines but the intent is for it to do so eventually.
.. note::
The existing TF codebase does not necessarily comply with all the
below guidelines but the intent is for it to do so eventually.
Checkpatch overrides
--------------------
@ -296,7 +293,7 @@ of the size of an array is the same.
If ``MY_STRUCT_SIZE`` in the above example were wrong then the compiler would
emit an error like this:
.. code:: c
::
my_struct.h:10:1: error: size of array assert_my_struct_size_mismatch is negative

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@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
Contributing to Trusted Firmware-A
==================================
Contributor's Guide
===================
Getting Started
---------------

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@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ Processes & Policies
:numbered:
release-information
security-center
security
platform-compatibility-policy
coding-guidelines
contributing

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@ -1,12 +1,5 @@
TF-A Platform Compatibility Policy
==================================
.. contents::
--------------
Platform Compatibility Policy
=============================
Introduction
------------

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@ -1,12 +1,5 @@
TF-A Release Information
========================
.. section-numbering::
:suffix: .
.. contents::
--------------
Release Processes
=================
Project Release Cadence
-----------------------

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@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
Security Center
===============
Security Handling
=================
Security Disclosures
--------------------

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@ -1,3 +1,6 @@
Advisory TFV-1 (CVE-2016-10319)
===============================
+----------------+-------------------------------------------------------------+
| Title | Malformed Firmware Update SMC can result in copy of |
| | unexpectedly large data into secure memory |

View File

@ -1,3 +1,6 @@
Advisory TFV-2 (CVE-2017-7564)
==============================
+----------------+-------------------------------------------------------------+
| Title | Enabled secure self-hosted invasive debug interface can |
| | allow normal world to panic secure world |

View File

@ -1,3 +1,6 @@
Advisory TFV-3 (CVE-2017-7563)
==============================
+----------------+-------------------------------------------------------------+
| Title | RO memory is always executable at AArch64 Secure EL1 |
+================+=============================================================+
@ -65,7 +68,7 @@ The vulnerability is mitigated by the following factors:
of the ``XN``, ``UXN`` or ``PXN`` bits in the translation tables. See the
``enable_mmu()`` function:
.. code:: c
::
sctlr = read_sctlr_el##_el(); \
sctlr |= SCTLR_WXN_BIT | SCTLR_M_BIT; \

View File

@ -1,3 +1,6 @@
Advisory TFV-4 (CVE-2017-9607)
==============================
+----------------+-------------------------------------------------------------+
| Title | Malformed Firmware Update SMC can result in copy or |
| | authentication of unexpected data in secure memory in |

View File

@ -1,3 +1,6 @@
Advisory TFV-5 (CVE-2017-15031)
===============================
+----------------+-------------------------------------------------------------+
| Title | Not initializing or saving/restoring ``PMCR_EL0`` can leak |
| | secure world timing information |

View File

@ -1,3 +1,6 @@
Advisory TFV-6 (CVE-2017-5753, CVE-2017-5715, CVE-2017-5754)
============================================================
+----------------+-------------------------------------------------------------+
| Title | Arm Trusted Firmware exposure to speculative processor |
| | vulnerabilities using cache timing side-channels |
@ -28,13 +31,13 @@ these vulnerabilities on Arm systems, please refer to the `Arm Processor
Security Update`_.
Variant 1 (`CVE-2017-5753`_)
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
----------------------------
At the time of writing, no vulnerable patterns have been observed in upstream TF
code, therefore no workarounds have been applied or are planned.
Variant 2 (`CVE-2017-5715`_)
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
----------------------------
Where possible on vulnerable CPUs, Arm recommends invalidating the branch
predictor as early as possible on entry into the secure world, before any branch
@ -122,7 +125,7 @@ Cortex-A76, Cortex-A53, Cortex-A55, Cortex-A32, Cortex-A7 and Cortex-A5.
For more information about non-Arm CPUs, please contact the CPU vendor.
Variant 3 (`CVE-2017-5754`_)
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
----------------------------
This variant is only exploitable between Exception Levels within the same
translation regime, for example between EL0 and EL1, therefore this variant

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@ -1,3 +1,6 @@
Advisory TFV-7 (CVE-2018-3639)
==============================
+----------------+-------------------------------------------------------------+
| Title | Trusted Firmware-A exposure to cache speculation |
| | vulnerability Variant 4 |
@ -46,7 +49,7 @@ for platforms that are unaffected or where the risk is deemed low enough.
Arm CPUs not mentioned below are unaffected.
Static mitigation
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-----------------
For affected CPUs, this approach enables the mitigation during EL3
initialization, following every PE reset. No mechanism is provided to disable
@ -67,7 +70,7 @@ TF-A implements this approach for the following affected CPUs:
(``S3_0_C15_C1_0``).
Dynamic mitigation
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
------------------
For affected CPUs, this approach also enables the mitigation during EL3
initialization, following every PE reset. In addition, this approach implements

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@ -1,3 +1,6 @@
Advisory TFV-8 (CVE-2018-19440)
===============================
+----------------+-------------------------------------------------------------+
| Title | Not saving x0 to x3 registers can leak information from one |
| | Normal World SMC client to another |
@ -36,7 +39,7 @@ CPU context stored on the stack. This includes registers ``x0`` to ``x3``, as
can be seen in the ``lib/el3_runtime/aarch64/context.S`` file at line 339
(referring to the version of the code as of `commit c385955`_):
.. code:: c
::
/*
* This function restores all general purpose registers except x30 from the

View File

@ -27,8 +27,8 @@ SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
--------------
Note:
Individual files contain the following tag instead of the full license text.
.. note::
Individual files contain the following tag instead of the full license text.
::