Merge pull request #995 from davidcunado-arm/dc/init_reg

Fully initialise essential control registers
This commit is contained in:
davidcunado-arm 2017-06-23 08:39:19 +01:00 committed by GitHub
commit ee881c15d0
13 changed files with 576 additions and 213 deletions

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@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
* Copyright (c) 2016, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2016-2017, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
*
* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
*/
@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ func bl1_entrypoint
* ---------------------------------------------------------------------
*/
el3_entrypoint_common \
_set_endian=1 \
_init_sctlr=1 \
_warm_boot_mailbox=!PROGRAMMABLE_RESET_ADDRESS \
_secondary_cold_boot=!COLD_BOOT_SINGLE_CPU \
_init_memory=1 \

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@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
* Copyright (c) 2013-2015, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2013-2017, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
*
* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
*/
@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ func bl1_entrypoint
* ---------------------------------------------------------------------
*/
el3_entrypoint_common \
_set_endian=1 \
_init_sctlr=1 \
_warm_boot_mailbox=!PROGRAMMABLE_RESET_ADDRESS \
_secondary_cold_boot=!COLD_BOOT_SINGLE_CPU \
_init_memory=1 \

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@ -36,12 +36,12 @@ func bl31_entrypoint
* bl31_entrypoint() during the cold boot flow, so the cold/warm boot
* and primary/secondary CPU logic should not be executed in this case.
*
* Also, assume that the previous bootloader has already set up the CPU
* endianness and has initialised the memory.
* Also, assume that the previous bootloader has already initialised the
* SCTLR_EL3, including the endianness, and has initialised the memory.
* ---------------------------------------------------------------------
*/
el3_entrypoint_common \
_set_endian=0 \
_init_sctlr=0 \
_warm_boot_mailbox=0 \
_secondary_cold_boot=0 \
_init_memory=0 \
@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ func bl31_entrypoint
* ---------------------------------------------------------------------
*/
el3_entrypoint_common \
_set_endian=1 \
_init_sctlr=1 \
_warm_boot_mailbox=!PROGRAMMABLE_RESET_ADDRESS \
_secondary_cold_boot=!COLD_BOOT_SINGLE_CPU \
_init_memory=1 \
@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ func bl31_warm_entrypoint
* 'el3_entrypoint_common' must be skipped:
*
* - Only when the platform bypasses the BL1/BL31 entrypoint by
* programming the reset address do we need to set the CPU endianness.
* programming the reset address do we need to initialise SCTLR_EL3.
* In other cases, we assume this has been taken care by the
* entrypoint code.
*
@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ func bl31_warm_entrypoint
* it has been done once and for all on the cold boot path.
*/
el3_entrypoint_common \
_set_endian=PROGRAMMABLE_RESET_ADDRESS \
_init_sctlr=PROGRAMMABLE_RESET_ADDRESS \
_warm_boot_mailbox=0 \
_secondary_cold_boot=0 \
_init_memory=0 \

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@ -49,12 +49,12 @@ func sp_min_entrypoint
* sp_min_entrypoint() during the cold boot flow, so the cold/warm boot
* and primary/secondary CPU logic should not be executed in this case.
*
* Also, assume that the previous bootloader has already set up the CPU
* endianness and has initialised the memory.
* Also, assume that the previous bootloader has already initialised the
* SCTLR, including the CPU endianness, and has initialised the memory.
* ---------------------------------------------------------------------
*/
el3_entrypoint_common \
_set_endian=0 \
_init_sctlr=0 \
_warm_boot_mailbox=0 \
_secondary_cold_boot=0 \
_init_memory=0 \
@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ func sp_min_entrypoint
* ---------------------------------------------------------------------
*/
el3_entrypoint_common \
_set_endian=1 \
_init_sctlr=1 \
_warm_boot_mailbox=!PROGRAMMABLE_RESET_ADDRESS \
_secondary_cold_boot=!COLD_BOOT_SINGLE_CPU \
_init_memory=1 \
@ -174,7 +174,7 @@ func sp_min_warm_entrypoint
* 'el3_entrypoint_common' must be skipped:
*
* - Only when the platform bypasses the BL1/BL32 (SP_MIN) entrypoint by
* programming the reset address do we need to set the CPU endianness.
* programming the reset address do we need to initialied the SCTLR.
* In other cases, we assume this has been taken care by the
* entrypoint code.
*
@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ func sp_min_warm_entrypoint
* it has been done once and for all on the cold boot path.
*/
el3_entrypoint_common \
_set_endian=PROGRAMMABLE_RESET_ADDRESS \
_init_sctlr=PROGRAMMABLE_RESET_ADDRESS \
_warm_boot_mailbox=0 \
_secondary_cold_boot=0 \
_init_memory=0 \

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@ -220,6 +220,12 @@ BL1 performs minimal architectural initialization as follows.
- `DAIF`. The SError interrupt is enabled by clearing the SError interrupt
mask bit.
- `MDCR_EL3`. The trap controls, `MDCR_EL3.TDOSA`, `MDCR_EL3.TDA` and
`MDCR_EL3.TPM`, are set so that accesses to the registers they control
do not trap to EL3. AArch64 Secure self-hosted debug is disabled by
setting the `MDCR_EL3.SDD` bit. Also `MDCR_EL3.SPD32` is set to
disable AArch32 Secure self-hosted privileged debug from S-EL1.
* Control register setup (for AArch32)
- `SCTLR`. Instruction cache is enabled by setting the `SCTLR.I` bit.
Alignment checking is enabled by setting the `SCTLR.A` bit.
@ -243,6 +249,9 @@ BL1 performs minimal architectural initialization as follows.
- `CPSR.A`. The Asynchronous data abort interrupt is enabled by clearing
the Asynchronous data abort interrupt mask bit.
- `SDCR`. The `SDCR.SPD` field is set to disable AArch32 Secure
self-hosted privileged debug.
#### Platform initialization
On ARM platforms, BL1 performs the following platform initializations:

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@ -16,10 +16,18 @@
*/
.macro el3_arch_init_common _exception_vectors
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------
* Enable the instruction cache and alignment checks
* SCTLR has already been initialised - read current value before
* modifying.
*
* SCTLR.I: Enable the instruction cache.
*
* SCTLR.A: Enable Alignment fault checking. All instructions that load
* or store one or more registers have an alignment check that the
* address being accessed is aligned to the size of the data element(s)
* being accessed.
* ---------------------------------------------------------------------
*/
ldr r1, =(SCTLR_RES1 | SCTLR_I_BIT | SCTLR_A_BIT)
ldr r1, =(SCTLR_I_BIT | SCTLR_A_BIT)
ldcopr r0, SCTLR
orr r0, r0, r1
stcopr r0, SCTLR
@ -34,13 +42,14 @@
stcopr r0, MVBAR
isb
/* -----------------------------------------------------
* Enable the SIF bit to disable instruction fetches
* from Non-secure memory.
* -----------------------------------------------------
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------
* Initialise SCR, setting all fields rather than relying on the hw.
*
* SCR.SIF: Enabled so that Secure state instruction fetches from
* Non-secure memory are not permitted.
* ---------------------------------------------------------------------
*/
ldcopr r0, SCR
orr r0, r0, #SCR_SIF_BIT
ldr r0, =(SCR_RESET_VAL | SCR_SIF_BIT)
stcopr r0, SCR
/* -----------------------------------------------------
@ -51,32 +60,61 @@
cpsie a
isb
/* Enable access to Advanced SIMD registers */
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------
* Initialise NSACR, setting all the fields, except for the
* IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED field, rather than relying on the hw. Some
* fields are architecturally UNKNOWN on reset.
*
* NSACR_ENABLE_FP_ACCESS: Represents NSACR.cp11 and NSACR.cp10. The
* cp11 field is ignored, but is set to same value as cp10. The cp10
* field is set to allow access to Advanced SIMD and floating point
* features from both Security states.
* ---------------------------------------------------------------------
*/
ldcopr r0, NSACR
bic r0, r0, #NSASEDIS_BIT
bic r0, r0, #NSTRCDIS_BIT
orr r0, r0, #(NASCR_CP10_BIT | NASCR_CP11_BIT)
and r0, r0, #NSACR_IMP_DEF_MASK
orr r0, r0, #(NSACR_RESET_VAL | NSACR_ENABLE_FP_ACCESS)
stcopr r0, NSACR
isb
/*
* Enable access to Advanced SIMD, Floating point and to the Trace
* functionality as well.
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------
* Initialise CPACR, setting all fields rather than relying on hw. Some
* fields are architecturally UNKNOWN on reset.
*
* CPACR.TRCDIS: Trap control for PL0 and PL1 System register accesses
* to trace registers. Set to zero to allow access.
*
* CPACR_ENABLE_FP_ACCESS: Represents CPACR.cp11 and CPACR.cp10. The
* cp11 field is ignored, but is set to same value as cp10. The cp10
* field is set to allow full access from PL0 and PL1 to floating-point
* and Advanced SIMD features.
* ---------------------------------------------------------------------
*/
ldcopr r0, CPACR
bic r0, r0, #ASEDIS_BIT
bic r0, r0, #TRCDIS_BIT
orr r0, r0, #CPACR_ENABLE_FP_ACCESS
ldr r0, =((CPACR_RESET_VAL | CPACR_ENABLE_FP_ACCESS) & ~(TRCDIS_BIT))
stcopr r0, CPACR
isb
vmrs r0, FPEXC
orr r0, r0, #FPEXC_EN_BIT
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------
* Initialise FPEXC, setting all fields rather than relying on hw. Some
* fields are architecturally UNKNOWN on reset and are set to zero
* except for field(s) listed below.
*
* FPEXC.EN: Enable access to Advanced SIMD and floating point features
* from all exception levels.
* ---------------------------------------------------------------------
*/
ldr r0, =(FPEXC_RESET_VAL | FPEXC_EN_BIT)
vmsr FPEXC, r0
isb
/* Disable secure self-hosted invasive debug. */
ldr r0, =SDCR_DEF_VAL
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------
* Initialise SDCR, setting all the fields rather than relying on hw.
*
* SDCR.SPD: Disable AArch32 privileged debug. Debug exceptions from
* Secure EL1 are disabled.
* ---------------------------------------------------------------------
*/
ldr r0, =(SDCR_RESET_VAL | SDCR_SPD(SDCR_SPD_DISABLE))
stcopr r0, SDCR
.endm
@ -91,8 +129,9 @@
* why this macro is parameterised ; each parameter allows to enable/disable
* some actions.
*
* _set_endian:
* Whether the macro needs to configure the endianness of data accesses.
* _init_sctlr:
* Whether the macro needs to initialise the SCTLR register including
* configuring the endianness of data accesses.
*
* _warm_boot_mailbox:
* Whether the macro needs to detect the type of boot (cold/warm). The
@ -120,7 +159,7 @@
* -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
*/
.macro el3_entrypoint_common \
_set_endian, _warm_boot_mailbox, _secondary_cold_boot, \
_init_sctlr, _warm_boot_mailbox, _secondary_cold_boot, \
_init_memory, _init_c_runtime, _exception_vectors
/* Make sure we are in Secure Mode */
@ -130,17 +169,27 @@
ASM_ASSERT(eq)
#endif
.if \_set_endian
.if \_init_sctlr
/* -------------------------------------------------------------
* Set the CPU endianness before doing anything that might
* involve memory reads or writes.
* This is the initialisation of SCTLR and so must ensure that
* all fields are explicitly set rather than relying on hw. Some
* fields reset to an IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED value.
*
* SCTLR.TE: Set to zero so that exceptions to an Exception
* Level executing at PL1 are taken to A32 state.
*
* SCTLR.EE: Set the CPU endianness before doing anything that
* might involve memory reads or writes. Set to zero to select
* Little Endian.
*
* SCTLR.V: Set to zero to select the normal exception vectors
* with base address held in VBAR.
* -------------------------------------------------------------
*/
ldcopr r0, SCTLR
bic r0, r0, #SCTLR_EE_BIT
ldr r0, =(SCTLR_RESET_VAL & ~(SCTLR_TE_BIT | SCTLR_EE_BIT | SCTLR_V_BIT))
stcopr r0, SCTLR
isb
.endif /* _set_endian */
.endif /* _init_sctlr */
/* Switch to monitor mode */
cps #MODE32_mon

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@ -15,8 +15,20 @@
*/
.macro el3_arch_init_common _exception_vectors
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------
* Enable the instruction cache, stack pointer and data access alignment
* checks
* SCTLR_EL3 has already been initialised - read current value before
* modifying.
*
* SCTLR_EL3.I: Enable the instruction cache.
*
* SCTLR_EL3.SA: Enable Stack Aligment check. A SP alignment fault
* exception is generated if a load or store instruction executed at
* EL3 uses the SP as the base address and the SP is not aligned to a
* 16-byte boundary.
*
* SCTLR_EL3.A: Enable Alignment fault checking. All instructions that
* load or store one or more registers have an alignment check that the
* address being accessed is aligned to the size of the data element(s)
* being accessed.
* ---------------------------------------------------------------------
*/
mov x1, #(SCTLR_I_BIT | SCTLR_A_BIT | SCTLR_SA_BIT)
@ -46,19 +58,56 @@
isb
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------
* Early set RES1 bits in SCR_EL3. Set EA bit to catch both
* External Aborts and SError Interrupts in EL3 and also the SIF bit
* to disable instruction fetches from Non-secure memory.
* Initialise SCR_EL3, setting all fields rather than relying on hw.
* All fields are architecturally UNKNOWN on reset. The following fields
* do not change during the TF lifetime. The remaining fields are set to
* zero here but are updated ahead of transitioning to a lower EL in the
* function cm_init_context_common().
*
* SCR_EL3.TWE: Set to zero so that execution of WFE instructions at
* EL2, EL1 and EL0 are not trapped to EL3.
*
* SCR_EL3.TWI: Set to zero so that execution of WFI instructions at
* EL2, EL1 and EL0 are not trapped to EL3.
*
* SCR_EL3.SIF: Set to one to disable instruction fetches from
* Non-secure memory.
*
* SCR_EL3.SMD: Set to zero to enable SMC calls at EL1 and above, from
* both Security states and both Execution states.
*
* SCR_EL3.EA: Set to one to route External Aborts and SError Interrupts
* to EL3 when executing at any EL.
* ---------------------------------------------------------------------
*/
mov x0, #(SCR_RES1_BITS | SCR_EA_BIT | SCR_SIF_BIT)
mov x0, #((SCR_RESET_VAL | SCR_EA_BIT | SCR_SIF_BIT) \
& ~(SCR_TWE_BIT | SCR_TWI_BIT | SCR_SMD_BIT))
msr scr_el3, x0
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------
* Disable secure self-hosted invasive debug.
* Initialise MDCR_EL3, setting all fields rather than relying on hw.
* Some fields are architecturally UNKNOWN on reset.
*
* MDCR_EL3.SDD: Set to one to disable AArch64 Secure self-hosted debug.
* Debug exceptions, other than Breakpoint Instruction exceptions, are
* disabled from all ELs in Secure state.
*
* MDCR_EL3.SPD32: Set to 0b10 to disable AArch32 Secure self-hosted
* privileged debug from S-EL1.
*
* MDCR_EL3.TDOSA: Set to zero so that EL2 and EL2 System register
* access to the powerdown debug registers do not trap to EL3.
*
* MDCR_EL3.TDA: Set to zero to allow EL0, EL1 and EL2 access to the
* debug registers, other than those registers that are controlled by
* MDCR_EL3.TDOSA.
*
* MDCR_EL3.TPM: Set to zero so that EL0, EL1, and EL2 System register
* accesses to all Performance Monitors registers do not trap to EL3.
* ---------------------------------------------------------------------
*/
mov_imm x0, MDCR_DEF_VAL
mov_imm x0, ((MDCR_EL3_RESET_VAL | MDCR_SDD_BIT | MDCR_SPD32(MDCR_SPD32_DISABLE)) \
& ~(MDCR_TDOSA_BIT | MDCR_TDA_BIT | MDCR_TPM_BIT))
msr mdcr_el3, x0
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------
@ -69,28 +118,20 @@
msr daifclr, #DAIF_ABT_BIT
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------
* The initial state of the Architectural feature trap register
* (CPTR_EL3) is unknown and it must be set to a known state. All
* feature traps are disabled. Some bits in this register are marked as
* reserved and should not be modified.
* Initialise CPTR_EL3, setting all fields rather than relying on hw.
* All fields are architecturally UNKNOWN on reset.
*
* CPTR_EL3.TCPAC: This causes a direct access to the CPACR_EL1 from EL1
* or the CPTR_EL2 from EL2 to trap to EL3 unless it is trapped at EL2.
* CPTR_EL3.TCPAC: Set to zero so that any accesses to CPACR_EL1,
* CPTR_EL2, CPACR, or HCPTR do not trap to EL3.
*
* CPTR_EL3.TTA: This causes access to the Trace functionality to trap
* to EL3 when executed from EL0, EL1, EL2, or EL3. If system register
* access to trace functionality is not supported, this bit is RES0.
* CPTR_EL3.TTA: Set to zero so that System register accesses to the
* trace registers do not trap to EL3.
*
* CPTR_EL3.TFP: This causes instructions that access the registers
* associated with Floating Point and Advanced SIMD execution to trap
* to EL3 when executed from any exception level, unless trapped to EL1
* or EL2.
* CPTR_EL3.TFP: Set to zero so that accesses to Advanced SIMD and
* floating-point functionality do not trap to EL3.
* ---------------------------------------------------------------------
*/
mrs x0, cptr_el3
bic w0, w0, #TCPAC_BIT
bic w0, w0, #TTA_BIT
bic w0, w0, #TFP_BIT
mov_imm x0, (CPTR_EL3_RESET_VAL & ~(TCPAC_BIT | TTA_BIT | TFP_BIT))
msr cptr_el3, x0
.endm
@ -104,8 +145,9 @@
* why this macro is parameterised ; each parameter allows to enable/disable
* some actions.
*
* _set_endian:
* Whether the macro needs to configure the endianness of data accesses.
* _init_sctlr:
* Whether the macro needs to initialise SCTLR_EL3, including configuring
* the endianness of data accesses.
*
* _warm_boot_mailbox:
* Whether the macro needs to detect the type of boot (cold/warm). The
@ -133,20 +175,35 @@
* -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
*/
.macro el3_entrypoint_common \
_set_endian, _warm_boot_mailbox, _secondary_cold_boot, \
_init_sctlr, _warm_boot_mailbox, _secondary_cold_boot, \
_init_memory, _init_c_runtime, _exception_vectors
.if \_set_endian
.if \_init_sctlr
/* -------------------------------------------------------------
* Set the CPU endianness before doing anything that might
* involve memory reads or writes.
* This is the initialisation of SCTLR_EL3 and so must ensure
* that all fields are explicitly set rather than relying on hw.
* Some fields reset to an IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED value and
* others are architecturally UNKNOWN on reset.
*
* SCTLR.EE: Set the CPU endianness before doing anything that
* might involve memory reads or writes. Set to zero to select
* Little Endian.
*
* SCTLR_EL3.WXN: For the EL3 translation regime, this field can
* force all memory regions that are writeable to be treated as
* XN (Execute-never). Set to zero so that this control has no
* effect on memory access permissions.
*
* SCTLR_EL3.SA: Set to zero to disable Stack Aligment check.
*
* SCTLR_EL3.A: Set to zero to disable Alignment fault checking.
* -------------------------------------------------------------
*/
mrs x0, sctlr_el3
bic x0, x0, #SCTLR_EE_BIT
mov_imm x0, (SCTLR_RESET_VAL & ~(SCTLR_EE_BIT | SCTLR_WXN_BIT \
| SCTLR_SA_BIT | SCTLR_A_BIT))
msr sctlr_el3, x0
isb
.endif /* _set_endian */
.endif /* _init_sctlr */
.if \_warm_boot_mailbox
/* -------------------------------------------------------------

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@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
((x) = ((x) & ~PARAM_EP_SECURITY_MASK) | (security))
#define EP_EE_MASK U(0x2)
#define EP_EE_SHIFT 1
#define EP_EE_LITTLE U(0x0)
#define EP_EE_BIG U(0x2)
#define EP_GET_EE(x) (x & EP_EE_MASK)

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@ -101,14 +101,19 @@
#define SCTLR_TRE_BIT (1 << 28)
#define SCTLR_AFE_BIT (1 << 29)
#define SCTLR_TE_BIT (1 << 30)
#define SCTLR_RESET_VAL (SCTLR_RES1 | SCTLR_NTWE_BIT | \
SCTLR_NTWI_BIT | SCTLR_CP15BEN_BIT)
/* SDCR definitions */
#define SDCR_SPD(x) ((x) << 14)
#define SDCR_SPD_LEGACY 0x0
#define SDCR_SPD_DISABLE 0x2
#define SDCR_SPD_ENABLE 0x3
#define SDCR_RESET_VAL 0x0
#if !ERROR_DEPRECATED
#define SDCR_DEF_VAL SDCR_SPD(SDCR_SPD_DISABLE)
#endif
/* HSCTLR definitions */
#define HSCTLR_RES1 ((1 << 29) | (1 << 28) | (1 << 23) | (1 << 22) \
@ -145,6 +150,7 @@
#define SCR_IRQ_BIT (1 << 1)
#define SCR_NS_BIT (1 << 0)
#define SCR_VALID_BIT_MASK 0x33ff
#define SCR_RESET_VAL 0x0
#define GET_NS_BIT(scr) ((scr) & SCR_NS_BIT)
@ -152,9 +158,10 @@
#define HCR_AMO_BIT (1 << 5)
#define HCR_IMO_BIT (1 << 4)
#define HCR_FMO_BIT (1 << 3)
#define HCR_RESET_VAL 0x0
/* CNTHCTL definitions */
#define EVNTEN_BIT (1 << 2)
#define CNTHCTL_RESET_VAL 0x0
#define PL1PCEN_BIT (1 << 1)
#define PL1PCTEN_BIT (1 << 0)
@ -169,16 +176,42 @@
#define EVNTI_MASK 0xf
/* HCPTR definitions */
#define HCPTR_RES1 ((1 << 13) | (1<<12) | 0x3ff)
#define TCPAC_BIT (1 << 31)
#define TTA_BIT (1 << 20)
#define TCP11_BIT (1 << 10)
#define TCP10_BIT (1 << 10)
#define HCPTR_RESET_VAL HCPTR_RES1
/* VTTBR defintions */
#define VTTBR_RESET_VAL ULL(0x0)
#define VTTBR_VMID_MASK ULL(0xff)
#define VTTBR_VMID_SHIFT 48
#define VTTBR_BADDR_MASK 0xffffffffffff
#define VTTBR_BADDR_SHIFT 0
/* HDCR definitions */
#define HDCR_RESET_VAL 0x0
/* HSTR definitions */
#define HSTR_RESET_VAL 0x0
/* CNTHP_CTL definitions */
#define CNTHP_CTL_RESET_VAL 0x0
/* NASCR definitions */
#define NSASEDIS_BIT (1 << 15)
#define NSTRCDIS_BIT (1 << 20)
/* NOTE: correct typo in the definitions */
#if !ERROR_DEPRECATED
#define NASCR_CP11_BIT (1 << 11)
#define NASCR_CP10_BIT (1 << 10)
#endif
#define NSACR_CP11_BIT (1 << 11)
#define NSACR_CP10_BIT (1 << 10)
#define NSACR_IMP_DEF_MASK (0x7 << 16)
#define NSACR_ENABLE_FP_ACCESS (NSACR_CP11_BIT | NSACR_CP10_BIT)
#define NSACR_RESET_VAL 0x0
/* CPACR definitions */
#define ASEDIS_BIT (1 << 31)
@ -187,9 +220,12 @@
#define CPACR_CP10_SHIFT 20
#define CPACR_ENABLE_FP_ACCESS (0x3 << CPACR_CP11_SHIFT |\
0x3 << CPACR_CP10_SHIFT)
#define CPACR_RESET_VAL 0x0
/* FPEXC definitions */
#define FPEXC_RES1 ((1 << 10) | (1 << 9) | (1 << 8))
#define FPEXC_EN_BIT (1 << 30)
#define FPEXC_RESET_VAL FPEXC_RES1
/* SPSR/CPSR definitions */
#define SPSR_FIQ_BIT (1 << 0)
@ -369,6 +405,7 @@
#define HSCTLR p15, 4, c1, c0, 0
#define HCR p15, 4, c1, c1, 0
#define HCPTR p15, 4, c1, c1, 2
#define HSTR p15, 4, c1, c1, 3
#define CNTHCTL p15, 4, c14, c1, 0
#define CNTKCTL p15, 0, c14, c1, 0
#define VPIDR p15, 4, c0, c0, 0

View File

@ -251,6 +251,7 @@ DEFINE_COPROCR_RW_FUNCS_64(vttbr, VTTBR_64)
DEFINE_COPROCR_RW_FUNCS_64(ttbr1, TTBR1_64)
DEFINE_COPROCR_RW_FUNCS_64(cntvoff, CNTVOFF_64)
DEFINE_COPROCR_RW_FUNCS(csselr, CSSELR)
DEFINE_COPROCR_RW_FUNCS(hstr, HSTR)
DEFINE_COPROCR_RW_FUNCS(icc_sre_el1, ICC_SRE)
DEFINE_COPROCR_RW_FUNCS(icc_sre_el2, ICC_HSRE)

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@ -135,16 +135,20 @@
& ID_PFR1_VIRTEXT_MASK)
/* SCTLR definitions */
#define SCTLR_EL2_RES1 ((U(1) << 29) | (U(1) << 28) | (U(1) << 23) | \
#define SCTLR_EL2_RES1 ((U(1) << 29) | (U(1) << 28) | (U(1) << 23) | \
(U(1) << 22) | (U(1) << 18) | (U(1) << 16) | \
(U(1) << 11) | (U(1) << 5) | (U(1) << 4))
#define SCTLR_EL1_RES1 ((U(1) << 29) | (U(1) << 28) | (U(1) << 23) | \
#define SCTLR_EL1_RES1 ((U(1) << 29) | (U(1) << 28) | (U(1) << 23) | \
(U(1) << 22) | (U(1) << 20) | (U(1) << 11))
#define SCTLR_AARCH32_EL1_RES1 \
((U(1) << 23) | (U(1) << 22) | (U(1) << 11) | \
(U(1) << 4) | (U(1) << 3))
#define SCTLR_EL3_RES1 ((U(1) << 29) | (U(1) << 28) | (U(1) << 23) | \
(U(1) << 22) | (U(1) << 18) | (U(1) << 16) | \
(U(1) << 11) | (U(1) << 5) | (U(1) << 4))
#define SCTLR_M_BIT (U(1) << 0)
#define SCTLR_A_BIT (U(1) << 1)
#define SCTLR_C_BIT (U(1) << 2)
@ -155,6 +159,7 @@
#define SCTLR_NTWE_BIT (U(1) << 18)
#define SCTLR_WXN_BIT (U(1) << 19)
#define SCTLR_EE_BIT (U(1) << 25)
#define SCTLR_RESET_VAL SCTLR_EL3_RES1
/* CPACR_El1 definitions */
#define CPACR_EL1_FPEN(x) ((x) << 20)
@ -176,15 +181,47 @@
#define SCR_IRQ_BIT (U(1) << 1)
#define SCR_NS_BIT (U(1) << 0)
#define SCR_VALID_BIT_MASK U(0x2f8f)
#define SCR_RESET_VAL SCR_RES1_BITS
/* MDCR definitions */
/* MDCR_EL3 definitions */
#define MDCR_SPD32(x) ((x) << 14)
#define MDCR_SPD32_LEGACY U(0x0)
#define MDCR_SPD32_DISABLE U(0x2)
#define MDCR_SPD32_ENABLE U(0x3)
#define MDCR_SDD_BIT (U(1) << 16)
#define MDCR_TDOSA_BIT (U(1) << 10)
#define MDCR_TDA_BIT (U(1) << 9)
#define MDCR_TPM_BIT (U(1) << 6)
#define MDCR_EL3_RESET_VAL U(0x0)
#if !ERROR_DEPRECATED
#define MDCR_DEF_VAL (MDCR_SDD_BIT | MDCR_SPD32(MDCR_SPD32_DISABLE))
#endif
/* MDCR_EL2 definitions */
#define MDCR_EL2_TDRA_BIT (U(1) << 11)
#define MDCR_EL2_TDOSA_BIT (U(1) << 10)
#define MDCR_EL2_TDA_BIT (U(1) << 9)
#define MDCR_EL2_TDE_BIT (U(1) << 8)
#define MDCR_EL2_HPME_BIT (U(1) << 7)
#define MDCR_EL2_TPM_BIT (U(1) << 6)
#define MDCR_EL2_TPMCR_BIT (U(1) << 5)
#define MDCR_EL2_RESET_VAL U(0x0)
/* HSTR_EL2 definitions */
#define HSTR_EL2_RESET_VAL U(0x0)
#define HSTR_EL2_T_MASK U(0xff)
/* CNTHP_CTL_EL2 definitions */
#define CNTHP_CTL_ENABLE_BIT (U(1) << 0)
#define CNTHP_CTL_RESET_VAL U(0x0)
/* VTTBR_EL2 definitions */
#define VTTBR_RESET_VAL ULL(0x0)
#define VTTBR_VMID_MASK ULL(0xff)
#define VTTBR_VMID_SHIFT U(48)
#define VTTBR_BADDR_MASK ULL(0xffffffffffff)
#define VTTBR_BADDR_SHIFT U(0)
/* HCR definitions */
#define HCR_RW_SHIFT U(31)
@ -199,6 +236,7 @@
#define ISR_F_SHIFT U(6)
/* CNTHCTL_EL2 definitions */
#define CNTHCTL_RESET_VAL U(0x0)
#define EVNTEN_BIT (U(1) << 2)
#define EL1PCEN_BIT (U(1) << 1)
#define EL1PCTEN_BIT (U(1) << 0)
@ -217,6 +255,14 @@
#define TCPAC_BIT (U(1) << 31)
#define TTA_BIT (U(1) << 20)
#define TFP_BIT (U(1) << 10)
#define CPTR_EL3_RESET_VAL U(0x0)
/* CPTR_EL2 definitions */
#define CPTR_EL2_RES1 ((U(1) << 13) | (U(1) << 12) | (U(0x3ff)))
#define CPTR_EL2_TCPAC_BIT (U(1) << 31)
#define CPTR_EL2_TTA_BIT (U(1) << 20)
#define CPTR_EL2_TFP_BIT (U(1) << 10)
#define CPTR_EL2_RESET_VAL CPTR_EL2_RES1
/* CPSR/SPSR definitions */
#define DAIF_FIQ_BIT (U(1) << 0)

View File

@ -75,36 +75,44 @@ static void cm_init_context_common(cpu_context_t *ctx, const entry_point_info_t
if (security_state != SECURE)
scr |= SCR_NS_BIT;
/*
* Set up SCTLR for the Non Secure context.
* EE bit is taken from the entrypoint attributes
* M, C and I bits must be zero (as required by PSCI specification)
*
* The target exception level is based on the spsr mode requested.
* If execution is requested to hyp mode, HVC is enabled
* via SCR.HCE.
*
* Always compute the SCTLR_EL1 value and save in the cpu_context
* - the HYP registers are set up by cm_preapre_ns_entry() as they
* are not part of the stored cpu_context
*
* TODO: In debug builds the spsr should be validated and checked
* against the CPU support, security state, endianness and pc
*/
if (security_state != SECURE) {
sctlr = EP_GET_EE(ep->h.attr) ? SCTLR_EE_BIT : 0;
/*
* In addition to SCTLR_RES1, set the CP15_BEN, nTWI & nTWE
* bits that architecturally reset to 1.
* Set up SCTLR for the Non-secure context.
*
* SCTLR.EE: Endianness is taken from the entrypoint attributes.
*
* SCTLR.M, SCTLR.C and SCTLR.I: These fields must be zero (as
* required by PSCI specification)
*
* Set remaining SCTLR fields to their architecturally defined
* values. Some fields reset to an IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED value:
*
* SCTLR.TE: Set to zero so that exceptions to an Exception
* Level executing at PL1 are taken to A32 state.
*
* SCTLR.V: Set to zero to select the normal exception vectors
* with base address held in VBAR.
*/
sctlr |= SCTLR_RES1 | SCTLR_CP15BEN_BIT |
SCTLR_NTWI_BIT | SCTLR_NTWE_BIT;
assert(((ep->spsr >> SPSR_E_SHIFT) & SPSR_E_MASK) ==
(EP_GET_EE(ep->h.attr) >> EP_EE_SHIFT));
sctlr = EP_GET_EE(ep->h.attr) ? SCTLR_EE_BIT : 0;
sctlr |= (SCTLR_RESET_VAL & ~(SCTLR_TE_BIT | SCTLR_V_BIT));
write_ctx_reg(reg_ctx, CTX_NS_SCTLR, sctlr);
}
/*
* The target exception level is based on the spsr mode requested. If
* execution is requested to hyp mode, HVC is enabled via SCR.HCE.
*/
if (GET_M32(ep->spsr) == MODE32_hyp)
scr |= SCR_HCE_BIT;
/*
* Store the initialised values for SCTLR and SCR in the cpu_context.
* The Hyp mode registers are not part of the saved context and are
* set-up in cm_prepare_el3_exit().
*/
write_ctx_reg(reg_ctx, CTX_SCR, scr);
write_ctx_reg(reg_ctx, CTX_LR, ep->pc);
write_ctx_reg(reg_ctx, CTX_SPSR, ep->spsr);
@ -151,7 +159,7 @@ void cm_init_my_context(const entry_point_info_t *ep)
******************************************************************************/
void cm_prepare_el3_exit(uint32_t security_state)
{
uint32_t sctlr, scr, hcptr;
uint32_t hsctlr, scr;
cpu_context_t *ctx = cm_get_context(security_state);
assert(ctx);
@ -160,9 +168,9 @@ void cm_prepare_el3_exit(uint32_t security_state)
scr = read_ctx_reg(get_regs_ctx(ctx), CTX_SCR);
if (scr & SCR_HCE_BIT) {
/* Use SCTLR value to initialize HSCTLR */
sctlr = read_ctx_reg(get_regs_ctx(ctx),
hsctlr = read_ctx_reg(get_regs_ctx(ctx),
CTX_NS_SCTLR);
sctlr |= HSCTLR_RES1;
hsctlr |= HSCTLR_RES1;
/* Temporarily set the NS bit to access HSCTLR */
write_scr(read_scr() | SCR_NS_BIT);
/*
@ -170,7 +178,7 @@ void cm_prepare_el3_exit(uint32_t security_state)
* we can access HSCTLR
*/
isb();
write_hsctlr(sctlr);
write_hsctlr(hsctlr);
isb();
write_scr(read_scr() & ~SCR_NS_BIT);
@ -184,48 +192,92 @@ void cm_prepare_el3_exit(uint32_t security_state)
write_scr(read_scr() | SCR_NS_BIT);
isb();
/* PL2 present but unused, need to disable safely */
write_hcr(0);
/*
* Hyp / PL2 present but unused, need to disable safely.
* HSCTLR can be ignored in this case.
*
* Set HCR to its architectural reset value so that
* Non-secure operations do not trap to Hyp mode.
*/
write_hcr(HCR_RESET_VAL);
/* HSCTLR : can be ignored when bypassing */
/*
* Set HCPTR to its architectural reset value so that
* Non-secure access from EL1 or EL0 to trace and to
* Advanced SIMD and floating point functionality does
* not trap to Hyp mode.
*/
write_hcptr(HCPTR_RESET_VAL);
/* HCPTR : disable all traps TCPAC, TTA, TCP */
hcptr = read_hcptr();
hcptr &= ~(TCPAC_BIT | TTA_BIT | TCP11_BIT | TCP10_BIT);
write_hcptr(hcptr);
/*
* Initialise CNTHCTL. All fields are architecturally
* UNKNOWN on reset and are set to zero except for
* field(s) listed below.
*
* CNTHCTL.PL1PCEN: Disable traps to Hyp mode of
* Non-secure EL0 and EL1 accessed to the physical
* timer registers.
*
* CNTHCTL.PL1PCTEN: Disable traps to Hyp mode of
* Non-secure EL0 and EL1 accessed to the physical
* counter registers.
*/
write_cnthctl(CNTHCTL_RESET_VAL |
PL1PCEN_BIT | PL1PCTEN_BIT);
/* Enable EL1 access to timer */
write_cnthctl(PL1PCEN_BIT | PL1PCTEN_BIT);
/* Reset CNTVOFF_EL2 */
/*
* Initialise CNTVOFF to zero as it resets to an
* IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED value.
*/
write64_cntvoff(0);
/* Set VPIDR, VMPIDR to match MIDR, MPIDR */
/*
* Set VPIDR and VMPIDR to match MIDR_EL1 and MPIDR
* respectively.
*/
write_vpidr(read_midr());
write_vmpidr(read_mpidr());
/*
* Reset VTTBR.
* Needed because cache maintenance operations depend on
* the VMID even when non-secure EL1&0 stage 2 address
* translation are disabled.
* Initialise VTTBR, setting all fields rather than
* relying on the hw. Some fields are architecturally
* UNKNOWN at reset.
*
* VTTBR.VMID: Set to zero which is the architecturally
* defined reset value. Even though EL1&0 stage 2
* address translation is disabled, cache maintenance
* operations depend on the VMID.
*
* VTTBR.BADDR: Set to zero as EL1&0 stage 2 address
* translation is disabled.
*/
write64_vttbr(0);
write64_vttbr(VTTBR_RESET_VAL &
~((VTTBR_VMID_MASK << VTTBR_VMID_SHIFT)
| (VTTBR_BADDR_MASK << VTTBR_BADDR_SHIFT)));
/*
* Avoid unexpected debug traps in case where HDCR
* is not completely reset by the hardware - set
* HDCR.HPMN to PMCR.N and zero the remaining bits.
* The HDCR.HPMN and PMCR.N fields are the same size
* (5 bits) and HPMN is at offset zero within HDCR.
* Initialise HDCR, setting all the fields rather than
* relying on hw.
*
* HDCR.HPMN: Set to value of PMCR.N which is the
* architecturally-defined reset value.
*/
write_hdcr((read_pmcr() & PMCR_N_BITS) >> PMCR_N_SHIFT);
write_hdcr(HDCR_RESET_VAL |
((read_pmcr() & PMCR_N_BITS) >> PMCR_N_SHIFT));
/*
* Reset CNTHP_CTL to disable the EL2 physical timer and
* therefore prevent timer interrupts.
* Set HSTR to its architectural reset value so that
* access to system registers in the cproc=1111
* encoding space do not trap to Hyp mode.
*/
write_cnthp_ctl(0);
write_hstr(HSTR_RESET_VAL);
/*
* Set CNTHP_CTL to its architectural reset value to
* disable the EL2 physical timer and prevent timer
* interrupts. Some fields are architecturally UNKNOWN
* on reset and are set to zero.
*/
write_cnthp_ctl(CNTHP_CTL_RESET_VAL);
isb();
write_scr(read_scr() & ~SCR_NS_BIT);

View File

@ -71,70 +71,58 @@ static void cm_init_context_common(cpu_context_t *ctx, const entry_point_info_t
zeromem(ctx, sizeof(*ctx));
/*
* Base the context SCR on the current value, adjust for entry point
* specific requirements and set trap bits from the IMF
* TODO: provide the base/global SCR bits using another mechanism?
* SCR_EL3 was initialised during reset sequence in macro
* el3_arch_init_common. This code modifies the SCR_EL3 fields that
* affect the next EL.
*
* The following fields are initially set to zero and then updated to
* the required value depending on the state of the SPSR_EL3 and the
* Security state and entrypoint attributes of the next EL.
*/
scr_el3 = read_scr();
scr_el3 &= ~(SCR_NS_BIT | SCR_RW_BIT | SCR_FIQ_BIT | SCR_IRQ_BIT |
SCR_ST_BIT | SCR_HCE_BIT);
/*
* SCR_NS: Set the security state of the next EL.
*/
if (security_state != SECURE)
scr_el3 |= SCR_NS_BIT;
/*
* SCR_EL3.RW: Set the execution state, AArch32 or AArch64, for next
* Exception level as specified by SPSR.
*/
if (GET_RW(ep->spsr) == MODE_RW_64)
scr_el3 |= SCR_RW_BIT;
/*
* SCR_EL3.ST: Traps Secure EL1 accesses to the Counter-timer Physical
* Secure timer registers to EL3, from AArch64 state only, if specified
* by the entrypoint attributes.
*/
if (EP_GET_ST(ep->h.attr))
scr_el3 |= SCR_ST_BIT;
#ifndef HANDLE_EA_EL3_FIRST
/* Explicitly stop to trap aborts from lower exception levels. */
/*
* SCR_EL3.EA: Do not route External Abort and SError Interrupt External
* to EL3 when executing at a lower EL. When executing at EL3, External
* Aborts are taken to EL3.
*/
scr_el3 &= ~SCR_EA_BIT;
#endif
#ifdef IMAGE_BL31
/*
* IRQ/FIQ bits only need setting if interrupt routing
* model has been set up for BL31.
* SCR_EL3.IRQ, SCR_EL3.FIQ: Enable the physical FIQ and IRQ rounting as
* indicated by the interrupt routing model for BL31.
*/
scr_el3 |= get_scr_el3_from_routing_model(security_state);
#endif
/*
* Set up SCTLR_ELx for the target exception level:
* EE bit is taken from the entrypoint attributes
* M, C and I bits must be zero (as required by PSCI specification)
*
* The target exception level is based on the spsr mode requested.
* If execution is requested to EL2 or hyp mode, HVC is enabled
* via SCR_EL3.HCE.
*
* Always compute the SCTLR_EL1 value and save in the cpu_context
* - the EL2 registers are set up by cm_preapre_ns_entry() as they
* are not part of the stored cpu_context
*
* TODO: In debug builds the spsr should be validated and checked
* against the CPU support, security state, endianess and pc
* SCR_EL3.HCE: Enable HVC instructions if next execution state is
* AArch64 and next EL is EL2, or if next execution state is AArch32 and
* next mode is Hyp.
*/
sctlr_elx = EP_GET_EE(ep->h.attr) ? SCTLR_EE_BIT : 0;
if (GET_RW(ep->spsr) == MODE_RW_64)
sctlr_elx |= SCTLR_EL1_RES1;
else {
sctlr_elx |= SCTLR_AARCH32_EL1_RES1;
/*
* If lower non-secure EL is AArch32, enable the CP15BEN, nTWI
* & nTWI bits. This aligns with SCTLR initialization on
* systems with an AArch32 EL3, where these bits
* architecturally reset to 1.
*/
if (security_state != SECURE)
sctlr_elx |= SCTLR_CP15BEN_BIT | SCTLR_NTWI_BIT
| SCTLR_NTWE_BIT;
}
write_ctx_reg(get_sysregs_ctx(ctx), CTX_SCTLR_EL1, sctlr_elx);
if ((GET_RW(ep->spsr) == MODE_RW_64
&& GET_EL(ep->spsr) == MODE_EL2)
|| (GET_RW(ep->spsr) != MODE_RW_64
@ -142,6 +130,45 @@ static void cm_init_context_common(cpu_context_t *ctx, const entry_point_info_t
scr_el3 |= SCR_HCE_BIT;
}
/*
* Initialise SCTLR_EL1 to the reset value corresponding to the target
* execution state setting all fields rather than relying of the hw.
* Some fields have architecturally UNKNOWN reset values and these are
* set to zero.
*
* SCTLR.EE: Endianness is taken from the entrypoint attributes.
*
* SCTLR.M, SCTLR.C and SCTLR.I: These fields must be zero (as
* required by PSCI specification)
*/
sctlr_elx = EP_GET_EE(ep->h.attr) ? SCTLR_EE_BIT : 0;
if (GET_RW(ep->spsr) == MODE_RW_64)
sctlr_elx |= SCTLR_EL1_RES1;
else {
/*
* If the target execution state is AArch32 then the following
* fields need to be set.
*
* SCTRL_EL1.nTWE: Set to one so that EL0 execution of WFE
* instructions are not trapped to EL1.
*
* SCTLR_EL1.nTWI: Set to one so that EL0 execution of WFI
* instructions are not trapped to EL1.
*
* SCTLR_EL1.CP15BEN: Set to one to enable EL0 execution of the
* CP15DMB, CP15DSB, and CP15ISB instructions.
*/
sctlr_elx |= SCTLR_AARCH32_EL1_RES1 | SCTLR_CP15BEN_BIT
| SCTLR_NTWI_BIT | SCTLR_NTWE_BIT;
}
/*
* Store the initialised SCTLR_EL1 value in the cpu_context - SCTLR_EL2
* and other EL2 resgisters are set up by cm_preapre_ns_entry() as they
* are not part of the stored cpu_context.
*/
write_ctx_reg(get_sysregs_ctx(ctx), CTX_SCTLR_EL1, sctlr_elx);
/* Populate EL3 state so that we've the right context before doing ERET */
state = get_el3state_ctx(ctx);
write_ctx_reg(state, CTX_SCR_EL3, scr_el3);
@ -191,7 +218,7 @@ void cm_init_my_context(const entry_point_info_t *ep)
******************************************************************************/
void cm_prepare_el3_exit(uint32_t security_state)
{
uint32_t sctlr_elx, scr_el3, cptr_el2;
uint32_t sctlr_elx, scr_el3;
cpu_context_t *ctx = cm_get_context(security_state);
assert(ctx);
@ -206,57 +233,141 @@ void cm_prepare_el3_exit(uint32_t security_state)
sctlr_elx |= SCTLR_EL2_RES1;
write_sctlr_el2(sctlr_elx);
} else if (EL_IMPLEMENTED(2)) {
/* EL2 present but unused, need to disable safely */
/* HCR_EL2 = 0, except RW bit set to match SCR_EL3 */
/*
* EL2 present but unused, need to disable safely.
* SCTLR_EL2 can be ignored in this case.
*
* Initialise all fields in HCR_EL2, except HCR_EL2.RW,
* to zero so that Non-secure operations do not trap to
* EL2.
*
* HCR_EL2.RW: Set this field to match SCR_EL3.RW
*/
write_hcr_el2((scr_el3 & SCR_RW_BIT) ? HCR_RW_BIT : 0);
/* SCTLR_EL2 : can be ignored when bypassing */
/*
* Initialise CPTR_EL2 setting all fields rather than
* relying on the hw. All fields have architecturally
* UNKNOWN reset values.
*
* CPTR_EL2.TCPAC: Set to zero so that Non-secure EL1
* accesses to the CPACR_EL1 or CPACR from both
* Execution states do not trap to EL2.
*
* CPTR_EL2.TTA: Set to zero so that Non-secure System
* register accesses to the trace registers from both
* Execution states do not trap to EL2.
*
* CPTR_EL2.TFP: Set to zero so that Non-secure accesses
* to SIMD and floating-point functionality from both
* Execution states do not trap to EL2.
*/
write_cptr_el2(CPTR_EL2_RESET_VAL &
~(CPTR_EL2_TCPAC_BIT | CPTR_EL2_TTA_BIT
| CPTR_EL2_TFP_BIT));
/* CPTR_EL2 : disable all traps TCPAC, TTA, TFP */
cptr_el2 = read_cptr_el2();
cptr_el2 &= ~(TCPAC_BIT | TTA_BIT | TFP_BIT);
write_cptr_el2(cptr_el2);
/*
* Initiliase CNTHCTL_EL2. All fields are
* architecturally UNKNOWN on reset and are set to zero
* except for field(s) listed below.
*
* CNTHCTL_EL2.EL1PCEN: Set to one to disable traps to
* Hyp mode of Non-secure EL0 and EL1 accesses to the
* physical timer registers.
*
* CNTHCTL_EL2.EL1PCTEN: Set to one to disable traps to
* Hyp mode of Non-secure EL0 and EL1 accesses to the
* physical counter registers.
*/
write_cnthctl_el2(CNTHCTL_RESET_VAL |
EL1PCEN_BIT | EL1PCTEN_BIT);
/* Enable EL1 access to timer */
write_cnthctl_el2(EL1PCEN_BIT | EL1PCTEN_BIT);
/* Reset CNTVOFF_EL2 */
/*
* Initialise CNTVOFF_EL2 to zero as it resets to an
* architecturally UNKNOWN value.
*/
write_cntvoff_el2(0);
/* Set VPIDR, VMPIDR to match MIDR, MPIDR */
/*
* Set VPIDR_EL2 and VMPIDR_EL2 to match MIDR_EL1 and
* MPIDR_EL1 respectively.
*/
write_vpidr_el2(read_midr_el1());
write_vmpidr_el2(read_mpidr_el1());
/*
* Reset VTTBR_EL2.
* Needed because cache maintenance operations depend on
* the VMID even when non-secure EL1&0 stage 2 address
* translation are disabled.
* Initialise VTTBR_EL2. All fields are architecturally
* UNKNOWN on reset.
*
* VTTBR_EL2.VMID: Set to zero. Even though EL1&0 stage
* 2 address translation is disabled, cache maintenance
* operations depend on the VMID.
*
* VTTBR_EL2.BADDR: Set to zero as EL1&0 stage 2 address
* translation is disabled.
*/
write_vttbr_el2(0);
write_vttbr_el2(VTTBR_RESET_VAL &
~((VTTBR_VMID_MASK << VTTBR_VMID_SHIFT)
| (VTTBR_BADDR_MASK << VTTBR_BADDR_SHIFT)));
/*
* Avoid unexpected debug traps in case where MDCR_EL2
* is not completely reset by the hardware - set
* MDCR_EL2.HPMN to PMCR_EL0.N and zero the remaining
* bits.
* MDCR_EL2.HPMN and PMCR_EL0.N fields are the same size
* (5 bits) and HPMN is at offset zero within MDCR_EL2.
* Initialise MDCR_EL2, setting all fields rather than
* relying on hw. Some fields are architecturally
* UNKNOWN on reset.
*
* MDCR_EL2.TDRA: Set to zero so that Non-secure EL0 and
* EL1 System register accesses to the Debug ROM
* registers are not trapped to EL2.
*
* MDCR_EL2.TDOSA: Set to zero so that Non-secure EL1
* System register accesses to the powerdown debug
* registers are not trapped to EL2.
*
* MDCR_EL2.TDA: Set to zero so that System register
* accesses to the debug registers do not trap to EL2.
*
* MDCR_EL2.TDE: Set to zero so that debug exceptions
* are not routed to EL2.
*
* MDCR_EL2.HPME: Set to zero to disable EL2 Performance
* Monitors.
*
* MDCR_EL2.TPM: Set to zero so that Non-secure EL0 and
* EL1 accesses to all Performance Monitors registers
* are not trapped to EL2.
*
* MDCR_EL2.TPMCR: Set to zero so that Non-secure EL0
* and EL1 accesses to the PMCR_EL0 or PMCR are not
* trapped to EL2.
*
* MDCR_EL2.HPMN: Set to value of PMCR_EL0.N which is the
* architecturally-defined reset value.
*/
write_mdcr_el2((read_pmcr_el0() & PMCR_EL0_N_BITS)
>> PMCR_EL0_N_SHIFT);
write_mdcr_el2((MDCR_EL2_RESET_VAL |
((read_pmcr_el0() & PMCR_EL0_N_BITS)
>> PMCR_EL0_N_SHIFT)) &
~(MDCR_EL2_TDRA_BIT | MDCR_EL2_TDOSA_BIT
| MDCR_EL2_TDA_BIT | MDCR_EL2_TDE_BIT
| MDCR_EL2_HPME_BIT | MDCR_EL2_TPM_BIT
| MDCR_EL2_TPMCR_BIT));
/*
* Avoid unexpected traps of non-secure access to
* certain system registers at EL1 or lower where
* HSTR_EL2 is not completely reset to zero by the
* hardware - zero the entire register.
* Initialise HSTR_EL2. All fields are architecturally
* UNKNOWN on reset.
*
* HSTR_EL2.T<n>: Set all these fields to zero so that
* Non-secure EL0 or EL1 accesses to System registers
* do not trap to EL2.
*/
write_hstr_el2(0);
write_hstr_el2(HSTR_EL2_RESET_VAL & ~(HSTR_EL2_T_MASK));
/*
* Reset CNTHP_CTL_EL2 to disable the EL2 physical timer
* and therefore prevent timer interrupts.
* Initialise CNTHP_CTL_EL2. All fields are
* architecturally UNKNOWN on reset.
*
* CNTHP_CTL_EL2:ENABLE: Set to zero to disable the EL2
* physical timer and prevent timer interrupts.
*/
write_cnthp_ctl_el2(0);
write_cnthp_ctl_el2(CNTHP_CTL_RESET_VAL &
~(CNTHP_CTL_ENABLE_BIT));
}
}