This patch applies CVE-2022-23960 workarounds for Cortex-A75,
Cortex-A73, Cortex-A72 & Cortex-A57. This patch also implements
the new SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_3 and enables necessary discovery
hooks for Coxtex-A72, Cortex-A57, Cortex-A73 and Cortex-A75 to
enable discovery of this SMC via SMC_FEATURES. SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_3
is implemented for A57/A72 because some revisions are affected by both
CVE-2022-23960 and CVE-2017-5715 and this allows callers to replace
SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 calls with SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_3. For details
of SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_3, please refer SMCCCv1.4 specification.
Signed-off-by: Bipin Ravi <bipin.ravi@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: John Powell <john.powell@arm.com>
Change-Id: Ifa6d9c7baa6764924638efe3c70468f98d60ed7c
This patch fixes this issue:
https://github.com/ARM-software/tf-issues/issues/660
The introduced changes are the following:
1) Some cores implement cache coherency maintenance operation on the
hardware level. For those cores, such as - but not only - the DynamIQ
cores, it is mandatory that TF-A is compiled with the
HW_ASSISTED_COHERENCY flag. If not, the core behaviour at runtime is
unpredictable. To prevent this, compile time checks have been added and
compilation errors are generated, if needed.
2) To enable this change for FVP, a logical separation has been done for
the core libraries. A system cannot contain cores of both groups, i.e.
cores that manage coherency on hardware and cores that don't do it. As
such, depending on the HW_ASSISTED_COHERENCY flag, FVP includes the
libraries only of the relevant cores.
3) The neoverse_e1.S file has been added to the FVP sources.
Change-Id: I787d15819b2add4ec0d238249e04bf0497dc12f3
Signed-off-by: John Tsichritzis <john.tsichritzis@arm.com>
Under certain near idle conditions, DSU may miss response transfers on
the ACE master or Peripheral port, leading to deadlock. This workaround
disables high-level clock gating of the DSU to prevent this.
Change-Id: I820911d61570bacb38dd325b3519bc8d12caa14b
Signed-off-by: Louis Mayencourt <louis.mayencourt@arm.com>
Internal timing conditions might cause the CPU to stop processing
interrupts. Set bit 13 of CPUACTLR_EL1 to prevent this.
Change-Id: Ifdd19dbcdb71bb0d9609cab1315c478aaedb03ba
Signed-off-by: Louis Mayencourt <louis.mayencourt@arm.com>
Implicit Error Synchronization Barrier (IESB) might not be correctly
generated in Cortex-A75 r0p0. To prevent this, IESB are enabled at all
expection levels.
Change-Id: I2a1a568668a31e4f3f38d0fba1d632ad9939e5ad
Signed-off-by: Louis Mayencourt <louis.mayencourt@arm.com>
If the system is in near idle conditions, this erratum could cause a
deadlock or data corruption. This patch applies the workaround that
prevents this.
This DSU erratum affects only the DSUs that contain the ACP interface
and it was fixed in r2p0. The workaround is applied only to the DSUs
that are actually affected.
Link to respective Arm documentation:
http://infocenter.arm.com/help/index.jsp?topic=/com.arm.doc.epm138168/index.html
Change-Id: I033213b3077685130fc1e3f4f79c4d15d7483ec9
Signed-off-by: John Tsichritzis <john.tsichritzis@arm.com>
Some CPUS may benefit from using a dynamic mitigation approach for
CVE-2018-3639. A new SMC interface is defined to allow software
executing in lower ELs to enable or disable the mitigation for their
execution context.
It should be noted that regardless of the state of the mitigation for
lower ELs, code executing in EL3 is always mitigated against
CVE-2018-3639.
NOTE: This change is a compatibility break for any platform using
the declare_cpu_ops_workaround_cve_2017_5715 macro. Migrate to
the declare_cpu_ops_wa macro instead.
Change-Id: I3509a9337ad217bbd96de9f380c4ff8bf7917013
Signed-off-by: Dimitris Papastamos <dimitris.papastamos@arm.com>
For affected CPUs, this approach enables the mitigation during EL3
initialization, following every PE reset. No mechanism is provided to
disable the mitigation at runtime.
This approach permanently mitigates the entire software stack and no
additional mitigation code is required in other software components.
TF-A implements this approach for the following affected CPUs:
* Cortex-A57 and Cortex-A72, by setting bit 55 (Disable load pass store) of
`CPUACTLR_EL1` (`S3_1_C15_C2_0`).
* Cortex-A73, by setting bit 3 of `S3_0_C15_C0_0` (not documented in the
Technical Reference Manual (TRM)).
* Cortex-A75, by setting bit 35 (reserved in TRM) of `CPUACTLR_EL1`
(`S3_0_C15_C1_0`).
Additionally, a new SMC interface is implemented to allow software
executing in lower ELs to discover whether the system is mitigated
against CVE-2018-3639.
Refer to "Firmware interfaces for mitigating cache speculation
vulnerabilities System Software on Arm Systems"[0] for more
information.
[0] https://developer.arm.com/cache-speculation-vulnerability-firmware-specification
Change-Id: I084aa7c3bc7c26bf2df2248301270f77bed22ceb
Signed-off-by: Dimitris Papastamos <dimitris.papastamos@arm.com>
This patch renames symbols and files relating to CVE-2017-5715 to make
it easier to introduce new symbols and files for new CVE mitigations.
Change-Id: I24c23822862ca73648c772885f1690bed043dbc7
Signed-off-by: Dimitris Papastamos <dimitris.papastamos@arm.com>
When querying `SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1` through `SMCCC_ARCH_FEATURES`,
return either:
* -1 to indicate the PE on which `SMCCC_ARCH_FEATURES` is called
requires firmware mitigation for CVE-2017-5715 but the mitigation
is not compiled in.
* 0 to indicate that firmware mitigation is required, or
* 1 to indicate that no firmware mitigation is required.
This patch complies with v1.2 of the firmware interfaces
specification (ARM DEN 0070A).
Change-Id: Ibc32d6620efdac6c340758ec502d95554a55f02a
Signed-off-by: Dimitris Papastamos <dimitris.papastamos@arm.com>
If the CSV2 field reads as 1 then branch targets trained in one
context cannot affect speculative execution in a different context.
In that case skip the workaround on Cortex A72 and A73.
Change-Id: Ide24fb6efc77c548e4296295adc38dca87d042ee
Signed-off-by: Dimitris Papastamos <dimitris.papastamos@arm.com>
This patch also fixes the assumption that the counters are disabled on
the resume path. This is incorrect as the AMU counters are enabled
early in the CPU reset function before `cpuamu_context_restore()`
runs.
Change-Id: I38a94eb166a523f00de18e86860434ffccff2131
Signed-off-by: Dimitris Papastamos <dimitris.papastamos@arm.com>
Even though the workaround for CVE-2017-5715 is not a CPU erratum, the
code is piggybacking on the errata framework to print whether the
workaround was applied, missing or not needed.
Change-Id: I821197a4b8560c73fd894cd7cd9ecf9503c72fa3
Signed-off-by: Dimitris Papastamos <dimitris.papastamos@arm.com>
If the CSV2 field reads as 1 then branch targets trained in one
context cannot affect speculative execution in a different context.
In that case skip the workaround on Cortex A75.
Change-Id: I4d5504cba516a67311fb5f0657b08f72909cbd38
Signed-off-by: Dimitris Papastamos <dimitris.papastamos@arm.com>
Invalidate the Branch Target Buffer (BTB) on entry to EL3 by
temporarily dropping into AArch32 Secure-EL1 and executing the
`BPIALL` instruction.
This is achieved by using 3 vector tables. There is the runtime
vector table which is used to handle exceptions and 2 additional
tables which are required to implement this workaround. The
additional tables are `vbar0` and `vbar1`.
The sequence of events for handling a single exception is
as follows:
1) Install vector table `vbar0` which saves the CPU context on entry
to EL3 and sets up the Secure-EL1 context to execute in AArch32 mode
with the MMU disabled and I$ enabled. This is the default vector table.
2) Before doing an ERET into Secure-EL1, switch vbar to point to
another vector table `vbar1`. This is required to restore EL3 state
when returning from the workaround, before proceeding with normal EL3
exception handling.
3) While in Secure-EL1, the `BPIALL` instruction is executed and an
SMC call back to EL3 is performed.
4) On entry to EL3 from Secure-EL1, the saved context from step 1) is
restored. The vbar is switched to point to `vbar0` in preparation to
handle further exceptions. Finally a branch to the runtime vector
table entry is taken to complete the handling of the original
exception.
This workaround is enabled by default on the affected CPUs.
NOTE
====
There are 4 different stubs in Secure-EL1. Each stub corresponds to
an exception type such as Sync/IRQ/FIQ/SError. Each stub will move a
different value in `R0` before doing an SMC call back into EL3.
Without this piece of information it would not be possible to know
what the original exception type was as we cannot use `ESR_EL3` to
distinguish between IRQs and FIQs.
Change-Id: I90b32d14a3735290b48685d43c70c99daaa4b434
Signed-off-by: Dimitris Papastamos <dimitris.papastamos@arm.com>
The Cortex A75 has 5 AMU counters. The first three counters are fixed
and the remaining two are programmable.
A new build option is introduced, `ENABLE_AMU`. When set, the fixed
counters will be enabled for use by lower ELs. The programmable
counters are currently disabled.
Change-Id: I4bd5208799bb9ed7d2596e8b0bfc87abbbe18740
Signed-off-by: Dimitris Papastamos <dimitris.papastamos@arm.com>
Both Cortex-A75 and Cortex-A55 CPUs use the ARM DynamIQ Shared Unit
(DSU). The power-down and power-up sequences are therefore mostly
managed in hardware, and required software operations are considerably
simpler.
Change-Id: I68b30e6e1ebe7c041d5e67f39c59f08575fc7ecc
Co-authored-by: Sandrine Bailleux <sandrine.bailleux@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeenu Viswambharan <jeenu.viswambharan@arm.com>
Bipin Ravi
John Tsichritzis
Louis Mayencourt
Dimitris Papastamos
davidcunado-arm
David Wang