Commit Graph

11 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Ambroise Vincent d0d115e214 Cortex-A76: Optimize CVE_2018_3639 workaround
Switched from a static check to a runtime assert to make sure a
workaround is implemented for CVE_2018_3639.

This allows platforms that know they have the SSBS hardware workaround
in the CPU to compile out code under DYNAMIC_WORKAROUND_CVE_2018_3639.

The gain in memory size without the dynamic workaround is 4KB in bl31.

Change-Id: I61bb7d87c59964b0c7faac5d6bc7fc5c4651cbf3
Signed-off-by: Ambroise Vincent <ambroise.vincent@arm.com>
2019-03-14 09:36:12 +00:00
Ambroise Vincent e8383be4a1 Cortex-A76: fix spelling
Change-Id: I6adf7c14e8a974a7d40d51615b5e69eab1a7436f
Signed-off-by: Ambroise Vincent <ambroise.vincent@arm.com>
2019-03-14 09:36:12 +00:00
Louis Mayencourt 5c6aa01aff Add workaround for errata 1073348 for Cortex-A76
Concurrent instruction TLB miss and mispredicted return instruction
might fetch wrong instruction stream. Set bit 6 of CPUACTLR_EL1 to
prevent this.

Change-Id: I2da4f30cd2df3f5e885dd3c4825c557492d1ac58
Signed-off-by: Louis Mayencourt <louis.mayencourt@arm.com>
2019-02-26 16:21:06 +00:00
Louis Mayencourt 5cc8c7ba1b Add workaround for errata 1220197 for Cortex-A76
Streaming store under specific conditions might cause deadlock or data
corruption. Set bit 25:24 of CPUECTLR_EL1, which disables write
streaming to the L2 to prevent this.

Change-Id: Ib5cabb997b35ada78b27e75787afd610ea606dcf
Signed-off-by: Louis Mayencourt <louis.mayencourt@arm.com>
2019-02-26 16:21:06 +00:00
Louis Mayencourt 508d71108a Add workaround for errata 1130799 for Cortex-A76
TLBI VAAE1 or TLBI VAALE1 targeting a page within hardware page
aggregated address translation data in the L2 TLB might cause
corruption of address translation data. Set bit 59 of CPUACTLR2_EL1 to
prevent this.

Change-Id: I59f3edea54e87d264e0794f5ca2a8c68a636e586
Signed-off-by: Louis Mayencourt <louis.mayencourt@arm.com>
2019-02-26 16:21:06 +00:00
Antonio Nino Diaz 09d40e0e08 Sanitise includes across codebase
Enforce full include path for includes. Deprecate old paths.

The following folders inside include/lib have been left unchanged:

- include/lib/cpus/${ARCH}
- include/lib/el3_runtime/${ARCH}

The reason for this change is that having a global namespace for
includes isn't a good idea. It defeats one of the advantages of having
folders and it introduces problems that are sometimes subtle (because
you may not know the header you are actually including if there are two
of them).

For example, this patch had to be created because two headers were
called the same way: e0ea0928d5 ("Fix gpio includes of mt8173 platform
to avoid collision."). More recently, this patch has had similar
problems: 46f9b2c3a2 ("drivers: add tzc380 support").

This problem was introduced in commit 4ecca33988 ("Move include and
source files to logical locations"). At that time, there weren't too
many headers so it wasn't a real issue. However, time has shown that
this creates problems.

Platforms that want to preserve the way they include headers may add the
removed paths to PLAT_INCLUDES, but this is discouraged.

Change-Id: I39dc53ed98f9e297a5966e723d1936d6ccf2fc8f
Signed-off-by: Antonio Nino Diaz <antonio.ninodiaz@arm.com>
2019-01-04 10:43:17 +00:00
Jeenu Viswambharan 48e1d350a0 AArch64: Use SSBS for CVE_2018_3639 mitigation
The Armv8.5 extensions introduces PSTATE.SSBS (Speculation Store Bypass
Safe) bit to mitigate against Variant 4 vulnerabilities. Although an
Armv8.5 feature, this can be implemented by CPUs implementing earlier
version of the architecture.

With this patch, when both PSTATE.SSBS is implemented and
DYNAMIC_WORKAROUND_CVE_2018_3639 is active, querying for
SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2 via. SMCCC_ARCH_FEATURES call would return 1 to
indicate that mitigation on the PE is either permanently enabled or not
required.

When SSBS is implemented, SCTLR_EL3.DSSBS is initialized to 0 at reset
of every BL stage. This means that EL3 always executes with mitigation
applied.

For Cortex A76, if the PE implements SSBS, the existing mitigation (by
using a different vector table, and tweaking CPU ACTLR2) is not used.

Change-Id: Ib0386c5714184144d4747951751c2fc6ba4242b6
Signed-off-by: Jeenu Viswambharan <jeenu.viswambharan@arm.com>
2018-12-10 14:28:58 +00:00
John Tsichritzis 8a6771803f DSU erratum 936184 workaround
If the system is in near idle conditions, this erratum could cause a
deadlock or data corruption. This patch applies the workaround that
prevents this.

This DSU erratum affects only the DSUs that contain the ACP interface
and it was fixed in r2p0. The workaround is applied only to the DSUs
that are actually affected.

Link to respective Arm documentation:
http://infocenter.arm.com/help/index.jsp?topic=/com.arm.doc.epm138168/index.html

Change-Id: I033213b3077685130fc1e3f4f79c4d15d7483ec9
Signed-off-by: John Tsichritzis <john.tsichritzis@arm.com>
2018-08-17 10:34:43 +01:00
Roberto Vargas a9203edae7 Add end_vector_entry assembler macro
Check_vector_size checks if the size of the vector fits
in the size reserved for it. This check creates problems in
the Clang assembler. A new macro, end_vector_entry, is added
and check_vector_size is deprecated.

This new macro fills the current exception vector until the next
exception vector. If the size of the current vector is bigger
than 32 instructions then it gives an error.

Change-Id: Ie8545cf1003a1e31656a1018dd6b4c28a4eaf671
Signed-off-by: Roberto Vargas <roberto.vargas@arm.com>
2018-07-11 09:23:00 +01:00
Dimitris Papastamos d6b798097e Implement dynamic mitigation for CVE-2018-3639 on Cortex-A76
The Cortex-A76 implements SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2 as defined in
"Firmware interfaces for mitigating cache speculation vulnerabilities
System Software on Arm Systems"[0].

Dynamic mitigation for CVE-2018-3639 is enabled/disabled by
setting/clearning bit 16 (Disable load pass store) of `CPUACTLR2_EL1`.

NOTE: The generic code that implements dynamic mitigation does not
currently implement the expected semantics when dispatching an SDEI
event to a lower EL.  This will be fixed in a separate patch.

[0] https://developer.arm.com/cache-speculation-vulnerability-firmware-specification

Change-Id: I8fb2862b9ab24d55a0e9693e48e8be4df32afb5a
Signed-off-by: Dimitris Papastamos <dimitris.papastamos@arm.com>
2018-06-08 11:46:31 +01:00
Isla Mitchell abbffe98ed Add support for Cortex-Ares and Cortex-A76 CPUs
Both Cortex-Ares and Cortex-A76 CPUs use the ARM DynamIQ Shared Unit
(DSU).  The power-down and power-up sequences are therefore mostly
managed in hardware, and required software operations are simple.

Change-Id: I3a9447b5bdbdbc5ed845b20f6564d086516fa161
Signed-off-by: Isla Mitchell <isla.mitchell@arm.com>
2018-06-08 11:46:31 +01:00