arm-trusted-firmware/include/common/bl_common.h

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2013-10-25 09:08:21 +01:00
/*
* Copyright (c) 2013-2022, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
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*
* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
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*/
#ifndef BL_COMMON_H
#define BL_COMMON_H
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#include <common/ep_info.h>
#include <common/param_header.h>
#include <lib/utils_def.h>
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#ifndef __ASSEMBLER__
#include <stddef.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <lib/cassert.h>
#endif /* __ASSEMBLER__ */
#include <export/common/bl_common_exp.h>
#define UP U(1)
#define DOWN U(0)
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/*******************************************************************************
* Constants to identify the location of a memory region in a given memory
* layout.
******************************************************************************/
#define TOP U(0x1)
#define BOTTOM U(0x0)
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/*******************************************************************************
* Constants to indicate type of exception to the common exception handler.
******************************************************************************/
#define SYNC_EXCEPTION_SP_EL0 U(0x0)
#define IRQ_SP_EL0 U(0x1)
#define FIQ_SP_EL0 U(0x2)
#define SERROR_SP_EL0 U(0x3)
#define SYNC_EXCEPTION_SP_ELX U(0x4)
#define IRQ_SP_ELX U(0x5)
#define FIQ_SP_ELX U(0x6)
#define SERROR_SP_ELX U(0x7)
#define SYNC_EXCEPTION_AARCH64 U(0x8)
#define IRQ_AARCH64 U(0x9)
#define FIQ_AARCH64 U(0xa)
#define SERROR_AARCH64 U(0xb)
#define SYNC_EXCEPTION_AARCH32 U(0xc)
#define IRQ_AARCH32 U(0xd)
#define FIQ_AARCH32 U(0xe)
#define SERROR_AARCH32 U(0xf)
/*
* Mapping to connect linker symbols from .ld.S with their counterparts
* from .scat for the BL31 image
*/
#if defined(USE_ARM_LINK)
#define __BL31_END__ Load$$LR$$LR_END$$Base
#define __BSS_START__ Load$$LR$$LR_BSS$$Base
#define __BSS_END__ Load$$LR$$LR_BSS$$Limit
#define __BSS_SIZE__ Load$$LR$$LR_BSS$$Length
#define __COHERENT_RAM_START__ Load$$LR$$LR_COHERENT_RAM$$Base
#define __COHERENT_RAM_END_UNALIGNED__ Load$$__COHERENT_RAM_EPILOGUE_UNALIGNED__$$Base
#define __COHERENT_RAM_END__ Load$$LR$$LR_COHERENT_RAM$$Limit
#define __COHERENT_RAM_UNALIGNED_SIZE__ Load$$__COHERENT_RAM__$$Length
#define __CPU_OPS_START__ Load$$__CPU_OPS__$$Base
#define __CPU_OPS_END__ Load$$__CPU_OPS__$$Limit
#define __DATA_START__ Load$$__DATA__$$Base
#define __DATA_END__ Load$$__DATA__$$Limit
#define __GOT_START__ Load$$__GOT__$$Base
#define __GOT_END__ Load$$__GOT__$$Limit
#define __PERCPU_BAKERY_LOCK_START__ Load$$__BAKERY_LOCKS__$$Base
#define __PERCPU_BAKERY_LOCK_END__ Load$$__BAKERY_LOCKS_EPILOGUE__$$Base
#define __PMF_SVC_DESCS_START__ Load$$__PMF_SVC_DESCS__$$Base
#define __PMF_SVC_DESCS_END__ Load$$__PMF_SVC_DESCS__$$Limit
#define __PMF_TIMESTAMP_START__ Load$$__PMF_TIMESTAMP__$$Base
#define __PMF_TIMESTAMP_END__ Load$$__PER_CPU_TIMESTAMPS__$$Limit
#define __PMF_PERCPU_TIMESTAMP_END__ Load$$__PMF_TIMESTAMP_EPILOGUE__$$Base
#define __RELA_END__ Load$$__RELA__$$Limit
#define __RELA_START__ Load$$__RELA__$$Base
#define __RODATA_START__ Load$$__RODATA__$$Base
#define __RODATA_END__ Load$$__RODATA_EPILOGUE__$$Base
#define __RT_SVC_DESCS_START__ Load$$__RT_SVC_DESCS__$$Base
#define __RT_SVC_DESCS_END__ Load$$__RT_SVC_DESCS__$$Limit
#if SPMC_AT_EL3
#define __EL3_LP_DESCS_START__ Load$$__EL3_LP_DESCS__$$Base
#define __EL3_LP_DESCS_END__ Load$$__EL3_LP_DESCS__$$Limit
#endif
#define __RW_START__ Load$$LR$$LR_RW_DATA$$Base
#define __RW_END__ Load$$LR$$LR_END$$Base
#define __SPM_SHIM_EXCEPTIONS_START__ Load$$__SPM_SHIM_EXCEPTIONS__$$Base
#define __SPM_SHIM_EXCEPTIONS_END__ Load$$__SPM_SHIM_EXCEPTIONS_EPILOGUE__$$Base
#define __STACKS_START__ Load$$__STACKS__$$Base
#define __STACKS_END__ Load$$__STACKS__$$Limit
#define __TEXT_START__ Load$$__TEXT__$$Base
#define __TEXT_END__ Load$$__TEXT_EPILOGUE__$$Base
#endif /* USE_ARM_LINK */
#ifndef __ASSEMBLER__
/*
* Declarations of linker defined symbols to help determine memory layout of
* BL images
*/
Introduce SEPARATE_CODE_AND_RODATA build flag At the moment, all BL images share a similar memory layout: they start with their code section, followed by their read-only data section. The two sections are contiguous in memory. Therefore, the end of the code section and the beginning of the read-only data one might share a memory page. This forces both to be mapped with the same memory attributes. As the code needs to be executable, this means that the read-only data stored on the same memory page as the code are executable as well. This could potentially be exploited as part of a security attack. This patch introduces a new build flag called SEPARATE_CODE_AND_RODATA, which isolates the code and read-only data on separate memory pages. This in turn allows independent control of the access permissions for the code and read-only data. This has an impact on memory footprint, as padding bytes need to be introduced between the code and read-only data to ensure the segragation of the two. To limit the memory cost, the memory layout of the read-only section has been changed in this case. - When SEPARATE_CODE_AND_RODATA=0, the layout is unchanged, i.e. the read-only section still looks like this (padding omitted): | ... | +-------------------+ | Exception vectors | +-------------------+ | Read-only data | +-------------------+ | Code | +-------------------+ BLx_BASE In this case, the linker script provides the limits of the whole read-only section. - When SEPARATE_CODE_AND_RODATA=1, the exception vectors and read-only data are swapped, such that the code and exception vectors are contiguous, followed by the read-only data. This gives the following new layout (padding omitted): | ... | +-------------------+ | Read-only data | +-------------------+ | Exception vectors | +-------------------+ | Code | +-------------------+ BLx_BASE In this case, the linker script now exports 2 sets of addresses instead: the limits of the code and the limits of the read-only data. Refer to the Firmware Design guide for more details. This provides platform code with a finer-grained view of the image layout and allows it to map these 2 regions with the appropriate access permissions. Note that SEPARATE_CODE_AND_RODATA applies to all BL images. Change-Id: I936cf80164f6b66b6ad52b8edacadc532c935a49
2016-07-08 14:37:40 +01:00
#if SEPARATE_CODE_AND_RODATA
IMPORT_SYM(uintptr_t, __TEXT_START__, BL_CODE_BASE);
IMPORT_SYM(uintptr_t, __TEXT_END__, BL_CODE_END);
IMPORT_SYM(uintptr_t, __RODATA_START__, BL_RO_DATA_BASE);
IMPORT_SYM(uintptr_t, __RODATA_END__, BL_RO_DATA_END);
Introduce SEPARATE_CODE_AND_RODATA build flag At the moment, all BL images share a similar memory layout: they start with their code section, followed by their read-only data section. The two sections are contiguous in memory. Therefore, the end of the code section and the beginning of the read-only data one might share a memory page. This forces both to be mapped with the same memory attributes. As the code needs to be executable, this means that the read-only data stored on the same memory page as the code are executable as well. This could potentially be exploited as part of a security attack. This patch introduces a new build flag called SEPARATE_CODE_AND_RODATA, which isolates the code and read-only data on separate memory pages. This in turn allows independent control of the access permissions for the code and read-only data. This has an impact on memory footprint, as padding bytes need to be introduced between the code and read-only data to ensure the segragation of the two. To limit the memory cost, the memory layout of the read-only section has been changed in this case. - When SEPARATE_CODE_AND_RODATA=0, the layout is unchanged, i.e. the read-only section still looks like this (padding omitted): | ... | +-------------------+ | Exception vectors | +-------------------+ | Read-only data | +-------------------+ | Code | +-------------------+ BLx_BASE In this case, the linker script provides the limits of the whole read-only section. - When SEPARATE_CODE_AND_RODATA=1, the exception vectors and read-only data are swapped, such that the code and exception vectors are contiguous, followed by the read-only data. This gives the following new layout (padding omitted): | ... | +-------------------+ | Read-only data | +-------------------+ | Exception vectors | +-------------------+ | Code | +-------------------+ BLx_BASE In this case, the linker script now exports 2 sets of addresses instead: the limits of the code and the limits of the read-only data. Refer to the Firmware Design guide for more details. This provides platform code with a finer-grained view of the image layout and allows it to map these 2 regions with the appropriate access permissions. Note that SEPARATE_CODE_AND_RODATA applies to all BL images. Change-Id: I936cf80164f6b66b6ad52b8edacadc532c935a49
2016-07-08 14:37:40 +01:00
#else
IMPORT_SYM(uintptr_t, __RO_START__, BL_CODE_BASE);
IMPORT_SYM(uintptr_t, __RO_END__, BL_CODE_END);
Introduce SEPARATE_CODE_AND_RODATA build flag At the moment, all BL images share a similar memory layout: they start with their code section, followed by their read-only data section. The two sections are contiguous in memory. Therefore, the end of the code section and the beginning of the read-only data one might share a memory page. This forces both to be mapped with the same memory attributes. As the code needs to be executable, this means that the read-only data stored on the same memory page as the code are executable as well. This could potentially be exploited as part of a security attack. This patch introduces a new build flag called SEPARATE_CODE_AND_RODATA, which isolates the code and read-only data on separate memory pages. This in turn allows independent control of the access permissions for the code and read-only data. This has an impact on memory footprint, as padding bytes need to be introduced between the code and read-only data to ensure the segragation of the two. To limit the memory cost, the memory layout of the read-only section has been changed in this case. - When SEPARATE_CODE_AND_RODATA=0, the layout is unchanged, i.e. the read-only section still looks like this (padding omitted): | ... | +-------------------+ | Exception vectors | +-------------------+ | Read-only data | +-------------------+ | Code | +-------------------+ BLx_BASE In this case, the linker script provides the limits of the whole read-only section. - When SEPARATE_CODE_AND_RODATA=1, the exception vectors and read-only data are swapped, such that the code and exception vectors are contiguous, followed by the read-only data. This gives the following new layout (padding omitted): | ... | +-------------------+ | Read-only data | +-------------------+ | Exception vectors | +-------------------+ | Code | +-------------------+ BLx_BASE In this case, the linker script now exports 2 sets of addresses instead: the limits of the code and the limits of the read-only data. Refer to the Firmware Design guide for more details. This provides platform code with a finer-grained view of the image layout and allows it to map these 2 regions with the appropriate access permissions. Note that SEPARATE_CODE_AND_RODATA applies to all BL images. Change-Id: I936cf80164f6b66b6ad52b8edacadc532c935a49
2016-07-08 14:37:40 +01:00
#endif
#if SEPARATE_NOBITS_REGION
IMPORT_SYM(uintptr_t, __NOBITS_START__, BL_NOBITS_BASE);
IMPORT_SYM(uintptr_t, __NOBITS_END__, BL_NOBITS_END);
#endif
IMPORT_SYM(uintptr_t, __RW_END__, BL_END);
Introduce SEPARATE_CODE_AND_RODATA build flag At the moment, all BL images share a similar memory layout: they start with their code section, followed by their read-only data section. The two sections are contiguous in memory. Therefore, the end of the code section and the beginning of the read-only data one might share a memory page. This forces both to be mapped with the same memory attributes. As the code needs to be executable, this means that the read-only data stored on the same memory page as the code are executable as well. This could potentially be exploited as part of a security attack. This patch introduces a new build flag called SEPARATE_CODE_AND_RODATA, which isolates the code and read-only data on separate memory pages. This in turn allows independent control of the access permissions for the code and read-only data. This has an impact on memory footprint, as padding bytes need to be introduced between the code and read-only data to ensure the segragation of the two. To limit the memory cost, the memory layout of the read-only section has been changed in this case. - When SEPARATE_CODE_AND_RODATA=0, the layout is unchanged, i.e. the read-only section still looks like this (padding omitted): | ... | +-------------------+ | Exception vectors | +-------------------+ | Read-only data | +-------------------+ | Code | +-------------------+ BLx_BASE In this case, the linker script provides the limits of the whole read-only section. - When SEPARATE_CODE_AND_RODATA=1, the exception vectors and read-only data are swapped, such that the code and exception vectors are contiguous, followed by the read-only data. This gives the following new layout (padding omitted): | ... | +-------------------+ | Read-only data | +-------------------+ | Exception vectors | +-------------------+ | Code | +-------------------+ BLx_BASE In this case, the linker script now exports 2 sets of addresses instead: the limits of the code and the limits of the read-only data. Refer to the Firmware Design guide for more details. This provides platform code with a finer-grained view of the image layout and allows it to map these 2 regions with the appropriate access permissions. Note that SEPARATE_CODE_AND_RODATA applies to all BL images. Change-Id: I936cf80164f6b66b6ad52b8edacadc532c935a49
2016-07-08 14:37:40 +01:00
#if defined(IMAGE_BL1)
IMPORT_SYM(uintptr_t, __BL1_ROM_END__, BL1_ROM_END);
IMPORT_SYM(uintptr_t, __BL1_RAM_START__, BL1_RAM_BASE);
IMPORT_SYM(uintptr_t, __BL1_RAM_END__, BL1_RAM_LIMIT);
#elif defined(IMAGE_BL2)
IMPORT_SYM(uintptr_t, __BL2_END__, BL2_END);
#elif defined(IMAGE_BL2U)
IMPORT_SYM(uintptr_t, __BL2U_END__, BL2U_END);
#elif defined(IMAGE_BL31)
IMPORT_SYM(uintptr_t, __BL31_START__, BL31_START);
IMPORT_SYM(uintptr_t, __BL31_END__, BL31_END);
#elif defined(IMAGE_BL32)
IMPORT_SYM(uintptr_t, __BL32_END__, BL32_END);
#elif defined(IMAGE_RMM)
IMPORT_SYM(uintptr_t, __RMM_END__, RMM_END);
#endif /* IMAGE_BLX */
/* The following symbols are only exported from the BL2 at EL3 linker script. */
#if BL2_IN_XIP_MEM && defined(IMAGE_BL2)
IMPORT_SYM(uintptr_t, __BL2_ROM_END__, BL2_ROM_END);
IMPORT_SYM(uintptr_t, __BL2_RAM_START__, BL2_RAM_BASE);
IMPORT_SYM(uintptr_t, __BL2_RAM_END__, BL2_RAM_END);
#endif /* BL2_IN_XIP_MEM */
/*
* The next 2 constants identify the extents of the coherent memory region.
* These addresses are used by the MMU setup code and therefore they must be
* page-aligned. It is the responsibility of the linker script to ensure that
* __COHERENT_RAM_START__ and __COHERENT_RAM_END__ linker symbols refer to
* page-aligned addresses.
*/
#if USE_COHERENT_MEM
IMPORT_SYM(uintptr_t, __COHERENT_RAM_START__, BL_COHERENT_RAM_BASE);
IMPORT_SYM(uintptr_t, __COHERENT_RAM_END__, BL_COHERENT_RAM_END);
#endif
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/*******************************************************************************
* Structure used for telling the next BL how much of a particular type of
* memory is available for its use and how much is already used.
******************************************************************************/
typedef struct meminfo {
uintptr_t total_base;
size_t total_size;
} meminfo_t;
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/*******************************************************************************
* Function & variable prototypes
******************************************************************************/
Add new version of image loading. This patch adds capability to load BL images based on image descriptors instead of hard coded way of loading BL images. This framework is designed such that it can be readily adapted by any BL stage that needs to load images. In order to provide the above capability the following new platform functions are introduced: bl_load_info_t *plat_get_bl_image_load_info(void); This function returns pointer to the list of images that the platform has populated to load. bl_params_t *plat_get_next_bl_params(void); This function returns a pointer to the shared memory that the platform has kept aside to pass trusted firmware related information that next BL image needs. void plat_flush_next_bl_params(void); This function flushes to main memory all the params that are passed to next image. int bl2_plat_handle_post_image_load(unsigned int image_id) This function can be used by the platforms to update/use image information for given `image_id`. `desc_image_load.c` contains utility functions which can be used by the platforms to generate, load and executable, image list based on the registered image descriptors. This patch also adds new version of `load_image/load_auth_image` functions in-order to achieve the above capability. Following are the changes for the new version as compared to old: - Refactor the signature and only keep image_id and image_info_t arguments. Removed image_base argument as it is already passed through image_info_t. Given that the BL image base addresses and limit/size are already provided by the platforms, the meminfo_t and entry_point_info arguments are not needed to provide/reserve the extent of free memory for the given BL image. - Added check for the image size against the defined max size. This is needed because the image size could come from an unauthenticated source (e.g. the FIP header). To make this check, new member is added to the image_info_t struct for identifying the image maximum size. New flag `LOAD_IMAGE_V2` is added in the Makefile. Default value is 0. NOTE: `TRUSTED_BOARD_BOOT` is currently not supported when `LOAD_IMAGE_V2` is enabled. Change-Id: Ia7b643f4817a170d5a2fbf479b9bc12e63112e79
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int load_auth_image(unsigned int image_id, image_info_t *image_data);
#if TRUSTED_BOARD_BOOT && defined(DYN_DISABLE_AUTH)
/*
* API to dynamically disable authentication. Only meant for development
* systems.
*/
void dyn_disable_auth(void);
#endif
Add new version of image loading. This patch adds capability to load BL images based on image descriptors instead of hard coded way of loading BL images. This framework is designed such that it can be readily adapted by any BL stage that needs to load images. In order to provide the above capability the following new platform functions are introduced: bl_load_info_t *plat_get_bl_image_load_info(void); This function returns pointer to the list of images that the platform has populated to load. bl_params_t *plat_get_next_bl_params(void); This function returns a pointer to the shared memory that the platform has kept aside to pass trusted firmware related information that next BL image needs. void plat_flush_next_bl_params(void); This function flushes to main memory all the params that are passed to next image. int bl2_plat_handle_post_image_load(unsigned int image_id) This function can be used by the platforms to update/use image information for given `image_id`. `desc_image_load.c` contains utility functions which can be used by the platforms to generate, load and executable, image list based on the registered image descriptors. This patch also adds new version of `load_image/load_auth_image` functions in-order to achieve the above capability. Following are the changes for the new version as compared to old: - Refactor the signature and only keep image_id and image_info_t arguments. Removed image_base argument as it is already passed through image_info_t. Given that the BL image base addresses and limit/size are already provided by the platforms, the meminfo_t and entry_point_info arguments are not needed to provide/reserve the extent of free memory for the given BL image. - Added check for the image size against the defined max size. This is needed because the image size could come from an unauthenticated source (e.g. the FIP header). To make this check, new member is added to the image_info_t struct for identifying the image maximum size. New flag `LOAD_IMAGE_V2` is added in the Makefile. Default value is 0. NOTE: `TRUSTED_BOARD_BOOT` is currently not supported when `LOAD_IMAGE_V2` is enabled. Change-Id: Ia7b643f4817a170d5a2fbf479b9bc12e63112e79
2016-09-12 16:08:41 +01:00
extern const char build_message[];
extern const char version_string[];
void print_entry_point_info(const entry_point_info_t *ep_info);
uintptr_t page_align(uintptr_t value, unsigned dir);
struct mmap_region;
void setup_page_tables(const struct mmap_region *bl_regions,
const struct mmap_region *plat_regions);
void bl_handle_pauth(void);
#endif /*__ASSEMBLER__*/
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#endif /* BL_COMMON_H */