The function arm_validate_ns_entrypoint() validates a given non-secure
physical address. This function however specifically returns PSCI error
codes.
Non-secure physical address validation is potentially useful across ARM
platforms, even for non-PSCI use cases. Therefore make this function
common by returning 0 for success or -1 otherwise.
Having made the function common, make arm_validate_psci_entrypoint() a
wrapper around arm_validate_ns_entrypoint() which only translates return
value into PSCI error codes. This wrapper is now used where
arm_validate_ns_entrypoint() was currently used for PSCI entry point
validation.
Change-Id: Ic781fc3105d6d199fd8f53f01aba5baea0ebc310
Signed-off-by: Jeenu Viswambharan <jeenu.viswambharan@arm.com>
The implementation currently supports only interrupt-based SDEI events,
and supports all interfaces as defined by SDEI specification version
1.0 [1].
Introduce the build option SDEI_SUPPORT to include SDEI dispatcher in
BL31.
Update user guide and porting guide. SDEI documentation to follow.
[1] http://infocenter.arm.com/help/topic/com.arm.doc.den0054a/ARM_DEN0054A_Software_Delegated_Exception_Interface.pdf
Change-Id: I758b733084e4ea3b27ac77d0259705565842241a
Co-authored-by: Yousuf A <yousuf.sait@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeenu Viswambharan <jeenu.viswambharan@arm.com>
Acknowledging interrupt shall return a raw value from the interrupt
controller in which the actual interrupt ID may be encoded. Add a
platform API to extract the actual interrupt ID from the raw value
obtained from interrupt controller.
Document the new function. Also clarify the semantics of interrupt
acknowledge.
Change-Id: I818dad7be47661658b16f9807877d259eb127405
Signed-off-by: Jeenu Viswambharan <jeenu.viswambharan@arm.com>
This initial port of the Secure Partitions Manager to FVP supports BL31
in both SRAM and Trusted DRAM.
A document with instructions to build the SPM has been added.
Change-Id: I4ea83ff0a659be77f2cd72eaf2302cdf8ba98b32
Co-authored-by: Douglas Raillard <douglas.raillard@arm.com>
Co-authored-by: Sandrine Bailleux <sandrine.bailleux@arm.com>
Co-authored-by: Achin Gupta <achin.gupta@arm.com>
Co-authored-by: Antonio Nino Diaz <antonio.ninodiaz@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Antonio Nino Diaz <antonio.ninodiaz@arm.com>
A Secure Partition is a software execution environment instantiated in
S-EL0 that can be used to implement simple management and security
services. Since S-EL0 is an unprivileged exception level, a Secure
Partition relies on privileged firmware e.g. ARM Trusted Firmware to be
granted access to system and processor resources. Essentially, it is a
software sandbox that runs under the control of privileged software in
the Secure World and accesses the following system resources:
- Memory and device regions in the system address map.
- PE system registers.
- A range of asynchronous exceptions e.g. interrupts.
- A range of synchronous exceptions e.g. SMC function identifiers.
A Secure Partition enables privileged firmware to implement only the
absolutely essential secure services in EL3 and instantiate the rest in
a partition. Since the partition executes in S-EL0, its implementation
cannot be overly complex.
The component in ARM Trusted Firmware responsible for managing a Secure
Partition is called the Secure Partition Manager (SPM). The SPM is
responsible for the following:
- Validating and allocating resources requested by a Secure Partition.
- Implementing a well defined interface that is used for initialising a
Secure Partition.
- Implementing a well defined interface that is used by the normal world
and other secure services for accessing the services exported by a
Secure Partition.
- Implementing a well defined interface that is used by a Secure
Partition to fulfil service requests.
- Instantiating the software execution environment required by a Secure
Partition to fulfil a service request.
Change-Id: I6f7862d6bba8732db5b73f54e789d717a35e802f
Co-authored-by: Douglas Raillard <douglas.raillard@arm.com>
Co-authored-by: Sandrine Bailleux <sandrine.bailleux@arm.com>
Co-authored-by: Achin Gupta <achin.gupta@arm.com>
Co-authored-by: Antonio Nino Diaz <antonio.ninodiaz@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Antonio Nino Diaz <antonio.ninodiaz@arm.com>
For Trusted Board Boot, BL2 needs more space to support the ECDSA
and ECDSA+RSA algorithms.
Change-Id: Ie7eda9a1315ce836dbc6d18d6588f8d17891a92d
Signed-off-by: Qixiang Xu <qixiang.xu@arm.com>
These hooks are intended to allow one platform to try load
images from alternative places. There is a hook to initialize
the sequence of boot locations and a hook to pass to the next
sequence.
Change-Id: Ia0f84c415208dc4fa4f9d060d58476db23efa5b2
Signed-off-by: Roberto Vargas <roberto.vargas@arm.com>
An earlier patch added provision for the platform to provide secure
interrupt properties. ARM platforms already has a list of interrupts
that fall into different secure groups.
This patch defines macros that enumerate interrupt properties in the
same fashion, and points the driver driver data to a list of interrupt
properties rather than list of secure interrupts on ARM platforms. The
deprecated interrupt list definitions are however retained to support
legacy builds.
Configuration applied to individual interrupts remain unchanged, so no
runtime behaviour change expected.
NOTE: Platforms that use the arm/common function
plat_arm_gic_driver_init() must replace their PLAT_ARM_G1S_IRQS and
PLAT_ARM_G0_IRQS macro definitions with PLAT_ARM_G1S_IRQ_PROPS and
PLAT_ARM_G0_IRQ_PROPS macros respectively, using the provided
INTR_PROP_DESC macro.
Change-Id: I24d643b83e3333753a3ba97d4b6fb71e16bb0952
Signed-off-by: Jeenu Viswambharan <jeenu.viswambharan@arm.com>
SPIs can be routed to either a specific PE, or to any one of all
available PEs.
API documentation updated.
Change-Id: I28675f634568aaf4ea1aa8aa7ebf25b419a963ed
Co-authored-by: Yousuf A <yousuf.sait@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeenu Viswambharan <jeenu.viswambharan@arm.com>
The back end GIC driver converts and assigns the interrupt type to
suitable group.
For GICv2, a build option GICV2_G0_FOR_EL3 is introduced, which
determines to which type Group 0 interrupts maps to.
- When the build option is set 0 (the default), Group 0 interrupts are
meant for Secure EL1. This is presently the case.
- Otherwise, Group 0 interrupts are meant for EL3. This means the SPD
will have to synchronously hand over the interrupt to Secure EL1.
The query API allows the platform to query whether the platform supports
interrupts of a given type.
API documentation updated.
Change-Id: I60fdb4053ffe0bd006b3b20914914ebd311fc858
Co-authored-by: Yousuf A <yousuf.sait@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeenu Viswambharan <jeenu.viswambharan@arm.com>
These APIs allow the GIC implementation to categorize interrupt numbers
into SPIs, PPIs, and SGIs. The default implementations for GICv2 and
GICv3 follows interrupt numbering as specified by the ARM GIC
architecture.
API documentation updated.
Change-Id: Ia6aa379dc955994333232e6138f259535d4fa087
Signed-off-by: Jeenu Viswambharan <jeenu.viswambharan@arm.com>
Document the API in separate platform interrupt controller API document.
Change-Id: If18f208e10a8a243f5c59d226fcf48e985941949
Co-authored-by: Yousuf A <yousuf.sait@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeenu Viswambharan <jeenu.viswambharan@arm.com>
Provides GICv3 save/restore feature to arm_system_pwr_domain_resume and
arm_system_pwr_domain_save functions.
Introduce FVP PSCI power level 3 (System level) support. This is solely
done to provide example code on how to use the GICv3 save and restore
helpers.
Also make CSS GICv3 platforms power off the Redistributor on SYSTEM
SUSPEND as its state is saved and restored.
Change-Id: I0d852f3af8824edee1a17c085cf593ddd33a4e77
Signed-off-by: Soby Mathew <soby.mathew@arm.com>
Co-Authored-by: Douglas Raillard <douglas.raillard@arm.com>
Some recent enhancements to EL3 runtime firmware like support for
save and restoring GICv3 register context during system_suspend
necessitates additional data memory for the firmware. This patch
introduces support for creating a TZC secured DDR carveout for use
by ARM reference platforms. A new linker section `el3_tzc_dram` is
created using platform supplied linker script and data marked with
the attribute `arm_el3_tzc_dram` will be placed in this section.
The FVP makefile now defines the `PLAT_EXTRA_LD_SCRIPT` variable to
allow inclusion of the platform linker script by the top level BL31
linker script.
Change-Id: I0e7f4a75a6ac51419c667875ff2677043df1585d
Signed-off-by: Soby Mathew <soby.mathew@arm.com>
The MEM_PROTECT support adds a MMAP region for DRAM2, which when
building with TBBR support and OP-TEE tsp requires an additional
entry in the MMAP region array in BL2 - PLAT_ARM_MMAP_ENTRIES is
increased.
The MEM_PROTECT support also adds a new region in BL31, and when
BL31 is placed in DRAM, the memory mappings require an additional
translation table - MAX_XLAT_TABLES is increased.
Change-Id: I0b76260da817dcfd0b8f73a7193c36efda977625
Signed-off-by: David Cunado <david.cunado@arm.com>
On ARM platforms, the maximum size of the address space is limited
to 32-bits as defined in arm_def.h. In order to access DRAM2, which
is defined beyond the 32-bit address space, the maximum address space
is increased to 36-bits in AArch64. It is possible to increase the
virtual space for AArch32, but it is more difficult and not supported
for now.
NOTE - the actual maximum memory address space is platform dependent
and is checked at run-time by querying the PARange field in the
ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1 register.
Change-Id: I6cb05c78a63b1fed96db9a9773faca04a5b93d67
Signed-off-by: Roberto Vargas <roberto.vargas@arm.com>
mem_protect needs some kind of non-volatile memory because it has
to remember its state across reset and power down events.
The most suitable electronic part for this feature is a NVRAM
which should be only accesible from the secure world. Juno and
FVP lack such hardware and for this reason the MEM_PROTECT
functionality is implemented with Flash EEPROM memory on both
boards, even though this memory is accesible from the non-secure
world. This is done only to show a full implementation of
these PSCI features, but an actual system shouldn't use a
non-secure NVRAM to implement it.
The EL3 runtime software will write the mem_protect flag and BL2
will read and clear the memory ranges if enabled. It is done in
BL2 because it reduces the time that TF needs access to the full
non-secure memory.
The memory layout of both boards is defined using macros which
take different values in Juno and FVP platforms. Generic platform
helpers are added that use the platform specific macros to generate
a mem_region_t that is valid for the platform.
Change-Id: I2c6818ac091a2966fa07a52c5ddf8f6fde4941e9
Signed-off-by: Roberto Vargas <roberto.vargas@arm.com>
For Trusted Board Boot, BL1 RW section and BL2 need more space to
support the ECDSA algorithm. Specifically, PLAT_ARM_MAX_BL1_RW_SIZE
is increased on ARM platforms.
And on the Juno platform:
- BL2 size, PLAT_ARM_MAX_BL2_SIZE is increased.
- SCP_BL2 is loaded into the space defined by BL31_BASE ->
BL31_RW_BASE. In order to maintain the same size space for
SCP_BL2,PLAT_ARM_MAX_BL31_SIZE is increased.
Change-Id: I379083f918b40ab1c765da4e71780d89f0058040
Co-Authored-By: David Cunado <david.cunado@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Qixiang Xu <qixiang.xu@arm.com>
The value of BL31_BASE currently depends on the size of BL31. This
causes problems in the RESET_TO_BL31 case because the value of
BL31_BASE is used in the model launch parameters, which often changes.
Therefore, this patch fixes BL31_BASE to the middle of Trusted SRAM,
to avoid further model parameter changes in future.
Change-Id: I6d7fa4fe293717d84768974679539c0e0cb6d935
Signed-off-by: David Cunado <david.cunado@arm.com>
This patch gives users control over logging messages printed from the C
code using the LOG macros defined in debug.h Users now have the ability
to reduce the log_level at run time using the tf_log_set_max_level()
function. The default prefix string can be defined by platform by
overriding the `plat_log_get_prefix()` platform API which is also
introduced in this patch.
The new log framework results in saving of some RO data. For example,
when BL1 is built for FVP with LOG_LEVEL=LOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE, resulted
in saving 384 bytes of RO data and increase of 8 bytes of RW data. The
framework also adds about 108 bytes of code to the release build of FVP.
FixesARM-software/tf-issues#462
Change-Id: I476013d9c3deedfdd4c8b0b0f125665ba6250554
Co-authored-by: Eleanor Bonnici <Eleanor.bonnici@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Soby Mathew <soby.mathew@arm.com>
This patch does the required changes to enable CSS platforms
to build and use the SDS framework. Since SDS is always coupled with
SCMI protocol, the preexisting SCMI build flag is now renamed to
`CSS_USE_SCMI_SDS_DRIVER` which will enable both SCMI and SDS on
CSS platforms. Also some of the workarounds applied for SCMI are
now removed with SDS in place.
Change-Id: I94e8b93f05e3fe95e475c5501c25bec052588a9c
Signed-off-by: Soby Mathew <soby.mathew@arm.com>
This patch fixes the inconsistency with regards as to how
BL2_BASE/BL2U_BASE and BL2_LIMIT/BL2U_LIMIT macros are defined
when building Juno to run in AArch32 mode at EL3. In this case,
BL32 is compiled for AArch32 whereas BL1 and BL2 are compiled
for AArch64. This resulted in BL32 conditionally compiling a
different definition of the above mentioned macros from BL1/BL2.
This is fixed by taking into consideration the
JUNO_AARCH32_EL3_RUNTIME build flag as well in the conditional
compilation check.
Change-Id: I27ac68aa4df0502089c1739c05366a9c509eb5be
Signed-off-by: Soby Mathew <soby.mathew@arm.com>
The commit 3eb2d67 optimizes the memory map for BL2 when TSP
is not present. But this also broke OP-TEE as it was reusing
the TSP mapping. This patch fixes this problem by adding a
separate mapping for OP-TEE in the BL2 memory map table.
Change-Id: I130a2ea552b7b62d8478081feb1f4ddf5292a118
Signed-off-by: Soby Mathew <soby.mathew@arm.com>
This patch ensures that the ARM_MAP_TSP_SEC_MEM memory region is mapped
in BL2 only if the TSPD has been included in the build. This saves one
entry in the plat_arm_mmap[] array and avoids to map extra memory when
it's not needed.
Change-Id: I6ae60822ff8f0de198145925b0b0d45355179a94
Signed-off-by: Achin Gupta <achin.gupta@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Sandrine Bailleux <sandrine.bailleux@arm.com>
The current definition of ARM_INSTANTIATE_LOCK macro includes a
semicolon, which means it's omitted where it's used. This is anomalous
for a C statement in global scope.
Fix this by removing semicolon from the definition; and where it's a
NOP, declare a file-scoped variable explicitly tagged as unused to avoid
compiler warning.
No functional changes.
Change-Id: I2c1d92ece4777e272a025011e03b8003f3543335
Signed-off-by: Jeenu Viswambharan <jeenu.viswambharan@arm.com>
Changes ARM_OPTEE_PAGEABLE_LOAD_BASE to end of ARM_AP_TZC_DRAM1.
ARM_OPTEE_PAGEABLE_LOAD_SIZE is also increased to 4MB to optimize
translation table usage.
This change makes loading of paged part easier inside OP-TEE OS as the
previous location of ARM_OPTEE_PAGEABLE_LOAD_BASE normally isn't mapped
if paging is enabled.
Signed-off-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org>
NOR memory only supports setting bits to 1. To clear a bit, set to zero,
the NOR memory needs to be erased.
Change-Id: Ia82eb15a5af9a6d4fc7e5ea2b58e6db87226b351
Signed-off-by: Roberto Vargas <roberto.vargas@arm.com>
lock/unlock operation must wait until WSM bit
is set. Since we do not allow to loop forever then these functions
must return an error if WSM bit isn't enabled after a number of tries.
Change-Id: I21c9e292b514b28786ff4a225128bcd8c1bfa999
Signed-off-by: Roberto Vargas <roberto.vargas@arm.com>
Trusted OS may have extra images to be loaded. Load them one by one
and do the parsing. In this patch, ARM TF need to load up to 3 images
for optee os: header, pager and paged images. Header image is the info
about optee os and images. Pager image include pager code and data.
Paged image include the paging parts using virtual memory.
Change-Id: Ia3bcfa6d8a3ed7850deb5729654daca7b00be394
Signed-off-by: Summer Qin <summer.qin@arm.com>
Revision C of the Base FVP has the same memory map as earlier revisions,
but has the following differences:
- Implements CCI550 instead of CCI400,
- Has a single instantiation of SMMUv3,
- CPU MPIDs are shifted left by one level, and has MT bit set in them.
The correct interconnect to program is chosen at run time based on the
FVP revision. Therefore, this patch implements FVP functions for
interconnect programming, rather than depending on ARM generic ones. The
macros used have been renamed to reflect this change.
Additionally, this patch initializes SMMUv3 as part of FVP early
platform setup.
New ARM config flags are introduced for feature queries at run time.
Change-Id: Ic7b7f080953a51fceaf62ce7daa6de0573801f09
Signed-off-by: Jeenu Viswambharan <jeenu.viswambharan@arm.com>
On ARM CSS platforms, the SCP_BL2/2U image is loaded below
BL1 read-write data. This same memory is used to load BL31
later on. But sufficient checks were not done to ensure that the
SCP_BL2 would not overwrite BL1 rw data. This patch adds the
required CASSERT checks to prevent overwrite into BL1 or BL2
memory by load of SCP_BL2/2U. Also the size of BL31 is increased
and SCP_BL2/2U size is decreased to accomodate it within the
allocated region.
Change-Id: I23b28b5e1589e91150852a06452bd52b273216ee
Signed-off-by: Soby Mathew <soby.mathew@arm.com>
This patch makes the necessary changes to enable ARM platform to
successfully integrate CryptoCell during Trusted Board Boot. The
changes are as follows:
* A new build option `ARM_CRYPTOCELL_INTEG` is introduced to select
the CryptoCell crypto driver for Trusted Board boot.
* The TrustZone filter settings for Non Secure DRAM is modified
to allow CryptoCell to read this memory. This is required to
authenticate BL33 which is loaded into the Non Secure DDR.
* The CSS platforms are modified to use coherent stacks in BL1 and BL2
when CryptoCell crypto is selected. This is because CryptoCell makes
use of DMA to transfer data and the CryptoCell SBROM library allocates
buffers on the stack during signature/hash verification.
Change-Id: I1e6f6dcd1899784f1edeabfa2a9f279bbfb90e31
Signed-off-by: Soby Mathew <soby.mathew@arm.com>
SPE is only supported in non-secure state. Accesses to SPE specific
registers from SEL1 will trap to EL3. During a world switch, before
`TTBR` is modified the SPE profiling buffers are drained. This is to
avoid a potential invalid memory access in SEL1.
SPE is architecturally specified only for AArch64.
Change-Id: I04a96427d9f9d586c331913d815fdc726855f6b0
Signed-off-by: dp-arm <dimitris.papastamos@arm.com>
On ARM platforms before exiting from SP_MIN ensure that
the default console is switched to the runtime serial port.
Change-Id: I0ca0d42cc47e345d56179eac16aa3d6712767c9b
Signed-off-by: Dimitris Papastamos <dimitris.papastamos@arm.com>