The ARMv8.4 RAS extensions introduce architectural support for software
to inject faults into the system in order to test fault-handling
software. This patch introduces the build option FAULT_HANDLING_SUPPORT
to allow for lower ELs to use registers in the Standard Error Record to
inject fault. The build option RAS_EXTENSIONS must also be enabled along
with fault injection.
This feature is intended for testing purposes only, and is advisable to
keep disabled for production images.
Change-Id: I6f7a4454b15aec098f9505a10eb188c2f928f7ea
Signed-off-by: Jeenu Viswambharan <jeenu.viswambharan@arm.com>
The ARMv8 RAS Extensions introduced Standard Error Records which are a
set of standard registers through which:
- Platform can configure RAS node policy; e.g., notification
mechanism;
- RAS nodes can record and expose error information for error handling
agents.
Standard Error Records can either be accessed via. memory-mapped
or System registers. This patch adds helper functions to access
registers and fields within an error record.
Change-Id: I6594ba799f4a1789d7b1e45b3e17fd40e7e0ba5c
Signed-off-by: Jeenu Viswambharan <jeenu.viswambharan@arm.com>
RAS extensions are mandatory for ARMv8.2 CPUs, but are also optional
extensions to base ARMv8.0 architecture.
This patch adds build system support to enable RAS features in ARM
Trusted Firmware. A boolean build option RAS_EXTENSION is introduced for
this.
With RAS_EXTENSION, an Exception Synchronization Barrier (ESB) is
inserted at all EL3 vector entry and exit. ESBs will synchronize pending
external aborts before entering EL3, and therefore will contain and
attribute errors to lower EL execution. Any errors thus synchronized are
detected via. DISR_EL1 register.
When RAS_EXTENSION is set to 1, HANDLE_EL3_EA_FIRST must also be set to 1.
Change-Id: I38a19d84014d4d8af688bd81d61ba582c039383a
Signed-off-by: Jeenu Viswambharan <jeenu.viswambharan@arm.com>
At present, any External Abort routed to EL3 is reported as an unhandled
exception and cause a panic. This patch enables ARM Trusted Firmware to
handle External Aborts routed to EL3.
With this patch, when an External Abort is received at EL3, its handling
is delegated to plat_ea_handler() function. Platforms can provide their
own implementation of this function. This patch adds a weak definition
of the said function that prints out a message and just panics.
In order to support handling External Aborts at EL3, the build option
HANDLE_EA_EL3_FIRST must be set to 1.
Before this patch, HANDLE_EA_EL3_FIRST wasn't passed down to
compilation; this patch fixes that too.
Change-Id: I4d07b7e65eb191ff72d63b909ae9512478cd01a1
Signed-off-by: Jeenu Viswambharan <jeenu.viswambharan@arm.com>
Add some AMU helper functions to allow configuring, reading and
writing of the Group 0 and Group 1 counters. Documentation for these
helpers will come in a separate patch.
Change-Id: I656e070d2dae830c22414f694aa655341d4e2c40
Signed-off-by: Dimitris Papastamos <dimitris.papastamos@arm.com>
If the CSV2 field reads as 1 then branch targets trained in one
context cannot affect speculative execution in a different context.
In that case skip the workaround on Cortex A75.
Change-Id: I4d5504cba516a67311fb5f0657b08f72909cbd38
Signed-off-by: Dimitris Papastamos <dimitris.papastamos@arm.com>
Invalidate the Branch Target Buffer (BTB) on entry to EL3 by
temporarily dropping into AArch32 Secure-EL1 and executing the
`BPIALL` instruction.
This is achieved by using 3 vector tables. There is the runtime
vector table which is used to handle exceptions and 2 additional
tables which are required to implement this workaround. The
additional tables are `vbar0` and `vbar1`.
The sequence of events for handling a single exception is
as follows:
1) Install vector table `vbar0` which saves the CPU context on entry
to EL3 and sets up the Secure-EL1 context to execute in AArch32 mode
with the MMU disabled and I$ enabled. This is the default vector table.
2) Before doing an ERET into Secure-EL1, switch vbar to point to
another vector table `vbar1`. This is required to restore EL3 state
when returning from the workaround, before proceeding with normal EL3
exception handling.
3) While in Secure-EL1, the `BPIALL` instruction is executed and an
SMC call back to EL3 is performed.
4) On entry to EL3 from Secure-EL1, the saved context from step 1) is
restored. The vbar is switched to point to `vbar0` in preparation to
handle further exceptions. Finally a branch to the runtime vector
table entry is taken to complete the handling of the original
exception.
This workaround is enabled by default on the affected CPUs.
NOTE
====
There are 4 different stubs in Secure-EL1. Each stub corresponds to
an exception type such as Sync/IRQ/FIQ/SError. Each stub will move a
different value in `R0` before doing an SMC call back into EL3.
Without this piece of information it would not be possible to know
what the original exception type was as we cannot use `ESR_EL3` to
distinguish between IRQs and FIQs.
Change-Id: I90b32d14a3735290b48685d43c70c99daaa4b434
Signed-off-by: Dimitris Papastamos <dimitris.papastamos@arm.com>
This patch adds a new build option, ENABLE_SVE_FOR_NS, which when set
to one EL3 will check to see if the Scalable Vector Extension (SVE) is
implemented when entering and exiting the Non-secure world.
If SVE is implemented, EL3 will do the following:
- Entry to Non-secure world: SIMD, FP and SVE functionality is enabled.
- Exit from Non-secure world: SIMD, FP and SVE functionality is
disabled. As SIMD and FP registers are part of the SVE Z-registers
then any use of SIMD / FP functionality would corrupt the SVE
registers.
The build option default is 1. The SVE functionality is only supported
on AArch64 and so the build option is set to zero when the target
archiecture is AArch32.
This build option is not compatible with the CTX_INCLUDE_FPREGS - an
assert will be raised on platforms where SVE is implemented and both
ENABLE_SVE_FOR_NS and CTX_INCLUDE_FPREGS are set to 1.
Also note this change prevents secure world use of FP&SIMD registers on
SVE-enabled platforms. Existing Secure-EL1 Payloads will not work on
such platforms unless ENABLE_SVE_FOR_NS is set to 0.
Additionally, on the first entry into the Non-secure world the SVE
functionality is enabled and the SVE Z-register length is set to the
maximum size allowed by the architecture. This includes the use case
where EL2 is implemented but not used.
Change-Id: Ie2d733ddaba0b9bef1d7c9765503155188fe7dae
Signed-off-by: David Cunado <david.cunado@arm.com>
The `ENABLE_AMU` build option can be used to enable the
architecturally defined AMU counters. At present, there is no support
for the auxiliary counter group.
Change-Id: I7ea0c0a00327f463199d1b0a481f01dadb09d312
Signed-off-by: Dimitris Papastamos <dimitris.papastamos@arm.com>
Factor out SPE operations in a separate file. Use the publish
subscribe framework to drain the SPE buffers before entering secure
world. Additionally, enable SPE before entering normal world.
A side effect of this change is that the profiling buffers are now
only drained when a transition from normal world to secure world
happens. Previously they were drained also on return from secure
world, which is unnecessary as SPE is not supported in S-EL1.
Change-Id: I17582c689b4b525770dbb6db098b3a0b5777b70a
Signed-off-by: Dimitris Papastamos <dimitris.papastamos@arm.com>
If an implementation of ARMv8.2 includes ARMv8.2-LPA, the value 0b0110
is permitted in ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1.PARange, which means that the Physical
Address range supported is 52 bits (4 PiB). It is a reserved value
otherwise.
Change-Id: Ie0147218e9650aa09f0034a9ee03c1cca8db908a
Signed-off-by: Antonio Nino Diaz <antonio.ninodiaz@arm.com>
Provide a strong definition for plat_sdei_validate_sdei_entrypoint()
which translates client address to Physical Address, and then validating
the address to be present in DRAM.
Change-Id: Ib93eb66b413d638aa5524d1b3de36aa16d38ea11
Signed-off-by: Jeenu Viswambharan <jeenu.viswambharan@arm.com>
A Secure Partition is a software execution environment instantiated in
S-EL0 that can be used to implement simple management and security
services. Since S-EL0 is an unprivileged exception level, a Secure
Partition relies on privileged firmware e.g. ARM Trusted Firmware to be
granted access to system and processor resources. Essentially, it is a
software sandbox that runs under the control of privileged software in
the Secure World and accesses the following system resources:
- Memory and device regions in the system address map.
- PE system registers.
- A range of asynchronous exceptions e.g. interrupts.
- A range of synchronous exceptions e.g. SMC function identifiers.
A Secure Partition enables privileged firmware to implement only the
absolutely essential secure services in EL3 and instantiate the rest in
a partition. Since the partition executes in S-EL0, its implementation
cannot be overly complex.
The component in ARM Trusted Firmware responsible for managing a Secure
Partition is called the Secure Partition Manager (SPM). The SPM is
responsible for the following:
- Validating and allocating resources requested by a Secure Partition.
- Implementing a well defined interface that is used for initialising a
Secure Partition.
- Implementing a well defined interface that is used by the normal world
and other secure services for accessing the services exported by a
Secure Partition.
- Implementing a well defined interface that is used by a Secure
Partition to fulfil service requests.
- Instantiating the software execution environment required by a Secure
Partition to fulfil a service request.
Change-Id: I6f7862d6bba8732db5b73f54e789d717a35e802f
Co-authored-by: Douglas Raillard <douglas.raillard@arm.com>
Co-authored-by: Sandrine Bailleux <sandrine.bailleux@arm.com>
Co-authored-by: Achin Gupta <achin.gupta@arm.com>
Co-authored-by: Antonio Nino Diaz <antonio.ninodiaz@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Antonio Nino Diaz <antonio.ninodiaz@arm.com>
Document the API in separate platform interrupt controller API document.
Change-Id: If18f208e10a8a243f5c59d226fcf48e985941949
Co-authored-by: Yousuf A <yousuf.sait@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeenu Viswambharan <jeenu.viswambharan@arm.com>
Currently TF does not initialise the PMCR_EL0 register in
the secure context or save/restore the register.
In particular, the DP field may not be set to one to prohibit
cycle counting in the secure state, even though event counting
generally is prohibited via the default setting of MDCR_EL3.SMPE
to 0.
This patch initialises PMCR_EL0.DP to one in the secure state
to prohibit cycle counting and also initialises other fields
that have an architectually UNKNOWN reset value.
Additionally, PMCR_EL0 is added to the list of registers that are
saved and restored during a world switch.
Similar changes are made for PMCR for the AArch32 execution state.
NOTE: secure world code at lower ELs that assume other values in PMCR_EL0
will be impacted.
Change-Id: Iae40e8c0a196d74053accf97063ebc257b4d2f3a
Signed-off-by: David Cunado <david.cunado@arm.com>
The type `unsigned long` is 32 bit wide in AArch32, but 64 bit wide in
AArch64. This is inconsistent and that's why we avoid using it as per
the Coding Guidelines. This patch changes all `UL` occurrences to `U`
or `ULL` depending on the context so that the size of the constant is
clear.
This problem affected the macro `BIT(nr)`. As long as this macro is used
to fill fields of registers, that's not a problem, since all registers
are 32 bit wide in AArch32 and 64 bit wide in AArch64. However, if the
macro is used to fill the fields of a 64-bit integer, it won't be able
to set the upper 32 bits in AArch32.
By changing the type of this macro to `unsigned long long` the behaviour
is always the same regardless of the architecture, as this type is
64-bit wide in both cases.
Some Tegra platform files have been modified by this patch.
Change-Id: I918264c03e7d691a931f0d1018df25a2796cc221
Signed-off-by: Antonio Nino Diaz <antonio.ninodiaz@arm.com>
In the S-EL1&0 translation regime we aren't using the higher VA range,
whose translation table base address is held in TTBR1_EL1. The bit
TCR_EL1.EPD1 can be used to disable translations using TTBR1_EL1, but
the code wasn't setting it to 1. Additionally, other fields in TCR1_EL1
associated with the higher VA range (TBI1, TG1, SH1, ORGN1, IRGN1 and
A1) weren't set correctly as they were left as 0. In particular, 0 is a
reserved value for TG1. Also, TBBR1_EL1 was not explicitly set and its
reset value is UNKNOWN.
Therefore memory accesses to the higher VA range would result in
unpredictable behaviour as a translation table walk would be attempted
using an UNKNOWN value in TTBR1_EL1.
On the FVP and Juno platforms accessing the higher VA range resulted in
a translation fault, but this may not always be the case on all
platforms.
This patch sets the bit TCR_EL1.EPD1 to 1 so that any kind of
unpredictable behaviour is prevented.
This bug only affects the AArch64 version of the code, the AArch32
version sets this bit to 1 as expected.
Change-Id: I481c000deda5bc33a475631301767b9e0474a303
Signed-off-by: Antonio Nino Diaz <antonio.ninodiaz@arm.com>
This patch provides helper macros for both Device and Normal memory MAIR
encodings as defined by the ARM Architecture Reference Manual for ARMv8-A
(ARM DDI0487B.A).
Change-Id: I5faae7f2cf366390ad4ba1d9253c6f3b60fd5e20
Signed-off-by: David Cunado <david.cunado@arm.com>
This patch enables the CnP (Common not Private) bit for secure page
tables so that multiple PEs in the same Inner Shareable domain can use
the same translation table entries for a given stage of translation in
a particular translation regime. This only takes effect when ARM
Trusted Firmware is built with ARM_ARCH_MINOR >= 2.
ARM Trusted Firmware Design has been updated to include a description
of this feature usage.
Change-Id: I698305f047400119aa1900d34c65368022e410b8
Signed-off-by: Isla Mitchell <isla.mitchell@arm.com>
SPE is only supported in non-secure state. Accesses to SPE specific
registers from SEL1 will trap to EL3. During a world switch, before
`TTBR` is modified the SPE profiling buffers are drained. This is to
avoid a potential invalid memory access in SEL1.
SPE is architecturally specified only for AArch64.
Change-Id: I04a96427d9f9d586c331913d815fdc726855f6b0
Signed-off-by: dp-arm <dimitris.papastamos@arm.com>
This patch updates the el3_arch_init_common macro so that it fully
initialises essential control registers rather then relying on hardware
to set the reset values.
The context management functions are also updated to fully initialise
the appropriate control registers when initialising the non-secure and
secure context structures and when preparing to leave EL3 for a lower
EL.
This gives better alignement with the ARM ARM which states that software
must initialise RES0 and RES1 fields with 0 / 1.
This patch also corrects the following typos:
"NASCR definitions" -> "NSACR definitions"
Change-Id: Ia8940b8351dc27bc09e2138b011e249655041cfc
Signed-off-by: David Cunado <david.cunado@arm.com>
This patch uses the U() and ULL() macros for constants, to fix some
of the signed-ness defects flagged by the MISRA scanner.
Signed-off-by: Varun Wadekar <vwadekar@nvidia.com>
In AArch64, privileged exception levels control the execution state
(a.k.a. register width) of the immediate lower Exception Level; i.e.
whether the lower exception level executes in AArch64 or AArch32 state.
For an exception level to have its execution state changed at run time,
it must request the change by raising a synchronous exception to the
higher exception level.
This patch implements and adds such a provision to the ARM SiP service,
by which an immediate lower exception level can request to switch its
execution state. The execution state is switched if the request is:
- raised from non-secure world;
- raised on the primary CPU, before any secondaries are brought online
with CPU_ON PSCI call;
- raised from an exception level immediately below EL3: EL2, if
implemented; otherwise NS EL1.
If successful, the SMC doesn't return to the caller, but to the entry
point supplied with the call. Otherwise, the caller will observe the SMC
returning with STATE_SW_E_DENIED code. If ARM Trusted Firmware is built
for AArch32, the feature is not supported, and the call will always
fail.
For the ARM SiP service:
- Add SMC function IDs for both AArch32 and AArch64;
- Increment the SiP service minor version to 2;
- Adjust the number of supported SiP service calls.
Add documentation for ARM SiP service.
FixesARM-software/tf-issues#436
Change-Id: I4347f2d6232e69fbfbe333b340fcd0caed0a4cea
Signed-off-by: Jeenu Viswambharan <jeenu.viswambharan@arm.com>
To make software license auditing simpler, use SPDX[0] license
identifiers instead of duplicating the license text in every file.
NOTE: Files that have been imported by FreeBSD have not been modified.
[0]: https://spdx.org/
Change-Id: I80a00e1f641b8cc075ca5a95b10607ed9ed8761a
Signed-off-by: dp-arm <dimitris.papastamos@arm.com>
Replace all instances of checks with the new macro.
Change-Id: I0eec39b9376475a1a9707a3115de9d36f88f8a2a
Signed-off-by: Jeenu Viswambharan <jeenu.viswambharan@arm.com>
utils.h is included in various header files for the defines in it.
Some of the other header files only contain defines. This allows the
header files to be shared between host and target builds for shared defines.
Recently types.h has been included in utils.h as well as some function
prototypes.
Because of the inclusion of types.h conflicts exist building host tools
abd these header files now. To solve this problem,
move the defines to utils_def.h and have this included by utils.h and
change header files to only include utils_def.h and not pick up the new
types.h being introduced.
FixesARM-software/tf-issues#461
Signed-off-by: Scott Branden <scott.branden@broadcom.com>
Remove utils_def.h from utils.h
This patch removes utils_def.h from utils.h as it is not required.
And also makes a minor change to ensure Juno platform compiles.
Change-Id: I10cf1fb51e44a8fa6dcec02980354eb9ecc9fa29
Following steps are required to boot JUNO in AArch32 state:
1> BL1, in AArch64 state, loads BL2.
2> BL2, in AArch64 state, initializes DDR.
Loads SP_MIN & BL33 (AArch32 executable)images.
Calls RUN_IMAGE SMC to go back to BL1.
3> BL1 writes AArch32 executable opcodes, to load and branch
at the entrypoint address of SP_MIN, at HI-VECTOR address and
then request for warm reset in AArch32 state using RMR_EL3.
This patch makes following changes to facilitate above steps:
* Added assembly function to carry out step 3 above.
* Added region in TZC that enables Secure access to the
HI-VECTOR(0xFFFF0000) address space.
* AArch32 image descriptor is used, in BL2, to load
SP_MIN and BL33 AArch32 executable images.
A new flag `JUNO_AARCH32_EL3_RUNTIME` is introduced that
controls above changes. By default this flag is disabled.
NOTE: BL1 and BL2 are not supported in AArch32 state for JUNO.
Change-Id: I091d56a0e6d36663e6d9d2bb53c92c672195d1ec
Signed-off-by: Yatharth Kochar <yatharth.kochar@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: dp-arm <dimitris.papastamos@arm.com>
This patch adds support for fake system suspend (SC7).
This is a debug mode, to ensure that a different code path is
executed for cases like pre-silicon development, where a
full-fledged SC7 is not possible in early stages.
This particular patch ensures that, if fake system suspend is
enabled (denoted by tegra_fake_system_suspend variable
having a non-zero value), instead of calling WFI, a request
for a warm reset is made for starting the SC7 exit procedure.
This ensures that the code path of kernel->ATF and back to
kernel is executed without depending on other components
involved in SC7 code path.
Additionally, this patch also adds support for SMC call
from kernel, enabling fake system suspend mode.
Signed-off-by: Vignesh Radhakrishnan <vigneshr@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Varun Wadekar <vwadekar@nvidia.com>
This patch modifies some of the functions in ARM platform layer to cater
for the case when multi-threading `MT` is set in MPIDR. A new build flag
`ARM_PLAT_MT` is added, and when enabled, the functions accessing MPIDR
now assume that the `MT` bit is set for the platform and access the bit
fields accordingly.
Also, a new API plat_arm_get_cpu_pe_count is added when `ARM_PLAT_MT` is
enabled, returning the PE count within the physical cpu corresponding to
`mpidr`.
Change-Id: I04ccf212ac3054a60882761f4087bae299af13cb
Signed-off-by: Summer Qin <summer.qin@arm.com>
Added APIs to add and remove regions to the translation tables
dynamically while the MMU is enabled. Only static regions are allowed
to overlap other static ones (for backwards compatibility).
A new private attribute (MT_DYNAMIC / MT_STATIC) has been added to
flag each region as such.
The dynamic mapping functionality can be enabled or disabled when
compiling by setting the build option PLAT_XLAT_TABLES_DYNAMIC to 1
or 0. This can be done per-image.
TLB maintenance code during dynamic table mapping and unmapping has
also been added.
FixesARM-software/tf-issues#310
Change-Id: I19e8992005c4292297a382824394490c5387aa3b
Signed-off-by: Antonio Nino Diaz <antonio.ninodiaz@arm.com>
Trusted Firmware currently has no support for secure self-hosted
debug. To avoid unexpected exceptions, disable software debug
exceptions, other than software breakpoint instruction exceptions,
from all exception levels in secure state. This applies to both
AArch32 and AArch64 EL3 initialization.
Change-Id: Id097e54a6bbcd0ca6a2be930df5d860d8d09e777
Signed-off-by: dp-arm <dimitris.papastamos@arm.com>
The errata reporting policy is as follows:
- If an errata workaround is enabled:
- If it applies (i.e. the CPU is affected by the errata), an INFO
message is printed, confirming that the errata workaround has been
applied.
- If it does not apply, a VERBOSE message is printed, confirming
that the errata workaround has been skipped.
- If an errata workaround is not enabled, but would have applied had
it been, a WARN message is printed, alerting that errata workaround
is missing.
The CPU errata messages are printed by both BL1 (primary CPU only) and
runtime firmware on debug builds, once for each CPU/errata combination.
Relevant output from Juno r1 console when ARM Trusted Firmware is built
with PLAT=juno LOG_LEVEL=50 DEBUG=1:
VERBOSE: BL1: cortex_a57: errata workaround for 806969 was not applied
VERBOSE: BL1: cortex_a57: errata workaround for 813420 was not applied
INFO: BL1: cortex_a57: errata workaround for disable_ldnp_overread was applied
WARNING: BL1: cortex_a57: errata workaround for 826974 was missing!
WARNING: BL1: cortex_a57: errata workaround for 826977 was missing!
WARNING: BL1: cortex_a57: errata workaround for 828024 was missing!
WARNING: BL1: cortex_a57: errata workaround for 829520 was missing!
WARNING: BL1: cortex_a57: errata workaround for 833471 was missing!
...
VERBOSE: BL31: cortex_a57: errata workaround for 806969 was not applied
VERBOSE: BL31: cortex_a57: errata workaround for 813420 was not applied
INFO: BL31: cortex_a57: errata workaround for disable_ldnp_overread was applied
WARNING: BL31: cortex_a57: errata workaround for 826974 was missing!
WARNING: BL31: cortex_a57: errata workaround for 826977 was missing!
WARNING: BL31: cortex_a57: errata workaround for 828024 was missing!
WARNING: BL31: cortex_a57: errata workaround for 829520 was missing!
WARNING: BL31: cortex_a57: errata workaround for 833471 was missing!
...
VERBOSE: BL31: cortex_a53: errata workaround for 826319 was not applied
INFO: BL31: cortex_a53: errata workaround for disable_non_temporal_hint was applied
Also update documentation.
Change-Id: Iccf059d3348adb876ca121cdf5207bdbbacf2aba
Signed-off-by: Jeenu Viswambharan <jeenu.viswambharan@arm.com>
Added the definitions `PLAT_PHY_ADDR_SPACE_SIZE` and
`PLAT_VIRT_ADDR_SPACE_SIZE` which specify respectively the physical
and virtual address space size a platform can use.
`ADDR_SPACE_SIZE` is now deprecated. To maintain compatibility, if any
of the previous defines aren't present, the value of `ADDR_SPACE_SIZE`
will be used instead.
For AArch64, register ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1 is checked to calculate the
max PA supported by the hardware and to verify that the previously
mentioned definition is valid. For AArch32, a 40 bit physical
address space is considered.
Added asserts to check for overflows.
Porting guide updated.
Change-Id: Ie8ce1da5967993f0c94dbd4eb9841fc03d5ef8d6
Signed-off-by: Antonio Nino Diaz <antonio.ninodiaz@arm.com>
In order to avoid unexpected traps into EL3/MON mode, this patch
resets the debug registers, MDCR_EL3 and MDCR_EL2 for AArch64,
and SDCR and HDCR for AArch32.
MDCR_EL3/SDCR is zero'ed when EL3/MON mode is entered, at the
start of BL1 and BL31/SMP_MIN.
For MDCR_EL2/HDCR, this patch zero's the bits that are
architecturally UNKNOWN values on reset. This is done when
exiting from EL3/MON mode but only on platforms that support
EL2/HYP mode but choose to exit to EL1/SVC mode.
FixesARM-software/tf-issues#430
Change-Id: Idb992232163c072faa08892251b5626ae4c3a5b6
Signed-off-by: David Cunado <david.cunado@arm.com>
The values of CP15BEN, nTWI & nTWE bits in SCTLR_EL1 are architecturally
unknown if EL3 is AARCH64 whereas they reset to 1 if EL3 is AArch32. This
might be a compatibility break for legacy AArch32 normal world software if
these bits are not set to 1 when EL3 is AArch64. This patch enables the
CP15BEN, nTWI and nTWE bits in the SCTLR_EL1 if the lower non-secure EL is
AArch32. This unifies the SCTLR settings for lower non-secure EL in AArch32
mode for both AArch64 and AArch32 builds of Trusted Firmware.
FixesARM-software/tf-issues#428
Change-Id: I3152d1580e4869c0ea745c5bd9da765f9c254947
Signed-off-by: Soby Mathew <soby.mathew@arm.com>
Instead of hardcoding a level 1 table as the base translation level
table, let the code decide which level is the most appropriate given
the virtual address space size.
As the table granularity is 4 KB, this allows the code to select
level 0, 1 or 2 as base level for AArch64. This way, instead of
limiting the virtual address space width to 39-31 bits, widths of
48-25 bit can be used.
For AArch32, this change allows the code to select level 1 or 2
as the base translation level table and use virtual address space
width of 32-25 bits.
Also removed some unused definitions related to translation tables.
FixesARM-software/tf-issues#362
Change-Id: Ie3bb5d6d1a4730a26700b09827c79f37ca3cdb65
This patch moves the macro SIZE_FROM_LOG2_WORDS() defined in
`arch.h` to `utils.h` as it is utility macro.
Change-Id: Ia8171a226978f053a1ee4037f80142c0a4d21430
The AArch32 long descriptor format and the AArch64 descriptor format
correspond to each other which allows possible sharing of xlat_tables
library code between AArch64 and AArch32. This patch refactors the
xlat_tables library code to seperate the common functionality from
architecture specific code. Prior to this patch, all of the xlat_tables
library code were in `lib/aarch64/xlat_tables.c` file. The refactored code
is now in `lib/xlat_tables/` directory. The AArch64 specific programming
for xlat_tables is in `lib/xlat_tables/aarch64/xlat_tables.c` and the rest
of the code common to AArch64 and AArch32 is in
`lib/xlat_tables/xlat_tables_common.c`. Also the data types used in
xlat_tables library APIs are reworked to make it compatible between AArch64
and AArch32.
The `lib/aarch64/xlat_tables.c` file now includes the new xlat_tables
library files to retain compatibility for existing platform ports.
The macros related to xlat_tables library are also moved from
`include/lib/aarch64/arch.h` to the header `include/lib/xlat_tables.h`.
NOTE: THE `lib/aarch64/xlat_tables.c` FILE IS DEPRECATED AND PLATFORM PORTS
ARE EXPECTED TO INCLUDE THE NEW XLAT_TABLES LIBRARY FILES IN THEIR MAKEFILES.
Change-Id: I3d17217d24aaf3a05a4685d642a31d4d56255a0f
At the moment, the memory translation library allows to create memory
mappings of 2 types:
- Device nGnRE memory (named MT_DEVICE in the library);
- Normal, Inner Write-back non-transient, Outer Write-back
non-transient memory (named MT_MEMORY in the library).
As a consequence, the library code treats the memory type field as a
boolean: everything that is not device memory is normal memory and
vice-versa.
In reality, the ARMv8 architecture allows up to 8 types of memory to
be used at a single time for a given exception level. This patch
reworks the memory attributes such that the memory type is now defined
as an integer ranging from 0 to 7 instead of a boolean. This makes it
possible to extend the list of memory types supported by the memory
translation library.
The priority system dictating memory attributes for overlapping
memory regions has been extended to cope with these changes but the
algorithm at its core has been preserved. When a memory region is
re-mapped with different memory attributes, the memory translation
library examines the former attributes and updates them only if
the new attributes create a more restrictive mapping. This behaviour
is unchanged, only the manipulation of the value has been modified
to cope with the new format.
This patch also introduces a new type of memory mapping in the memory
translation library: MT_NON_CACHEABLE, meaning Normal, Inner
Non-cacheable, Outer Non-cacheable memory. This can be useful to map
a non-cacheable memory region, such as a DMA buffer for example.
The rules around the Execute-Never (XN) bit in a translation table
for an MT_NON_CACHEABLE memory mapping have been aligned on the rules
used for MT_MEMORY mappings:
- If the memory is read-only then it is also executable (XN = 0);
- If the memory is read-write then it is not executable (XN = 1).
The shareability field for MT_NON_CACHEABLE mappings is always set as
'Outer-Shareable'. Note that this is not strictly needed since
shareability is only relevant if the memory is a Normal Cacheable
memory type, but this is to align with the existing device memory
mappings setup. All Device and Normal Non-cacheable memory regions
are always treated as Outer Shareable, regardless of the translation
table shareability attributes.
This patch also removes the 'ATTR_SO' and 'ATTR_SO_INDEX' #defines.
They were introduced to map memory as Device nGnRnE (formerly called
"Strongly-Ordered" memory in the ARMv7 architecture) but were not
used anywhere in the code base. Removing them avoids any confusion
about the memory types supported by the library.
Upstream platforms do not currently use the MT_NON_CACHEABLE memory
type.
NOTE: THIS CHANGE IS SOURCE COMPATIBLE BUT PLATFORMS THAT RELY ON THE
BINARY VALUES OF `mmap_attr_t` or the `attr` argument of
`mmap_add_region()` MAY BE BROKEN.
Change-Id: I717d6ed79b4c845a04e34132432f98b93d661d79
This patch adds a driver for ARM GICv3 systems that need to run software
stacks where affinity routing is enabled across all privileged exception
levels for both security states. This driver is a partial implementation
of the ARM Generic Interrupt Controller Architecture Specification, GIC
architecture version 3.0 and version 4.0 (ARM IHI 0069A). The driver does
not cater for legacy support of interrupts and asymmetric configurations.
The existing GIC driver has been preserved unchanged. The common code for
GICv2 and GICv3 systems has been refactored into a new file,
`drivers/arm/gic/common/gic_common.c`. The corresponding header is in
`include/drivers/arm/gic_common.h`.
The driver interface is implemented in `drivers/arm/gic/v3/gicv3_main.c`.
The corresponding header is in `include/drivers/arm/gicv3.h`. Helper
functions are implemented in `drivers/arm/gic/v3/arm_gicv3_helpers.c`
and are accessible through the `drivers/arm/gic/v3/gicv3_private.h`
header.
Change-Id: I8c3c834a1d049d05b776b4dcb76b18ccb927444a
Jeenu Viswambharan
Antonio Nino Diaz
davidcunado-arm
Dimitris Papastamos
Isla Mitchell
Varun Wadekar
Scott Branden
Scott Branden
Yatharth Kochar
Vignesh Radhakrishnan
Summer Qin
Soby Mathew
Gerald Lejeune
Sandrine Bailleux
Achin Gupta