arm-trusted-firmware/include/plat/common/platform.h

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/*
* Copyright (c) 2013-2022, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
*
* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
*/
#ifndef PLATFORM_H
#define PLATFORM_H
#include <stdint.h>
#include <lib/psci/psci.h>
#if defined(SPD_spmd)
#include <services/spm_core_manifest.h>
#endif
#if TRNG_SUPPORT
#include "plat_trng.h"
#endif
#include <drivers/fwu/fwu_metadata.h>
/*******************************************************************************
* Forward declarations
******************************************************************************/
struct auth_img_desc_s;
struct meminfo;
struct image_info;
struct entry_point_info;
Add descriptor based image management support in BL1 As of now BL1 loads and execute BL2 based on hard coded information provided in BL1. But due to addition of support for upcoming Firmware Update feature, BL1 now require more flexible approach to load and run different images using information provided by the platform. This patch adds new mechanism to load and execute images based on platform provided image id's. BL1 now queries the platform to fetch the image id of the next image to be loaded and executed. In order to achieve this, a new struct image_desc_t was added which holds the information about images, such as: ep_info and image_info. This patch introduces following platform porting functions: unsigned int bl1_plat_get_next_image_id(void); This is used to identify the next image to be loaded and executed by BL1. struct image_desc *bl1_plat_get_image_desc(unsigned int image_id); This is used to retrieve the image_desc for given image_id. void bl1_plat_set_ep_info(unsigned int image_id, struct entry_point_info *ep_info); This function allows platforms to update ep_info for given image_id. The plat_bl1_common.c file provides default weak implementations of all above functions, the `bl1_plat_get_image_desc()` always return BL2 image descriptor, the `bl1_plat_get_next_image_id()` always return BL2 image ID and `bl1_plat_set_ep_info()` is empty and just returns. These functions gets compiled into all BL1 platforms by default. Platform setup in BL1, using `bl1_platform_setup()`, is now done _after_ the initialization of authentication module. This change provides the opportunity to use authentication while doing the platform setup in BL1. In order to store secure/non-secure context, BL31 uses percpu_data[] to store context pointer for each core. In case of BL1 only the primary CPU will be active hence percpu_data[] is not required to store the context pointer. This patch introduce bl1_cpu_context[] and bl1_cpu_context_ptr[] to store the context and context pointers respectively. It also also re-defines cm_get_context() and cm_set_context() for BL1 in bl1/bl1_context_mgmt.c. BL1 now follows the BL31 pattern of using SP_EL0 for the C runtime environment, to support resuming execution from a previously saved context. NOTE: THE `bl1_plat_set_bl2_ep_info()` PLATFORM PORTING FUNCTION IS NO LONGER CALLED BY BL1 COMMON CODE. PLATFORMS THAT OVERRIDE THIS FUNCTION MAY NEED TO IMPLEMENT `bl1_plat_set_ep_info()` INSTEAD TO MAINTAIN EXISTING BEHAVIOUR. Change-Id: Ieee4c124b951c2e9bc1c1013fa2073221195d881
2015-10-09 18:06:13 +01:00
struct image_desc;
Add new version of image loading. This patch adds capability to load BL images based on image descriptors instead of hard coded way of loading BL images. This framework is designed such that it can be readily adapted by any BL stage that needs to load images. In order to provide the above capability the following new platform functions are introduced: bl_load_info_t *plat_get_bl_image_load_info(void); This function returns pointer to the list of images that the platform has populated to load. bl_params_t *plat_get_next_bl_params(void); This function returns a pointer to the shared memory that the platform has kept aside to pass trusted firmware related information that next BL image needs. void plat_flush_next_bl_params(void); This function flushes to main memory all the params that are passed to next image. int bl2_plat_handle_post_image_load(unsigned int image_id) This function can be used by the platforms to update/use image information for given `image_id`. `desc_image_load.c` contains utility functions which can be used by the platforms to generate, load and executable, image list based on the registered image descriptors. This patch also adds new version of `load_image/load_auth_image` functions in-order to achieve the above capability. Following are the changes for the new version as compared to old: - Refactor the signature and only keep image_id and image_info_t arguments. Removed image_base argument as it is already passed through image_info_t. Given that the BL image base addresses and limit/size are already provided by the platforms, the meminfo_t and entry_point_info arguments are not needed to provide/reserve the extent of free memory for the given BL image. - Added check for the image size against the defined max size. This is needed because the image size could come from an unauthenticated source (e.g. the FIP header). To make this check, new member is added to the image_info_t struct for identifying the image maximum size. New flag `LOAD_IMAGE_V2` is added in the Makefile. Default value is 0. NOTE: `TRUSTED_BOARD_BOOT` is currently not supported when `LOAD_IMAGE_V2` is enabled. Change-Id: Ia7b643f4817a170d5a2fbf479b9bc12e63112e79
2016-09-12 16:08:41 +01:00
struct bl_load_info;
struct bl_params;
SPM: Introduce Secure Partition Manager A Secure Partition is a software execution environment instantiated in S-EL0 that can be used to implement simple management and security services. Since S-EL0 is an unprivileged exception level, a Secure Partition relies on privileged firmware e.g. ARM Trusted Firmware to be granted access to system and processor resources. Essentially, it is a software sandbox that runs under the control of privileged software in the Secure World and accesses the following system resources: - Memory and device regions in the system address map. - PE system registers. - A range of asynchronous exceptions e.g. interrupts. - A range of synchronous exceptions e.g. SMC function identifiers. A Secure Partition enables privileged firmware to implement only the absolutely essential secure services in EL3 and instantiate the rest in a partition. Since the partition executes in S-EL0, its implementation cannot be overly complex. The component in ARM Trusted Firmware responsible for managing a Secure Partition is called the Secure Partition Manager (SPM). The SPM is responsible for the following: - Validating and allocating resources requested by a Secure Partition. - Implementing a well defined interface that is used for initialising a Secure Partition. - Implementing a well defined interface that is used by the normal world and other secure services for accessing the services exported by a Secure Partition. - Implementing a well defined interface that is used by a Secure Partition to fulfil service requests. - Instantiating the software execution environment required by a Secure Partition to fulfil a service request. Change-Id: I6f7862d6bba8732db5b73f54e789d717a35e802f Co-authored-by: Douglas Raillard <douglas.raillard@arm.com> Co-authored-by: Sandrine Bailleux <sandrine.bailleux@arm.com> Co-authored-by: Achin Gupta <achin.gupta@arm.com> Co-authored-by: Antonio Nino Diaz <antonio.ninodiaz@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Antonio Nino Diaz <antonio.ninodiaz@arm.com>
2017-10-24 10:07:35 +01:00
struct mmap_region;
struct spm_mm_boot_info;
struct sp_res_desc;
enum fw_enc_status_t;
/*******************************************************************************
* plat_get_rotpk_info() flags
******************************************************************************/
#define ROTPK_IS_HASH (1 << 0)
/* Flag used to skip verification of the certificate ROTPK while the platform
ROTPK is not deployed */
#define ROTPK_NOT_DEPLOYED (1 << 1)
/*******************************************************************************
* plat_get_enc_key_info() flags
******************************************************************************/
/*
* Flag used to notify caller that information provided in key buffer is an
* identifier rather than an actual key.
*/
#define ENC_KEY_IS_IDENTIFIER (1 << 0)
/*******************************************************************************
* Function declarations
******************************************************************************/
/*******************************************************************************
* Mandatory common functions
******************************************************************************/
unsigned int plat_get_syscnt_freq2(void);
Use numbers to identify images instead of names The Trusted firmware code identifies BL images by name. The platform port defines a name for each image e.g. the IO framework uses this mechanism in the platform function plat_get_image_source(). For a given image name, it returns the handle to the image file which involves comparing images names. In addition, if the image is packaged in a FIP, a name comparison is required to find the UUID for the image. This method is not optimal. This patch changes the interface between the generic and platform code with regard to identifying images. The platform port must now allocate a unique number (ID) for every image. The generic code will use the image ID instead of the name to access its attributes. As a result, the plat_get_image_source() function now takes an image ID as an input parameter. The organisation of data structures within the IO framework has been rationalised to use an image ID as an index into an array which contains attributes of the image such as UUID and name. This prevents the name comparisons. A new type 'io_uuid_spec_t' has been introduced in the IO framework to specify images identified by UUID (i.e. when the image is contained in a FIP file). There is no longer need to maintain a look-up table [iname_name --> uuid] in the io_fip driver code. Because image names are no longer mandatory in the platform port, the debug messages in the generic code will show the image identifier instead of the file name. The platforms that support semihosting to load images (i.e. FVP) must provide the file names as definitions private to the platform. The ARM platform ports and documentation have been updated accordingly. All ARM platforms reuse the image IDs defined in the platform common code. These IDs will be used to access other attributes of an image in subsequent patches. IMPORTANT: applying this patch breaks compatibility for platforms that use TF BL1 or BL2 images or the image loading code. The platform port must be updated to match the new interface. Change-Id: I9c1b04cb1a0684c6ee65dee66146dd6731751ea5
2015-04-13 17:36:19 +01:00
int plat_get_image_source(unsigned int image_id,
uintptr_t *dev_handle,
uintptr_t *image_spec);
uintptr_t plat_get_ns_image_entrypoint(void);
unsigned int plat_my_core_pos(void);
int plat_core_pos_by_mpidr(u_register_t mpidr);
int plat_get_mbedtls_heap(void **heap_addr, size_t *heap_size);
#if STACK_PROTECTOR_ENABLED
/*
* Return a new value to be used for the stack protection's canary.
*
* Ideally, this value is a random number that is impossible to predict by an
* attacker.
*/
u_register_t plat_get_stack_protector_canary(void);
#endif /* STACK_PROTECTOR_ENABLED */
/*******************************************************************************
* Mandatory interrupt management functions
******************************************************************************/
uint32_t plat_ic_get_pending_interrupt_id(void);
uint32_t plat_ic_get_pending_interrupt_type(void);
uint32_t plat_ic_acknowledge_interrupt(void);
uint32_t plat_ic_get_interrupt_type(uint32_t id);
void plat_ic_end_of_interrupt(uint32_t id);
uint32_t plat_interrupt_type_to_line(uint32_t type,
uint32_t security_state);
/*******************************************************************************
* Optional interrupt management functions, depending on chosen EL3 components.
******************************************************************************/
unsigned int plat_ic_get_running_priority(void);
int plat_ic_is_spi(unsigned int id);
int plat_ic_is_ppi(unsigned int id);
int plat_ic_is_sgi(unsigned int id);
unsigned int plat_ic_get_interrupt_active(unsigned int id);
void plat_ic_disable_interrupt(unsigned int id);
void plat_ic_enable_interrupt(unsigned int id);
int plat_ic_has_interrupt_type(unsigned int type);
void plat_ic_set_interrupt_type(unsigned int id, unsigned int type);
void plat_ic_set_interrupt_priority(unsigned int id, unsigned int priority);
void plat_ic_raise_el3_sgi(int sgi_num, u_register_t target);
void plat_ic_set_spi_routing(unsigned int id, unsigned int routing_mode,
u_register_t mpidr);
void plat_ic_set_interrupt_pending(unsigned int id);
void plat_ic_clear_interrupt_pending(unsigned int id);
unsigned int plat_ic_set_priority_mask(unsigned int mask);
unsigned int plat_ic_get_interrupt_id(unsigned int raw);
/*******************************************************************************
* Optional common functions (may be overridden)
******************************************************************************/
uintptr_t plat_get_my_stack(void);
void plat_report_exception(unsigned int exception_type);
int plat_crash_console_init(void);
int plat_crash_console_putc(int c);
void plat_crash_console_flush(void);
void plat_error_handler(int err) __dead2;
void plat_panic_handler(void) __dead2;
const char *plat_log_get_prefix(unsigned int log_level);
void bl2_plat_preload_setup(void);
int plat_try_next_boot_source(void);
#if MEASURED_BOOT
int plat_mboot_measure_image(unsigned int image_id, image_info_t *image_data);
int plat_mboot_measure_critical_data(unsigned int critical_data_id,
const void *base,
size_t size);
#else
static inline int plat_mboot_measure_image(unsigned int image_id __unused,
image_info_t *image_data __unused)
{
return 0;
}
static inline int plat_mboot_measure_critical_data(
unsigned int critical_data_id __unused,
const void *base __unused,
size_t size __unused)
{
return 0;
}
#endif /* MEASURED_BOOT */
/*******************************************************************************
* Mandatory BL1 functions
******************************************************************************/
void bl1_early_platform_setup(void);
void bl1_plat_arch_setup(void);
void bl1_platform_setup(void);
struct meminfo *bl1_plat_sec_mem_layout(void);
/*******************************************************************************
* Optional EL3 component functions in BL31
******************************************************************************/
/* SDEI platform functions */
#if SDEI_SUPPORT
void plat_sdei_setup(void);
int plat_sdei_validate_entry_point(uintptr_t ep, unsigned int client_mode);
void plat_sdei_handle_masked_trigger(uint64_t mpidr, unsigned int intr);
#endif
void plat_default_ea_handler(unsigned int ea_reason, uint64_t syndrome, void *cookie,
void *handle, uint64_t flags);
void plat_ea_handler(unsigned int ea_reason, uint64_t syndrome, void *cookie,
void *handle, uint64_t flags);
2015-10-10 19:06:53 +01:00
/*
* The following function is mandatory when the
* firmware update feature is used.
*/
int bl1_plat_mem_check(uintptr_t mem_base, unsigned int mem_size,
unsigned int flags);
/*******************************************************************************
* Optional BL1 functions (may be overridden)
******************************************************************************/
Add descriptor based image management support in BL1 As of now BL1 loads and execute BL2 based on hard coded information provided in BL1. But due to addition of support for upcoming Firmware Update feature, BL1 now require more flexible approach to load and run different images using information provided by the platform. This patch adds new mechanism to load and execute images based on platform provided image id's. BL1 now queries the platform to fetch the image id of the next image to be loaded and executed. In order to achieve this, a new struct image_desc_t was added which holds the information about images, such as: ep_info and image_info. This patch introduces following platform porting functions: unsigned int bl1_plat_get_next_image_id(void); This is used to identify the next image to be loaded and executed by BL1. struct image_desc *bl1_plat_get_image_desc(unsigned int image_id); This is used to retrieve the image_desc for given image_id. void bl1_plat_set_ep_info(unsigned int image_id, struct entry_point_info *ep_info); This function allows platforms to update ep_info for given image_id. The plat_bl1_common.c file provides default weak implementations of all above functions, the `bl1_plat_get_image_desc()` always return BL2 image descriptor, the `bl1_plat_get_next_image_id()` always return BL2 image ID and `bl1_plat_set_ep_info()` is empty and just returns. These functions gets compiled into all BL1 platforms by default. Platform setup in BL1, using `bl1_platform_setup()`, is now done _after_ the initialization of authentication module. This change provides the opportunity to use authentication while doing the platform setup in BL1. In order to store secure/non-secure context, BL31 uses percpu_data[] to store context pointer for each core. In case of BL1 only the primary CPU will be active hence percpu_data[] is not required to store the context pointer. This patch introduce bl1_cpu_context[] and bl1_cpu_context_ptr[] to store the context and context pointers respectively. It also also re-defines cm_get_context() and cm_set_context() for BL1 in bl1/bl1_context_mgmt.c. BL1 now follows the BL31 pattern of using SP_EL0 for the C runtime environment, to support resuming execution from a previously saved context. NOTE: THE `bl1_plat_set_bl2_ep_info()` PLATFORM PORTING FUNCTION IS NO LONGER CALLED BY BL1 COMMON CODE. PLATFORMS THAT OVERRIDE THIS FUNCTION MAY NEED TO IMPLEMENT `bl1_plat_set_ep_info()` INSTEAD TO MAINTAIN EXISTING BEHAVIOUR. Change-Id: Ieee4c124b951c2e9bc1c1013fa2073221195d881
2015-10-09 18:06:13 +01:00
/*
* The following functions are used for image loading process in BL1.
*/
void bl1_plat_set_ep_info(unsigned int image_id,
struct entry_point_info *ep_info);
2015-10-10 19:06:53 +01:00
/*
* The following functions are mandatory when firmware update
* feature is used and optional otherwise.
*/
Add descriptor based image management support in BL1 As of now BL1 loads and execute BL2 based on hard coded information provided in BL1. But due to addition of support for upcoming Firmware Update feature, BL1 now require more flexible approach to load and run different images using information provided by the platform. This patch adds new mechanism to load and execute images based on platform provided image id's. BL1 now queries the platform to fetch the image id of the next image to be loaded and executed. In order to achieve this, a new struct image_desc_t was added which holds the information about images, such as: ep_info and image_info. This patch introduces following platform porting functions: unsigned int bl1_plat_get_next_image_id(void); This is used to identify the next image to be loaded and executed by BL1. struct image_desc *bl1_plat_get_image_desc(unsigned int image_id); This is used to retrieve the image_desc for given image_id. void bl1_plat_set_ep_info(unsigned int image_id, struct entry_point_info *ep_info); This function allows platforms to update ep_info for given image_id. The plat_bl1_common.c file provides default weak implementations of all above functions, the `bl1_plat_get_image_desc()` always return BL2 image descriptor, the `bl1_plat_get_next_image_id()` always return BL2 image ID and `bl1_plat_set_ep_info()` is empty and just returns. These functions gets compiled into all BL1 platforms by default. Platform setup in BL1, using `bl1_platform_setup()`, is now done _after_ the initialization of authentication module. This change provides the opportunity to use authentication while doing the platform setup in BL1. In order to store secure/non-secure context, BL31 uses percpu_data[] to store context pointer for each core. In case of BL1 only the primary CPU will be active hence percpu_data[] is not required to store the context pointer. This patch introduce bl1_cpu_context[] and bl1_cpu_context_ptr[] to store the context and context pointers respectively. It also also re-defines cm_get_context() and cm_set_context() for BL1 in bl1/bl1_context_mgmt.c. BL1 now follows the BL31 pattern of using SP_EL0 for the C runtime environment, to support resuming execution from a previously saved context. NOTE: THE `bl1_plat_set_bl2_ep_info()` PLATFORM PORTING FUNCTION IS NO LONGER CALLED BY BL1 COMMON CODE. PLATFORMS THAT OVERRIDE THIS FUNCTION MAY NEED TO IMPLEMENT `bl1_plat_set_ep_info()` INSTEAD TO MAINTAIN EXISTING BEHAVIOUR. Change-Id: Ieee4c124b951c2e9bc1c1013fa2073221195d881
2015-10-09 18:06:13 +01:00
unsigned int bl1_plat_get_next_image_id(void);
struct image_desc *bl1_plat_get_image_desc(unsigned int image_id);
2015-10-10 19:06:53 +01:00
/*
* The following functions are used by firmware update
* feature and may optionally be overridden.
*/
__dead2 void bl1_plat_fwu_done(void *client_cookie, void *reserved);
2015-10-10 19:06:53 +01:00
/*
* This BL1 function can be used by the platforms to update/use image
* information for a given `image_id`.
*/
int bl1_plat_handle_pre_image_load(unsigned int image_id);
int bl1_plat_handle_post_image_load(unsigned int image_id);
2015-10-10 19:06:53 +01:00
#if MEASURED_BOOT
void bl1_plat_mboot_init(void);
void bl1_plat_mboot_finish(void);
#else
static inline void bl1_plat_mboot_init(void)
{
}
static inline void bl1_plat_mboot_finish(void)
{
}
#endif /* MEASURED_BOOT */
/*******************************************************************************
* Mandatory BL2 functions
******************************************************************************/
void bl2_early_platform_setup2(u_register_t arg0, u_register_t arg1, u_register_t arg2, u_register_t arg3);
void bl2_plat_arch_setup(void);
void bl2_platform_setup(void);
struct meminfo *bl2_plat_sec_mem_layout(void);
Add new version of image loading. This patch adds capability to load BL images based on image descriptors instead of hard coded way of loading BL images. This framework is designed such that it can be readily adapted by any BL stage that needs to load images. In order to provide the above capability the following new platform functions are introduced: bl_load_info_t *plat_get_bl_image_load_info(void); This function returns pointer to the list of images that the platform has populated to load. bl_params_t *plat_get_next_bl_params(void); This function returns a pointer to the shared memory that the platform has kept aside to pass trusted firmware related information that next BL image needs. void plat_flush_next_bl_params(void); This function flushes to main memory all the params that are passed to next image. int bl2_plat_handle_post_image_load(unsigned int image_id) This function can be used by the platforms to update/use image information for given `image_id`. `desc_image_load.c` contains utility functions which can be used by the platforms to generate, load and executable, image list based on the registered image descriptors. This patch also adds new version of `load_image/load_auth_image` functions in-order to achieve the above capability. Following are the changes for the new version as compared to old: - Refactor the signature and only keep image_id and image_info_t arguments. Removed image_base argument as it is already passed through image_info_t. Given that the BL image base addresses and limit/size are already provided by the platforms, the meminfo_t and entry_point_info arguments are not needed to provide/reserve the extent of free memory for the given BL image. - Added check for the image size against the defined max size. This is needed because the image size could come from an unauthenticated source (e.g. the FIP header). To make this check, new member is added to the image_info_t struct for identifying the image maximum size. New flag `LOAD_IMAGE_V2` is added in the Makefile. Default value is 0. NOTE: `TRUSTED_BOARD_BOOT` is currently not supported when `LOAD_IMAGE_V2` is enabled. Change-Id: Ia7b643f4817a170d5a2fbf479b9bc12e63112e79
2016-09-12 16:08:41 +01:00
/*
* This function can be used by the platforms to update/use image
* information for given `image_id`.
*/
int bl2_plat_handle_pre_image_load(unsigned int image_id);
Add new version of image loading. This patch adds capability to load BL images based on image descriptors instead of hard coded way of loading BL images. This framework is designed such that it can be readily adapted by any BL stage that needs to load images. In order to provide the above capability the following new platform functions are introduced: bl_load_info_t *plat_get_bl_image_load_info(void); This function returns pointer to the list of images that the platform has populated to load. bl_params_t *plat_get_next_bl_params(void); This function returns a pointer to the shared memory that the platform has kept aside to pass trusted firmware related information that next BL image needs. void plat_flush_next_bl_params(void); This function flushes to main memory all the params that are passed to next image. int bl2_plat_handle_post_image_load(unsigned int image_id) This function can be used by the platforms to update/use image information for given `image_id`. `desc_image_load.c` contains utility functions which can be used by the platforms to generate, load and executable, image list based on the registered image descriptors. This patch also adds new version of `load_image/load_auth_image` functions in-order to achieve the above capability. Following are the changes for the new version as compared to old: - Refactor the signature and only keep image_id and image_info_t arguments. Removed image_base argument as it is already passed through image_info_t. Given that the BL image base addresses and limit/size are already provided by the platforms, the meminfo_t and entry_point_info arguments are not needed to provide/reserve the extent of free memory for the given BL image. - Added check for the image size against the defined max size. This is needed because the image size could come from an unauthenticated source (e.g. the FIP header). To make this check, new member is added to the image_info_t struct for identifying the image maximum size. New flag `LOAD_IMAGE_V2` is added in the Makefile. Default value is 0. NOTE: `TRUSTED_BOARD_BOOT` is currently not supported when `LOAD_IMAGE_V2` is enabled. Change-Id: Ia7b643f4817a170d5a2fbf479b9bc12e63112e79
2016-09-12 16:08:41 +01:00
int bl2_plat_handle_post_image_load(unsigned int image_id);
/*******************************************************************************
* Optional BL2 functions (may be overridden)
******************************************************************************/
#if MEASURED_BOOT
void bl2_plat_mboot_init(void);
void bl2_plat_mboot_finish(void);
#else
static inline void bl2_plat_mboot_init(void)
{
}
static inline void bl2_plat_mboot_finish(void)
{
}
#endif /* MEASURED_BOOT */
/*******************************************************************************
* Mandatory BL2 at EL3 functions: Must be implemented if BL2_AT_EL3 image is
* supported
******************************************************************************/
void bl2_el3_early_platform_setup(u_register_t arg0, u_register_t arg1,
u_register_t arg2, u_register_t arg3);
void bl2_el3_plat_arch_setup(void);
/*******************************************************************************
* Optional BL2 at EL3 functions (may be overridden)
******************************************************************************/
void bl2_el3_plat_prepare_exit(void);
/*******************************************************************************
* Mandatory BL2U functions.
******************************************************************************/
void bl2u_early_platform_setup(struct meminfo *mem_layout,
void *plat_info);
void bl2u_plat_arch_setup(void);
void bl2u_platform_setup(void);
/*******************************************************************************
* Conditionally mandatory BL2U functions for CSS platforms.
******************************************************************************/
/*
* This function is used to perform any platform-specific actions required to
* handle the BL2U_SCP firmware.
*/
int bl2u_plat_handle_scp_bl2u(void);
/*******************************************************************************
* Mandatory BL31 functions
******************************************************************************/
void bl31_early_platform_setup2(u_register_t arg0, u_register_t arg1,
u_register_t arg2, u_register_t arg3);
void bl31_plat_arch_setup(void);
void bl31_platform_setup(void);
void bl31_plat_runtime_setup(void);
struct entry_point_info *bl31_plat_get_next_image_ep_info(uint32_t type);
/*******************************************************************************
* Mandatory PSCI functions (BL31)
******************************************************************************/
int plat_setup_psci_ops(uintptr_t sec_entrypoint,
const struct plat_psci_ops **psci_ops);
const unsigned char *plat_get_power_domain_tree_desc(void);
/*******************************************************************************
* Optional PSCI functions (BL31).
******************************************************************************/
void plat_psci_stat_accounting_start(const psci_power_state_t *state_info);
void plat_psci_stat_accounting_stop(const psci_power_state_t *state_info);
u_register_t plat_psci_stat_get_residency(unsigned int lvl,
const psci_power_state_t *state_info,
unsigned int last_cpu_idx);
plat_local_state_t plat_get_target_pwr_state(unsigned int lvl,
const plat_local_state_t *states,
unsigned int ncpu);
/*******************************************************************************
* Mandatory BL31 functions when ENABLE_RME=1
******************************************************************************/
int plat_get_cca_attest_token(uintptr_t buf, size_t *len,
uintptr_t hash, size_t hash_size);
int plat_get_cca_realm_attest_key(uintptr_t buf, size_t *len,
unsigned int type);
/*******************************************************************************
* Optional BL31 functions (may be overridden)
******************************************************************************/
void bl31_plat_enable_mmu(uint32_t flags);
/*******************************************************************************
* Optional BL32 functions (may be overridden)
******************************************************************************/
void bl32_plat_enable_mmu(uint32_t flags);
/*******************************************************************************
* Trusted Board Boot functions
******************************************************************************/
int plat_get_rotpk_info(void *cookie, void **key_ptr, unsigned int *key_len,
unsigned int *flags);
TBB: add non-volatile counter support This patch adds support for non-volatile counter authentication to the Authentication Module. This method consists of matching the counter values provided in the certificates with the ones stored in the platform. If the value from the certificate is lower than the platform, the boot process is aborted. This mechanism protects the system against rollback. The TBBR CoT has been updated to include this method as part of the authentication process. Two counters are used: one for the trusted world images and another for the non trusted world images. ** NEW PLATFORM APIs (mandatory when TBB is enabled) ** int plat_get_nv_ctr(void *cookie, unsigned int *nv_ctr); This API returns the non-volatile counter value stored in the platform. The cookie in the first argument may be used to select the counter in case the platform provides more than one (i.e. TBSA compliant platforms must provide trusted and non-trusted counters). This cookie is specified in the CoT. int plat_set_nv_ctr(void *cookie, unsigned int nv_ctr); This API sets a new counter value. The cookie may be used to select the counter to be updated. An implementation of these new APIs for ARM platforms is also provided. The values are obtained from the Trusted Non-Volatile Counters peripheral. The cookie is used to pass the extension OID. This OID may be interpreted by the platform to know which counter must return. On Juno, The trusted and non-trusted counter values have been tied to 31 and 223, respectively, and cannot be modified. ** IMPORTANT ** THIS PATCH BREAKS THE BUILD WHEN TRUSTED_BOARD_BOOT IS ENABLED. THE NEW PLATFORM APIs INTRODUCED IN THIS PATCH MUST BE IMPLEMENTED IN ORDER TO SUCCESSFULLY BUILD TF. Change-Id: Ic943b76b25f2a37f490eaaab6d87b4a8b3cbc89a
2016-01-22 11:05:57 +00:00
int plat_get_nv_ctr(void *cookie, unsigned int *nv_ctr);
int plat_set_nv_ctr(void *cookie, unsigned int nv_ctr);
int plat_set_nv_ctr2(void *cookie, const struct auth_img_desc_s *img_desc,
unsigned int nv_ctr);
int get_mbedtls_heap_helper(void **heap_addr, size_t *heap_size);
int plat_get_enc_key_info(enum fw_enc_status_t fw_enc_status, uint8_t *key,
size_t *key_len, unsigned int *flags,
const uint8_t *img_id, size_t img_id_len);
SPM: Introduce Secure Partition Manager A Secure Partition is a software execution environment instantiated in S-EL0 that can be used to implement simple management and security services. Since S-EL0 is an unprivileged exception level, a Secure Partition relies on privileged firmware e.g. ARM Trusted Firmware to be granted access to system and processor resources. Essentially, it is a software sandbox that runs under the control of privileged software in the Secure World and accesses the following system resources: - Memory and device regions in the system address map. - PE system registers. - A range of asynchronous exceptions e.g. interrupts. - A range of synchronous exceptions e.g. SMC function identifiers. A Secure Partition enables privileged firmware to implement only the absolutely essential secure services in EL3 and instantiate the rest in a partition. Since the partition executes in S-EL0, its implementation cannot be overly complex. The component in ARM Trusted Firmware responsible for managing a Secure Partition is called the Secure Partition Manager (SPM). The SPM is responsible for the following: - Validating and allocating resources requested by a Secure Partition. - Implementing a well defined interface that is used for initialising a Secure Partition. - Implementing a well defined interface that is used by the normal world and other secure services for accessing the services exported by a Secure Partition. - Implementing a well defined interface that is used by a Secure Partition to fulfil service requests. - Instantiating the software execution environment required by a Secure Partition to fulfil a service request. Change-Id: I6f7862d6bba8732db5b73f54e789d717a35e802f Co-authored-by: Douglas Raillard <douglas.raillard@arm.com> Co-authored-by: Sandrine Bailleux <sandrine.bailleux@arm.com> Co-authored-by: Achin Gupta <achin.gupta@arm.com> Co-authored-by: Antonio Nino Diaz <antonio.ninodiaz@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Antonio Nino Diaz <antonio.ninodiaz@arm.com>
2017-10-24 10:07:35 +01:00
/*******************************************************************************
* Secure Partitions functions
******************************************************************************/
const struct mmap_region *plat_get_secure_partition_mmap(void *cookie);
const struct spm_mm_boot_info *plat_get_secure_partition_boot_info(
SPM: Introduce Secure Partition Manager A Secure Partition is a software execution environment instantiated in S-EL0 that can be used to implement simple management and security services. Since S-EL0 is an unprivileged exception level, a Secure Partition relies on privileged firmware e.g. ARM Trusted Firmware to be granted access to system and processor resources. Essentially, it is a software sandbox that runs under the control of privileged software in the Secure World and accesses the following system resources: - Memory and device regions in the system address map. - PE system registers. - A range of asynchronous exceptions e.g. interrupts. - A range of synchronous exceptions e.g. SMC function identifiers. A Secure Partition enables privileged firmware to implement only the absolutely essential secure services in EL3 and instantiate the rest in a partition. Since the partition executes in S-EL0, its implementation cannot be overly complex. The component in ARM Trusted Firmware responsible for managing a Secure Partition is called the Secure Partition Manager (SPM). The SPM is responsible for the following: - Validating and allocating resources requested by a Secure Partition. - Implementing a well defined interface that is used for initialising a Secure Partition. - Implementing a well defined interface that is used by the normal world and other secure services for accessing the services exported by a Secure Partition. - Implementing a well defined interface that is used by a Secure Partition to fulfil service requests. - Instantiating the software execution environment required by a Secure Partition to fulfil a service request. Change-Id: I6f7862d6bba8732db5b73f54e789d717a35e802f Co-authored-by: Douglas Raillard <douglas.raillard@arm.com> Co-authored-by: Sandrine Bailleux <sandrine.bailleux@arm.com> Co-authored-by: Achin Gupta <achin.gupta@arm.com> Co-authored-by: Antonio Nino Diaz <antonio.ninodiaz@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Antonio Nino Diaz <antonio.ninodiaz@arm.com>
2017-10-24 10:07:35 +01:00
void *cookie);
int plat_spm_sp_rd_load(struct sp_res_desc *rd, const void *ptr, size_t size);
int plat_spm_sp_get_next_address(void **sp_base, size_t *sp_size,
void **rd_base, size_t *rd_size);
#if defined(SPD_spmd)
int plat_spm_core_manifest_load(spmc_manifest_attribute_t *manifest,
const void *pm_addr);
#endif
#if defined(SPMC_AT_EL3)
int plat_spmc_shmem_datastore_get(uint8_t **datastore, size_t *size);
#endif
Add new version of image loading. This patch adds capability to load BL images based on image descriptors instead of hard coded way of loading BL images. This framework is designed such that it can be readily adapted by any BL stage that needs to load images. In order to provide the above capability the following new platform functions are introduced: bl_load_info_t *plat_get_bl_image_load_info(void); This function returns pointer to the list of images that the platform has populated to load. bl_params_t *plat_get_next_bl_params(void); This function returns a pointer to the shared memory that the platform has kept aside to pass trusted firmware related information that next BL image needs. void plat_flush_next_bl_params(void); This function flushes to main memory all the params that are passed to next image. int bl2_plat_handle_post_image_load(unsigned int image_id) This function can be used by the platforms to update/use image information for given `image_id`. `desc_image_load.c` contains utility functions which can be used by the platforms to generate, load and executable, image list based on the registered image descriptors. This patch also adds new version of `load_image/load_auth_image` functions in-order to achieve the above capability. Following are the changes for the new version as compared to old: - Refactor the signature and only keep image_id and image_info_t arguments. Removed image_base argument as it is already passed through image_info_t. Given that the BL image base addresses and limit/size are already provided by the platforms, the meminfo_t and entry_point_info arguments are not needed to provide/reserve the extent of free memory for the given BL image. - Added check for the image size against the defined max size. This is needed because the image size could come from an unauthenticated source (e.g. the FIP header). To make this check, new member is added to the image_info_t struct for identifying the image maximum size. New flag `LOAD_IMAGE_V2` is added in the Makefile. Default value is 0. NOTE: `TRUSTED_BOARD_BOOT` is currently not supported when `LOAD_IMAGE_V2` is enabled. Change-Id: Ia7b643f4817a170d5a2fbf479b9bc12e63112e79
2016-09-12 16:08:41 +01:00
/*******************************************************************************
* Mandatory BL image load functions(may be overridden).
******************************************************************************/
/*
* This function returns pointer to the list of images that the
* platform has populated to load.
*/
struct bl_load_info *plat_get_bl_image_load_info(void);
/*
* This function returns a pointer to the shared memory that the
* platform has kept aside to pass trusted firmware related
* information that next BL image could need.
*/
struct bl_params *plat_get_next_bl_params(void);
/*
* This function flushes to main memory all the params that are
* passed to next image.
*/
void plat_flush_next_bl_params(void);
/*
* The below function enable Trusted Firmware components like SPDs which
* haven't migrated to the new platform API to compile on platforms which
* have the compatibility layer disabled.
*/
unsigned int platform_core_pos_helper(unsigned long mpidr);
/*
* Optional function to get SOC version
*/
int32_t plat_get_soc_version(void);
/*
* Optional function to get SOC revision
*/
int32_t plat_get_soc_revision(void);
/*
* Optional function to check for SMCCC function availability for platform
*/
int32_t plat_is_smccc_feature_available(u_register_t fid);
/*******************************************************************************
* FWU platform specific functions
******************************************************************************/
int plat_fwu_set_metadata_image_source(unsigned int image_id,
uintptr_t *dev_handle,
uintptr_t *image_spec);
void plat_fwu_set_images_source(const struct fwu_metadata *metadata);
uint32_t plat_fwu_get_boot_idx(void);
#endif /* PLATFORM_H */