arm-trusted-firmware/include/lib/aarch64/arch.h

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/*
Report errata workaround status to console The errata reporting policy is as follows: - If an errata workaround is enabled: - If it applies (i.e. the CPU is affected by the errata), an INFO message is printed, confirming that the errata workaround has been applied. - If it does not apply, a VERBOSE message is printed, confirming that the errata workaround has been skipped. - If an errata workaround is not enabled, but would have applied had it been, a WARN message is printed, alerting that errata workaround is missing. The CPU errata messages are printed by both BL1 (primary CPU only) and runtime firmware on debug builds, once for each CPU/errata combination. Relevant output from Juno r1 console when ARM Trusted Firmware is built with PLAT=juno LOG_LEVEL=50 DEBUG=1: VERBOSE: BL1: cortex_a57: errata workaround for 806969 was not applied VERBOSE: BL1: cortex_a57: errata workaround for 813420 was not applied INFO: BL1: cortex_a57: errata workaround for disable_ldnp_overread was applied WARNING: BL1: cortex_a57: errata workaround for 826974 was missing! WARNING: BL1: cortex_a57: errata workaround for 826977 was missing! WARNING: BL1: cortex_a57: errata workaround for 828024 was missing! WARNING: BL1: cortex_a57: errata workaround for 829520 was missing! WARNING: BL1: cortex_a57: errata workaround for 833471 was missing! ... VERBOSE: BL31: cortex_a57: errata workaround for 806969 was not applied VERBOSE: BL31: cortex_a57: errata workaround for 813420 was not applied INFO: BL31: cortex_a57: errata workaround for disable_ldnp_overread was applied WARNING: BL31: cortex_a57: errata workaround for 826974 was missing! WARNING: BL31: cortex_a57: errata workaround for 826977 was missing! WARNING: BL31: cortex_a57: errata workaround for 828024 was missing! WARNING: BL31: cortex_a57: errata workaround for 829520 was missing! WARNING: BL31: cortex_a57: errata workaround for 833471 was missing! ... VERBOSE: BL31: cortex_a53: errata workaround for 826319 was not applied INFO: BL31: cortex_a53: errata workaround for disable_non_temporal_hint was applied Also update documentation. Change-Id: Iccf059d3348adb876ca121cdf5207bdbbacf2aba Signed-off-by: Jeenu Viswambharan <jeenu.viswambharan@arm.com>
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* Copyright (c) 2013-2017, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
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*
* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
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*/
#ifndef __ARCH_H__
#define __ARCH_H__
#include <utils_def.h>
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/*******************************************************************************
* MIDR bit definitions
******************************************************************************/
#define MIDR_IMPL_MASK U(0xff)
#define MIDR_IMPL_SHIFT U(0x18)
#define MIDR_VAR_SHIFT U(20)
#define MIDR_VAR_BITS U(4)
#define MIDR_VAR_MASK U(0xf)
#define MIDR_REV_SHIFT U(0)
#define MIDR_REV_BITS U(4)
#define MIDR_REV_MASK U(0xf)
#define MIDR_PN_MASK U(0xfff)
#define MIDR_PN_SHIFT U(0x4)
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/*******************************************************************************
* MPIDR macros
******************************************************************************/
#define MPIDR_MT_MASK (U(1) << 24)
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#define MPIDR_CPU_MASK MPIDR_AFFLVL_MASK
#define MPIDR_CLUSTER_MASK (MPIDR_AFFLVL_MASK << MPIDR_AFFINITY_BITS)
#define MPIDR_AFFINITY_BITS U(8)
#define MPIDR_AFFLVL_MASK U(0xff)
#define MPIDR_AFF0_SHIFT U(0)
#define MPIDR_AFF1_SHIFT U(8)
#define MPIDR_AFF2_SHIFT U(16)
#define MPIDR_AFF3_SHIFT U(32)
#define MPIDR_AFFINITY_MASK U(0xff00ffffff)
#define MPIDR_AFFLVL_SHIFT U(3)
#define MPIDR_AFFLVL0 U(0)
#define MPIDR_AFFLVL1 U(1)
#define MPIDR_AFFLVL2 U(2)
#define MPIDR_AFFLVL3 U(3)
#define MPIDR_AFFLVL0_VAL(mpidr) \
((mpidr >> MPIDR_AFF0_SHIFT) & MPIDR_AFFLVL_MASK)
#define MPIDR_AFFLVL1_VAL(mpidr) \
((mpidr >> MPIDR_AFF1_SHIFT) & MPIDR_AFFLVL_MASK)
#define MPIDR_AFFLVL2_VAL(mpidr) \
((mpidr >> MPIDR_AFF2_SHIFT) & MPIDR_AFFLVL_MASK)
#define MPIDR_AFFLVL3_VAL(mpidr) \
((mpidr >> MPIDR_AFF3_SHIFT) & MPIDR_AFFLVL_MASK)
/*
* The MPIDR_MAX_AFFLVL count starts from 0. Take care to
* add one while using this macro to define array sizes.
* TODO: Support only the first 3 affinity levels for now.
*/
#define MPIDR_MAX_AFFLVL U(2)
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/* Constant to highlight the assumption that MPIDR allocation starts from 0 */
#define FIRST_MPIDR U(0)
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/*******************************************************************************
* Definitions for CPU system register interface to GICv3
******************************************************************************/
#define ICC_SRE_EL1 S3_0_C12_C12_5
#define ICC_SRE_EL2 S3_4_C12_C9_5
#define ICC_SRE_EL3 S3_6_C12_C12_5
#define ICC_CTLR_EL1 S3_0_C12_C12_4
#define ICC_CTLR_EL3 S3_6_C12_C12_4
#define ICC_PMR_EL1 S3_0_C4_C6_0
#define ICC_RPR_EL1 S3_0_C12_C11_3
#define ICC_IGRPEN1_EL3 S3_6_c12_c12_7
#define ICC_IGRPEN0_EL1 S3_0_c12_c12_6
#define ICC_HPPIR0_EL1 S3_0_c12_c8_2
#define ICC_HPPIR1_EL1 S3_0_c12_c12_2
#define ICC_IAR0_EL1 S3_0_c12_c8_0
#define ICC_IAR1_EL1 S3_0_c12_c12_0
#define ICC_EOIR0_EL1 S3_0_c12_c8_1
#define ICC_EOIR1_EL1 S3_0_c12_c12_1
#define ICC_SGI0R_EL1 S3_0_c12_c11_7
/*******************************************************************************
* Generic timer memory mapped registers & offsets
******************************************************************************/
#define CNTCR_OFF U(0x000)
#define CNTFID_OFF U(0x020)
#define CNTCR_EN (U(1) << 0)
#define CNTCR_HDBG (U(1) << 1)
#define CNTCR_FCREQ(x) ((x) << 8)
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/*******************************************************************************
* System register bit definitions
******************************************************************************/
/* CLIDR definitions */
#define LOUIS_SHIFT U(21)
#define LOC_SHIFT U(24)
#define CLIDR_FIELD_WIDTH U(3)
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/* CSSELR definitions */
#define LEVEL_SHIFT U(1)
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/* D$ set/way op type defines */
#define DCISW U(0x0)
#define DCCISW U(0x1)
#define DCCSW U(0x2)
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/* ID_AA64PFR0_EL1 definitions */
#define ID_AA64PFR0_EL0_SHIFT U(0)
#define ID_AA64PFR0_EL1_SHIFT U(4)
#define ID_AA64PFR0_EL2_SHIFT U(8)
#define ID_AA64PFR0_EL3_SHIFT U(12)
#define ID_AA64PFR0_AMU_SHIFT U(44)
#define ID_AA64PFR0_AMU_LENGTH U(4)
#define ID_AA64PFR0_AMU_MASK U(0xf)
#define ID_AA64PFR0_ELX_MASK U(0xf)
#define ID_AA64PFR0_SVE_SHIFT U(32)
#define ID_AA64PFR0_SVE_MASK U(0xf)
#define ID_AA64PFR0_SVE_LENGTH U(4)
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/* ID_AA64DFR0_EL1.PMS definitions (for ARMv8.2+) */
#define ID_AA64DFR0_PMS_SHIFT U(32)
#define ID_AA64DFR0_PMS_LENGTH U(4)
#define ID_AA64DFR0_PMS_MASK U(0xf)
#define EL_IMPL_NONE U(0)
#define EL_IMPL_A64ONLY U(1)
#define EL_IMPL_A64_A32 U(2)
#define ID_AA64PFR0_GIC_SHIFT U(24)
#define ID_AA64PFR0_GIC_WIDTH U(4)
#define ID_AA64PFR0_GIC_MASK ((U(1) << ID_AA64PFR0_GIC_WIDTH) - 1)
/* ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1 definitions */
SPM: Introduce Secure Partition Manager A Secure Partition is a software execution environment instantiated in S-EL0 that can be used to implement simple management and security services. Since S-EL0 is an unprivileged exception level, a Secure Partition relies on privileged firmware e.g. ARM Trusted Firmware to be granted access to system and processor resources. Essentially, it is a software sandbox that runs under the control of privileged software in the Secure World and accesses the following system resources: - Memory and device regions in the system address map. - PE system registers. - A range of asynchronous exceptions e.g. interrupts. - A range of synchronous exceptions e.g. SMC function identifiers. A Secure Partition enables privileged firmware to implement only the absolutely essential secure services in EL3 and instantiate the rest in a partition. Since the partition executes in S-EL0, its implementation cannot be overly complex. The component in ARM Trusted Firmware responsible for managing a Secure Partition is called the Secure Partition Manager (SPM). The SPM is responsible for the following: - Validating and allocating resources requested by a Secure Partition. - Implementing a well defined interface that is used for initialising a Secure Partition. - Implementing a well defined interface that is used by the normal world and other secure services for accessing the services exported by a Secure Partition. - Implementing a well defined interface that is used by a Secure Partition to fulfil service requests. - Instantiating the software execution environment required by a Secure Partition to fulfil a service request. Change-Id: I6f7862d6bba8732db5b73f54e789d717a35e802f Co-authored-by: Douglas Raillard <douglas.raillard@arm.com> Co-authored-by: Sandrine Bailleux <sandrine.bailleux@arm.com> Co-authored-by: Achin Gupta <achin.gupta@arm.com> Co-authored-by: Antonio Nino Diaz <antonio.ninodiaz@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Antonio Nino Diaz <antonio.ninodiaz@arm.com>
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#define ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1_PARANGE_SHIFT U(0)
#define ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1_PARANGE_MASK U(0xf)
#define PARANGE_0000 U(32)
#define PARANGE_0001 U(36)
#define PARANGE_0010 U(40)
#define PARANGE_0011 U(42)
#define PARANGE_0100 U(44)
#define PARANGE_0101 U(48)
#define PARANGE_0110 U(52)
SPM: Introduce Secure Partition Manager A Secure Partition is a software execution environment instantiated in S-EL0 that can be used to implement simple management and security services. Since S-EL0 is an unprivileged exception level, a Secure Partition relies on privileged firmware e.g. ARM Trusted Firmware to be granted access to system and processor resources. Essentially, it is a software sandbox that runs under the control of privileged software in the Secure World and accesses the following system resources: - Memory and device regions in the system address map. - PE system registers. - A range of asynchronous exceptions e.g. interrupts. - A range of synchronous exceptions e.g. SMC function identifiers. A Secure Partition enables privileged firmware to implement only the absolutely essential secure services in EL3 and instantiate the rest in a partition. Since the partition executes in S-EL0, its implementation cannot be overly complex. The component in ARM Trusted Firmware responsible for managing a Secure Partition is called the Secure Partition Manager (SPM). The SPM is responsible for the following: - Validating and allocating resources requested by a Secure Partition. - Implementing a well defined interface that is used for initialising a Secure Partition. - Implementing a well defined interface that is used by the normal world and other secure services for accessing the services exported by a Secure Partition. - Implementing a well defined interface that is used by a Secure Partition to fulfil service requests. - Instantiating the software execution environment required by a Secure Partition to fulfil a service request. Change-Id: I6f7862d6bba8732db5b73f54e789d717a35e802f Co-authored-by: Douglas Raillard <douglas.raillard@arm.com> Co-authored-by: Sandrine Bailleux <sandrine.bailleux@arm.com> Co-authored-by: Achin Gupta <achin.gupta@arm.com> Co-authored-by: Antonio Nino Diaz <antonio.ninodiaz@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Antonio Nino Diaz <antonio.ninodiaz@arm.com>
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#define ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1_TGRAN4_SHIFT U(28)
#define ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1_TGRAN4_MASK U(0xf)
#define ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1_TGRAN4_SUPPORTED U(0x0)
#define ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1_TGRAN4_NOT_SUPPORTED U(0xf)
#define ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1_TGRAN64_SHIFT U(24)
#define ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1_TGRAN64_MASK U(0xf)
#define ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1_TGRAN64_SUPPORTED U(0x0)
#define ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1_TGRAN64_NOT_SUPPORTED U(0xf)
#define ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1_TGRAN16_SHIFT U(20)
#define ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1_TGRAN16_MASK U(0xf)
#define ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1_TGRAN16_SUPPORTED U(0x1)
#define ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1_TGRAN16_NOT_SUPPORTED U(0x0)
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/* ID_PFR1_EL1 definitions */
#define ID_PFR1_VIRTEXT_SHIFT U(12)
#define ID_PFR1_VIRTEXT_MASK U(0xf)
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#define GET_VIRT_EXT(id) ((id >> ID_PFR1_VIRTEXT_SHIFT) \
& ID_PFR1_VIRTEXT_MASK)
/* SCTLR definitions */
#define SCTLR_EL2_RES1 ((U(1) << 29) | (U(1) << 28) | (U(1) << 23) | \
(U(1) << 22) | (U(1) << 18) | (U(1) << 16) | \
(U(1) << 11) | (U(1) << 5) | (U(1) << 4))
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#define SCTLR_EL1_RES1 ((U(1) << 29) | (U(1) << 28) | (U(1) << 23) | \
(U(1) << 22) | (U(1) << 20) | (U(1) << 11))
#define SCTLR_AARCH32_EL1_RES1 \
((U(1) << 23) | (U(1) << 22) | (U(1) << 11) | \
(U(1) << 4) | (U(1) << 3))
#define SCTLR_EL3_RES1 ((U(1) << 29) | (U(1) << 28) | (U(1) << 23) | \
(U(1) << 22) | (U(1) << 18) | (U(1) << 16) | \
(U(1) << 11) | (U(1) << 5) | (U(1) << 4))
#define SCTLR_M_BIT (U(1) << 0)
#define SCTLR_A_BIT (U(1) << 1)
#define SCTLR_C_BIT (U(1) << 2)
#define SCTLR_SA_BIT (U(1) << 3)
SPM: Introduce Secure Partition Manager A Secure Partition is a software execution environment instantiated in S-EL0 that can be used to implement simple management and security services. Since S-EL0 is an unprivileged exception level, a Secure Partition relies on privileged firmware e.g. ARM Trusted Firmware to be granted access to system and processor resources. Essentially, it is a software sandbox that runs under the control of privileged software in the Secure World and accesses the following system resources: - Memory and device regions in the system address map. - PE system registers. - A range of asynchronous exceptions e.g. interrupts. - A range of synchronous exceptions e.g. SMC function identifiers. A Secure Partition enables privileged firmware to implement only the absolutely essential secure services in EL3 and instantiate the rest in a partition. Since the partition executes in S-EL0, its implementation cannot be overly complex. The component in ARM Trusted Firmware responsible for managing a Secure Partition is called the Secure Partition Manager (SPM). The SPM is responsible for the following: - Validating and allocating resources requested by a Secure Partition. - Implementing a well defined interface that is used for initialising a Secure Partition. - Implementing a well defined interface that is used by the normal world and other secure services for accessing the services exported by a Secure Partition. - Implementing a well defined interface that is used by a Secure Partition to fulfil service requests. - Instantiating the software execution environment required by a Secure Partition to fulfil a service request. Change-Id: I6f7862d6bba8732db5b73f54e789d717a35e802f Co-authored-by: Douglas Raillard <douglas.raillard@arm.com> Co-authored-by: Sandrine Bailleux <sandrine.bailleux@arm.com> Co-authored-by: Achin Gupta <achin.gupta@arm.com> Co-authored-by: Antonio Nino Diaz <antonio.ninodiaz@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Antonio Nino Diaz <antonio.ninodiaz@arm.com>
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#define SCTLR_SA0_BIT (U(1) << 4)
#define SCTLR_CP15BEN_BIT (U(1) << 5)
SPM: Introduce Secure Partition Manager A Secure Partition is a software execution environment instantiated in S-EL0 that can be used to implement simple management and security services. Since S-EL0 is an unprivileged exception level, a Secure Partition relies on privileged firmware e.g. ARM Trusted Firmware to be granted access to system and processor resources. Essentially, it is a software sandbox that runs under the control of privileged software in the Secure World and accesses the following system resources: - Memory and device regions in the system address map. - PE system registers. - A range of asynchronous exceptions e.g. interrupts. - A range of synchronous exceptions e.g. SMC function identifiers. A Secure Partition enables privileged firmware to implement only the absolutely essential secure services in EL3 and instantiate the rest in a partition. Since the partition executes in S-EL0, its implementation cannot be overly complex. The component in ARM Trusted Firmware responsible for managing a Secure Partition is called the Secure Partition Manager (SPM). The SPM is responsible for the following: - Validating and allocating resources requested by a Secure Partition. - Implementing a well defined interface that is used for initialising a Secure Partition. - Implementing a well defined interface that is used by the normal world and other secure services for accessing the services exported by a Secure Partition. - Implementing a well defined interface that is used by a Secure Partition to fulfil service requests. - Instantiating the software execution environment required by a Secure Partition to fulfil a service request. Change-Id: I6f7862d6bba8732db5b73f54e789d717a35e802f Co-authored-by: Douglas Raillard <douglas.raillard@arm.com> Co-authored-by: Sandrine Bailleux <sandrine.bailleux@arm.com> Co-authored-by: Achin Gupta <achin.gupta@arm.com> Co-authored-by: Antonio Nino Diaz <antonio.ninodiaz@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Antonio Nino Diaz <antonio.ninodiaz@arm.com>
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#define SCTLR_ITD_BIT (U(1) << 7)
#define SCTLR_SED_BIT (U(1) << 8)
#define SCTLR_UMA_BIT (U(1) << 9)
#define SCTLR_I_BIT (U(1) << 12)
SPM: Introduce Secure Partition Manager A Secure Partition is a software execution environment instantiated in S-EL0 that can be used to implement simple management and security services. Since S-EL0 is an unprivileged exception level, a Secure Partition relies on privileged firmware e.g. ARM Trusted Firmware to be granted access to system and processor resources. Essentially, it is a software sandbox that runs under the control of privileged software in the Secure World and accesses the following system resources: - Memory and device regions in the system address map. - PE system registers. - A range of asynchronous exceptions e.g. interrupts. - A range of synchronous exceptions e.g. SMC function identifiers. A Secure Partition enables privileged firmware to implement only the absolutely essential secure services in EL3 and instantiate the rest in a partition. Since the partition executes in S-EL0, its implementation cannot be overly complex. The component in ARM Trusted Firmware responsible for managing a Secure Partition is called the Secure Partition Manager (SPM). The SPM is responsible for the following: - Validating and allocating resources requested by a Secure Partition. - Implementing a well defined interface that is used for initialising a Secure Partition. - Implementing a well defined interface that is used by the normal world and other secure services for accessing the services exported by a Secure Partition. - Implementing a well defined interface that is used by a Secure Partition to fulfil service requests. - Instantiating the software execution environment required by a Secure Partition to fulfil a service request. Change-Id: I6f7862d6bba8732db5b73f54e789d717a35e802f Co-authored-by: Douglas Raillard <douglas.raillard@arm.com> Co-authored-by: Sandrine Bailleux <sandrine.bailleux@arm.com> Co-authored-by: Achin Gupta <achin.gupta@arm.com> Co-authored-by: Antonio Nino Diaz <antonio.ninodiaz@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Antonio Nino Diaz <antonio.ninodiaz@arm.com>
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#define SCTLR_V_BIT (U(1) << 13)
#define SCTLR_DZE_BIT (U(1) << 14)
#define SCTLR_UCT_BIT (U(1) << 15)
#define SCTLR_NTWI_BIT (U(1) << 16)
#define SCTLR_NTWE_BIT (U(1) << 18)
#define SCTLR_WXN_BIT (U(1) << 19)
SPM: Introduce Secure Partition Manager A Secure Partition is a software execution environment instantiated in S-EL0 that can be used to implement simple management and security services. Since S-EL0 is an unprivileged exception level, a Secure Partition relies on privileged firmware e.g. ARM Trusted Firmware to be granted access to system and processor resources. Essentially, it is a software sandbox that runs under the control of privileged software in the Secure World and accesses the following system resources: - Memory and device regions in the system address map. - PE system registers. - A range of asynchronous exceptions e.g. interrupts. - A range of synchronous exceptions e.g. SMC function identifiers. A Secure Partition enables privileged firmware to implement only the absolutely essential secure services in EL3 and instantiate the rest in a partition. Since the partition executes in S-EL0, its implementation cannot be overly complex. The component in ARM Trusted Firmware responsible for managing a Secure Partition is called the Secure Partition Manager (SPM). The SPM is responsible for the following: - Validating and allocating resources requested by a Secure Partition. - Implementing a well defined interface that is used for initialising a Secure Partition. - Implementing a well defined interface that is used by the normal world and other secure services for accessing the services exported by a Secure Partition. - Implementing a well defined interface that is used by a Secure Partition to fulfil service requests. - Instantiating the software execution environment required by a Secure Partition to fulfil a service request. Change-Id: I6f7862d6bba8732db5b73f54e789d717a35e802f Co-authored-by: Douglas Raillard <douglas.raillard@arm.com> Co-authored-by: Sandrine Bailleux <sandrine.bailleux@arm.com> Co-authored-by: Achin Gupta <achin.gupta@arm.com> Co-authored-by: Antonio Nino Diaz <antonio.ninodiaz@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Antonio Nino Diaz <antonio.ninodiaz@arm.com>
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#define SCTLR_UWXN_BIT (U(1) << 20)
#define SCTLR_E0E_BIT (U(1) << 24)
#define SCTLR_EE_BIT (U(1) << 25)
SPM: Introduce Secure Partition Manager A Secure Partition is a software execution environment instantiated in S-EL0 that can be used to implement simple management and security services. Since S-EL0 is an unprivileged exception level, a Secure Partition relies on privileged firmware e.g. ARM Trusted Firmware to be granted access to system and processor resources. Essentially, it is a software sandbox that runs under the control of privileged software in the Secure World and accesses the following system resources: - Memory and device regions in the system address map. - PE system registers. - A range of asynchronous exceptions e.g. interrupts. - A range of synchronous exceptions e.g. SMC function identifiers. A Secure Partition enables privileged firmware to implement only the absolutely essential secure services in EL3 and instantiate the rest in a partition. Since the partition executes in S-EL0, its implementation cannot be overly complex. The component in ARM Trusted Firmware responsible for managing a Secure Partition is called the Secure Partition Manager (SPM). The SPM is responsible for the following: - Validating and allocating resources requested by a Secure Partition. - Implementing a well defined interface that is used for initialising a Secure Partition. - Implementing a well defined interface that is used by the normal world and other secure services for accessing the services exported by a Secure Partition. - Implementing a well defined interface that is used by a Secure Partition to fulfil service requests. - Instantiating the software execution environment required by a Secure Partition to fulfil a service request. Change-Id: I6f7862d6bba8732db5b73f54e789d717a35e802f Co-authored-by: Douglas Raillard <douglas.raillard@arm.com> Co-authored-by: Sandrine Bailleux <sandrine.bailleux@arm.com> Co-authored-by: Achin Gupta <achin.gupta@arm.com> Co-authored-by: Antonio Nino Diaz <antonio.ninodiaz@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Antonio Nino Diaz <antonio.ninodiaz@arm.com>
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#define SCTLR_UCI_BIT (U(1) << 26)
#define SCTLR_TRE_BIT (U(1) << 28)
#define SCTLR_AFE_BIT (U(1) << 29)
#define SCTLR_TE_BIT (U(1) << 30)
#define SCTLR_RESET_VAL SCTLR_EL3_RES1
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/* CPACR_El1 definitions */
#define CPACR_EL1_FPEN(x) ((x) << 20)
#define CPACR_EL1_FP_TRAP_EL0 U(0x1)
#define CPACR_EL1_FP_TRAP_ALL U(0x2)
#define CPACR_EL1_FP_TRAP_NONE U(0x3)
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/* SCR definitions */
#define SCR_RES1_BITS ((U(1) << 4) | (U(1) << 5))
#define SCR_TWE_BIT (U(1) << 13)
#define SCR_TWI_BIT (U(1) << 12)
#define SCR_ST_BIT (U(1) << 11)
#define SCR_RW_BIT (U(1) << 10)
#define SCR_SIF_BIT (U(1) << 9)
#define SCR_HCE_BIT (U(1) << 8)
#define SCR_SMD_BIT (U(1) << 7)
#define SCR_EA_BIT (U(1) << 3)
#define SCR_FIQ_BIT (U(1) << 2)
#define SCR_IRQ_BIT (U(1) << 1)
#define SCR_NS_BIT (U(1) << 0)
#define SCR_VALID_BIT_MASK U(0x2f8f)
#define SCR_RESET_VAL SCR_RES1_BITS
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/* MDCR_EL3 definitions */
#define MDCR_SPD32(x) ((x) << 14)
#define MDCR_SPD32_LEGACY U(0x0)
#define MDCR_SPD32_DISABLE U(0x2)
#define MDCR_SPD32_ENABLE U(0x3)
#define MDCR_SDD_BIT (U(1) << 16)
#define MDCR_NSPB(x) ((x) << 12)
#define MDCR_NSPB_EL1 U(0x3)
#define MDCR_TDOSA_BIT (U(1) << 10)
#define MDCR_TDA_BIT (U(1) << 9)
#define MDCR_TPM_BIT (U(1) << 6)
#define MDCR_EL3_RESET_VAL U(0x0)
#if !ERROR_DEPRECATED
#define MDCR_DEF_VAL (MDCR_SDD_BIT | MDCR_SPD32(MDCR_SPD32_DISABLE))
#endif
/* MDCR_EL2 definitions */
#define MDCR_EL2_TPMS (U(1) << 14)
#define MDCR_EL2_E2PB(x) ((x) << 12)
#define MDCR_EL2_E2PB_EL1 U(0x3)
#define MDCR_EL2_TDRA_BIT (U(1) << 11)
#define MDCR_EL2_TDOSA_BIT (U(1) << 10)
#define MDCR_EL2_TDA_BIT (U(1) << 9)
#define MDCR_EL2_TDE_BIT (U(1) << 8)
#define MDCR_EL2_HPME_BIT (U(1) << 7)
#define MDCR_EL2_TPM_BIT (U(1) << 6)
#define MDCR_EL2_TPMCR_BIT (U(1) << 5)
#define MDCR_EL2_RESET_VAL U(0x0)
/* HSTR_EL2 definitions */
#define HSTR_EL2_RESET_VAL U(0x0)
#define HSTR_EL2_T_MASK U(0xff)
/* CNTHP_CTL_EL2 definitions */
#define CNTHP_CTL_ENABLE_BIT (U(1) << 0)
#define CNTHP_CTL_RESET_VAL U(0x0)
/* VTTBR_EL2 definitions */
#define VTTBR_RESET_VAL ULL(0x0)
#define VTTBR_VMID_MASK ULL(0xff)
#define VTTBR_VMID_SHIFT U(48)
#define VTTBR_BADDR_MASK ULL(0xffffffffffff)
#define VTTBR_BADDR_SHIFT U(0)
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/* HCR definitions */
#define HCR_RW_SHIFT U(31)
#define HCR_RW_BIT (ULL(1) << HCR_RW_SHIFT)
#define HCR_AMO_BIT (U(1) << 5)
#define HCR_IMO_BIT (U(1) << 4)
#define HCR_FMO_BIT (U(1) << 3)
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/* ISR definitions */
#define ISR_A_SHIFT U(8)
#define ISR_I_SHIFT U(7)
#define ISR_F_SHIFT U(6)
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/* CNTHCTL_EL2 definitions */
#define CNTHCTL_RESET_VAL U(0x0)
#define EVNTEN_BIT (U(1) << 2)
#define EL1PCEN_BIT (U(1) << 1)
#define EL1PCTEN_BIT (U(1) << 0)
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/* CNTKCTL_EL1 definitions */
#define EL0PTEN_BIT (U(1) << 9)
#define EL0VTEN_BIT (U(1) << 8)
#define EL0PCTEN_BIT (U(1) << 0)
#define EL0VCTEN_BIT (U(1) << 1)
#define EVNTEN_BIT (U(1) << 2)
#define EVNTDIR_BIT (U(1) << 3)
#define EVNTI_SHIFT U(4)
#define EVNTI_MASK U(0xf)
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/* CPTR_EL3 definitions */
#define TCPAC_BIT (U(1) << 31)
#define TAM_BIT (U(1) << 30)
#define TTA_BIT (U(1) << 20)
#define TFP_BIT (U(1) << 10)
#define CPTR_EZ_BIT (U(1) << 8)
#define CPTR_EL3_RESET_VAL U(0x0)
/* CPTR_EL2 definitions */
#define CPTR_EL2_RES1 ((U(1) << 13) | (U(1) << 12) | (U(0x3ff)))
#define CPTR_EL2_TCPAC_BIT (U(1) << 31)
#define CPTR_EL2_TAM_BIT (U(1) << 30)
#define CPTR_EL2_TTA_BIT (U(1) << 20)
#define CPTR_EL2_TFP_BIT (U(1) << 10)
#define CPTR_EL2_TZ_BIT (U(1) << 8)
#define CPTR_EL2_RESET_VAL CPTR_EL2_RES1
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/* CPSR/SPSR definitions */
#define DAIF_FIQ_BIT (U(1) << 0)
#define DAIF_IRQ_BIT (U(1) << 1)
#define DAIF_ABT_BIT (U(1) << 2)
#define DAIF_DBG_BIT (U(1) << 3)
#define SPSR_DAIF_SHIFT U(6)
#define SPSR_DAIF_MASK U(0xf)
#define SPSR_AIF_SHIFT U(6)
#define SPSR_AIF_MASK U(0x7)
#define SPSR_E_SHIFT U(9)
#define SPSR_E_MASK U(0x1)
#define SPSR_E_LITTLE U(0x0)
#define SPSR_E_BIG U(0x1)
#define SPSR_T_SHIFT U(5)
#define SPSR_T_MASK U(0x1)
#define SPSR_T_ARM U(0x0)
#define SPSR_T_THUMB U(0x1)
#define DISABLE_ALL_EXCEPTIONS \
(DAIF_FIQ_BIT | DAIF_IRQ_BIT | DAIF_ABT_BIT | DAIF_DBG_BIT)
/*
* RMR_EL3 definitions
*/
#define RMR_EL3_RR_BIT (U(1) << 1)
#define RMR_EL3_AA64_BIT (U(1) << 0)
/*
* HI-VECTOR address for AArch32 state
*/
#define HI_VECTOR_BASE U(0xFFFF0000)
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/*
* TCR defintions
*/
#define TCR_EL3_RES1 ((U(1) << 31) | (U(1) << 23))
#define TCR_EL1_IPS_SHIFT U(32)
#define TCR_EL3_PS_SHIFT U(16)
#define TCR_TxSZ_MIN U(16)
#define TCR_TxSZ_MAX U(39)
/* (internal) physical address size bits in EL3/EL1 */
#define TCR_PS_BITS_4GB U(0x0)
#define TCR_PS_BITS_64GB U(0x1)
#define TCR_PS_BITS_1TB U(0x2)
#define TCR_PS_BITS_4TB U(0x3)
#define TCR_PS_BITS_16TB U(0x4)
#define TCR_PS_BITS_256TB U(0x5)
#define ADDR_MASK_48_TO_63 ULL(0xFFFF000000000000)
#define ADDR_MASK_44_TO_47 ULL(0x0000F00000000000)
#define ADDR_MASK_42_TO_43 ULL(0x00000C0000000000)
#define ADDR_MASK_40_TO_41 ULL(0x0000030000000000)
#define ADDR_MASK_36_TO_39 ULL(0x000000F000000000)
#define ADDR_MASK_32_TO_35 ULL(0x0000000F00000000)
#define TCR_RGN_INNER_NC (U(0x0) << 8)
#define TCR_RGN_INNER_WBA (U(0x1) << 8)
#define TCR_RGN_INNER_WT (U(0x2) << 8)
#define TCR_RGN_INNER_WBNA (U(0x3) << 8)
#define TCR_RGN_OUTER_NC (U(0x0) << 10)
#define TCR_RGN_OUTER_WBA (U(0x1) << 10)
#define TCR_RGN_OUTER_WT (U(0x2) << 10)
#define TCR_RGN_OUTER_WBNA (U(0x3) << 10)
#define TCR_SH_NON_SHAREABLE (U(0x0) << 12)
#define TCR_SH_OUTER_SHAREABLE (U(0x2) << 12)
#define TCR_SH_INNER_SHAREABLE (U(0x3) << 12)
SPM: Introduce Secure Partition Manager A Secure Partition is a software execution environment instantiated in S-EL0 that can be used to implement simple management and security services. Since S-EL0 is an unprivileged exception level, a Secure Partition relies on privileged firmware e.g. ARM Trusted Firmware to be granted access to system and processor resources. Essentially, it is a software sandbox that runs under the control of privileged software in the Secure World and accesses the following system resources: - Memory and device regions in the system address map. - PE system registers. - A range of asynchronous exceptions e.g. interrupts. - A range of synchronous exceptions e.g. SMC function identifiers. A Secure Partition enables privileged firmware to implement only the absolutely essential secure services in EL3 and instantiate the rest in a partition. Since the partition executes in S-EL0, its implementation cannot be overly complex. The component in ARM Trusted Firmware responsible for managing a Secure Partition is called the Secure Partition Manager (SPM). The SPM is responsible for the following: - Validating and allocating resources requested by a Secure Partition. - Implementing a well defined interface that is used for initialising a Secure Partition. - Implementing a well defined interface that is used by the normal world and other secure services for accessing the services exported by a Secure Partition. - Implementing a well defined interface that is used by a Secure Partition to fulfil service requests. - Instantiating the software execution environment required by a Secure Partition to fulfil a service request. Change-Id: I6f7862d6bba8732db5b73f54e789d717a35e802f Co-authored-by: Douglas Raillard <douglas.raillard@arm.com> Co-authored-by: Sandrine Bailleux <sandrine.bailleux@arm.com> Co-authored-by: Achin Gupta <achin.gupta@arm.com> Co-authored-by: Antonio Nino Diaz <antonio.ninodiaz@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Antonio Nino Diaz <antonio.ninodiaz@arm.com>
2017-10-24 10:07:35 +01:00
#define TCR_TG0_SHIFT U(14)
#define TCR_TG0_MASK U(3)
#define TCR_TG0_4K (ULL(0) << TCR_TG0_SHIFT)
#define TCR_TG0_64K (ULL(1) << TCR_TG0_SHIFT)
#define TCR_TG0_16K (ULL(2) << TCR_TG0_SHIFT)
#define TCR_EPD0_BIT (U(1) << 7)
#define TCR_EPD1_BIT (U(1) << 23)
#define MODE_SP_SHIFT U(0x0)
#define MODE_SP_MASK U(0x1)
#define MODE_SP_EL0 U(0x0)
#define MODE_SP_ELX U(0x1)
#define MODE_RW_SHIFT U(0x4)
#define MODE_RW_MASK U(0x1)
#define MODE_RW_64 U(0x0)
#define MODE_RW_32 U(0x1)
#define MODE_EL_SHIFT U(0x2)
#define MODE_EL_MASK U(0x3)
#define MODE_EL3 U(0x3)
#define MODE_EL2 U(0x2)
#define MODE_EL1 U(0x1)
#define MODE_EL0 U(0x0)
#define MODE32_SHIFT U(0)
#define MODE32_MASK U(0xf)
#define MODE32_usr U(0x0)
#define MODE32_fiq U(0x1)
#define MODE32_irq U(0x2)
#define MODE32_svc U(0x3)
#define MODE32_mon U(0x6)
#define MODE32_abt U(0x7)
#define MODE32_hyp U(0xa)
#define MODE32_und U(0xb)
#define MODE32_sys U(0xf)
#define GET_RW(mode) (((mode) >> MODE_RW_SHIFT) & MODE_RW_MASK)
#define GET_EL(mode) (((mode) >> MODE_EL_SHIFT) & MODE_EL_MASK)
#define GET_SP(mode) (((mode) >> MODE_SP_SHIFT) & MODE_SP_MASK)
#define GET_M32(mode) (((mode) >> MODE32_SHIFT) & MODE32_MASK)
#define SPSR_64(el, sp, daif) \
(MODE_RW_64 << MODE_RW_SHIFT | \
((el) & MODE_EL_MASK) << MODE_EL_SHIFT | \
((sp) & MODE_SP_MASK) << MODE_SP_SHIFT | \
((daif) & SPSR_DAIF_MASK) << SPSR_DAIF_SHIFT)
#define SPSR_MODE32(mode, isa, endian, aif) \
((MODE_RW_32 << MODE_RW_SHIFT) | \
(((mode) & MODE32_MASK) << MODE32_SHIFT) | \
(((isa) & SPSR_T_MASK) << SPSR_T_SHIFT) | \
(((endian) & SPSR_E_MASK) << SPSR_E_SHIFT) | \
(((aif) & SPSR_AIF_MASK) << SPSR_AIF_SHIFT))
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/*
* TTBR Definitions
*/
#define TTBR_CNP_BIT 0x1
/*
* CTR_EL0 definitions
*/
#define CTR_CWG_SHIFT U(24)
#define CTR_CWG_MASK U(0xf)
#define CTR_ERG_SHIFT U(20)
#define CTR_ERG_MASK U(0xf)
#define CTR_DMINLINE_SHIFT U(16)
#define CTR_DMINLINE_MASK U(0xf)
#define CTR_L1IP_SHIFT U(14)
#define CTR_L1IP_MASK U(0x3)
#define CTR_IMINLINE_SHIFT U(0)
#define CTR_IMINLINE_MASK U(0xf)
#define MAX_CACHE_LINE_SIZE U(0x800) /* 2KB */
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/* Physical timer control register bit fields shifts and masks */
#define CNTP_CTL_ENABLE_SHIFT U(0)
#define CNTP_CTL_IMASK_SHIFT U(1)
#define CNTP_CTL_ISTATUS_SHIFT U(2)
#define CNTP_CTL_ENABLE_MASK U(1)
#define CNTP_CTL_IMASK_MASK U(1)
#define CNTP_CTL_ISTATUS_MASK U(1)
#define get_cntp_ctl_enable(x) (((x) >> CNTP_CTL_ENABLE_SHIFT) & \
CNTP_CTL_ENABLE_MASK)
#define get_cntp_ctl_imask(x) (((x) >> CNTP_CTL_IMASK_SHIFT) & \
CNTP_CTL_IMASK_MASK)
#define get_cntp_ctl_istatus(x) (((x) >> CNTP_CTL_ISTATUS_SHIFT) & \
CNTP_CTL_ISTATUS_MASK)
#define set_cntp_ctl_enable(x) ((x) |= (U(1) << CNTP_CTL_ENABLE_SHIFT))
#define set_cntp_ctl_imask(x) ((x) |= (U(1) << CNTP_CTL_IMASK_SHIFT))
#define clr_cntp_ctl_enable(x) ((x) &= ~(U(1) << CNTP_CTL_ENABLE_SHIFT))
#define clr_cntp_ctl_imask(x) ((x) &= ~(U(1) << CNTP_CTL_IMASK_SHIFT))
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/* Exception Syndrome register bits and bobs */
#define ESR_EC_SHIFT U(26)
#define ESR_EC_MASK U(0x3f)
#define ESR_EC_LENGTH U(6)
#define EC_UNKNOWN U(0x0)
#define EC_WFE_WFI U(0x1)
#define EC_AARCH32_CP15_MRC_MCR U(0x3)
#define EC_AARCH32_CP15_MRRC_MCRR U(0x4)
#define EC_AARCH32_CP14_MRC_MCR U(0x5)
#define EC_AARCH32_CP14_LDC_STC U(0x6)
#define EC_FP_SIMD U(0x7)
#define EC_AARCH32_CP10_MRC U(0x8)
#define EC_AARCH32_CP14_MRRC_MCRR U(0xc)
#define EC_ILLEGAL U(0xe)
#define EC_AARCH32_SVC U(0x11)
#define EC_AARCH32_HVC U(0x12)
#define EC_AARCH32_SMC U(0x13)
#define EC_AARCH64_SVC U(0x15)
#define EC_AARCH64_HVC U(0x16)
#define EC_AARCH64_SMC U(0x17)
#define EC_AARCH64_SYS U(0x18)
#define EC_IABORT_LOWER_EL U(0x20)
#define EC_IABORT_CUR_EL U(0x21)
#define EC_PC_ALIGN U(0x22)
#define EC_DABORT_LOWER_EL U(0x24)
#define EC_DABORT_CUR_EL U(0x25)
#define EC_SP_ALIGN U(0x26)
#define EC_AARCH32_FP U(0x28)
#define EC_AARCH64_FP U(0x2c)
#define EC_SERROR U(0x2f)
#define EC_BITS(x) (((x) >> ESR_EC_SHIFT) & ESR_EC_MASK)
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/* Reset bit inside the Reset management register for EL3 (RMR_EL3) */
#define RMR_RESET_REQUEST_SHIFT U(0x1)
#define RMR_WARM_RESET_CPU (U(1) << RMR_RESET_REQUEST_SHIFT)
/*******************************************************************************
* Definitions of register offsets, fields and macros for CPU system
* instructions.
******************************************************************************/
#define TLBI_ADDR_SHIFT U(12)
#define TLBI_ADDR_MASK ULL(0x00000FFFFFFFFFFF)
#define TLBI_ADDR(x) (((x) >> TLBI_ADDR_SHIFT) & TLBI_ADDR_MASK)
/*******************************************************************************
* Definitions of register offsets and fields in the CNTCTLBase Frame of the
* system level implementation of the Generic Timer.
******************************************************************************/
#define CNTNSAR U(0x4)
#define CNTNSAR_NS_SHIFT(x) (x)
#define CNTACR_BASE(x) (U(0x40) + ((x) << 2))
#define CNTACR_RPCT_SHIFT U(0x0)
#define CNTACR_RVCT_SHIFT U(0x1)
#define CNTACR_RFRQ_SHIFT U(0x2)
#define CNTACR_RVOFF_SHIFT U(0x3)
#define CNTACR_RWVT_SHIFT U(0x4)
#define CNTACR_RWPT_SHIFT U(0x5)
/* PMCR_EL0 definitions */
#define PMCR_EL0_RESET_VAL U(0x0)
#define PMCR_EL0_N_SHIFT U(11)
#define PMCR_EL0_N_MASK U(0x1f)
#define PMCR_EL0_N_BITS (PMCR_EL0_N_MASK << PMCR_EL0_N_SHIFT)
#define PMCR_EL0_LC_BIT (U(1) << 6)
#define PMCR_EL0_DP_BIT (U(1) << 5)
#define PMCR_EL0_X_BIT (U(1) << 4)
#define PMCR_EL0_D_BIT (U(1) << 3)
/*******************************************************************************
* Definitions for system register interface to SVE
******************************************************************************/
#define ZCR_EL3 S3_6_C1_C2_0
#define ZCR_EL2 S3_4_C1_C2_0
/* ZCR_EL3 definitions */
#define ZCR_EL3_LEN_MASK U(0xf)
/* ZCR_EL2 definitions */
#define ZCR_EL2_LEN_MASK U(0xf)
/*******************************************************************************
* Definitions of MAIR encodings for device and normal memory
******************************************************************************/
/*
* MAIR encodings for device memory attributes.
*/
#define MAIR_DEV_nGnRnE ULL(0x0)
#define MAIR_DEV_nGnRE ULL(0x4)
#define MAIR_DEV_nGRE ULL(0x8)
#define MAIR_DEV_GRE ULL(0xc)
/*
* MAIR encodings for normal memory attributes.
*
* Cache Policy
* WT: Write Through
* WB: Write Back
* NC: Non-Cacheable
*
* Transient Hint
* NTR: Non-Transient
* TR: Transient
*
* Allocation Policy
* RA: Read Allocate
* WA: Write Allocate
* RWA: Read and Write Allocate
* NA: No Allocation
*/
#define MAIR_NORM_WT_TR_WA ULL(0x1)
#define MAIR_NORM_WT_TR_RA ULL(0x2)
#define MAIR_NORM_WT_TR_RWA ULL(0x3)
#define MAIR_NORM_NC ULL(0x4)
#define MAIR_NORM_WB_TR_WA ULL(0x5)
#define MAIR_NORM_WB_TR_RA ULL(0x6)
#define MAIR_NORM_WB_TR_RWA ULL(0x7)
#define MAIR_NORM_WT_NTR_NA ULL(0x8)
#define MAIR_NORM_WT_NTR_WA ULL(0x9)
#define MAIR_NORM_WT_NTR_RA ULL(0xa)
#define MAIR_NORM_WT_NTR_RWA ULL(0xb)
#define MAIR_NORM_WB_NTR_NA ULL(0xc)
#define MAIR_NORM_WB_NTR_WA ULL(0xd)
#define MAIR_NORM_WB_NTR_RA ULL(0xe)
#define MAIR_NORM_WB_NTR_RWA ULL(0xf)
#define MAIR_NORM_OUTER_SHIFT 4
#define MAKE_MAIR_NORMAL_MEMORY(inner, outer) ((inner) | ((outer) << MAIR_NORM_OUTER_SHIFT))
/* PAR_EL1 fields */
#define PAR_F_SHIFT 0
#define PAR_F_MASK 1
#define PAR_ADDR_SHIFT 12
#define PAR_ADDR_MASK (BIT(40) - 1) /* 40-bits-wide page address */
/*******************************************************************************
* Definitions for system register interface to SPE
******************************************************************************/
#define PMBLIMITR_EL1 S3_0_C9_C10_0
/*******************************************************************************
* Definitions for system register interface to AMU for ARMv8.4 onwards
******************************************************************************/
#define AMCR_EL0 S3_3_C13_C2_0
#define AMCFGR_EL0 S3_3_C13_C2_1
#define AMCGCR_EL0 S3_3_C13_C2_2
#define AMUSERENR_EL0 S3_3_C13_C2_3
#define AMCNTENCLR0_EL0 S3_3_C13_C2_4
#define AMCNTENSET0_EL0 S3_3_C13_C2_5
#define AMCNTENCLR1_EL0 S3_3_C13_C3_0
#define AMCNTENSET1_EL0 S3_3_C13_C3_1
/* Activity Monitor Group 0 Event Counter Registers */
#define AMEVCNTR00_EL0 S3_3_C13_C4_0
#define AMEVCNTR01_EL0 S3_3_C13_C4_1
#define AMEVCNTR02_EL0 S3_3_C13_C4_2
#define AMEVCNTR03_EL0 S3_3_C13_C4_3
/* Activity Monitor Group 0 Event Type Registers */
#define AMEVTYPER00_EL0 S3_3_C13_C6_0
#define AMEVTYPER01_EL0 S3_3_C13_C6_1
#define AMEVTYPER02_EL0 S3_3_C13_C6_2
#define AMEVTYPER03_EL0 S3_3_C13_C6_3
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#endif /* __ARCH_H__ */