arm-trusted-firmware/plat/arm/board/fvp/platform.mk

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#
# Copyright (c) 2013-2022, Arm Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
#
# SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
#
include common/fdt_wrappers.mk
# Use the GICv3 driver on the FVP by default
FVP_USE_GIC_DRIVER := FVP_GICV3
# Default cluster count for FVP
FVP_CLUSTER_COUNT := 2
# Default number of CPUs per cluster on FVP
FVP_MAX_CPUS_PER_CLUSTER := 4
# Default number of threads per CPU on FVP
FVP_MAX_PE_PER_CPU := 1
# Disable redistributor frame of inactive/fused CPU cores by marking it as read
# only; enable redistributor frames of all CPU cores by default.
FVP_GICR_REGION_PROTECTION := 0
FVP_DT_PREFIX := fvp-base-gicv3-psci
Rework use of ARM GIC drivers on ARM platforms Suport for ARM GIC v2.0 and v3.0 drivers has been reworked to create three separate drivers instead of providing a single driver that can work on both versions of the GIC architecture. These drivers correspond to the following software use cases: 1. A GICv2 only driver that can run only on ARM GIC v2.0 implementations e.g. GIC-400 2. A GICv3 only driver that can run only on ARM GIC v3.0 implementations e.g. GIC-500 in a mode where all interrupt regimes use GICv3 features 3. A deprecated GICv3 driver that operates in legacy mode. This driver can operate only in the GICv2 mode in the secure world. On a GICv3 system, this driver allows normal world to run in either GICv3 mode (asymmetric mode) or in the GICv2 mode. Both modes of operation are deprecated on GICv3 systems. ARM platforms implement both versions of the GIC architecture. This patch adds a layer of abstraction to help ARM platform ports chose the right GIC driver and corresponding platform support. This is as described below: 1. A set of ARM common functions have been introduced to initialise the GIC and the driver during cold and warm boot. These functions are prefixed as "plat_arm_gic_". Weak definitions of these functions have been provided for each type of driver. 2. Each platform includes the sources that implement the right functions directly into the its makefile. The FVP can be instantiated with different versions of the GIC architecture. It uses the FVP_USE_GIC_DRIVER build option to specify which of the three drivers should be included in the build. 3. A list of secure interrupts has to be provided to initialise each of the three GIC drivers. For GIC v3.0 the interrupt ids have to be further categorised as Group 0 and Group 1 Secure interrupts. For GIC v2.0, the two types are merged and treated as Group 0 interrupts. The two lists of interrupts are exported from the platform_def.h. The lists are constructed by adding a list of board specific interrupt ids to a list of ids common to all ARM platforms and Compute sub-systems. This patch also makes some fields of `arm_config` data structure in FVP redundant and these unused fields are removed. Change-Id: Ibc8c087be7a8a6b041b78c2c3bd0c648cd2035d8
2015-11-03 14:18:34 +00:00
# The FVP platform depends on this macro to build with correct GIC driver.
$(eval $(call add_define,FVP_USE_GIC_DRIVER))
# Pass FVP_CLUSTER_COUNT to the build system.
$(eval $(call add_define,FVP_CLUSTER_COUNT))
# Pass FVP_MAX_CPUS_PER_CLUSTER to the build system.
$(eval $(call add_define,FVP_MAX_CPUS_PER_CLUSTER))
# Pass FVP_MAX_PE_PER_CPU to the build system.
$(eval $(call add_define,FVP_MAX_PE_PER_CPU))
# Pass FVP_GICR_REGION_PROTECTION to the build system.
$(eval $(call add_define,FVP_GICR_REGION_PROTECTION))
# Sanity check the cluster count and if FVP_CLUSTER_COUNT <= 2,
# choose the CCI driver , else the CCN driver
ifeq ($(FVP_CLUSTER_COUNT), 0)
$(error "Incorrect cluster count specified for FVP port")
else ifeq ($(FVP_CLUSTER_COUNT),$(filter $(FVP_CLUSTER_COUNT),1 2))
FVP_INTERCONNECT_DRIVER := FVP_CCI
else
FVP_INTERCONNECT_DRIVER := FVP_CCN
endif
$(eval $(call add_define,FVP_INTERCONNECT_DRIVER))
# Choose the GIC sources depending upon the how the FVP will be invoked
ifeq (${FVP_USE_GIC_DRIVER}, FVP_GICV3)
# The GIC model (GIC-600 or GIC-500) will be detected at runtime
GICV3_SUPPORT_GIC600 := 1
GICV3_OVERRIDE_DISTIF_PWR_OPS := 1
# Include GICv3 driver files
include drivers/arm/gic/v3/gicv3.mk
FVP_GIC_SOURCES := ${GICV3_SOURCES} \
Rework use of ARM GIC drivers on ARM platforms Suport for ARM GIC v2.0 and v3.0 drivers has been reworked to create three separate drivers instead of providing a single driver that can work on both versions of the GIC architecture. These drivers correspond to the following software use cases: 1. A GICv2 only driver that can run only on ARM GIC v2.0 implementations e.g. GIC-400 2. A GICv3 only driver that can run only on ARM GIC v3.0 implementations e.g. GIC-500 in a mode where all interrupt regimes use GICv3 features 3. A deprecated GICv3 driver that operates in legacy mode. This driver can operate only in the GICv2 mode in the secure world. On a GICv3 system, this driver allows normal world to run in either GICv3 mode (asymmetric mode) or in the GICv2 mode. Both modes of operation are deprecated on GICv3 systems. ARM platforms implement both versions of the GIC architecture. This patch adds a layer of abstraction to help ARM platform ports chose the right GIC driver and corresponding platform support. This is as described below: 1. A set of ARM common functions have been introduced to initialise the GIC and the driver during cold and warm boot. These functions are prefixed as "plat_arm_gic_". Weak definitions of these functions have been provided for each type of driver. 2. Each platform includes the sources that implement the right functions directly into the its makefile. The FVP can be instantiated with different versions of the GIC architecture. It uses the FVP_USE_GIC_DRIVER build option to specify which of the three drivers should be included in the build. 3. A list of secure interrupts has to be provided to initialise each of the three GIC drivers. For GIC v3.0 the interrupt ids have to be further categorised as Group 0 and Group 1 Secure interrupts. For GIC v2.0, the two types are merged and treated as Group 0 interrupts. The two lists of interrupts are exported from the platform_def.h. The lists are constructed by adding a list of board specific interrupt ids to a list of ids common to all ARM platforms and Compute sub-systems. This patch also makes some fields of `arm_config` data structure in FVP redundant and these unused fields are removed. Change-Id: Ibc8c087be7a8a6b041b78c2c3bd0c648cd2035d8
2015-11-03 14:18:34 +00:00
plat/common/plat_gicv3.c \
plat/arm/common/arm_gicv3.c
ifeq ($(filter 1,${BL2_AT_EL3} ${RESET_TO_BL31} ${RESET_TO_SP_MIN}),)
FVP_GIC_SOURCES += plat/arm/board/fvp/fvp_gicv3.c
endif
Rework use of ARM GIC drivers on ARM platforms Suport for ARM GIC v2.0 and v3.0 drivers has been reworked to create three separate drivers instead of providing a single driver that can work on both versions of the GIC architecture. These drivers correspond to the following software use cases: 1. A GICv2 only driver that can run only on ARM GIC v2.0 implementations e.g. GIC-400 2. A GICv3 only driver that can run only on ARM GIC v3.0 implementations e.g. GIC-500 in a mode where all interrupt regimes use GICv3 features 3. A deprecated GICv3 driver that operates in legacy mode. This driver can operate only in the GICv2 mode in the secure world. On a GICv3 system, this driver allows normal world to run in either GICv3 mode (asymmetric mode) or in the GICv2 mode. Both modes of operation are deprecated on GICv3 systems. ARM platforms implement both versions of the GIC architecture. This patch adds a layer of abstraction to help ARM platform ports chose the right GIC driver and corresponding platform support. This is as described below: 1. A set of ARM common functions have been introduced to initialise the GIC and the driver during cold and warm boot. These functions are prefixed as "plat_arm_gic_". Weak definitions of these functions have been provided for each type of driver. 2. Each platform includes the sources that implement the right functions directly into the its makefile. The FVP can be instantiated with different versions of the GIC architecture. It uses the FVP_USE_GIC_DRIVER build option to specify which of the three drivers should be included in the build. 3. A list of secure interrupts has to be provided to initialise each of the three GIC drivers. For GIC v3.0 the interrupt ids have to be further categorised as Group 0 and Group 1 Secure interrupts. For GIC v2.0, the two types are merged and treated as Group 0 interrupts. The two lists of interrupts are exported from the platform_def.h. The lists are constructed by adding a list of board specific interrupt ids to a list of ids common to all ARM platforms and Compute sub-systems. This patch also makes some fields of `arm_config` data structure in FVP redundant and these unused fields are removed. Change-Id: Ibc8c087be7a8a6b041b78c2c3bd0c648cd2035d8
2015-11-03 14:18:34 +00:00
else ifeq (${FVP_USE_GIC_DRIVER}, FVP_GICV2)
# No GICv4 extension
GIC_ENABLE_V4_EXTN := 0
$(eval $(call add_define,GIC_ENABLE_V4_EXTN))
# Include GICv2 driver files
include drivers/arm/gic/v2/gicv2.mk
FVP_GIC_SOURCES := ${GICV2_SOURCES} \
Rework use of ARM GIC drivers on ARM platforms Suport for ARM GIC v2.0 and v3.0 drivers has been reworked to create three separate drivers instead of providing a single driver that can work on both versions of the GIC architecture. These drivers correspond to the following software use cases: 1. A GICv2 only driver that can run only on ARM GIC v2.0 implementations e.g. GIC-400 2. A GICv3 only driver that can run only on ARM GIC v3.0 implementations e.g. GIC-500 in a mode where all interrupt regimes use GICv3 features 3. A deprecated GICv3 driver that operates in legacy mode. This driver can operate only in the GICv2 mode in the secure world. On a GICv3 system, this driver allows normal world to run in either GICv3 mode (asymmetric mode) or in the GICv2 mode. Both modes of operation are deprecated on GICv3 systems. ARM platforms implement both versions of the GIC architecture. This patch adds a layer of abstraction to help ARM platform ports chose the right GIC driver and corresponding platform support. This is as described below: 1. A set of ARM common functions have been introduced to initialise the GIC and the driver during cold and warm boot. These functions are prefixed as "plat_arm_gic_". Weak definitions of these functions have been provided for each type of driver. 2. Each platform includes the sources that implement the right functions directly into the its makefile. The FVP can be instantiated with different versions of the GIC architecture. It uses the FVP_USE_GIC_DRIVER build option to specify which of the three drivers should be included in the build. 3. A list of secure interrupts has to be provided to initialise each of the three GIC drivers. For GIC v3.0 the interrupt ids have to be further categorised as Group 0 and Group 1 Secure interrupts. For GIC v2.0, the two types are merged and treated as Group 0 interrupts. The two lists of interrupts are exported from the platform_def.h. The lists are constructed by adding a list of board specific interrupt ids to a list of ids common to all ARM platforms and Compute sub-systems. This patch also makes some fields of `arm_config` data structure in FVP redundant and these unused fields are removed. Change-Id: Ibc8c087be7a8a6b041b78c2c3bd0c648cd2035d8
2015-11-03 14:18:34 +00:00
plat/common/plat_gicv2.c \
plat/arm/common/arm_gicv2.c
FVP_DT_PREFIX := fvp-base-gicv2-psci
Rework use of ARM GIC drivers on ARM platforms Suport for ARM GIC v2.0 and v3.0 drivers has been reworked to create three separate drivers instead of providing a single driver that can work on both versions of the GIC architecture. These drivers correspond to the following software use cases: 1. A GICv2 only driver that can run only on ARM GIC v2.0 implementations e.g. GIC-400 2. A GICv3 only driver that can run only on ARM GIC v3.0 implementations e.g. GIC-500 in a mode where all interrupt regimes use GICv3 features 3. A deprecated GICv3 driver that operates in legacy mode. This driver can operate only in the GICv2 mode in the secure world. On a GICv3 system, this driver allows normal world to run in either GICv3 mode (asymmetric mode) or in the GICv2 mode. Both modes of operation are deprecated on GICv3 systems. ARM platforms implement both versions of the GIC architecture. This patch adds a layer of abstraction to help ARM platform ports chose the right GIC driver and corresponding platform support. This is as described below: 1. A set of ARM common functions have been introduced to initialise the GIC and the driver during cold and warm boot. These functions are prefixed as "plat_arm_gic_". Weak definitions of these functions have been provided for each type of driver. 2. Each platform includes the sources that implement the right functions directly into the its makefile. The FVP can be instantiated with different versions of the GIC architecture. It uses the FVP_USE_GIC_DRIVER build option to specify which of the three drivers should be included in the build. 3. A list of secure interrupts has to be provided to initialise each of the three GIC drivers. For GIC v3.0 the interrupt ids have to be further categorised as Group 0 and Group 1 Secure interrupts. For GIC v2.0, the two types are merged and treated as Group 0 interrupts. The two lists of interrupts are exported from the platform_def.h. The lists are constructed by adding a list of board specific interrupt ids to a list of ids common to all ARM platforms and Compute sub-systems. This patch also makes some fields of `arm_config` data structure in FVP redundant and these unused fields are removed. Change-Id: Ibc8c087be7a8a6b041b78c2c3bd0c648cd2035d8
2015-11-03 14:18:34 +00:00
else
$(error "Incorrect GIC driver chosen on FVP port")
endif
ifeq (${FVP_INTERCONNECT_DRIVER}, FVP_CCI)
FVP_INTERCONNECT_SOURCES := drivers/arm/cci/cci.c
else ifeq (${FVP_INTERCONNECT_DRIVER}, FVP_CCN)
FVP_INTERCONNECT_SOURCES := drivers/arm/ccn/ccn.c \
plat/arm/common/arm_ccn.c
else
$(error "Incorrect CCN driver chosen on FVP port")
endif
FVP_SECURITY_SOURCES := drivers/arm/tzc/tzc400.c \
Perform security setup separately for each ARM platform Prior to this patch, it was assumed that on all ARM platforms the bare minimal security setup required is to program TrustZone protection. This would always be done by programming the TZC-400 which was assumed to be present in all ARM platforms. The weak definition of platform_arm_security_setup() in plat/arm/common/arm_security.c reflected these assumptions. In reality, each ARM platform either decides at runtime whether TrustZone protection needs to be programmed (e.g. FVPs) or performs some security setup in addition to programming TrustZone protection (e.g. NIC setup on Juno). As a result, the weak definition of plat_arm_security_setup() is always overridden. When a platform needs to program TrustZone protection and implements the TZC-400 peripheral, it uses the arm_tzc_setup() function to do so. It is also possible to program TrustZone protection through other peripherals that include a TrustZone controller e.g. DMC-500. The programmer's interface is slightly different across these various peripherals. In order to satisfy the above requirements, this patch makes the following changes to the way security setup is done on ARM platforms. 1. arm_security.c retains the definition of arm_tzc_setup() and has been renamed to arm_tzc400.c. This is to reflect the reliance on the TZC-400 peripheral to perform TrustZone programming. The new file is not automatically included in all platform ports through arm_common.mk. Each platform must include it explicitly in a platform specific makefile if needed. This approach enables introduction of similar library code to program TrustZone protection using a different peripheral. This code would be used by the subset of ARM platforms that implement this peripheral. 2. Due to #1 above, existing platforms which implements the TZC-400 have been updated to include the necessary files for both BL2, BL2U and BL31 images. Change-Id: I513c58f7a19fff2e9e9c3b95721592095bcb2735
2016-02-10 14:50:53 +00:00
plat/arm/board/fvp/fvp_security.c \
plat/arm/common/arm_tzc400.c
PLAT_INCLUDES := -Iplat/arm/board/fvp/include
fvp: Move TSP from Secure DRAM to Secure SRAM The TSP used to execute from secure DRAM on the FVPs because there was not enough space in Trusted SRAM to fit it in. Thanks to recent RAM usage enhancements being implemented, we have made enough savings for the TSP to execute in SRAM. However, there is no contiguous free chunk of SRAM big enough to hold the TSP. Therefore, the different bootloader images need to be moved around to reduce memory fragmentation. This patch keeps the overall memory layout (i.e. keeping BL1 R/W at the bottom, BL2 at the top and BL3-1 in between) but moves the base addresses of all the bootloader images in such a way that: - memory fragmentation is reduced enough to fit BL3-2 in; - new base addresses are suitable for release builds as well as debug ones; - each image has a few extra kilobytes for future growth. BL3-1 and BL3-2 are the images which received the biggest slice of the cake since they will most probably grow the most. A few useful numbers for reference (valid at the time of this patch): |-----------------------|------------------------------- | image size (debug) | extra space for the future --------|-----------------------|------------------------------- BL1 R/W | 20 KB | 4 KB BL2 | 44 KB | 4 KB BL3-1 | 108 KB | 12 KB BL3-2 | 56 KB | 8 KB --------|-----------------------|------------------------------- Total | 228 KB | 28 KB = 256 KB --------|-----------------------|------------------------------- Although on FVPs the TSP now executes from Trusted SRAM by default, this patch keeps the option to execute it from Trusted DRAM. This is controlled by the build configuration 'TSP_RAM_LOCATION'. Fixes ARM-Software/tf-issues#81 Change-Id: Ifb9ef2befa9a2d5ac0813f7f79834df7af992b94
2014-05-20 17:28:25 +01:00
PLAT_BL_COMMON_SOURCES := plat/arm/board/fvp/fvp_common.c
FVP_CPU_LIBS := lib/cpus/${ARCH}/aem_generic.S
ifeq (${ARCH}, aarch64)
# select a different set of CPU files, depending on whether we compile for
# hardware assisted coherency cores or not
ifeq (${HW_ASSISTED_COHERENCY}, 0)
# Cores used without DSU
FVP_CPU_LIBS += lib/cpus/aarch64/cortex_a35.S \
lib/cpus/aarch64/cortex_a53.S \
lib/cpus/aarch64/cortex_a57.S \
lib/cpus/aarch64/cortex_a72.S \
lib/cpus/aarch64/cortex_a73.S
else
# Cores used with DSU only
ifeq (${CTX_INCLUDE_AARCH32_REGS}, 0)
# AArch64-only cores
FVP_CPU_LIBS += lib/cpus/aarch64/cortex_a76.S \
lib/cpus/aarch64/cortex_a76ae.S \
lib/cpus/aarch64/cortex_a77.S \
lib/cpus/aarch64/cortex_a78.S \
lib/cpus/aarch64/neoverse_n_common.S \
lib/cpus/aarch64/neoverse_n1.S \
lib/cpus/aarch64/neoverse_n2.S \
lib/cpus/aarch64/neoverse_e1.S \
lib/cpus/aarch64/neoverse_v1.S \
lib/cpus/aarch64/neoverse_demeter.S \
lib/cpus/aarch64/cortex_a78_ae.S \
lib/cpus/aarch64/cortex_a510.S \
lib/cpus/aarch64/cortex_a710.S \
lib/cpus/aarch64/cortex_makalu.S \
lib/cpus/aarch64/cortex_makalu_elp_arm.S \
lib/cpus/aarch64/cortex_a65.S \
lib/cpus/aarch64/cortex_a65ae.S \
lib/cpus/aarch64/cortex_a78c.S \
lib/cpus/aarch64/cortex_hayes.S \
lib/cpus/aarch64/cortex_hunter.S \
lib/cpus/aarch64/cortex_x2.S \
lib/cpus/aarch64/neoverse_poseidon.S
endif
# AArch64/AArch32 cores
FVP_CPU_LIBS += lib/cpus/aarch64/cortex_a55.S \
lib/cpus/aarch64/cortex_a75.S
endif
else
FVP_CPU_LIBS += lib/cpus/aarch32/cortex_a32.S
endif
BL1_SOURCES += drivers/arm/smmu/smmu_v3.c \
drivers/arm/sp805/sp805.c \
drivers/delay_timer/delay_timer.c \
drivers/io/io_semihosting.c \
lib/semihosting/semihosting.c \
lib/semihosting/${ARCH}/semihosting_call.S \
plat/arm/board/fvp/${ARCH}/fvp_helpers.S \
plat/arm/board/fvp/fvp_bl1_setup.c \
plat/arm/board/fvp/fvp_err.c \
plat/arm/board/fvp/fvp_io_storage.c \
${FVP_CPU_LIBS} \
${FVP_INTERCONNECT_SOURCES}
ifeq (${USE_SP804_TIMER},1)
BL1_SOURCES += drivers/arm/sp804/sp804_delay_timer.c
else
BL1_SOURCES += drivers/delay_timer/generic_delay_timer.c
endif
BL2_SOURCES += drivers/arm/sp805/sp805.c \
drivers/io/io_semihosting.c \
lib/utils/mem_region.c \
lib/semihosting/semihosting.c \
lib/semihosting/${ARCH}/semihosting_call.S \
plat/arm/board/fvp/fvp_bl2_setup.c \
plat/arm/board/fvp/fvp_err.c \
plat/arm/board/fvp/fvp_io_storage.c \
plat/arm/common/arm_nor_psci_mem_protect.c \
Perform security setup separately for each ARM platform Prior to this patch, it was assumed that on all ARM platforms the bare minimal security setup required is to program TrustZone protection. This would always be done by programming the TZC-400 which was assumed to be present in all ARM platforms. The weak definition of platform_arm_security_setup() in plat/arm/common/arm_security.c reflected these assumptions. In reality, each ARM platform either decides at runtime whether TrustZone protection needs to be programmed (e.g. FVPs) or performs some security setup in addition to programming TrustZone protection (e.g. NIC setup on Juno). As a result, the weak definition of plat_arm_security_setup() is always overridden. When a platform needs to program TrustZone protection and implements the TZC-400 peripheral, it uses the arm_tzc_setup() function to do so. It is also possible to program TrustZone protection through other peripherals that include a TrustZone controller e.g. DMC-500. The programmer's interface is slightly different across these various peripherals. In order to satisfy the above requirements, this patch makes the following changes to the way security setup is done on ARM platforms. 1. arm_security.c retains the definition of arm_tzc_setup() and has been renamed to arm_tzc400.c. This is to reflect the reliance on the TZC-400 peripheral to perform TrustZone programming. The new file is not automatically included in all platform ports through arm_common.mk. Each platform must include it explicitly in a platform specific makefile if needed. This approach enables introduction of similar library code to program TrustZone protection using a different peripheral. This code would be used by the subset of ARM platforms that implement this peripheral. 2. Due to #1 above, existing platforms which implements the TZC-400 have been updated to include the necessary files for both BL2, BL2U and BL31 images. Change-Id: I513c58f7a19fff2e9e9c3b95721592095bcb2735
2016-02-10 14:50:53 +00:00
${FVP_SECURITY_SOURCES}
ifeq (${COT_DESC_IN_DTB},1)
BL2_SOURCES += plat/arm/common/fconf/fconf_nv_cntr_getter.c
endif
ifeq (${ENABLE_RME},1)
BL2_SOURCES += plat/arm/board/fvp/aarch64/fvp_helpers.S
BL31_SOURCES += plat/arm/board/fvp/fvp_plat_attest_token.c \
plat/arm/board/fvp/fvp_realm_attest_key.c
endif
ifeq (${BL2_AT_EL3},1)
BL2_SOURCES += plat/arm/board/fvp/${ARCH}/fvp_helpers.S \
plat/arm/board/fvp/fvp_bl2_el3_setup.c \
${FVP_CPU_LIBS} \
${FVP_INTERCONNECT_SOURCES}
endif
ifeq (${USE_SP804_TIMER},1)
BL2_SOURCES += drivers/arm/sp804/sp804_delay_timer.c
endif
BL2U_SOURCES += plat/arm/board/fvp/fvp_bl2u_setup.c \
Perform security setup separately for each ARM platform Prior to this patch, it was assumed that on all ARM platforms the bare minimal security setup required is to program TrustZone protection. This would always be done by programming the TZC-400 which was assumed to be present in all ARM platforms. The weak definition of platform_arm_security_setup() in plat/arm/common/arm_security.c reflected these assumptions. In reality, each ARM platform either decides at runtime whether TrustZone protection needs to be programmed (e.g. FVPs) or performs some security setup in addition to programming TrustZone protection (e.g. NIC setup on Juno). As a result, the weak definition of plat_arm_security_setup() is always overridden. When a platform needs to program TrustZone protection and implements the TZC-400 peripheral, it uses the arm_tzc_setup() function to do so. It is also possible to program TrustZone protection through other peripherals that include a TrustZone controller e.g. DMC-500. The programmer's interface is slightly different across these various peripherals. In order to satisfy the above requirements, this patch makes the following changes to the way security setup is done on ARM platforms. 1. arm_security.c retains the definition of arm_tzc_setup() and has been renamed to arm_tzc400.c. This is to reflect the reliance on the TZC-400 peripheral to perform TrustZone programming. The new file is not automatically included in all platform ports through arm_common.mk. Each platform must include it explicitly in a platform specific makefile if needed. This approach enables introduction of similar library code to program TrustZone protection using a different peripheral. This code would be used by the subset of ARM platforms that implement this peripheral. 2. Due to #1 above, existing platforms which implements the TZC-400 have been updated to include the necessary files for both BL2, BL2U and BL31 images. Change-Id: I513c58f7a19fff2e9e9c3b95721592095bcb2735
2016-02-10 14:50:53 +00:00
${FVP_SECURITY_SOURCES}
ifeq (${USE_SP804_TIMER},1)
BL2U_SOURCES += drivers/arm/sp804/sp804_delay_timer.c
endif
BL31_SOURCES += drivers/arm/fvp/fvp_pwrc.c \
drivers/arm/smmu/smmu_v3.c \
drivers/delay_timer/delay_timer.c \
drivers/cfi/v2m/v2m_flash.c \
lib/utils/mem_region.c \
plat/arm/board/fvp/fvp_bl31_setup.c \
plat/arm/board/fvp/fvp_console.c \
plat/arm/board/fvp/fvp_pm.c \
plat/arm/board/fvp/fvp_topology.c \
plat/arm/board/fvp/aarch64/fvp_helpers.S \
plat/arm/common/arm_nor_psci_mem_protect.c \
${FVP_CPU_LIBS} \
Perform security setup separately for each ARM platform Prior to this patch, it was assumed that on all ARM platforms the bare minimal security setup required is to program TrustZone protection. This would always be done by programming the TZC-400 which was assumed to be present in all ARM platforms. The weak definition of platform_arm_security_setup() in plat/arm/common/arm_security.c reflected these assumptions. In reality, each ARM platform either decides at runtime whether TrustZone protection needs to be programmed (e.g. FVPs) or performs some security setup in addition to programming TrustZone protection (e.g. NIC setup on Juno). As a result, the weak definition of plat_arm_security_setup() is always overridden. When a platform needs to program TrustZone protection and implements the TZC-400 peripheral, it uses the arm_tzc_setup() function to do so. It is also possible to program TrustZone protection through other peripherals that include a TrustZone controller e.g. DMC-500. The programmer's interface is slightly different across these various peripherals. In order to satisfy the above requirements, this patch makes the following changes to the way security setup is done on ARM platforms. 1. arm_security.c retains the definition of arm_tzc_setup() and has been renamed to arm_tzc400.c. This is to reflect the reliance on the TZC-400 peripheral to perform TrustZone programming. The new file is not automatically included in all platform ports through arm_common.mk. Each platform must include it explicitly in a platform specific makefile if needed. This approach enables introduction of similar library code to program TrustZone protection using a different peripheral. This code would be used by the subset of ARM platforms that implement this peripheral. 2. Due to #1 above, existing platforms which implements the TZC-400 have been updated to include the necessary files for both BL2, BL2U and BL31 images. Change-Id: I513c58f7a19fff2e9e9c3b95721592095bcb2735
2016-02-10 14:50:53 +00:00
${FVP_GIC_SOURCES} \
${FVP_INTERCONNECT_SOURCES} \
Perform security setup separately for each ARM platform Prior to this patch, it was assumed that on all ARM platforms the bare minimal security setup required is to program TrustZone protection. This would always be done by programming the TZC-400 which was assumed to be present in all ARM platforms. The weak definition of platform_arm_security_setup() in plat/arm/common/arm_security.c reflected these assumptions. In reality, each ARM platform either decides at runtime whether TrustZone protection needs to be programmed (e.g. FVPs) or performs some security setup in addition to programming TrustZone protection (e.g. NIC setup on Juno). As a result, the weak definition of plat_arm_security_setup() is always overridden. When a platform needs to program TrustZone protection and implements the TZC-400 peripheral, it uses the arm_tzc_setup() function to do so. It is also possible to program TrustZone protection through other peripherals that include a TrustZone controller e.g. DMC-500. The programmer's interface is slightly different across these various peripherals. In order to satisfy the above requirements, this patch makes the following changes to the way security setup is done on ARM platforms. 1. arm_security.c retains the definition of arm_tzc_setup() and has been renamed to arm_tzc400.c. This is to reflect the reliance on the TZC-400 peripheral to perform TrustZone programming. The new file is not automatically included in all platform ports through arm_common.mk. Each platform must include it explicitly in a platform specific makefile if needed. This approach enables introduction of similar library code to program TrustZone protection using a different peripheral. This code would be used by the subset of ARM platforms that implement this peripheral. 2. Due to #1 above, existing platforms which implements the TZC-400 have been updated to include the necessary files for both BL2, BL2U and BL31 images. Change-Id: I513c58f7a19fff2e9e9c3b95721592095bcb2735
2016-02-10 14:50:53 +00:00
${FVP_SECURITY_SOURCES}
# Support for fconf in BL31
# Added separately from the above list for better readability
ifeq ($(filter 1,${BL2_AT_EL3} ${RESET_TO_BL31}),)
BL31_SOURCES += lib/fconf/fconf.c \
lib/fconf/fconf_dyn_cfg_getter.c \
plat/arm/board/fvp/fconf/fconf_hw_config_getter.c
BL31_SOURCES += ${FDT_WRAPPERS_SOURCES}
ifeq (${SEC_INT_DESC_IN_FCONF},1)
BL31_SOURCES += plat/arm/common/fconf/fconf_sec_intr_config.c
endif
endif
ifeq (${USE_SP804_TIMER},1)
BL31_SOURCES += drivers/arm/sp804/sp804_delay_timer.c
else
BL31_SOURCES += drivers/delay_timer/generic_delay_timer.c
endif
# Add the FDT_SOURCES and options for Dynamic Config (only for Unix env)
ifdef UNIX_MK
FVP_HW_CONFIG_DTS := fdts/${FVP_DT_PREFIX}.dts
FDT_SOURCES += $(addprefix plat/arm/board/fvp/fdts/, \
${PLAT}_fw_config.dts \
${PLAT}_tb_fw_config.dts \
${PLAT}_soc_fw_config.dts \
${PLAT}_nt_fw_config.dts \
)
FVP_FW_CONFIG := ${BUILD_PLAT}/fdts/${PLAT}_fw_config.dtb
FVP_TB_FW_CONFIG := ${BUILD_PLAT}/fdts/${PLAT}_tb_fw_config.dtb
FVP_SOC_FW_CONFIG := ${BUILD_PLAT}/fdts/${PLAT}_soc_fw_config.dtb
FVP_NT_FW_CONFIG := ${BUILD_PLAT}/fdts/${PLAT}_nt_fw_config.dtb
ifeq (${SPD},tspd)
FDT_SOURCES += plat/arm/board/fvp/fdts/${PLAT}_tsp_fw_config.dts
FVP_TOS_FW_CONFIG := ${BUILD_PLAT}/fdts/${PLAT}_tsp_fw_config.dtb
# Add the TOS_FW_CONFIG to FIP and specify the same to certtool
$(eval $(call TOOL_ADD_PAYLOAD,${FVP_TOS_FW_CONFIG},--tos-fw-config,${FVP_TOS_FW_CONFIG}))
endif
ifeq (${SPD},spmd)
ifeq ($(ARM_SPMC_MANIFEST_DTS),)
ARM_SPMC_MANIFEST_DTS := plat/arm/board/fvp/fdts/${PLAT}_spmc_manifest.dts
endif
FDT_SOURCES += ${ARM_SPMC_MANIFEST_DTS}
FVP_TOS_FW_CONFIG := ${BUILD_PLAT}/fdts/$(notdir $(basename ${ARM_SPMC_MANIFEST_DTS})).dtb
# Add the TOS_FW_CONFIG to FIP and specify the same to certtool
$(eval $(call TOOL_ADD_PAYLOAD,${FVP_TOS_FW_CONFIG},--tos-fw-config,${FVP_TOS_FW_CONFIG}))
endif
# Add the FW_CONFIG to FIP and specify the same to certtool
$(eval $(call TOOL_ADD_PAYLOAD,${FVP_FW_CONFIG},--fw-config,${FVP_FW_CONFIG}))
# Add the TB_FW_CONFIG to FIP and specify the same to certtool
$(eval $(call TOOL_ADD_PAYLOAD,${FVP_TB_FW_CONFIG},--tb-fw-config,${FVP_TB_FW_CONFIG}))
# Add the SOC_FW_CONFIG to FIP and specify the same to certtool
$(eval $(call TOOL_ADD_PAYLOAD,${FVP_SOC_FW_CONFIG},--soc-fw-config,${FVP_SOC_FW_CONFIG}))
# Add the NT_FW_CONFIG to FIP and specify the same to certtool
$(eval $(call TOOL_ADD_PAYLOAD,${FVP_NT_FW_CONFIG},--nt-fw-config,${FVP_NT_FW_CONFIG}))
FDT_SOURCES += ${FVP_HW_CONFIG_DTS}
$(eval FVP_HW_CONFIG := ${BUILD_PLAT}/$(patsubst %.dts,%.dtb,$(FVP_HW_CONFIG_DTS)))
# Add the HW_CONFIG to FIP and specify the same to certtool
$(eval $(call TOOL_ADD_PAYLOAD,${FVP_HW_CONFIG},--hw-config,${FVP_HW_CONFIG}))
endif
# Enable Activity Monitor Unit extensions by default
ENABLE_AMU := 1
# Enable dynamic mitigation support by default
DYNAMIC_WORKAROUND_CVE_2018_3639 := 1
ifeq (${ENABLE_AMU},1)
BL31_SOURCES += lib/cpus/aarch64/cpuamu.c \
lib/cpus/aarch64/cpuamu_helpers.S
ifeq (${HW_ASSISTED_COHERENCY}, 1)
BL31_SOURCES += lib/cpus/aarch64/cortex_a75_pubsub.c \
lib/cpus/aarch64/neoverse_n1_pubsub.c
endif
endif
ifeq (${RAS_EXTENSION},1)
BL31_SOURCES += plat/arm/board/fvp/aarch64/fvp_ras.c
endif
ifneq (${ENABLE_STACK_PROTECTOR},0)
PLAT_BL_COMMON_SOURCES += plat/arm/board/fvp/fvp_stack_protector.c
endif
ifeq (${ARCH},aarch32)
NEED_BL32 := yes
endif
# Enable the dynamic translation tables library.
feat(fvp): update HW_CONFIG DT loading mechanism Currently, HW-config is loaded into non-secure memory, which mean a malicious NS-agent could tamper with it. Ideally, this shouldn't be an issue since no software runs in non-secure world at this time (non-secure world has not been started yet). It does not provide a guarantee though since malicious external NS-agents can take control of this memory region for update/corruption after BL2 loads it and before BL31/BL32/SP_MIN consumes it. The threat is mapped to Threat ID#3 (Bypass authentication scenario) in threat model [1]. Hence modified the code as below - 1. BL2 loads the HW_CONFIG into secure memory 2. BL2 makes a copy of the HW_CONFIG in the non-secure memory at an address provided by the newly added property(ns-load-address) in the 'hw-config' node of the FW_CONFIG 3. SP_MIN receives the FW_CONFIG address from BL2 via arg1 so that it can retrieve details (address and size) of HW_CONFIG from FW_CONFIG 4. A secure and non-secure HW_CONFIG address will eventually be used by BL31/SP_MIN/BL32 and BL33 components respectively 5. BL31/SP_MIN dynamically maps the Secure HW_CONFIG region and reads information from it to local variables (structures) and then unmaps it 6. Reduce HW_CONFIG maximum size from 16MB to 1MB; it appears sufficient, and it will also create a free space for any future components to be added to memory [1]: https://trustedfirmware-a.readthedocs.io/en/latest/threat_model/threat_model.html Change-Id: I1d431f3e640ded60616604b1c33aa638b9a1e55e Signed-off-by: Manish V Badarkhe <Manish.Badarkhe@arm.com>
2022-03-15 16:05:58 +00:00
ifeq ($(filter 1,${BL2_AT_EL3} ${ARM_XLAT_TABLES_LIB_V1}),)
ifeq (${ARCH},aarch32)
BL32_CPPFLAGS += -DPLAT_XLAT_TABLES_DYNAMIC
feat(fvp): update HW_CONFIG DT loading mechanism Currently, HW-config is loaded into non-secure memory, which mean a malicious NS-agent could tamper with it. Ideally, this shouldn't be an issue since no software runs in non-secure world at this time (non-secure world has not been started yet). It does not provide a guarantee though since malicious external NS-agents can take control of this memory region for update/corruption after BL2 loads it and before BL31/BL32/SP_MIN consumes it. The threat is mapped to Threat ID#3 (Bypass authentication scenario) in threat model [1]. Hence modified the code as below - 1. BL2 loads the HW_CONFIG into secure memory 2. BL2 makes a copy of the HW_CONFIG in the non-secure memory at an address provided by the newly added property(ns-load-address) in the 'hw-config' node of the FW_CONFIG 3. SP_MIN receives the FW_CONFIG address from BL2 via arg1 so that it can retrieve details (address and size) of HW_CONFIG from FW_CONFIG 4. A secure and non-secure HW_CONFIG address will eventually be used by BL31/SP_MIN/BL32 and BL33 components respectively 5. BL31/SP_MIN dynamically maps the Secure HW_CONFIG region and reads information from it to local variables (structures) and then unmaps it 6. Reduce HW_CONFIG maximum size from 16MB to 1MB; it appears sufficient, and it will also create a free space for any future components to be added to memory [1]: https://trustedfirmware-a.readthedocs.io/en/latest/threat_model/threat_model.html Change-Id: I1d431f3e640ded60616604b1c33aa638b9a1e55e Signed-off-by: Manish V Badarkhe <Manish.Badarkhe@arm.com>
2022-03-15 16:05:58 +00:00
else # AArch64
BL31_CPPFLAGS += -DPLAT_XLAT_TABLES_DYNAMIC
endif
endif
ifeq (${ENABLE_RME},1)
BL31_CPPFLAGS += -DPLAT_XLAT_TABLES_DYNAMIC
endif
Read-only xlat tables for BL31 memory This patch introduces a build flag which allows the xlat tables to be mapped in a read-only region within BL31 memory. It makes it much harder for someone who has acquired the ability to write to arbitrary secure memory addresses to gain control of the translation tables. The memory attributes of the descriptors describing the tables themselves are changed to read-only secure data. This change happens at the end of BL31 runtime setup. Until this point, the tables have read-write permissions. This gives a window of opportunity for changes to be made to the tables with the MMU on (e.g. reclaiming init code). No changes can be made to the tables with the MMU turned on from this point onwards. This change is also enabled for sp_min and tspd. To make all this possible, the base table was moved to .rodata. The penalty we pay is that now .rodata must be aligned to the size of the base table (512B alignment). Still, this is better than putting the base table with the higher level tables in the xlat_table section, as that would cost us a full 4KB page. Changing the tables from read-write to read-only cannot be done with the MMU on, as the break-before-make sequence would invalidate the descriptor which resolves the level 3 page table where that very descriptor is located. This would make the translation required for writing the changes impossible, generating an MMU fault. The caches are also flushed. Signed-off-by: Petre-Ionut Tudor <petre-ionut.tudor@arm.com> Change-Id: Ibe5de307e6dc94c67d6186139ac3973516430466
2019-11-07 15:18:03 +00:00
ifeq (${ALLOW_RO_XLAT_TABLES}, 1)
ifeq (${ARCH},aarch32)
BL32_CPPFLAGS += -DPLAT_RO_XLAT_TABLES
Read-only xlat tables for BL31 memory This patch introduces a build flag which allows the xlat tables to be mapped in a read-only region within BL31 memory. It makes it much harder for someone who has acquired the ability to write to arbitrary secure memory addresses to gain control of the translation tables. The memory attributes of the descriptors describing the tables themselves are changed to read-only secure data. This change happens at the end of BL31 runtime setup. Until this point, the tables have read-write permissions. This gives a window of opportunity for changes to be made to the tables with the MMU on (e.g. reclaiming init code). No changes can be made to the tables with the MMU turned on from this point onwards. This change is also enabled for sp_min and tspd. To make all this possible, the base table was moved to .rodata. The penalty we pay is that now .rodata must be aligned to the size of the base table (512B alignment). Still, this is better than putting the base table with the higher level tables in the xlat_table section, as that would cost us a full 4KB page. Changing the tables from read-write to read-only cannot be done with the MMU on, as the break-before-make sequence would invalidate the descriptor which resolves the level 3 page table where that very descriptor is located. This would make the translation required for writing the changes impossible, generating an MMU fault. The caches are also flushed. Signed-off-by: Petre-Ionut Tudor <petre-ionut.tudor@arm.com> Change-Id: Ibe5de307e6dc94c67d6186139ac3973516430466
2019-11-07 15:18:03 +00:00
else # AArch64
BL31_CPPFLAGS += -DPLAT_RO_XLAT_TABLES
Read-only xlat tables for BL31 memory This patch introduces a build flag which allows the xlat tables to be mapped in a read-only region within BL31 memory. It makes it much harder for someone who has acquired the ability to write to arbitrary secure memory addresses to gain control of the translation tables. The memory attributes of the descriptors describing the tables themselves are changed to read-only secure data. This change happens at the end of BL31 runtime setup. Until this point, the tables have read-write permissions. This gives a window of opportunity for changes to be made to the tables with the MMU on (e.g. reclaiming init code). No changes can be made to the tables with the MMU turned on from this point onwards. This change is also enabled for sp_min and tspd. To make all this possible, the base table was moved to .rodata. The penalty we pay is that now .rodata must be aligned to the size of the base table (512B alignment). Still, this is better than putting the base table with the higher level tables in the xlat_table section, as that would cost us a full 4KB page. Changing the tables from read-write to read-only cannot be done with the MMU on, as the break-before-make sequence would invalidate the descriptor which resolves the level 3 page table where that very descriptor is located. This would make the translation required for writing the changes impossible, generating an MMU fault. The caches are also flushed. Signed-off-by: Petre-Ionut Tudor <petre-ionut.tudor@arm.com> Change-Id: Ibe5de307e6dc94c67d6186139ac3973516430466
2019-11-07 15:18:03 +00:00
ifeq (${SPD},tspd)
BL32_CPPFLAGS += -DPLAT_RO_XLAT_TABLES
Read-only xlat tables for BL31 memory This patch introduces a build flag which allows the xlat tables to be mapped in a read-only region within BL31 memory. It makes it much harder for someone who has acquired the ability to write to arbitrary secure memory addresses to gain control of the translation tables. The memory attributes of the descriptors describing the tables themselves are changed to read-only secure data. This change happens at the end of BL31 runtime setup. Until this point, the tables have read-write permissions. This gives a window of opportunity for changes to be made to the tables with the MMU on (e.g. reclaiming init code). No changes can be made to the tables with the MMU turned on from this point onwards. This change is also enabled for sp_min and tspd. To make all this possible, the base table was moved to .rodata. The penalty we pay is that now .rodata must be aligned to the size of the base table (512B alignment). Still, this is better than putting the base table with the higher level tables in the xlat_table section, as that would cost us a full 4KB page. Changing the tables from read-write to read-only cannot be done with the MMU on, as the break-before-make sequence would invalidate the descriptor which resolves the level 3 page table where that very descriptor is located. This would make the translation required for writing the changes impossible, generating an MMU fault. The caches are also flushed. Signed-off-by: Petre-Ionut Tudor <petre-ionut.tudor@arm.com> Change-Id: Ibe5de307e6dc94c67d6186139ac3973516430466
2019-11-07 15:18:03 +00:00
endif
endif
endif
ifeq (${USE_DEBUGFS},1)
BL31_CPPFLAGS += -DPLAT_XLAT_TABLES_DYNAMIC
endif
# Add support for platform supplied linker script for BL31 build
$(eval $(call add_define,PLAT_EXTRA_LD_SCRIPT))
ifneq (${BL2_AT_EL3}, 0)
override BL1_SOURCES =
endif
# Include Measured Boot makefile before any Crypto library makefile.
# Crypto library makefile may need default definitions of Measured Boot build
# flags present in Measured Boot makefile.
ifeq (${MEASURED_BOOT},1)
RSS_MEASURED_BOOT_MK := drivers/measured_boot/rss/rss_measured_boot.mk
$(info Including ${RSS_MEASURED_BOOT_MK})
include ${RSS_MEASURED_BOOT_MK}
BL1_SOURCES += ${MEASURED_BOOT_SOURCES}
BL2_SOURCES += ${MEASURED_BOOT_SOURCES}
endif
include plat/arm/board/common/board_common.mk
include plat/arm/common/arm_common.mk
ifeq (${MEASURED_BOOT},1)
BL1_SOURCES += plat/arm/board/fvp/fvp_common_measured_boot.c \
plat/arm/board/fvp/fvp_bl1_measured_boot.c \
lib/psa/measured_boot.c
BL2_SOURCES += plat/arm/board/fvp/fvp_common_measured_boot.c \
plat/arm/board/fvp/fvp_bl2_measured_boot.c \
lib/psa/measured_boot.c
PLAT_INCLUDES += -Iinclude/lib/psa
# RSS is not supported on FVP right now. Thus, we use the mocked version
# of PSA Measured Boot APIs. They return with success and hard-coded data.
PLAT_RSS_NOT_SUPPORTED := 1
endif
ifeq (${TRUSTED_BOARD_BOOT}, 1)
BL1_SOURCES += plat/arm/board/fvp/fvp_trusted_boot.c
BL2_SOURCES += plat/arm/board/fvp/fvp_trusted_boot.c
# FVP being a development platform, enable capability to disable Authentication
# dynamically if TRUSTED_BOARD_BOOT is set.
DYN_DISABLE_AUTH := 1
endif
# enable trace buffer control registers access to NS by default
ENABLE_TRBE_FOR_NS := 1
# enable branch record buffer control registers access in NS by default
# only enable for aarch64
# do not enable when ENABLE_RME=1
ifeq (${ARCH}, aarch64)
ifeq (${ENABLE_RME},0)
ENABLE_BRBE_FOR_NS := 1
endif
endif
# enable trace system registers access to NS by default
ENABLE_SYS_REG_TRACE_FOR_NS := 1
# enable trace filter control registers access to NS by default
ENABLE_TRF_FOR_NS := 1
ifeq (${SPMC_AT_EL3}, 1)
PLAT_BL_COMMON_SOURCES += plat/arm/board/fvp/fvp_el3_spmc.c
endif